Bangladesh: Availability of fraudulent documents, especially identity documents, medical files and financial documents; state response (2017–December 2021)
Information on fraudulent documents in Bangladesh was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
1. Overview
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the increasing use of biometrics limits the opportunities for fraud, but the use of fraudulent documents and "fraudulently obtained genuine documents remains widespread" (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.39). Sources indicate that corruption is "entrenched" (UK Sept. 2017, 102), [translation] "widespread" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 6) or "endemic" (Denmark 19 Dec. 2018, 10), and that it is everywhere in society (UK Sept. 2017, 102; Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 6; Denmark 19 Dec. 2018, 10).
A police official, interviewed by the UK Home Office during a factfinding mission to Bangladesh in May 2017, stated that forged or fraudulent police and court documents are difficult to obtain, "because of countersignature processes and the fact that all documents can be checked against a database" (UK Sept. 2017, 24–25, 81). In contrast, officials from the British High Commission in Dhaka interviewed for the same report indicated that counterfeit documents, including arrest warrants, summons and "'pack[s] of identity documents'," as well as fraudulently obtained genuine documents, are "easily" obtainable (UK Sept. 2017, 53, 72).
The information in the following paragraph was provided by the Danish National ID Centre (NIDC) in a report on a mission conducted in Bangladesh in November 2018 on Muslim marriage registration and the issuance of marriage documents:
According to two Western diplomatic sources, "it is easy to acquire genuine documents, issued by legitimate government authorities, containing fraudulent personal information." One of the diplomatic sources further specified that "the fraudulent information contained within these documents was often related to the age of the applicant in question, or their relationships with other Bangladeshi citizens, such as an alleged 'spouse'." Based on the information provided by "several credible and independent expert sources," the NIDC states the following:
[T]he credibility of Bangladeshi documents is generally low. This is primarily due to the high level of corruption in Bangladesh, as well as the inability to verify the information contained by genuine Bangladeshi documents, due to the lack of a central database for the registration of vital statistics. (Denmark 19 Dec. 2018, 11)
1.1 Identity Cards
Sources report that the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) is the authority responsible for issuing National Identity Cards (NICs) (Bangladesh n.d.a; Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.32) and maintaining the database for the registration of citizens based on this card (Bangladesh n.d.a).
In its report on Bangladesh from August 2019, Australia’s DFAT states the following regarding national identity cards:
Under the National Identity Registration Act (2010), all citizens over the age of 18 must register with the BEC to obtain a National Identity Card (NIC). NICs are valid for 15 years and are required to complete a wide range of transactions, including voting, banking, obtaining a passport, and purchasing property or other assets. To obtain a NIC, applicants must provide their electoral roll serial number, personal particulars (parents' names, date of birth and residential address), thumbprints, photograph, and signature. (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.32)
The Swedish Migration Agency reports that one of their sources stated that when a person receives a new biometric identity card, the old card [translation] "is confiscated" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 8). The same source also states the following about the security of the NIC, based on information provided by the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka:
[translation]
[I]t is completely possible to alter the second card's information – except for the 17-digit birth registration number for which a fingerprint is required – but the Embassy feels that this seldom happens. (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 8)
For additional information on NICs, see Response to Information Request BGD200089 of February 2020.
1.2 Passports
The Department of Immigration and Passports (DIP) of Bangladesh states that in order to obtain a machine-readable passport, individuals must apply through the online application and then go to a passport office to provide their biometric data (Bangladesh n.d.b). The US Department of State's Reciprocity Schedule indicates that there are three types of passports in Bangladesh: regular, diplomatic and official (US n.d.). Australia’s DFAT states the following about Bangladeshi passports:
Adults applying for a passport must have a valid NIC or birth registration certificate with a 17-digit birth registration number. Applicants must provide biometric data (fingerprints and photographs) to a passport office before lodging their application. (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.34)
The same source states that "there is still a high prevalence of fraud in relation to passports" despite the fact that the Bangladeshi government introduced machine-readable passports and established a passport database in 2010 (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.34).
A report published by the NIDC on the issuance of Bangladeshi passports, based on information obtained during a mission conducted in Bangladesh in November 2018, states that government authorities planned to start issuing e-passports in January 2019 (Denmark 20 Mar. 2019, 1). According to the same source, a representative of the competent authorities stated that the "current series" of machine-readable passports was issued in 2010, that Bangladeshi citizens can apply for such passports at 70 official locations across Bangladesh (for those who live in the country) or at one of 71 diplomatic missions (for expatriates), and that "[a]ll issued passports are printed and personalized in Dhaka" (Denmark 20 Mar. 2019, 1).
The Swedish Migration Agency states that according to the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka, [translation] "counterfeit passports are not seen very often" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 8). However, the same source also states that
[translation]
[t]he major problem is that it is possible to obtain an authentic passport issued via a correct procedure but based on false information. This is possible either through submitting false information on the passport application form or having false information registered through bribery. (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 8)
The same source also provides the following information, from the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka, about the cost of false passports:
[translation]
[A]n authentic passport issued with false information – for example, with false information concerning names, date and place of birth, parents' name, spouse's name, addresses, etc. – can cost between 10,000 and 25,000 Bangladeshi taka [(BDT)] [approximately C$148-369], and more in some cases. In comparison, a standard passport, issued in the correct way, costs considerably less. (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 8)
1.3 Acts of Civil Status
According to a source at the Swedish Migration Agency, [translation] "[n]o functioning civil registration exists in Bangladesh at present, and the country lacks a comprehensive national population registration system" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 5). The same source states that [translation] "births and deaths are recorded in different departments within the local authorities" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 5).
Australia's DFAT states the following about birth certificates:
The Births and Deaths Registration Act (2004) makes birth registration compulsory for all babies born in Bangladesh, and registration of births has become increasingly widespread. Parents must register newborn babies within 45 days of birth, and penalties apply for failure to register births within two years. Bangladeshis require birth certificates to access school enrolment, passports, voter registration, and employment in government or non-government organisations, and to register marriages. (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.31)
However, the same source understands that "people are still able to apply for birth certificates without any supporting documentation" and that "there is a high prevalence of document fraud in relation to birth certificates" (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.31).
A briefing note published by the NIDC on birth registration, based on information obtained during a mission to Bangladesh conducted in November 2018, reports that one diplomatic source stated that the Bangladeshi birth certificate is "vulnerable" to fraud, because it is considered proof of age; for example, a fraudulent birth certificate could make someone eligible for a government job with a minimum age requirement, or allow a girl to marry before she is of legal age (Denmark 15 Jan. 2019, 1, 5–6). According to a representative of an international organization present in Dhaka and interviewed by the NIDC, underage marriage "was [an] issue" in rural areas and that some individuals obtain "a genuine birth certificate for the intended bride containing a date of birth that met the minimum age requirement," to enable families to marry off a girl before she is of legal age (Denmark 19 Dec. 2018, 11).
The Swedish Migration Agency states that according to the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka, the cost of a genuine birth certificate obtained on the basis of false information ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 BDT [approximately C$15–30] paid as a [translation] "brib[e]" to an official (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 7).
2. Production and Acquisition of Fraudulent Documents
The Swedish Migration Agency states that according to the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka, [translation] "it is easy to acquire authentic documents containing false information. It is also possible to obtain counterfeit documents" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 7). The same source states that the documents concerned include the following:
- birth certificates
- death certificates
- marriage certificates
- divorce documents
- extracts from police records
- documents from a notary public
- court decisions
- [foreign] currency documents
- driver's licences
- NICs
- seaman's passbooks
- passports (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 7).
With regard to obtaining fraudulent birth certificates, the NIDC indicates in its mission report on birth registration that one of its diplomatic sources stated that the lack of security features in the birth certificates makes it possible "for visa brokers to photocopy a blank certificate form and fraudulently issue duplicates to several applicants using the same form number" (Denmark 15 Jan. 2019, 6). The Swedish Migration Agency reports that, according to the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka, [translation] "it is easy for a person to obtain a birth certificate fitting that person's needs" and that "[t]his applies both to a counterfeit document as well as an authentic document containing false information" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 7). According to the same source, [translation] "[t]ranslation of documents from Bangladesh is … not always trustworthy as it is possible to bribe an authorized translator to alter or omit information in the translated document" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 10).
3. Reports of Fraudulent Documents
The Dhaka Tribune, a national newspaper, states that, "[s]everal" DIP officials, including two directors, reportedly helped human traffickers obtain 77 official passports based on falsified documents between September 2014 and May 2015 (Dhaka Tribune 12 Dec. 2020). The same article states that the situation came to light after the Turkish government caught four incoming passengers with such passports and informed the Bangladeshi authorities (Dhaka Tribune 12 Dec. 2020). The article states that during that same period, another false passport case involving 71 people, including 8 DIP employees, was being prosecuted at the Dhaka Special Judge's Court7 (Dhaka Tribune 12 Dec. 2020).
The Dhaka Tribune also reported in September 2019 that in the preceding months "around 100 Rohingya people ha[d] been detained in various districts" in possession of Bangladeshi passports and NICs, "which only Bangladeshis can use"; these refugees reportedly paid fraudsters, trafficking rings, public representatives, and government and police officials, to get such documents "easily" (Dhaka Tribune 13 Sept. 2019). According to the same source, the police unit responsible for verifying official documents also reported that 54 Rohingyas were arrested while trying to leave the country with false Bangladeshi passports in February 2019 and that "some" local representatives and police officers worked with fraud gangs to help Rohingyas obtain false Bangladeshi passports (Dhaka Tribune 13 Sept. 2019).
4. State Response
4.1. Legislation
Chapter XVIII of the Penal Code, 1860 provides the following:
OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO TRADE OF PROPERTY MARKS
Forgery
463. Whoever makes any false document or part of a document, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intend [sic] to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.
Making a false document
464. A person is said to make a false document
Firstly.-Who dishonesty [sic] or fraudulently makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document, or makes any mark denoting the execution of a document, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed or executed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed, or at a time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed; or
Secondly.-Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part thereof, after it has been made or executed either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or
Thirdly.-Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document, knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practiced upon him he does not know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration.
…
Punishment for forgery
465. Whoever commits forgery shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Forgery of record of Court or of public register, etc.
466. Whoever forges a document, purporting to be a record or proceeding of or in a Court of Justice, or a register of birth, baptism, marriage or burial, or a register kept by a public servant as such, or a certificate or document purporting to be made by a public servant in his official capacity, or an authority to institute or defend a suit, or to take any proceedings therein, or to confess judgment, or a power of attorney, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.
467. Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, moveable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquaintance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquaintance or receipt for the delivery of any moveable property or valuable security, shall be punished with [imprisonment] for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Forgery for purpose of cheating
468. Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be to liable to fine.
Forgery for purpose of harming reputation
469. Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document forged shall harm the reputation of any party, or knowing that it is likely to be used for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Forged document
470. A false document made wholly or in part by forgery is designated "a forged document".
Using as genuine a forged document
471. Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document.
Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to commit forgery punishable under section 467
472. Whoever makes or counterfeits any seal, plate or other instrument for making an impression, intending that the same shall be used for the purpose of committing any forgery which would be punishable under section 467 of this Code, or, with such intent, has in his possession any such seal, plate or other instrument, knowing the same to be counterfeit, shall be punishable with [imprisonment] for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to commit forgery punishable otherwise
473. Whoever makes or counterfeits any seal, plate or other instrument for making an impression, intending that the same shall be used for the purpose of committing any forgery which would be punishable under any section of this chapter other than section 467, or, with such intent, has in his possession any such seal, plate or other instrument, knowing the same to be counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Having possession of document described in section 466 or 467, knowing it to be forged and intending to use it as genuine
474. Whoever has in his possession any document, knowing the same to be forged, and intending that the same shall fraudulently or dishonestly be used as genuine, shall, if the document is one of the description mentioned in section 466 of this Code, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the document is one of the description mentioned in section 467, shall be punished with [imprisonment] for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating documents described in section 467, or possessing counterfeit marked material
475. Whoever counterfeits upon, or in the substance of, any material, any device or mark used for the purpose of authenticating any document described in section 467 of this Code, intending that such device or mark shall be used for the purpose of giving the appearance of authenticity to any document then forged or thereafter to be forged on such material or who, with such intent, has in his possession any material upon or in the substance of which any such device or mark has been counterfeited, shall be punished with [imprisonment] for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating documents other than those described in section 467, or possessing counterfeit marked material
476. Whoever counterfeits upon, or in the substance of, any material, any device or mark used for the purpose of authenticating any document other than the document described in section 467 of this Code, intending that such device or mark shall be used for the purpose of giving the appearance of authenticity to any document then forged or thereafter to be forged on such material, or who, with such intent, has in his possession any material upon or in the substance of which any such device or mark has been counterfeited, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Fraudulent cancellation, destruction, etc., of will, authority to adopt, or valuable security
477. Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, cancels, destroys or defaces, or attempts to cancel, destroy or deface, or secrets or attempts to secret any document which is or purports to be a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or any valuable security, or commits mischief in respect to such document, shall be punished with [imprisonment] for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Falsification of accounts
477A. Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates or falsifies any book, paper, writing, valuable security or account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or wilfully, and with intent to defraud, makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the omission or alteration of any material particular from or in, any such book, paper, writing, valuable security or account, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
… (Bangladesh 1860, s. 463-477A, emphasis and square brackets in the original, endnotes omitted)
4.2 Other Government Measures
The Swedish Migration Agency states that according to the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka
[translation]
[t]he lack of a functioning population registry system and a central database against which to check documents serves to complicate any possibility for appraising the authenticity of certificates and documents. Verification of documents can be carried out at the offices of the issuing authority but the information in the local registry is not always reliable. (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 11)
According to the same source, it is [translation] "completely possible" to register a birth or death retroactively; a birth can be registered retroactively "without any form of supporting documentation concerning the person's identity," even if the person concerned is deceased (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 7).
However, Australia’s DFAT states that the rollout of smart national identity cards started in 2016:
In October 2016, the BEC announced the introduction of the "smart NIC." The smart NIC is a machine-readable card containing 32 types of basic information about a citizen embedded in its microchip. It contains 25 security features including photographs and electronic chips. The purpose of the smart NIC was to prevent fraud, which was previously endemic. The BEC is currently in the process of distributing smart NICS nationwide. This process remains ongoing, and many older National Identity Cards without security features are reportedly still in use. (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.33)
The same source also indicates that local police officers must verify an individual’s identity when they apply for a Bangladeshi passport (Australia 22 Aug. 2019, para. 5.34). However, the Dhaka Tribune reports that some of those police officers are also involved in enabling the process of obtaining fraudulent documents, including for Rohingya refugees (Dhaka Tribune 13 Sept. 2019).
The Swedish Migration Agency states that, according to the Embassy of Sweden in Dhaka, a thorough investigation on the ground, including a visit to the offices of the issuing authority and interviews with neighbours, villagers, and others involved, is the best way to verify the genuineness of a document; the embassy goes through a solicitor trustee in these cases, but, [translation] "it takes considerable time to get a response to this type of inquiry" (Sweden 25 Feb. 2019, 11).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
References
Australia. 22 August 2019. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Bangladesh. [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]
Bangladesh. 1860 (amended 2004). The Penal Code, 1860. [Accessed 22 Nov. 2021]
Bangladesh. N.d.a. Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC). "NIDW Objectives." [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]
Bangladesh. N.d.b. Department of Immigration and Passports (DIP). "Online Application for Bangladesh Machine Readable Passport." [Accessed18 Nov. 2021]
Denmark. 20 March 2019. Danish National ID Centre (NIDC). Issuance of the Bangladeshi Passport. [Accessed 26 Nov. 2021]
Denmark. 15 January 2019. Danish National ID Centre (NIDC). Birth Registration and Birth Certificates in Bangladesh. [Accessed 26 Nov. 2021]
Denmark. 19 December 2018. Danish National ID Centre (NIDC). Bangladesh: Muslim Marriage Registration and the Issuance of Marriage Documents. [Accessed 26 Nov. 2021]
Dhaka Tribune. 12 December 2020. Ashif Islam Shaon and Md. Sanaul Islam Tipu. "Official Passport Forgery: Most of the Accused Still at Large." [Accessed 24 Nov. 2021]
Dhaka Tribune. 13 September 2019. Tanjir Rahman and Ranajit Chandra Kuri. "How 3 Rohingyas Got Bangladeshi Passports with Fake Identities." [Accessed 22 Nov. 2021]
Sweden. 25 February 2019. Swedish Migration Agency. Bangladesh: Falska handlingar. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]
United Kingdom (UK). March 2020. Home Office. Country Information Note: Bangladesh, Documentation. Version 2.0. [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]
United Kingdom (UK). September 2017. Home Office. Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission: Bangladesh. [Accessed 24 Nov. 2021]
United States (US). N.d. Department of State. "Bangladesh Reciprocity Schedule." [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Asian Human Rights Commission; associate professor of international law at an American university; associate professor of security studies in Southeast Asia at an American university; Bangladesh – Bangladesh Police; Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust; Centre for Policy Dialogue; International Institute for Strategic Studies; former official from the Bangladesh High Commission in Ottawa; lawyer specializing in immigration in Bangladesh; Odhikar; PhD candidate whose research addresses Southeast Asian population movements at a Canadian university; professor emeritus of anthropology and political economy in Southeast Asian countries at an American university; professor of anthropology and population movements in Asia at a British university; Research Initiatives Bangladesh; senior researcher in Southeast Asian population movements at a British university; senior research professor of South Asian studies at a Norwegian university; Transparency International Bangladesh; US – Embassy in Dhaka; Widows for Peace Through Democracy.
Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Asian Human Rights Commission; Bangladesh – Bangladesh Police, Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and Overseas Employment; Belgium – Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides; ecoi.net; EU – European Asylum Support Office, European Anti-Fraud Office; Factiva; Freedom House; Human Rights Watch; Minority Rights Group International; Refworld; Transparency International Bangladesh; UN – Human Rights Council, International Organization for Migration, UN Bangladesh, UNDP in Bangladesh.