Colombia: Security situation, including crime and kidnappings; measures taken by the government to combat crime (2021–July 2023)
1. Overview
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a "disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project" on political violence and protests around the world, Colombia's security situation "continued to deteriorate" in 2022 and was characterized by "worsening political violence and increasing violence against civilians" (ACLED 2023-02-08). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that non-state armed groups "continued" to spread and fragment in 2022 and are now present in "at least" 44 percent of municipalities (UN 2023-06-09, 35). Human Rights Watch (HRW) states that, in 2022, the violence by armed groups had reached levels "similar" to those immediately before the 2016 peace process (2023-01-12, 162). The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz & Reconciliación, Pares), an organization involved in research and critical analysis to support democracy, peace and equity in Colombia (Pares n.d.), states that between 7 August and 14 November 2022 (the first 100 days of the new administration under President Gustavo Petro), [translation] "massacres" peaked for the year, with 16 separate incidents in August (Pares 2022-11-15, 5, 10, 11).
In a 2022 article on security in Colombia, Adam Isacson, the Director for the Defense Oversight program at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) [1] (WOLA n.d.b), notes that, aside from the US, Colombia has the largest army in the Western Hemisphere, but the country is "no more secure than its neighbors" (Isacson 2022-09-30).
1.1. Armed and Criminal Groups
HRW indicates that "[n]umerous" armed groups are present in Colombia (HRW 2023-01-12, 162). US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022 states that along with drug traffickers, armed groups
were reported as significant perpetrators of human rights abuses and violent crimes, including acts of extrajudicial and unlawful killings, extortion, and other abuses or crimes, such as kidnapping, torture, human trafficking, bombings, restrictions on freedom of movement, sexual violence, unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers, and threats of violence against journalists, women, human rights defenders, and religious leaders. (US 2023-03-20, 2)
Sources report that armed groups fund themselves through drug trafficking, illegal mining (HRW 2023-01-12, 162; DW 2023-03-16), and extortion (DW 2023-03-16).
According to a white paper published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), "a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization" based in Washington, DC (CSIS n.d.), and written by R. Evan Ellis, a senior associate with CSIS's Americas Program, armed groups in Colombia "have become increasingly fragmented in recent years," "in part" due to operations targeting the groups' leaders under the previous government of Iván Duque, though the "more established groups have not significantly diminished [in] overall strength" (Ellis 2023-02, 3).
In its humanitarian report on Colombia for 2022, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) indicates, without specifying the regions affected, that violence resulting from territorial conflicts "intensified" in "several parts" of the country, but in other areas government-armed group "clashes" decreased in the second half of the year (2023-03-08, 5).
1.2 Political Situation
Sources report that President Gustavo Petro took office in August 2022 (UN 2023-02-27, para. 3; HRW 2023-01-12, 162). The same sources add that Petro's vice president, Francia Márquez, is a human rights defender (UN 2023-02-27, para. 3) or an environmental leader (HRW 2023-01-12, 162). Sources note that she is the country's first Afro-Colombian vice president (HRW 2023-01-12, 162; Amnesty International 2023-03-27, 129). A CNN article indicates that Petro is the leader of the Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico) coalition, a group of [translation] "leftist and social democratic parties and movements" (CNN 2022-06-09). However, sources report that in April (Reuters 2023-04-25) or mid-May 2023 (International Crisis Group 2023-05), the governing coalition broke down (Reuters 2023-04-25; International Crisis Group 2023-05). Colombia Reports, a non-profit news source based in Colombia (Colombia Reports n.d.), indicates that Petro subsequently reorganized his cabinet and announced that the new cabinet will continue to govern (Colombia Reports 2023-04-27).
2. Crime
InSight Crime, a media organization and think tank focused on organized crime in the Americas (InSight Crime n.d.), notes, based on National Police (Policía Nacional) statistics, that Colombia's homicide rate was 26.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2022, the third highest in Latin America (InSight Crime 2023-02-08). In a report assessing the success of the Government of Colombia's Total Peace agenda, Pares reports that homicides in Colombia have been increasing over the last few years, with 21,870 cases in 2020, 25,530 cases in 2021, and 25,850 cases in 2022 (Pares 2023-04-03). Pares adds that while the overall homicide rate did not increase significantly between 2021 and 2022, [translation] "some" departments saw homicides increase "considerably"; Arauca, for example, had 190 homicides in 2021 and 398 in 2022, a reflection of clashes between organized armed groups in that region (Pares 2023-04-03).
Luis Eduardo Romero Anturi, a forensic medicine specialist and Coordinator for [Colombia's] National Group for Forensic Pathology, citing 2021 statistics from Colombia's National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, INMLCF), states that of the 5,383 homicides for which the institute had information, 416 were the result of [translation] "common crime" and 408 were committed by members of illegal or organized crime groups, while in 3,410 cases the perpetrator was unknown [to the victim] (Romero Anturi 2023-01, 99).
2.1 Kidnappings
Media sources report that kidnapping statistics in Colombia are the highest they have been in the last ten years (Semana 2023-06-17; Infobae 2023-06-17). National Police statistics for January to May 2023 record 152 individuals kidnapped across 19 [of 32] departments, with the worst-hit regions being Antioquia (22 cases), Norte de Santander (17 cases), Cundinamarca [including Bogotá] (14 cases), Valle (12 cases) and Cauca (11 cases) (Colombia 2023-06-05a). For comparison, the National Police recorded 57 individuals kidnapped over that same period in 2022 (Colombia 2023-01-06a). Semana, a Spanish-language magazine in Colombia, reports that the areas most affected by kidnapping are those where the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), the Gulf Clan [also known as the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, AGC), Los Urabeños, and Clan Úsuga], and the dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) [also called Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP] have an [translation] "extensive" presence—i.e., Antioquia, Norte de Santander, Cauca and Arauca (Semana 2023-06-17). Infobae, a Spanish-language news source from Argentina (The Washington Post 2016-06-08), similarly reports that the prevalence of kidnapping points to the [translation] "major presence" of illegal armed groups, such as FARC dissidents, the Gulf Clan and the ELN, noting that kidnapping for ransom is among these groups' main sources of income (Infobae 2023-06-17). US Country Reports 2022 states, citing the Ministry of Defence, that of 75 kidnappings from 1 January to 31 July 2022, 17 were "attributed" to the ELN and the rest were "attributed" to other armed groups (2023-03-20, 15). Infobae notes that the [translation] "majority" of kidnapping targets are businesspeople and public figures (2023-06-17). Semana states that [translation] "most" kidnappings are for ransom (2023-06-17).
3. Victims of Crime
Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany's international public broadcaster, reports that, for armed groups, clashes with security forces [translation] "are no longer the norm," noting that the "majority" of the 372 "massacres" since 2017 have been against civilians or between armed groups (DW 2023-03-16). Discussing Cauca department, ACLED states that 80 percent of fatalities in 2022 were "civilians directly targeted by armed groups"; the "most vulnerable" populations were farmers, workers, and Colombians from the Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities (2023-02-08). The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) similarly indicates that Colombians of Indigenous and African descent and "peasant leadership" are "severely affect[ed]" by armed group violence, as are women, girls, and "members of the LGBTIQ+ community" (UN 2023-02-27, para. 10). For further information on the situation of Afro-Colombians, see Response to Information Request COL201565 of August 2023.
The information in the following paragraph was provided in an article by Pares:
The frequency of social leaders being killed has been trending upwards since 2021. In 2022, there were 180 victims, a 32 percent increase over 2021, and in the first four months of 2023, 58 leaders were killed. Of the 2022 murders, 60 percent occurred in the Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, Putumayo, Arauca and Valle del Cauca departments. [translation] "Post-FARC armed groups" and the Gulf Clan are together responsible for 82 percent of cases (Pares 2023-05-23).
Ellis states that, due to the "exodus" from Venezuela to Colombia, Venezuelans have "increasing[ly]" been recruited or exploited by armed groups, including "for forced labor, prostitution, and other activities" (Ellis 2023-02, 3). In a report on Venezuelan migrants, International Crisis Group similarly indicates that migrants and refugees have "become prime targets" for recruitment by criminal groups; young migrant women and girls "in particular" are being trafficked and sexually exploited by organized crime "networks" (2022-08-09, 12, 19). According to the Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, CODHES), a civil society organization that promotes democracy, human rights, and peacebuilding (CODHES n.d.), [translation] "official figures" from the National Police indicate that between 1 January and 30 June 2021, 362 Venezuelans died by homicide in Colombia (CODHES 2021-10, 7). The National Police recorded 6,806 total homicide victims during that same time period (Colombia 2023-01-05).
4. Geography of Crime
According to an article by Andrés González Díaz [2], in 2022 the regions with the highest homicide rates were those where armed groups are fighting for control of territory or where drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, and smuggling occurred (González Díaz [2022-12]). The same source indicates that the violence in 2022 was [translation] "especially concentrated" in Putumayo, Cauca, Chocó, Guaviare, and Valle del Cauca, as well as in Arauca (González Díaz [2022-12]). ACLED describes Colombia's Pacific Coast region and its border with Venezuela as "epicenters of conflict," due to the presence of armed groups, with a "particular concentration of violence" in the departments of Cauca, Antioquia, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca (2023-02-08). ACAPS, an "independent" organization that provides "humanitarian data and analysis" (ACAPS n.d.), states that in 2022, armed conflicts have caused an increase in forced displacements, mobility restrictions, and forced confinements for departments in the Catatumbo and Amazon regions as well as along the Pacific and Caribbean coasts (ACAPS 2023-01-13, 3).
Pares states that, although killings of community leaders occurred in 29 of 32 Colombian departments in 2022, such killings were most [translation] "concentrat[ed]" in six departments: Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, Putumayo, Arauca, and Valle del Cauca (2023-04-03).
Ellis indicates that illegal mining is "concentrated" in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó and "to a lesser degree" in the mountains of southwestern Colombia (2023-02, 3).
ACAPS notes that Caquetá, Cesar, Guaviare, La Guajira, and Putumayo "have seen an increase in targeted killings, massacres, forced confinements, and antipersonnel mine (APM) and unexploded ordnance (UXO) events" (2023-01-13, 4).
4.1 Bogotá
According to National Police statistics, between 1 January and 31 May 2023 Bogotá had 8 kidnappings (Colombia 2023-06-05a) and 441 homicides victims (Colombia 2023-06-05b).
4.2 Cartagena (Bolívar Department)
Without providing further information, Pares states that murders increased in Cartagena by 51 percent between 2021 and 2022 (245 to 369 cases), [translation] "not necessarily" due to organized armed groups but rather due to extortion and threats from "criminal gangs" (Pares 2023-04-03). According to National Police statistics, between 1 January and 31 May 2023, Cartagena had 144 homicide victims (Colombia 2023-06-05b).
4.3 Santiago de Cali (Valle del Cauca Department)
According to ACAPS, citing Colombia's National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE), Valle del Cauca Department was among those "most affected" by escalated conflict in 2022 due to "changes in territorial control" (2023-01-13, 3, 4). ACAPS further notes that fights for territory "persist" in Valle del Cauca and armed groups control citizen mobility "through coercive tactics, such as forced confinements" (2023-01-13, 4). ACLED notes a "particular concentration of violence" in Valle del Cauca, with armed groups fighting for drug routes and "engag[ing] in other illegal economies" (2023-02-08). Pares indicates that the killings of social leaders in Valle del Cauca department were [translation] "especially" "concentrat[ed]" in Santiago de Cali with three community leaders murdered there in 2022 (2023-06-19, 7).
4.4 Medellín (Antioquia Department)
ACLED notes that armed clashes in Antioquia were "mainly" between the Gulf Clan and the Colombian military (2023-02-08). InSight Crime states that the Gulf Clan has its "base and territorial stronghold" in Antioquia, Chocó and Córdoba, and they have an "extensive presence" there (2022-11-08).
4.5 Border with Venezuela
In a March 2022 HRW article, the organization's Americas director is cited as stating that "'[a]rmed groups are committing brutal abuses against civilians in the Colombia-Venezuela border area'" (2022-03-28). According to the HRW article, these "abuses" include killings, forced recruitment, and forced displacement (2022-03-28). The article further notes that in "the early months" of 2022, conflicts between armed groups resulted in a "dramatic increase in violence" in the border region (HRW 2022-03-28). ACAPS indicates that, in 2022, ELN and Gulf Clan expansion along the border with Venezuela, especially in Catatumbo, resulted in a "dramatic increase in violence" (2023-01-13, 3).
An International Crisis Group researcher cited by the New Humanitarian, a news organization that focuses on humanitarian crises, stated that "[t]he ELN has consolidated control over the border" between Colombia and Venezuela; the article further notes that the ELN "holds sway" in the Norte de Santander, Arauca, Vichada, and Orinoco departments along the border (The New Humanitarian 2022-11-09).
BBC reports that the border was reopened on 26 September 2022 after being closed for seven years (2022-10-13). Ellis states that the border between Colombia and Venezuela was "highly porous even when closed," and its reopening is "likely to expand options for the movement of drugs, gold, money, and contraband goods" (2023-02, 17). Information on the effects of the reopening on cross-border crime could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
5. Measures Taken by the Government to Combat Crime
5.1 Total Peace Agenda
According to Carlos Ruiz Massieu, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the Petro government has laid out a Total Peace policy, which aims to implement the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP, to use dialogue to resolve the armed conflict, and better protect vulnerable communities (UN 2022-10-12).
5.1.1 Negotiations with Armed Groups
According to a March 2023 BBC article, President Petro is taking a "radically different" approach to ending the hostilities with armed groups; where the previous president, Iván Duque, aimed to stop this violence by "stepping up military operations," Petro is attempting to secure peace through negotiation (BBC 2023-03-20).
International Crisis Group indicates that in November 2022, the government passed legislation, Law 2272 of 2022 [Ley 2272 de 2022] that "sets parameters" for talks with armed groups (International Crisis Group 2023-02-24, 4). Article 2(c)i of Law 2272 provides the following:
[translation]
c. Within the peace policy framework, the Government may have two types of processes:
(i) Negotiations with organized armed groups operating outside the law, with which political dialogues are carried out. These dialogues result in peace agreements.
"Organized armed group operating outside the law" shall be understood to mean a group that, under the direction of a responsible commander, exercises control over part of the territory that enables it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. (Colombia 2022)
International Crisis Group explains that the law empowers the government to "make deals" with the ELN and a FARC dissident faction, which "call[s] itself FARC-EP" and is "still in arms because its leadership never signed the 2016 agreement" (2023-02-24, 4).
Article 2(c)ii of Law 2272 provides the following on armed groups and organized crime structures:
[translation]
(ii) Engagement and conversations with organized armed groups or organized armed high-impact crime structures, in order to bring them to justice and dismantle them.
"Organized armed high-impact crime structures" shall be understood to mean criminal organizations formed by a number of people organized into a hierarchical structure and/or a network. [These organizations] are dedicated to the permanent or continuous execution of punishable conducts, which may include those described in the Palermo Convention, are part of criminal patterns that include violent subjugation of the civilian population of the rural and urban territories in which they operate, and operate in one or more illicit economies.
Former members of armed groups operating outside the law, demobilized through agreements reached with the Colombian State, who contribute to their dismantling are understood to be part of an organized, armed, high-impact-crime structure. … (Colombia 2022)
International Crisis Group explains that
for groups designated by the law as high-impact criminal structures, the government can use talks only to seek their demobilisation and voluntary submission to the judicial system, though the details here are not yet final. (2023-02-24, 4)
The same source notes that the "high-impact criminal structures" designation applies to the Gulf Clan and the Segunda Marquetalia FARC dissident group (International Crisis Group 2023-02-24, 4).
Sources from June 2023 note that the law was being challenged in Colombia's Constitutional Court (Infobae 2023-06-27; Pares 2023-06-27). On 13 July 2023, the court released a statement that it would not [translation] "rule on the merits" of the challenge to Law 2272 of 2022, concluding that "none of the charges submitted met the requirements" (Colombia 2023-07-13).
In a February 2023 article, Will Freeman, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) [3] (CFR n.d.b), states that the Petro government initiated "dialogues" with "armed groups and criminal organizations," including the ELN, FARC dissidents, the Gulf Clan, and "dozens of smaller regional mafias and narcotrafficking groups operating across the country" (Freeman 2023-02). Similarly, a UN Security Council report indicates that in early 2023 the Petro government was engaged in "peace talks" with armed groups perceived as "having a political agenda" and in discussions with "criminal" groups, offering them "judicial benefits" in exchange for a cessation of violence (UN 2023-04-03, 11). According to International Crisis Group,
[o]fficials' immediate goal is to cut down the incidence of three violent crimes – murder, torture and disappearances. To motivate groups to strike the necessary bargains, the government is floating the possibility of negotiated settlements, judicial leniency, economic incentives and scaled-back military operations. (2023-02-24)
Citing a September 2022 announcement from Colombia's High Commissioner for Peace (Alto Comisionado Para la Paz), sources report that 10 groups had implemented unilateral ceasefires as proof of their willingness to negotiate (Freeman 2023-02; EFE 2022-09-28). Sources indicate that the 10 groups include the Gulf Clan (Freeman 2023-02; EFE 2022-09-28), the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the Segunda Marquetalia, and the Self-Defence Forces of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (Autodefensas de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta), as well as [translation] "'various'" local drug trafficking groups (EFE 2022-09-28).
According to a government press release from 31 December 2022, the government announced a six-month [translation] "bilateral ceasefire" set to expire 30 June 2023 with five armed groups (Colombia 2022-12-31). The same source indicated that the ceasefire involved the following groups:
- the ELN;
- Segunda Marquetalia;
- the EMC;
- the Gulf Clan; and
- the [translation] "Sierra Nevada group" [also known as the Self-Defence Forces of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta] (Colombia 2022-12-31).
The same source indicated that compliance with the ceasefire was to be monitored by national and international organizations, including the UN Verification Mission in Colombia (Colombia 2022-12-31). However, the ELN released a statement on 1 January 2023 that it had not discussed a ceasefire proposal with the government and had not agreed to such a measure (ELN 2023-01-01). In response, a government press release notes that the legal effects of the ceasefire decree would be suspended for ELN and that [translation] "dialogue" on a bilateral ceasefire would resume with ELN in the next "cycle of negotiations" (Colombia 2023-01-04).
International Crisis Group indicates, citing a letter from the Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación) to the peace commissioner, that on 13 January the Attorney General's Office announced its "refus[al] to lift warrants" for criminal group members, as had been promised by the government as a reward for entering into dialogue (2023-02-24, 5). The same International Crisis Group report states that as of February 2023 "[a]ll but one" of the ceasefires were "on hold" because of "legal or political challenges"; the ceasefire with the FARC-EP group was the sole to have been signed (2023-02-24, 1, 5). The UN Security Council similarly notes that as of April 2023, only one of the groups had signed their ceasefire agreement; the other agreements had "yet to be operationalised" (UN 2023-04-03).
Sources indicate that in March 2023, the government announced the "suspension" of the ceasefire with the Gulf Clan, responding in part to an attack against security forces (UN 2023-03-24, para. 9; BBC 2023-03-20). InSight Crime explains that the failure of the ceasefire with the Gulf Clan is "not surprising," because its regional "sub-structures" have a great deal of autonomy; while the group's leaders are supportive of the peace plan, other members are not (2023-03-24). ACLED indicates, in a report on April 2023, that violence against community leaders has "increased notably" in Antioquia, a department where the Gulf Clan "has a significant foothold" (ACLED 2023-05-05).
A government press release from May 2023 states that the government was [translation] "partially suspend[ing]" its ceasefire with the EMC, after the killing of four [Indigenous (Reuters 2023-05-22; BBC 2023-05-22)] minors (Colombia 2023-05-21). The press release further specifies that the ceasefire was suspended in Caquetá, Putumayo, Guaviare and Meta departments, where [translation] "offensive operations" were to be resumed, but that it remained in place for all other regions (Colombia 2023-05-21).
The ACLED report for April 2023 states that armed groups continued to clash over territory and "control of illicit economies," and "at least 18 social leaders" were killed that month as a result (2023-05-05).
Sources report that in May 2023 a bombing on a police patrol unit in Tibú, Norte de Santander, for which ELN claimed responsibility, killed two police officers and a civilian (El País 2023-05-26; US 2023-05-26). According to El Pais, a Spanish-language international newspaper, the bombing occurred while ELN representatives were in peace negotiations with Colombian officials in Havana (2023-05-26). However, sources indicate that in June 2023, the Colombian government and the ELN announced a bilateral ceasefire agreement; the ceasefire is set to come into effect on 3 August 2023 and last for 180 days (AP 2023-06-09; BBC 2023-06-09). The Associated Press (AP) reports that the ceasefire will be monitored by the UN, the Catholic Church, [translation] "guarantor countries," and civil society (2023-06-09). The BBC article adds that this is the longest such agreement ever reached between Colombian authorities and the ELN since the group's creation in the 1960s (2023-06-09). However, sources report that the ELN has indicated an intent to continue kidnapping [and extortion (El País 2023-06-09)] after the ceasefire comes into effect, stating that these are not specifically prohibited in the agreement (Diálogo Américas 2023-06-26; El País 2023-06-09).
An El Espectador article indicates that, as part of the ceasefire with Iván Mordisco's FARC-EP group (also called the [translation] "FARC-EP still in arms"), members of the guerilla group "will not be allowed to be armed in the villages" and cannot attack civilians (2023-01-19). Further and corroborating information on ceasefire requirements for armed groups could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Information on the effectiveness of the ceasefires in reducing violence was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The April 2023 report on Total Peace from Pares indicates that, at that time, statistics had yet to be gathered on the extent to which ceasefires are being followed (2023-04-03). However, the same source notes that the bilateral ceasefires between the government and individual armed groups were not designed in a way that would [translation] "de-escalat[e]" violence against civilians, since territorial disputes between armed groups are "one of the main causes" of such violence (Pares 2023-04-03). An Al Jazeera article states that the ceasefire with the ELN only affects conflict between the government and the armed group (2023-06-12). The same article cites a representative for International Crisis Group in Colombia as stating that "'[t]he main deficit of this agreement is that it's not a cessation of hostilities, which is really what is required in order to affect the humanitarian conditions on the ground'"; the same source indicates that the ELN may still engage in "intimidation campaigns" against other groups and civilians (Al Jazeera 2023-06-12). The same International Crisis Group representative told Al Jazeera that the ceasefire "'ends up providing a strategic advantage to the ELN in terms of their ability to consolidate their control on the ground'," as government forces "may" focus more on combatting rival groups, "'while doing very little to protect the communities who are living in these areas'" (Al Jazeera 2023-06-12).
According to National Police Statistics, there were 5,250 homicides in Colombia between January and May 2023 (Colombia 2023-06-05b). In comparison, there were 5,592 homicides during the same period in 2022 (Colombia 2023-01-06b).
5.1.2 Implementing the Peace Agreement
In an interview with El Espectador, the president of WOLA stated that, while Colombia's peace agreement is not inherently weak, [former] President Duque "insisted on weakening it" and "lack[ed] the political will to implement" it (El Espectador 2021-10-06). According to an article written by Viviana García Pinzón, a research fellow and doctoral student at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and the University of Marburg, and published by Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) [4], Duque campaigned against the accord before his election and in his time in office, the government "delayed, under-funded and challenged crucial components of the accord" (BTI 2021-12-14).
Nevertheless, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia reports that between 26 March 2022 and 27 June 2022, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) held its first public hearings, in which "indicted individuals" from both the FARC-EP and State forces "voluntarily and publicly acknowledged their responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity"; as part of this process, perpetrators also listened to accounts from victims (UN 2022-06-27, para. 6-8). The UN further states that the JEP hearings "are an important step towards the issuance of restorative sentences" and that the JEP's Judicial Panel for Acknowledgement of Truth and Responsibility (Sala de Reconocimiento de Verdad y Responsabilidad) was "expected to" determine whether the indicted individuals' "acknowledgment of responsibility and contributions to the truth" were "sufficient to make them eligible for restorative sentences" (UN 2022-06-27, para. 9). In "late October" 2022, the JEP issued its first indictment, with subsequent indictments in November and December; the indictments targeted both government officials and FARC commanders (HRW 2023-01-12, 166). HRW further notes that the December indictments involved 12 army officers who had made full confessions and 2 officers who did not and "should stand trial" (2023-01-12, 166).
HRW indicates that the Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad) established as part of the peace agreement released its findings in June 2022, while at the same time creating a committee to track the government's implementation of its recommendations over the next seven years (2023-01-12, 165). The same source indicates that those recommendations include an "'anti-violence policy', re-starting peace negotiations with the ELN, and reforming security and drug policies" (HRW 2023-01-12, 165). Sources indicate that in October 2022, the [Petro] government relaunched the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement (Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del Acuerdo Final, CSIVI) [5] and the National Commission on Security Guarantees (Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad, CNGS) [6] (UN 2023-02-27, para. 4; El Espectador 2022-10-06), which are "key mechanisms" for implementing Colombia's 2016 peace agreement (UN 2023-02-27, para. 4). The OHCHR states that the Petro government's Total Peace policy includes the "comprehensive implementation" of the 2016 peace agreement (UN 2023-02-27, para. 4).
Sources report that the commissions had [translation] "lagged behind" under the Duque government (El Espectador 2022-10-06) or that the CNGS had been [translation] "prevented" by the Duque government from "fulfilling its legal duties" (MOE & CCJ 2022-11, 39). However, El Espectador notes in March 2023 that since the CNGS's October 2022 relaunch, the commission, which was supposed to meet monthly, had only met three times (El Espectador 2023-03-27).
The UN Verification Mission in Colombia report, published in June 2022, indicates that to protect former FARC-EP combatants, "additional resources" have been allocated to the National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección, UNP) on JEP orders (UN 2022-06-27, para. 60). However, the same report for March 2023 states that the UNP has a "backlog" of "over 1,100 protection requests" and that since 2016, 43 former combatants have been killed while waiting for protection (UN 2023-03-24, para. 61).
5.1.3 Protecting Vulnerable Communities
Pares indicates that as part of its Total Peace plan, the Petro government launched an Emergency Plan for Protecting Social Leaders, Human Rights Defenders and Peace Agreement Signatories (Plan de Emergencia para la Protección a Líderes y Lideresas Sociales, Personas Defensoras de DDHH y Firmantes de Paz) (Pares 2023-06-19, 3). Sources report that the plan was developed by civil society organizations in partnership with members of congress (CCEEU [2022-10]; PSD 2022-11-03, 73). The objectives stated in the plan are as follows:
- Produce a rapid response from State institutions in areas where increasing violence is [translation] "concentrated";
- Take preventive actions to reduce "hostility and stigmatization";
- Develop a public policy on safeguards (Colombia 2022-09-21, 3).
The plan further identifies [translation] "priority municipalities," with "special attention" to be paid to the five municipalities with the highest levels of violence against social leaders, human rights defenders, and peace agreement signatories: Argelia in Cauca, Roberto Payán and Tumaco in Nariño, Tibú in Norte de Santander, and Ituango in Antioquia (Colombia 2022-09-21, 4). The Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination (Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos, CCEEU), a [translation] "platform" of NGOs working to promote human rights in Colombia (CCEEU n.d.), indicates that the plan includes short- and medium-term measures to be implemented within 100 days and within one year, respectively (CCEEU [2022-10]). According to the OHCHR, the Unified Operations Centres for Life (Puestos de Mando Unificados por la Vida, PSUV) are the "most visible" aspect of the plan; they serve as
operational spaces at the local level, created to adopt concrete prevention and protection measures. These centres have faced implementation challenges related to the lack of a preventive approach by some local authorities, limitations in the capacity of the National Government to accompany local level spaces, lack of trust between authorities and civil society, and the structural causes of violence in the territories. (UN 2023-02-27, para. 67)
The We Are Defenders Program (Programa Somos Defensores, PSD), a program for protecting human rights defenders in Colombia run by three Colombian human rights NGOs [7], states that implementation of short-term measures was not assessed after the 100-day deadline had expired, and the plan could therefore not be "adjust[ed]" and "modifi[ed]" based on the early experience of implementation (PSD 2023-06-01, 119). PSD further expresses "concern" that the government's efforts have been "concentrated" on the PSUV, "which constitute only one of the measures" (PSD 2023-06-01, 119). Pares states that the emergency protection plan is not being implemented [translation] "in practice" due to a lack of interagency coordination (Pares 2023-05-23). The same source notes that between Petro's inauguration [in August 2022] and May 2023, 128 leaders were killed (Pares 2023-05-23). Pares further indicates that while fewer leaders were killed from January to March 2023 compared to the same period in 2022, the killing of 20 leaders in April 2023 brought total deaths to 58, close in number to the 60 leaders killed from January to April 2022 (Pares 2023-06-19, 5).
The OHCHR notes, however, that in "some municipalities," "processes" have been launched in the context of the Emergency Plan to reduce "some" of the risks faced by defenders (UN 2023-02-27, para. 67). Further information on the implementation and effectiveness of the Emergency Plan could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
5.2 Law Enforcement and Judicial System
In its 2022 report, HRW indicates that security forces "have failed to effectively protect the population" and to "dismantle" armed groups, and that judicial authorities have "failed" to prosecute armed groups and ensure access to justice for their victims (2023-01-12, 163).
According to "[m]igration experts" consulted by International Crisis Group, law enforcement in Colombia will "common[ly]" prosecute individuals "on the basis of ordinary criminal law for belonging to armed groups, even if they desert after being forcibly recruited" (International Crisis Group 2022-08-09).
For information on state protection, see Response to Information Request COL200703 of August 2021 and Colombia: Fact‐Finding Mission Report. Conflict Dynamics in the Post-FARC-EP Period and State Protection of March 2020.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a "research and advocacy organization" that focuses on human rights in the Americas (WOLA n.d.a).
[2] Andrés González Díaz is the Director of the Centre for Data Analysis (Centre de Análisis de Datos, DELFOS) at the Universidad Externado de Colombia (González Díaz [2022-12]). He was previously a politician, and has held several positions in Colombia, such as senator, minister, and governor of the Department of Cundinamarca (Universidad de los Andes n.d.). He was also Colombia's representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) (OAS [2014]).
[3] The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an "independent" and "nonpartisan" US-based think tank and publisher on international affairs (CFR n.d.a).
[4] Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) is a project to analyze and compare "transformation processes towards democracy and inclusive market economy worldwide" (Bertelsmann Stiftung n.d.).
[5] The Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement (Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del Acuerdo Final, CSIVI) is tasked with resolving differences in interpretation and making recommendations for promoting and implementing the peace agreement (Colombia 2022-10-02).
[6] Decree 154 of 2017 (Decreto 154 de 2017) states the following regarding the mission of the National Commission on Security Guarantees (Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad, CNGS):
[translation]
ARTICLE 1. Creation and objective of the National Commission for Security Guarantees. The National Commission for Security Guarantees is hereby created, [and its] purpose shall be the design and monitoring of public and criminal policy regarding the dismantling of criminal organizations or conducts that are responsible for homicides and massacres; that attack human rights defenders, social movements or political movements; or that threaten or attack people who participate in the implementation of the Agreements and peace-building, including criminal organizations that have been identified as successors of paramilitarism and their support networks. The Commission shall also harmonize such policies to ensure their implementation. (Colombia 2017, emphasis in original)
[7] The We Are Defenders Program (Programa Somos Defensores, PSD) is made up of the following human rights NGOs: Asociación MINGA, Benposta Nation of Children (Benposta Nación de Muchachos), and the Colombian Commission of Jurists (Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, CCJ) (PSD n.d.).
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