Réponses aux demandes d'information

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. SSP/ASWJ

Sources indicate that the SSP is an anti-Shia [Shi'a, Shi'i, Shiite] organization (PIPS 2024-05-08, 52; US 2023-12-01, 2; Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 26) or a Deobandi group, a Sunni "sub-sect" that is "orthodox and often hardline" and "rejects Barelvi [a "Sunni sub-sect, believed to be Pakistan's largest"] and Shia beliefs and devotional practices around shrines as a form of idolatry" (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, i, 26). Sources note that the SSP emerged in 1985 in the Jhang district of Punjab under the leadership of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, who was killed in 1990 (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 2; TNS 2017-05-14). Sources state that the SSP split into the LeJ [see section 2 of this Response] and the "political" ASWJ (Al Jazeera 2018-07-06; Nelson 2018-02, 30). In an interview with the Research Directorate, Zia Ur Rehman, an independent journalist and researcher based in Islamabad who has written about militant groups in Pakistan, noted that the ASWJ is a political party and is also known as the Rah-e-Haq [Rah-i-Haq] party (PRHP) (Rehman 2024-12-04). A 2015 article in the Pakistani news source The News on Sunday (TNS) about the origins of the PRHP party, written by Rehman, notes that the PRHP was founded in Peshawar by a former SSP leader in February 2012; a Peshawar journalist was quoted as stating that "'the PRHP is a political front of the ASWJ'" (2015-05-31).

Media sources indicate that the Pakistani government lifted its ban on the ASWJ in 2018 (The Guardian 2020-10-21; The Express Tribune 2018-06-27). However, a 2018 New York Times article, co-written by Rehman, notes that the ASWJ remained on a Pakistan National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) "watch list"; however, an ASWJ leader and "several others" named on the list were allowed to run in that year's elections (The New York Times 2018-07-17). A list of organizations "[p]roscribed" by Pakistan's Ministry of Interior, updated as of 6 October 2024 and published by NACTA, includes both the SSP and ASWJ (Pakistan 2024-10-06).

1.1 Leadership, Structure, and Objectives

Sources indicate that [Muhammad (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 3)] Ahmed Ludhianvi is the ASWJ leader (Dawn 2023-12-24; Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 3; The Express Tribune 2018-06-27), and became the leader in 2009 (The Express Tribune 2018-06-27). A 2018 New York Times article notes that Aurangzeb Farooqi is a leader of the ASWJ and Ludhianvi's deputy (2018-07-17). The Express Tribune, a Pakistani newspaper, indicates that Taj Muhammad Hanfi is the ASWJ General Secretary (2024-08-11).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, an author, who focuses on counterterrorism and who has written a book on suicide bombers in Pakistan, stated that the SSP/ASWJ has a "clear organization[al] structure with central leadership, with assigned people who are responsible [for] media and finances" (Author 2024-11-29). According to estimates by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), there are between 3,000 and 6,000 SSP/ASWJ members (US 2023-12-01, 2).

Sources indicate that the objectives of the SSP/ASWJ are reforming Pakistan into a Sunni state, declaring all Shia as kafirs (non-believers) (UK 2024-04-26; TNS 2017-05-14), and "participat[ing] in the destruction of other religions, notably Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism" (UK 2024-04-26).

1.2 Activities

A 2020 Guardian article notes that "over the past two years," the ASWJ was "allowed to assemble, make public anti-Shia speeches, carry out rallies, run for political office and mobilise against the Shia community" (2020-10-21). Rehman, however, stated that the ASWJ has become "much weaker" (2024-12-04).

Sources indicate that the ASWJ ran candidates in the 2018 Pakistan election under the PRHP [or as independents (Reuters 2018-07-21)] (Dawn 2023-10-29; Reuters 2018-07-21) in Punjab and in other regions, including Karachi (Dawn 2023-10-29). The website of the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab notes that there was one PRHP party member, Muhammad Moavia, who was elected to the Provincial Assembly's 2018–2023 term (Punjab n.d.). The same website indicates that no candidate from the PRHP party was elected in the 2024 Punjab election (Punjab [2024]).

An article in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, written by Rehman, notes that Ludhianvi and Farooqi were allowed to run in the 2018 and 2024 general election after they were removed from the Fourth Schedule, a list of individuals who are banned under the Anti-Terrorism Act and who face restrictions, including suspension of their bank accounts and passports (Dawn 2024-10-16). International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) states that Ludhianvi was removed from the Fourth Schedule a month before the 2018 elections as a "reward" for "dissuading other militants from attacking the state" by issuing a fatwa (edict) warning against "'insurrectionary acts against the government and armed forces of Pakistan'" (2022-09-05, 3, 4).

Sources note the following incidents involving members of the ASWJ:

• The Express Tribune notes that in Karachi "[u]nknown assailants" shot at the vehicle of ASWJ General Secretary Hanfi; the article cites an ASWJ spokesperson who indicated that Hanfi and the other passengers were "unharmed" (2024-08-11).
• Dissent Today [1] indicates that following the arrest of Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister and chairman of the Tehreek-e-Insaft (PTI) party, the ASWJ held a rally in Karachi in May 2023 supporting the armed forces after PTI supporters "storm[ed] military installations" (2023-05-19). For additional information on the removal and arrest of Imran Khan, see Response to Information Request PAK201759 of January 2024. For additional information on political parties in Pakistan, see Response to Information Request PAK200860 of January 2022.
• The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) [2] states that on 7 September 2023, a Shia mourning procession in the Sanghar District in Sindh was blocked by ASWJ operatives, leading to an attack that resulted in "at least" 11 people injured (2023-09-18).

1.3 Areas of Operation

The US CRS indicates that the SSP/ASWJ is based "mainly" in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) [3], Punjab, and Karachi (US 2023-12-01, 2). In his interview with the Research Directorate, Rehman stated that the ASWJ operates in Karachi, Quetta in Balochistan, parts of Punjab, including Lahore, as well as Peshawar and Kurram districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2024-12-04). The author stated that the ASWJ has a political base in its "stronghold" of Jhang district in Punjab (Author 2024-11-29). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an associate professor of security and strategy studies at the National Defence College of the United Arab Emirates, who has written about the TTP, stated that the ASWJ/SSP is "active" in Punjab and Sindh, "particularly in Jhang and Karachi, where it has both militant and political influence" (Associate Professor 2024-12-10).

2. LeJ

Sources indicates that the LeJ emerged in 1996 as a "separate militant wing" (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 2) or "armed faction" (PIPS 2024-05-08, 52) of the SSP (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 2; PIPS 2024-05-08, 52). The list of organizations "[p]roscribed" by the Ministry of Interior, updated as of 6 October 2024 and published by NACTA, includes both the LeJ and LeJ Al-Almi [Al Alami] (LeJ A) (Pakistan 2024-10-06). Sources indicate that the LeJ A is an LeJ splinter group (The Jamestown Foundation 2017-01-27; RFE/RL 2017-01-23).

2.1 Leadership, Structure, and Objectives

Rehman indicated that "most" of the LeJ's leaders have been killed (2024-12-04). Sources note the following about Yousuf Mansoor Khurasani [also known as Syed Safdar Shah (The Jamestown Foundation 2017-01-27)]:

• He is the LeJ leader (Australia [2018])
• He is the LeJ A leader (RFE/RL 2017-01-23; The Jamestown Foundation 2017-01-27)
• He reorganized the LeJ A network (Sayed & Jadoon 2023-03-30).

Sources note that following a "crackdown" by Pakistan authorities, the LeJ split into various factions (The Jamestown Foundation 2017-01-27; RFE/RL 2017-01-23). Sources indicated that the LeJ is decentralized and has cells that operate independently (Author 2024-11-29; Associate Professor 2024-12-10). The national security website of the Australian Department of Home Affairs notes that the LeJ "typically operate[s] in small cells," "usually" with 5 to 8 operatives in each cell (Australia [2018]). According to sources, LeJ membership is estimated "in the low hundreds" (US 2023-12-01, 2; Australia [2018]).

A Dawn article written by Rehman indicates that the Balochistan chapter of the LeJ splintered in 2015, with a faction joining the Islamic State – Khorasan Province [ISIS-K, IS-K, Daesh-Khorasan] (ISKP) [4] and another faction joining the TTP in 2021 (Dawn 2023-10-03). The author indicated that after 2001, one faction of the LeJ connected with Al-Qaida; later, when the Islamic State (IS) [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Daesh] emerged in Pakistan, LeJ provided fighters to IS (Author 2024-11-29).

Sources indicate that the objectives of the LeJ are to establish a Sunni state in Pakistan through "violent means" (PIPS 2024-05-08, 52; Australia [2018]), to declare Shia as non-Muslims (PIPS 2024-05-08, 52) or non-believers, and to kill Shias, Jews, Christians, and other minorities (Australia [2018]).

2.2 Activities

Sources indicated that the LeJ has become "very weakened" (Rehman 2024-12-04) or that its activities have "declined considerably" (Author 2024-11-29). The author, interviewed in November 2024, noted that "of late" the LeJ has not conducted "prominent attacks of sectarian nature" (2024-11-29). Similarly, Rehman stated that the LeJ is not conducting attacks "[t]hese days," except for the factions that merged with the ISKP, which continues to attack Shias, "[m]ainly" in Balochistan and Peshawar (2024-12-04).

In contrast, a report on Pakistan militant groups by the PAK Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) [5] notes that while "for a period" LeJ leadership and activities were "effectively decimated," some LeJ factions "seem to be regaining activity" (2024-05-08, 52). The same source notes that, in 2023, LeJ factions "[p]rimarily" attacked the Shia and Hazara communities, including 4 incidents in Balochistan, 1 incident in Karachi, and another in Gilgit-Baltistan, which led to 16 killed and 27 injured; among these, the "most severe" was an attack on a bus in December 2023 in Chilas, Gilgit-Baltistan, which resulted in 10 killed and 26 injured (PIPS 2024-05-08, 52–53). However, according to 2023 media sources, no group claimed responsibility for that attack (AFP 2023-12-03; Al Jazeera 2023-12-08). Dawn, without providing further details, notes that security forces in Gilgit-Baltistan killed a "local terrorist commander" during an "intelligence-based operation" conducted against suspects involved in the Chilas bus attack (2024-07-05).

2.3 Areas of Operation

Sources indicate that in Pakistan, the LeJ operates principally in the former FATA, the provinces of Punjab and Balochistan, and in Karachi; the group also operates in Afghanistan (US 2023-12-01, 2; Australia 2022-01-25, para. 2.41). According to Rehman, the LeJ operates in Karachi, Quetta (Balochistan), parts of Punjab, including Lahore, as well as the Peshawar and Kurram districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2024-12-04). The Associate Professor stated that the LeJ is "most active" in Balochistan, Punjab, and Karachi, especially "targeting Shia-majority areas" (2024-12-10).

3. TTP

Sources indicate that the TTP formed in 2007 as an "umbrella" group of "militant" organizations (Sayed & Hamming 2023-05, 1; Sevea 2023-02-07, 1). Sources describe the TTP as the "deadliest terrorist group operating in Pakistan" that has conducted "numerous mass-casualty attacks" (US 2023-12-01, 2) or the "most prominent" of Pakistan's "domestic jihadist groups" that is responsible for "some of Pakistan's most notorious terrorist attacks" (Australia 2022-01-25, para. 2.39). The TTP is included in the list of organizations "[p]roscribed" by the Ministry of Interior, updated as of 6 October 2024 and published by NACTA (Pakistan 2024-10-06).

Sources indicate that the TTP is close to the Afghan Taliban (PIPS 2024-05-08, 66; Sayed & Hamming 2023-05, 1). Sources state that the TTP is distinct from the Afghan Taliban (Sevea 2023-02-07, 1; Australia 2022-01-25, para. 2.39). However, the US CRS notes that in late 2023 Pakistani officials "accused the Afghan Taliban of directly controlling the TTP" (US 2023-12-01, 2).

According to PIPS, the TTP is close to Al-Qaida and factions of "some" Central Asian groups; it is also connected to various groups in Punjab, Karachi, Balochistan, and the Pakistani "tribal belt," with 42 "militant groups" joining the TTP in "recent years" (2024-05-08, 66). Similarly, an article by Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming [6] published in the CTC Sentinel, a journal from the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the West Point US Military Academy, indicates that "smaller militant groups" have merged with the TTP, including 21 in 2021, 12 in 2022, and 8 in the first four months of 2023 (Sayed & Hamming 2023-05, 3).

Sources note that the TTP [leadership (US 2023-12-01)] fled to Afghanistan after the Pakistani government's operations against the group in 2014 (PIPS 2024-05-08, 55; US 2023-12-01), which led to the "dismantl[ing]" of the TTP from its "stronghold" in the former FATA (PIPS 2024-05-08, 55).

Sources state that since the Taliban gained control in Afghanistan in 2021, the TTP

• has "increased" attacks in Pakistan (Australia 2022-01-25, para. 2.40)
• has "reviv[ed]" its "militant campaign" (Sevea 2023-02-07, 1)
• has "obtained new[,] more sophisticated weapons," moved fighters from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and refocused on "its war against the Pakistani state" (Sayed & Hamming 2023-05, 1).

3.1 Leadership, Structure, and Objectives

Sources indicate that the following individuals are among the leadership of the TTP:

• Leader: Noor Wali Mehsud (UN 2024-07-22, para. 81; PIPS 2024-05-08, 58)
• Deputy: Qari Amjad [Ali (PIPS 2024-05-08, 58)] (UN 2024-07-22, para. 81; PIPS 2024-05-08, 58)
• Deputy: Mufti Hazrat (PIPS 2024-05-08, 58)
• Central Spokesperson: Muhammad Khurasani (PIPS 2024-05-08, 58).

Sayed and Hamming cite the TTP's Umar Media "propaganda outlet" as indicating that the TTP reorganized into a centralized structure with "shadow provinces and central organizational units responsible for key portfolios" (2023-05, 4, 6). PIPS states that the TTP made new appointments in 2024, including "governors for 12 shadow provinces, ministers for eight ministries and two military commissions"; a detailed list of these appointments is available in the PIPS report, which is available online (PIPS 2024-05-08, 59–63).

According to UN estimates, the TTP has 6,000 to 6,500 fighters, with "approximately" 14,000 family members (UN 2024-07-22, para. 81). Citing its interviews with a Peshawar-based journalist and with the head of the Pakistan Counter Terrorism Department in Punjab, PIPS estimates that there are between 15,000 and 20,000 TTP members in Pakistan and Afghanistan (2024-05-08, 57). According to the US CRS, the TTP is "largely" made up of Pashtun individuals (US 2023-12-01, 2).

The US CRS notes that the objective of the TTP is to defeat the Pakistani government and impose Sharia law in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (US 2023-12-01). In a July 2021 video interview with CNN, with English translation by CNN, TTP leader Mehsud stated that the TTP aims to "take control of the Pakistani tribal border regions and make them independent" (CNN 2021-07, 1:25–1:33).

3.2 Activities

The Associate Professor stated that the TTP conducts suicide bombings and attacks security forces and civilians, including educational institution workers and polio vaccination teams (2024-12-10). According to a UN letter dated May 2023, the TTP had conducted "more than" 100 attacks against Pakistan since 28 November 2022 when the end of the ceasefire [7] was announced (UN 2023-06-01, para. 53). PIPS notes that the TTP was "the major actor of violence" in 2023 and was responsible for "almost half of the total terrorist attacks" recorded in Pakistan, with "most" occurring in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2024-05-08, 29). The same source provides the following table which provides figures on TTP attacks conducted between 1 January 2021 and 15 April 2024:

(PIPS 2024-05-08, 63–64)

3.3 Areas of Operation

According to the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), an Islamabad-based think tank and advocacy organization that aims to "rationalize" the national conversation "over extremism and sectarianism" (CRSS 2024-02-19, 45), the TTP is based in the South Waziristan Agency of the former FATA, but has "influence" in all four provinces in Pakistan through local chapters led by commanders who support the TTP's objectives (2024-08-20, 12). Rehman stated that the TTP operates in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2024-12-04). The author indicated that the TTP has "hide outs" in the former FATA, but "most" of their attacks take place in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including in the districts adjacent to Waziristan; additionally, the TTP has "a lot of sleeper cells" in Karachi (Author 2024-11-29). The Associate Professor observed that while the TTP operates "primarily" in the former FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan, it also conducts attacks in urban regions, including Peshawar, Islamabad, and Karachi (2024-12-10).

4. Relationships Between the LeJ, SSP/ASWJ, and TTP

Citing a 2008 statement by a former TTP spokesperson, CRSS notes that the TTP has connections with the LeJ and SSP (2024-08-20, 12). According to the author, the LeJ, SSP/ASWJ, and TTP share a "sectarian bond," as they are Deobandi groups and have "common enem[ies]," that is, the US and governments that are perceived as US allies (Author 2024-11-29). In contrast, the Associate Professor noted that there is "no evidence" of the TTP collaborating with other sectarian organizations (2024-12-10).

Rehman indicated that while the ASWJ and LeJ do not publicize their relationship, they are "interlinked" (2024-12-04). Sources note that the SSP and LeJ have a "close" relationship, with LeJ members visiting SSP premises, including "madrasas" (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 2; PIPS 2024-05-08, 52) or mosques (Crisis Group 2022-09-05, 2). According to a Crisis Group interview with a "former intelligence official," the ASWJ assists the LeJ, including by "'intimidat[ing]'" Shia witnesses testifying in LeJ "terrorism trials" (2022-09-05, 3).

Citing interviews with senior police and intelligence officers in Lahore and Islamabad in April 2022, Crisis Group indicates that "[m]any" low level LeJ members joined "like-minded Deobandi groups," including the TTP, following the "decimat[ion]" of the LeJ leadership by authorities (2022-09-05, 6). According to an article written by Rehman in the Pakistani online newspaper The Friday Times (TFT), citing the TTP's Umar media channel, a faction of the Karachi chapter of the LeJ led by Naeem Bukhari pledged allegiance to the TTP on 6 September 2024 (TFT 2024-09-17).

5. Profiles of Individuals and Institutions Targeted or Likely to be Targeted, Including Polio Vaccine Workers

According to PIPS, since 2021 Pakistan has faced an increase in "terrorist violence" (2024-05-08, 26). CRSS notes that "terror attacks" against security forces have increased for 3 consecutive years since 2021, with "nearly" 300 attacks and "over" 500 fatalities recorded in 2023, the "deadliest year" in "nearly a decade" (2024-02-19, 13).

PIPS provides the following statistics on the targets of "[t]errorist [a]ttacks" in 2023:

(PIPS 2024-05-08, 27-28)

CRSS provides the following data on the "[c]asualties" of "[t]errorism" by "[m]ilitant" groups [9] in 2023:

5.1 Targets of the ASWJ/SSP, LeJ, and TTP

The Associate Professor noted that the ASWJ targets Shias, as well as individuals who oppose Sunni Deobandi ideology (2024-12-10).

The Associate Professor stated that the LeJ "predominantly" targets Shia individuals and institutions, such as places of worships, processions and community leaders (2024-12-10). The author indicated that the LeJ was initially only focused on Shia targets; however, "over the last decade," the group has also focused on Christians and Western targets (Author 2024-11-29). Rehman noted that while the LeJ "[p]rimarily" targets Shia and Sufi shrines, the ISKP, which includes some factions of the LeJ, targets Shias and Christians (2024-12-04).

Sources indicate that since the Afghan Taliban gained control of Afghanistan, TTP attacks are focused on the Pakistani security forces, as their past attacks on civilians caused them to lose popular support (Author 2024-11-29; Rehman 2024-12-04; Sayed & Hamming 2023-05, 3, 5–6). Rehman noted that the TTP is not "claiming any attacks on civilians" (2024-12-04). The same source added that the TTP targets "security forces, police officers guarding polio vaccine workers, military linked politicians" and businesspeople who refuse to pay extortion; however, there have been no attacks on NGOs "lately" (Rehman 2024-12-04). The Associate Professor stated that the TTP targets "security forces, government officials, educational institutions (especially those promoting women's education), journalists, and polio vaccination workers" (2024-12-10). PIPS provides the following statistics on the targets of TTP attacks between 1 January 2021 and 15 April 2024:

(PIPS 2024-05-08, 64)

5.2 Polio Vaccine Workers

Sources indicate that the polio vaccine program in Pakistan has been affected by "serious insecurity" (IMB 2024-09, 13) or is "regularly marred by violence" (AP 2024-09-12). An August 2024 Al Jazeera article notes that "[i]n recent years," the TTP has killed health workers and security forces in northern Pakistan (2024-08-31). Quoting the WHO director of polio eradication, the same source adds that "'[o]ver the last few years'," security forces protecting the vaccination team have been targeted (Al Jazeera 2024-08-31). A report published in September 2024 by the Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) [10], which provides independent analysis of the progress made by the GPEI, notes that 15 police officers have been killed while assisting with polio vaccination since July 2023 (IMB 2024-09, 11, 12).

Sources note that in October 2024 "unidentified gunmen" attacked a team of polio vaccine workers in Orakzai district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killing ["at least" (Reuters 2024-10-29)] one police officer (Reuters 2024-10-29; EFE 2024-10-29). Sources indicate that in November 2024 a bomb targeting police officers guarding polio vaccine workers in Mastung, Balochistan, killed 9 people, including 5 children and 1 police officer, and injured others; no group claimed responsibility for the attack (Al Jazeera 2024-11-01; AP 2024-11-01).

Sources report that attacks against polio vaccine workers have been carried out for the following reasons:

• US authorities used polio vaccine workers to track Osama Bin Laden (Author 2024-11-29; The Guardian 2024-09-17)
• ["falsely portraying" that (Reuters 2024-10-29)] the vaccine is used to sterilize Muslims (Author 2024-11-29) or children (Reuters 2024-10-29).

The author stated that threats against polio vaccine workers remain "pretty high," particularly in rural areas in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Author 2024-11-29). The same source added that the workers are targeted when they are on duty; they will not be attacked when they return home and not "every" worker is on the target list (Author 2024-11-29). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.3 High-Profile Targets

Information on high-profile targets was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The author indicated that the high-profile targets of the TTP are officials working in counterterrorism as they are viewed as "legitimate combatants from an insurgent perspective" (Author 2024-11-29). According to sources, the TTP published guidelines in 2018 directing its members to limit "martyrdom operations" [suicide bombings (The National 2018-10-30)] to "'extremely'" (Jadoon & Mahmood 2018-12, 23) or "'very'" (The National 2018-10-30) "important targets" (Jadoon & Mahmood 2018-12, 23; The National 2018-10-30). A December 2018 article by Amira Jadoon and Sara Mahmood [11] published in the CTC Sentinel further states that while the 2018 TTP guidelines do not provide a definition of an "important target," it "likely refers to attacks on hardened targets such as the military or police" (Jadoon & Mahmood 2018-12, 23).

6. Ability to Track Targeted Individuals

The Associate Professor stated the following:

[The] TTP, LeJ, and ASWJ/SSP have demonstrated the capability to track individuals across Pakistan, even in urban centres like Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad. They rely on a combination of local informants, sympathizers, and extensive networks. Their decentralized structures and use of sleeper cells make them adept at monitoring and executing attacks against targets who have relocated. (2024-12-10)

Rehman indicated that the tracking capacity of militant groups varies from target to target; persons who are accused of blasphemy or of siding with the military, as well as persons who are being covered by the media will be tracked and "harm[ed]" (2024-12-04).

The author indicated that "[o]f late," there have been no attacks where the TTP "hunted" people beyond their "stronghold" in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Author 2024-11-29).

7. State Response

The Associate Professor stated that

[t]he government provides security personnel, safe houses, and relocation services for high-profile targets. Intelligence agencies also monitor militant groups' activities to pre-empt attacks. But as can been seen from the success of such terrorist groups, such measures are insufficient. (2024-12-10)

The author noted that the state "rarely" provides protection, except for "politically exposed civilians" who are affiliated with a government body or political party (Author 2024-11-29). The same source stated that high profile civilians, including those who are targeted by the LeJ, and "ordinary" civilians arrange for their own protection as there is a "trust deficit" of the government; for example, when there is a mass gathering of the Shia community, the "first tier" of protection comes from within that community followed by the government (Author 2024-11-29). According to Rehman, "[e]ven the security forces cannot protect themselves" (2024-12-04).

Crisis Group notes that the state response against sectarian killings, including by the LeJ, is "largely reactive and often focused … on lethal force" (2022-09-05, 18). Similarly, PIPS notes that Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy employs "hard approaches" that yield short term success, but cannot be sustained as "more" will replace those who have been eliminated without the root cause of extremism being addressed (2024-05-08, 99). Quoting a "former police inspector general who remains closely involved in policy dialogue," Crisis Group notes that "'Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy has seen some successes, but violent extremism in society has risen'" (2022-09-05, 18–19).

According to an Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report, the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is "alleged to have high-level links with militant groups, including the Taliban," and "tolerate[s] their presence in Pakistan as a hedge against India and Afghanistan" (Australia 2022-01-25, para 5.5). Citing interviews with a "former counter-terrorism official," Crisis Group notes that security agencies continue to engage with the ASWJ, intending to gain their support in dissuading other militants from attacking the state (2022-09-05, 4).

Crisis Group notes that "[i]n some cases" the state has been "hesitant" to act against sectarian mobilization related to blasphemy (2022-09-05, 18). Australia's DFAT cites "[m]ultiple interlocutors" as indicating that the "government overlooked religious extremism to avoid antagonising powerful religious lobbies" (Australia 2022-01-25, para. 3.31).

CRSS provides the following data on the arrests of LeJ, SSP, and TTP "[m]ilitants" in 2023:

(CRSS 2024-02-19, 22)

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Dissent Today is a "progressive" media platform focusing on the "stories of individuals from authoritarian countries who have been forced into exile due to their views, as well as the challenges they face after their relocation" (Dissent Today n.d.).

[2] The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly newsletter whose focus includes "terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare" in South Asia and is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM) (SATP n.d.). The ICM is a "non-profit [s]ociety" "committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security" in South Asia whose projects also include the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a database on terrorism (SATP n.d.).

[3] The former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were a "swathe of territory along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border," which now are part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Australia 2022-01-25, para. 2.25).

[4] A Dawn article written by Zia Ur Rehman indicates that the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the Pakistan "local affiliate" of the Islamic State (IS) (Dawn 2023-10-03).

[5] The PAK Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is an Islamabad-based research and advocacy organization focusing on conflict analysis and prevention and countering "violent extremism" (PIPS 2024-05-08, 123). Data in its report on militant groups in Pakistan was collected between June 2023 and February 2024 from primary sources, including "over" 150 interviews with "scholars, journalists, community leaders and representatives, religious parties and groups, security officials, civil society organizations focusing on relevant issues, as well as security and militancy experts," as well as secondary sources (PIPS 2024-05-08, 2–3).

[6] Abdul Sayed is an "independent researcher on jihadism and the politics and security of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region"; Tore Hamming is a senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King's College in the UK (Sayed & Hamming 2023-05, 1).

[7] Sources indicate that the TTP announced a ceasefire in June 2022 after negotiations with the Pakistan government brokered by the Afghan Taliban; however, the ceasefire ended in November 2022 (RFE/RL 2022-12-31; The Express Tribune 2022-11-30).

[8] The Guardian describes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a Chinese investment program to create a "crucial trade route" in Pakistan (2015-04-20).

[9] The Center for Research Security Studies (CRSS) report separates "terrorism" incidents into two categories, "militancy and insurgency," with the LeJ, SSP, and TTP falling under the former category (2024-02-19, 22, 23).

[10] The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is a "public-private partnership" aiming to eradicate polio "led by national governments with six partners," including the WHO, Rotary International, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), UNICEF, the Gates Foundation, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (GPEI n.d.).

[11] Amira Jadoon [was] an assistant professor at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) and Department of Social Sciences at West Point US Military Academy and Sara Mahmood is a senior analyst at the International Center for Political Violence & Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore (Jadoon & Mahmood 2018-12, 21).

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Assistant professor at a university in Pakistan who has written on sectarian militants in Pakistan; assistant professor at a university in the US who has written about the LeJ; associate professor at a university in Singapore who has written about the TTP; fellow at US think tank who has written on extremism in Pakistan; International Crisis Group; research associate at an university in the UK who focuses on politics and military affairs of South Asia; senior associate fellow at a university in Singapore who has written about militants in Pakistan.

Internet sites, including: ACAPS; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project; Atlantic Council; Center for Strategic and International Studies; The Diplomat; Factiva; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; Jane's Country Risk Daily Report; The New Indian Express; Nanyang Technological University – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; Safeguarding Health in Conflict; Stanford University – Mapping Militant Project; US – National Counterterrorism Center; Voice of America; Wilson Center.