Nigeria: The situation and treatment of political opponents, including the People's Democratic Party (PDP), by the authorities and society; state protection (2019–October 2021)
1. Overview
According to Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2020, which "assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy, as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries," there are two "socially embedded" political parties: the PDP and the All Progressives Congress (APC) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 2, 11). According to Freedom House's 2021 report, while elections in Nigeria allow for opposition parties to gain power, the APC and PDP hold "most" elected positions (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B2). The BTI 2020 further states that the registered political parties do not have "a strong ideological foundation" and there are no major ideological differences between the APC and PDP (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 12, 26).
According to Freedom House, "[c]itizens' political choices remain impaired or undermined by vote buying and intimidation, the influence of powerful domestic and international economic interests, and the local domination of either the military or illegal armed groups in certain regions of the country" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B3). The same source further states that "politicians and parties often rely on voters' ethnic loyalties" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B4). According to the BTI 2020, both the APC and PDP are based "on long-existing networks of the old political class" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 26). Freedom House states that "[w]ealthy political sponsors," or "'godfathers'" support candidates who will use their political position to "further enrich their backers" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B3). According to a BBC article, the political sponsors are known as "godfathers" who use their wealth and influence to elect their "godsons" (BBC 4 Feb. 2019). BBC further states that in the largest oil-producing state of Akwa Ibom, when the "godfather" of that state changed parties to join the APC, his change was expected to bring "more than 300,000 voters over to the APC," which was viewed as "pivotal" to the party's hope for election in that state; the article further reports that the godfather used state resources to ensure their supported candidate won, including blocking access to the primaries venue (BBC 4 Feb. 2019). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a researcher in the Department of Military History at the Nigerian Army University Biu stated that individuals who are members of the political opposition in Nigeria are in a "difficult position" as they have "diminished access" to the government (Researcher 30 Sept. 2021).
According to a report on Nigeria's 2019 general elections by the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) for the 2019 elections, there were 91 registered political parties and "73 candidates for the presidency, 1,899 for 109 Senate seats, and 4,680 for the 360 House of Representative seats" and for the state elections, "there were 1,046 candidates for the 29 governorships, and 14,609 candidates for the 991 state assembly seats" (EU 2019, 19). According to sources, 74 political parties were de-registered in February 2020 by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) due to "their inability to win the support of a sufficient number of voters and lack of representation nationwide" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B1) or for not meeting the requirements specified under the law (US 30 Mar. 2021, 27; This Day 17 Feb. 2020).
2. 2019 Elections
According to the EOM, the 2015 general elections saw a democratic change of the party in power for the first time with the APC winning over the PDP, which had been power for 16 years (EU 2019, 10). A report from the US Congressional Research Service on Nigeria states that "[e]lections often serve as flashpoints for violence as political office at all tiers of government yields access to oil earnings and other state resources" (US 18 Sept. 2020, 3). A 2018 report from the World Bank in collaboration with Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) notes that among the three different geopolitical zones surveyed, the North East, North Central, and South South zones, all have "vastly different principal causes of conflict for the most recent [conflict] event" experienced by a household, with the South South zone having the highest percentage of violence attributed to by "ethnicity, politics, or religion" at 9 percent of household events and 14 percent of community events (World Bank and NBS of Nigeria 2018, 2, 31–32). According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020, the results of the February 2019 presidential election were "credible despite logistical challenges, localized violence, and some irregularities" (US 30 Mar. 2021, 1). Freedom House reports that President Buhari of the APC was re-elected with 53 percent of the vote, the PDP's candidate received 39 percent, and the remaining 8 percent went to other candidates (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. A1). According to the EOM during the 2019 elections, "[p]arties and candidates were overall able to campaign, with freedoms of assembly, expression and movement broadly respected" (EU 2019, 21).
However, the EOM reported "a few" opposition rallies being denied with the PDP "alleging" that their booking for the concluding presidential campaign was cancelled as the venue in Abuja was owned by the federal government, and "the APC in Akwa Ibom, and the PDP in Ekiti and Kano" faced disruptions when their rallies were denied and then later permitted (EU 2019, 21). The same source notes that campaign rhetoric became "at times threatening" with the president stating at a rally on 10 February 2019 in Zamfara, "'I want everyone’s stomach to be full even if it [i]s trouble/attack we are going to make'" (EU 2019, 23). According to an article from the Sun, a Nigerian daily newspaper, leading up to the 2019 elections there were "mild clashes" between the PDP and the APC with "frequent" "incidents of destruction of posters and billboards," and violence in the Ikwo Local Government Area on 23 February 2019 "when supporters of PDP and APC clashed in the area" which left two people dead and three people injured (The Sun 5 Mar. 2019). According to an article in This Day, a Nigerian newspaper, without identifying the actors behind incidents, a representative of the Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room (Situation Room) [1] noted that "'the election was marred by violence, security lapses and instances of overreach'" (This Day 26 Feb. 2019). A report from Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that according to a witness in Gama, people were threatened by "thugs" at polling places if they voted PDP during the supplementary elections; witnesses also reported instances of violence at polling places in Dala and Gama directed toward PDP supporters, including one man who was punched in the face, a woman who was slapped, and another individual who "said he narrowly escaped being stabbed at his polling place because he is a known PDP supporter" (HRW 10 June 2019). The HRW report also states that "[d]espite police claims of increased security measures to ensure peaceful voting, there seems to have been little or no police response to reports of threats and acts of violence by hired political thugs and soldiers against voters and election officials" (HRW 10 June 2019). The same source also reports that in Abonnema in Rivers state, after one soldier was killed on election day, soldiers began detaining, arresting and shooting at residents (HRW 10 June 2019).
An article by Timothy Onimisi [2] and Omolegbe Leah Tinuola [3] published in the Malaysian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (MJSSH) states that "[t]he 2019 general election in Nigeria witnessed one of the most violen[t] post-electoral processes ever witness[ed] in the history of the country, as over 70 persons lost the[ir] lives during and after the exercise" (Onimisi and Tinuola June 2019, 107). The same source further states that
ballot box snatching, burning of properties including the [INEC] offices housing sensitive and non-sensitive materials meant for the election, burning of houses of top political aspirants and people affected with varying degrees of injuries characterized the elections. (Onimisi and Tinuola June 2019, 107)
A report from the US Institute of Peace (USIP) [4], states that "rivalry between the APC and the PDP remains intense" and that in Rivers state, which is a leading oil producer, this competition is "at the root of persistent violence, including around elections" (USIP 5 Dec. 2018). According to SBM Intelligence (SBM), a Nigerian "geopolitical intelligence platform" (SBM n.d.), from 16 November 2018 to 10 March 2019, 55 people were killed in Rivers state in election-related violence (SBM 13 Mar. 2019). The same report states that the 2019 presidential election resulted in 54 deaths with Borno state having the highest number of casualties with 17 and Rivers state with 16 (SBM 13 Mar. 2019).
3. Treatment of Political Opponents by the Authorities
Information on treatment of political opponents by the authorities was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019 states that Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was facing "allegations of partisan motivations" due to their arrests of political opposition members (US 11 Mar. 2020, 28). According to an article from Vanguard, a Nigerian daily newspaper, PDP governors "cautioned the [EFCC] against harassing opposition parties and their officials" (Vanguard 25 May 2021). Referencing the same Vanguard article, the researcher noted that opposition members state that they face "extra-judicial actions" (Researcher 30 Sept. 2021).
3.1 Treatment of the PDP by the Authorities
According to the Political Handbook of the World 2018–2019, the PDP was formed in 1998 with more than 60 organizations and leaders coming together, including "traditional chiefs, businesspeople, academicians, and a strong contingent of retired generals" (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 18). The BTI 2020 states that the PDP "dominated" the federal and state elections since the re-democratization process started in 1999 until "a landslide victory" by the APC in 2015 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 11).
Vanguard reports that according to the PDP, "political thugs allegedly recruited by the [APC]" attacked PDP supporters during a governorship election in Edo State, including an incident in Ekpe where according to the Edo State Publicity Secretary of the PDP, PDP members and supporters were attacked; 11 people were injured by individuals who were "allegedly in [the] convoy of [the] APC governorship candidate when the incident occurred" (Vanguard 31 Aug. 2020). According to a story published by Sahara Reporters, "an online community of international reporters and social advocates" that report from a Nigerian-African perspective (Sahara Reporters n.d.), a staff member of Bayelsa State Broadcasting Corporation and four PDP supporters were killed at a PDP campaign rally in Nembe Ogolomabiri by "suspected [APC] thugs" (Sahara Reporters 13 Nov. 2019). According to an article in Premium Times, "a Nigerian media organisation based in Abuja with a vision to help strengthen Nigeria’s democracy" (Premium Times n.d.), the outgoing PDP governor of Bayelsa State "alleged" that during the election for governor in his state, twelve members of the PDP were murdered and ten other residents were killed at the polls (Premium Times 3 Dec. 2019). Regarding the same incident, Vanguard reports that 21 people were killed and according to a panel of inquiry report on the incident, 195 people were injured and there were 350 reports of property vandalism (Vanguard 24 Jan. 2020).
3.2 Other Opposition Parties
The Handbook states that the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) was formed in 2002 and while it was originally a participant in negotiations to create the APC, it declined to join the merger (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 20–21). The same source notes that the APGA won five seats in the House in 2015 elections and that two other parties, the Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), secured one seat each in the 2015 election (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21). According to Freedom House, the APGA won 10 seats in the 2019 legislative elections (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. A2). According to an August 2021 news story from the Daily Post, a Nigerian daily newspaper, approximately 5,000 members of the PDP, APGA and the Action Alliance (AA) defected from their parties to join the APC in Imo State (Daily Post 1 Aug. 2021). Sources state that a leader of the campaign of the APGA candidate for governor in Anambra state had his car set on fire by gunmen (Vanguard 27 Sept. 2021; The Punch 28 Sept. 2021). According to sources, in October 2021 a venue preparing to host an APGA campaign rally in Anambra state was attacked by gunmen, with police and security forces defending the members of the APGA (The Guardian 13 Oct. 2021; Vanguard 13 Oct. 2021); the attack resulted in "no fewer than six" deaths and "several" people injured (Vanguard 13 Oct. 2021).
4. Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN)
According to a country of information report on Nigeria by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the IMN is "a Shi'a Muslim political organisation that advocates [for] the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic state in Nigeria" and does not recognize the Nigerian government; they only recognize Sheikh Zakzaky as a "legitimate" source of authority (Australia 3 Dec. 2020, para. 3.36). The report further states that the government banned the IMN in July 2019, prohibiting meetings and other activities by the IMN (Australia 3 Dec. 2020, para. 3.41). US Country Reports 2020 states that in 2015 the Nigerian Army killed 347 members of the IMN and other civilians, and during "clashes" between the Nigerian Army and IMN protestors in Abuja in October and December 2018, "at least" 42 people were killed (US 30 Mar. 2021, 3).
5. State Protection
The researcher stated that the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) receives finances from both the APC and PDP; however, during elections "the higher echelon of the NPF could in some cases be seen as being used as instruments of intimidation [against] the opposition. This is mostly during elections. It has been known that incumbent administrations use state resources to fund police and other security actors, to turn elections" (Researcher 30 Sept. 2021). According to a report from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an African non-profit providing research, training and assistance to governments and civil society (ISS n.d.), the inspector general of the police, military chiefs, and other heads of security are appointed by the president and "can be removed at will," with security and law enforcement officers viewed "as loyal to the government of the day, and as tools for intimidation and harassment of opponents" (ISS 4 Mar. 2019). US Country Reports 2019 states that "[a]uthorities did not always hold police, military, or other security force personnel accountable for the use of excessive or deadly force or for the deaths of persons in custody" (US 11 Mar. 2020, 2). Referring to the 2019 elections, the same report further states that "[t]here was evidence military and security services intimidated voters, electoral officials, and election observers" with election violence in "several" states furthering the belief that "the army is a tool of the ruling party in many parts of the country, particularly in the South" (US 11 Mar. 2020, 26).
According to the DFAT report, even though the NPF is "one of the largest police forces in the world" it is short 155,000 officers of meeting UN-recommended standards of one police officer per 400 residents and "capacity constraints" have impeded the NPF's abilities to address violence (Australia 3 Dec. 2020, para. 5.2, 5.9). The DFAT report also states that Nigerian law enforcement, including the NPF, Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) and the Department of State Services (DSS) are managed at the federal level, and that community policing in high violence areas is "routinely" conducted by the military (Australia 3 Dec. 2020, para. 5.1, 5.2). The researcher stated that no matter their political party, all politicians receive protection from the NPF (Researcher 30 Sept. 2021).
6. Freedom of Speech
According to the DFAT report, the Cybercrimes Act, which was passed in 2015, has been used by local and state governments to "arrest opponents and critics, including journalists"; the report indicates that in June 2020 a news website founder was arrested and charged under the Act due to his reporting "on the alleged collapse of a COVID-19 isolation centre in Kogi state" and that, if convicted, the founder could "fac[e] up to three years' imprisonment and a fine of up to 7 million naira" (NGN) [C$21,000] (Australia 3 Dec. 2020, para. 3.71). According to an article from Amnesty International, freedom of expression is not being protected by law enforcement agencies, with authorities using violence, threatening "individuals and groups who express dissenting opinions" and "endangering the lives of those who dare to criticize authorities, those in power or institutions" (Amnesty International 31 May 2021). Amnesty International's report on human rights in 2020/2021 also indicates that the federal government changed the Nigeria Broadcasting Code in August 2020 to increase the fines for "'hate speech'," and in October 2020 the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission fined television stations for reporting on the #EndSARS protests [5] (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 271). According to sources, in 2019 the Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill 2019 was presented (Al Jazeera 18 Dec. 2019; HRW 26 Nov. 2019; The Guardian 22 Nov. 2019), with the bill proposing fines or imprisonment of up to three years for the offence of statements on social media "'likely to be prejudicial to national security' and 'those which may diminish public confidence' in Nigeria's government" (Al Jazeera 18 Dec. 2019; HRW 26 Nov. 2019). According to a November 2020 analysis from the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), a Nigerian NGO that aims to "strengthen the link between civil society and the legislature" through advocacy and capacity building (CISLAC n.d.), the Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill 2019 had its second reading in the Senate in November 2019 and was "[a]waiting [c]ommittee [r]eport" (CISLAC 13 Nov. 2020). Further information on the adoption and implementation of this bill could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. A 2019 report from the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) states that the government "should … ensure that … criminal laws, including hate speech provisions, are not improperly used against journalists, members of the political opposition and others criticizing the Government" (UN 29 Aug. 2019, para. 47).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room (Situation Room) is made up of "more than 70" civil society organizations and aims to "enhance civil society coordination and ensure constructive and proactive engagement [with] the election process" (Situation Room n.d.).
[2] Timothy Onimisi is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Federal University Lokoja in Nigeria, whose research interests include public policy, elections, Nigerian government and politics, and international relations (Federal University Lokoja n.d.).
[3] Omolegbe Leah Tinuola is a chief lecturer in the Department of Arts and Social Sciences at Kogi State Polytechnic, Lokoja (Nigerian Tribune 24 Sept. 2021).
[4] The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is a "national, nonpartisan, independent institute," founded and funded by the US Congress, which works abroad to prevent and end conflicts (USIP n.d.).
[5] The #EndSARS protests took place in Nigeria against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), "a police unit notorious for human rights violations"; the protests resulted in the deaths of 56 people and the dissolution of SARS (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 21).
References
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Amnesty International. 31 May 2021. "Nigeria: #TalkYourTruth – A Campaign to Secure the Right to Freedom of Expression." [Accessed 27 Sept. 2021]
Amnesty International. 7 April 2021. "Nigeria." Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World's Human Rights. [Accessed 17 Sept. 2021]
Australia. 3 December 2020. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Nigeria. [Accessed 20 Sept. 2021]
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2020. "Nigeria Country Report." Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2020. [Accessed 21 Sept. 2021]
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 4 February 2019. Mayeni Jones. "Nigeria Election 2019: How 'Godfathers' Influence Politics." [Accessed 12 Oct. 2021]
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Vanguard. 13 October 2021. Vincent Ujumadu. "Gunmen in Motorcycles, SUVs Attack Obiano’s Convoy at APGA Rally." [Accessed 18 Oct. 2021]
Vanguard. 27 September 2021. Vincent Ujumadu. "2 Killed, Many Injured as Gunmen Attack APC, APGA Campaigners in Anambra." [Accessed 18 Oct. 2021]
Vanguard. 25 May 2021. Dirisu Yakubu. "Stop Witch-Hunting Opposition Parties, PDP Governors Warn EFCC." [Accessed 4 Oct. 2021]
Vanguard. 31 August 2020. Gabriel Enogholase. "EDO 2020: PDP Raises Alarm over Attack on Members by Suspected Thugs." [Accessed 4 Oct. 2021]
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Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: African Center for Conflict Transformation; Centre for Democracy and Development; Civil Liberties Organisation; Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre Nigeria; Human Rights and Justice Group International; Ibadan School of Government and Public Policy; Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre; political analyst in Nigeria; professor of political science at a Nigerian university.
Internet sites, including: All Progressives Congress; Belgium – Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides; Brookings Institution; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Commonwealth Local Government Forum; Denmark – Danish Immigration Service; ecoi.net; EU – European Asylum Support Office; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; France – ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Germany – Federal Office for Migration and Refugees; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; International Crisis Group; International Foundation for Electoral Systems; Jane's Country Risk Daily Report; Journal of Culture, Society and Development; Metro Times Nigeria; Metro Daily Nigeria; Minority Rights Group International; NaijaNews.com; Netherlands – Ministry of Foreign Affairs; The New Humanitarian; News Express; Nigeria – Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, State House; Open Political Science; Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés; Peoples Democratic Party; SAGE Journals; Switzerland – State Secretariat for Migration; Transparency International; UK – Home Office; UN – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Refworld, Security Council, UNHCR; University of Central Arkansas; US – US Agency for International Development, CIA.