Chapter 6. Oral Hearings

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Table of contents

  1. 6.1. Introduction
  2. 6.2. Statutory framework
  3. 6.3. Discretionary nature of subsection 110(6)
  4. 6.4. Onus on RAD to consider and apply subsection 110(6)
  5. 6.5. Factors that must be met under subsection 110(6)
    1. 6.5.1. Evidence raises serious issue of credibility of the person
    2. 6.5.2. Evidence is central to the decision with respect to the refugee claim
    3. 6.5.3. Evidence would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim
  6. 6.6. Scope of a Refugee Appeal Division oral hearing
  7. 6.7. Holding a Refugee Appeal Division oral hearing - Procedural rules
    1. 6.7.1. Rules on appellant’s record, reply record, notice of intervention respondent’s record
    2. 6.7.2. Fixing a date for a hearing
    3. 6.7.3. Notice to appear
    4. 6.7.4. Conduct of a hearing
      1. 6.7.4.1 General rules
      2. 6.7.4.2 Particular situations​
    5. 6.7.5. Person who is in custody
    6. 6.7.6. Interpreters
    7. 6.7.7. Observers
    8. 6.7.8. Designated representatives
    9. 6.7.9. Witnesses
    10. 6.7.10. Changing the location of a hearing
    11. 6.7.11. Changing the date or time of a hearing
    12. 6.7.12. Abandonment
    13. 6.7.13. Refugee Appeal Division decision after hearing
    14. 6.7.14. Virtual hearings
  8. Notes

6. Oral Hearings

6.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)Note 1 that stipulate when the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) may hold an oral hearing, as well as the procedural rules that govern oral hearings under the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules).Note 2

6.2. Statutory framework

Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA provides for the circumstances where the RAD may hold an oral hearing. The provision stipulates that the RAD may hold a hearing if in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) of the IRPA that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal (person); that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim.Note 3

Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA requires that, when considering whether to hold an oral hearing, the factors are to be assessed in relation to the “documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3)”.Note 4 The documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) (new evidence) will potentially include:

  • any new evidence submitted by the person and that meets the requirements of subsection 110(4);
  • any documentary evidence submitted by the Minister, which does not have to meet the requirements of subsection 110(4); and
  • any evidence submitted by the person in response to the Minister’s evidence, which does not have to meet the requirements of subsection 110(4).Note 5

The Federal Court of Appeal in SinghNote 6 held that the general rule is that the RAD, according to subsection 110(3) of the IRPA, must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD). A hearing at the RAD can only be held if the new evidence is admissible and fulfils the factors set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA.Note 7 The factors outlined in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA are conjunctive and therefore must all be met for a hearing to be held by the RAD.Note 8

It has been argued in a number of cases at the Federal Court that not to hold an oral hearing at the RAD is a breach of common law procedural fairness. However, the Court held that statutory provisions governing a tribunal’s procedures take precedence over the common law.Note 9 The Court has been consistent in finding that there is no breach of procedural fairness when the RAD follows what the IRPA prescribes and decides not to hold an oral hearing when the requirements set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA are not met.Note 10 More particularly, the Court also held numerous times that in the absence of any admissible new evidence, an oral hearing is neither required nor possible in view of the statutory requirements.Note 11

The Court has held that the RAD is not obliged to hold a hearing simply because a hearing was requestedNote 12 nor because it admitted new evidence.Note 13 The new evidence must still meet the three factors set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA.

Finally, it is important to note that, the Court has repeatedly held that the RAD is not obliged to hold a hearing to determine whether a document presented as new evidence is credible.Note 14

6.3. Discretionary nature of subsection 110(6)

Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA stipulates that the RAD “may” hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3) that meets the factors set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA.

In interpreting subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, the Court has held numerous times that the term “may” indicates the RAD has discretion to hold an oral hearing.Note 15 When the factors of subsection 110(6) are met, the RAD may or may not hold a hearing. However, when the factors of subsection 110(6) are not met, the RAD has no discretion, and it cannot hold an oral hearing.Note 16

It is important to note that even though subsection 110(6) gives the RAD discretion, the Court held that where the conditions for holding an oral hearing are present, the RAD should generally be required to convene one.Note 17 In Zhuo,Note 18 the Court concluded that, after acknowledging that the factors for holding a hearing had been met, the RAD should have held an oral hearing before making adverse credibility findings.

As for the exercise of the discretion, the Court also held that the RAD’s discretion must be exercised reasonably in the circumstances,Note 19 and on the basis of the new evidence and of the record as a whole.Note 20 In Zhuo,Note 21 the Court found that the mere fact that a party did not request an oral hearing will generally not be sufficient to justify a refusal to convene one when the circumstances appear to require it.

6.4. Onus on RAD to consider and apply subsection 110(6)

When admissible new evidence is presented, the RAD has the obligation to consider and apply the factors of subsection 110(6) of the IRPA to determine if an oral hearing should be held. In Zhuo and Horvath, the Court held that even though the RAD RulesNote 22 allow a party to request a hearing, neither the IRPA nor the RAD Rules impose a burden on the parties either to request, or to satisfy the RAD that the circumstances merit an oral hearing. The onus rests with the RAD to consider and apply the statutory criteria reasonably.Note 23

In Tchangoue and Hundal, the Court held that the RAD committed a reviewable error by failing to conduct a proper analysis of whether the factors for holding an oral hearing set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA were met and if so, whether it should exercise its discretion and grant an oral hearing.Note 24

6.5. Factors that must be met under subsection 110(6)

This section discusses the three factors, enumerated in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, that must be met for the RAD to hold an oral hearing.

6.5.1. Evidence raises serious issue of credibility of the person

The first factor to be evaluated to decide if a hearing should by held at the RAD is to determine if the documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) of the IRPA (the new evidence) raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person.Note 25 This factor is composed of two elements: the new evidence must raise a serious issue and this serious issue must be in respect of the credibility of the person.

In Singh,Note 26 the Federal Court of Appeal held that it is not the credibility of the new evidence itself that must be weighed, but whether the new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the general credibility of the person. The Federal Court of Appeal further specified that a hearing is only held where new evidence would justify a reassessment of the overall credibility of the person and his or her narrative. In Paz,Note 27 the Federal Court also held that even if the new evidence raises an important issue, if it is not about the credibility of the person, it is not a factor to consider when deciding whether or not to hold a hearing. In Nuri,Note 28 the Federal Court held that since the RAD accepted the credibility of the person’s testimony, there was no issue raised as to his credibility, a precondition to holding an oral hearing.

The credibility factor to be addressed in the admissibility of new evidence assessed under subsection 110(4) of the IRPANote 29 and the credibility factor to be addressed in the oral hearing assessment under subsection 110(6) have often been misconstrued after the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Singh. The Court in the A.B.Note 30 decision shed further light on this issue. First, it held that the RAD is not required to hold an oral hearing to assess the credibility of new evidence.Note 31 Second, it held that a credibility assessment of the proposed new evidence under the Singh factors is not equivalent to a credibility assessment of the person under a subsection 110(6) oral hearing assessment.Note 32 Third, and most importantly for the purpose of this discussion, the Court reiterated that it is when credible and admitted evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the general credibility of the person that the determination of an oral hearing becomes relevant.Note 33

In a number of decisions, the Court has dealt with the issue of determining whether the serious issue relates to the credibility of the person. For instance, in TchangoueNote 34 and Horvath,Note 35 the Court held that it was unreasonable for the RAD not to hold a hearing. In Tchangoue, the Court found that the concern regarding the authenticity of the new documents was clearly a serious issue which undermined the person’s credibility and which was not before the RPD.Note 36 In Horvath, the Court found that the credibility issue related directly to the person and arose from evidence that was admitted by the RAD.Note 37

On the other hand, in Galamb,Note 38Idugboe,Note 39Akinyemi-Oguntunde,Note 40 and Tahir,Note 41 the Court held that it was reasonable for the RAD not to hold a hearing.Note 42In Galamb, the Court found that the new evidence was not specific to the persons’ experience and did not attack the fundamental credibility findings of the RPD. In Idugboe, the Court citing AhmedNote 43 rendered in the PRRA context, held that doubts about the veracity of evidence do not necessarily amount to concerns about the person’s credibility. It found that the new evidence from third parties recounting new incidents did not impact the person’s credibility. In Akinyemi-Oguntunde the Court found that the case concerned the sufficiency of evidence and not credibility. In Tahir, the Court found that the RAD’s authenticity concerns about the warrant and summons did not trigger a requirement to hold an oral hearing.

6.5.2. Evidence is central to the decision with respect to the refugee claim

The second factor to be evaluated to decide if a hearing should be held at the RAD is to determine if the documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) of the IRPA (the new evidence) is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim.Note 44 The Federal Court of Appeal in Singh,Note 45 in finding that it was reasonable for the RAD not to hold a hearing, indicated that it was "far from a given” that the new evidence in that case was essential in deciding the person’s refugee protection claim.

In general, the case law has interpreted “central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim” as central to the RPD’s decision.Note 46

However, in Mofreh,Note 47 this criterion was interpreted as meaning central to the RAD’s decision, as the Court held that the RAD was correct in declining to conduct an oral hearing on the ground that the new evidence would not be determinative of the appeal.

6.5.2.1. Examples where new evidence is central

The Court dealt a number of times with the issue of determining if the new evidence was central to the decision with respect to the refugee claim. Here are some examples where the Court held that it was unreasonable for the RAD not to hold a hearing because the new evidence was central. In TchangoueNote 48 the Court found that the absence of the new evidence at the RPD was determinative of the RPD’s decision. In Ajaj,Note 49 the Court found that the new evidence was central to the decision regarding the person’s sur place claim because if it would have been accepted as authentic by the RAD, it would substantiate the person’s fear of the authorities of his country and his sur place claim could potentially succeed. In Horvath,Note 50 the Court found that the serious issues of credibility were central to the RPD decision given the serious credibility issues which arose from the RPD hearing and considering the new evidence accepted by the RAD.

6.5.2.2. Examples where new evidence is not central

The Court has also held in a number of cases that it was reasonable for the RAD not to hold a hearing because the new evidence was not central. Here are some examples of such cases. In Ketchen,Note 51 the Court found that the RAD was justified to accord low weight to the new evidence. Therefore, it stated that the new evidence could not meet the materiality requirements of subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. In Onyeme,Note 52 the Court found that the new evidence accepted, which was in the form of an affidavit, was simply confirming allegations of threats that were accepted by the RPD and that consequently, it was not central to the decision. In Ikheloa,Note 53 the Court found that the new evidence was not central because there were other credibility issues besides those regarding the new evidence that were determinative. In Idugboe,Note 54 the RPD and the RAD concluded that the persons had an internal flight alternative (IFA). Even though the new evidence spoke of the motivation of the agent to find the persons, the Court found that the new evidence was not central as the IFA determination was based on a variety of factors, including the agent’s means and ability to locate the persons which was not affected by the new evidence. In Ajaguna,Note 55 the RAD found that the new evidence was not material to the outcome because it was inherently unreliable and untrustworthy as it was based on hearsay and contained several inconsistencies and implausibilities. In Simone,Note 56 the RAD found that the new evidence would not be determinative of the claim as it would be insufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the person’s identity. The new evidence offered insufficient detail to overcome the weight of the fraudulent evidence presented on identity.

6.5.3. Evidence would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim

The third factor to be evaluated to decide if a hearing should by held at the RAD is to determine if the documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) of the IRPA (the new evidence), if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim.Note 57

6.5.3.1. Examples where new evidence would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim

In some cases, the Court has found that the evidence would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. For example, in Tchangoue,Note 58 the Court considered that the decision of the RAD not to hold a hearing was unreasonable as the new evidence would have justified allowing the claim. While in obiter, the Court did mention in DenisNote 59 that the outcome could be affected since identity is a dispositive issue.

6.5.3.2. Examples where new evidence would not justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim

However, in many decisions, the Court found that the evidence would not justify allowing or rejecting the claim. In cases where there are other determinative credibility issues than the one concerning the new evidence, the Court has been inclined to conclude that the new evidence would not justify allowing or rejecting the claim. For example, the Federal Court of Appeal in SinghNote 60 found that in light of the multiple credibility issues at the RPD, the new evidence in those cases would not warrant allowing the claim or rejecting the claim.

Where the determinative issue was different than the one raised by the new evidence, the Court has concluded that the new evidence would not justify allowing or rejecting the claim. For example, in Idugboe,Note 61 the RPD and the RAD concluded that the persons had an IFA. Even though the new evidence spoke of the motivation of the agent to find the persons, the Court found that the new evidence, if accepted, would not justify allowing or rejecting the claim as the IFA determination was based on a variety of factors, including the agent’s means and ability to locate the persons, which was not affected by the new evidence.

6.6. Scope of a Refugee Appeal Division oral hearing

The scope of the oral hearing at the RAD is limited. RAD Rule 56(1) states that when the RAD is notifying the person and the Minister of an oral hearing, the notice must contain the issues that will be raised at the hearing. Furthermore, RAD Rule 57(1) describes the scope of an oral hearing. It states that a hearing is restricted to matters relating to the issues provided with the notice to appear unless the RAD considers that other issues have been raised by statements made by the person or by a witness during the hearing.The Court has held that when the RAD raises an issue in the hearing that was identified in the notice to appear, the parties are not taken by surprise and there is no breach of natural justice.Note 62

Furthermore, under RAD Rule 57(3) the RAD may limit the questioning of witnesses, including the person. However, the RAD must take into account the nature and complexity of the issues and the relevance of the questions before deciding to limit the questioning. The RAD is also required under RAD Rule 57(5) to limit the representations that may be made, taking into account the complexity of the issues and the amount of relevant evidence heard. The RAD must also indicate what issues need to be addressed in the representations.

6.7. Holding a Refugee Appeal Division oral hearing - Procedural rules

Part 4 of the RAD RulesNote 63 deals with the procedural requirements with respect to holding an oral hearing at the RAD. The following sections outline these rules.

6.7.1. Rules on appellant’s record, reply record, notice of intervention respondent’s record

According to the RAD Rules in several situations the person must indicate whether they are requesting a hearing and why the RAD should hold a hearing: in their appellants’ record,Note 64 in their reply record,Note 65 and in their respondent’s record.Note 66

Also, according to the RAD Rules, in several situations the Minister must indicate whether they are requesting a hearing and why the RAD should hold a hearing: in their appellant’s record,Note 67 in their notice of intervention,Note 68 and in their reply record.Note 69

However, even though the RAD Rules instruct the person and the Minister to provide information related to a RAD oral hearing, the Court held that neither the IRPA nor the RAD Rules impose a burden on the parties either to request, or to satisfy the RAD that the circumstances merit an oral hearing. The onus rests with the RAD to consider and apply the statutory criteria reasonably.Note 70

6.7.2 Fixing a date for a hearing

RAD Rule 55 allows the RAD to require the parties to participate in a scheduling conference or otherwise give information to help the RAD fix a date for a hearing.

6.7.3 Notice to appear

According to paragraph 171(a) of the IRPA,Note 71 the RAD must give notice of any hearing to the Minister and to the person.

RAD Rule 56(1) indicates that the RAD gives notice to the person and to the Minister of any hearing. It is important to note that this is a situation where the RAD Rules indicate that the Minister must be given notice even though he is not a party to the appeal.Note 72 This subrule also indicates that the notice must be in writing and include the date, time and location fixed for the hearing, and the issues that will be raised at the hearing.

Pursuant to RAD Rule 56(2), the date of the hearing must not be earlier than 10 days after the day on which the person and the Minister received the notice to appear. However, on consent of the parties, this time may be shortened.

6.7.4 Conduct of a hearing

6.7.4.1. General rules

According to section 165 of the IRPA,Note 73 the RAD and each member of the division has the power and authority of a commissioner appointed under Part 1 of the Inquiries ActNote 74 and may do any other thing they consider necessary to provide a full and proper hearing.

According to paragraph 171(a.1) of the IRPA,Note 75 subject to subsection 110(4), if a hearing is held, the RAD must give the person and the Minister the opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make submissions.

The order of questioning during a RAD hearing is addressed in RAD Rule 57(2). Any witness, including the person, will be questioned in the following order: first by the person, second by any other party, third by the person in reply, and fourth by the RAD. However, according to RAD Rule 57(2), the RAD may order a different order of questioning.

Oral representations are the norm in a RAD hearing. RAD Rule 57(4) states that unless the RAD orders otherwise, representations must be made orally at the end of a hearing.

6.7.4.2. Particular situations

According to RAD Rule 22(3), once a date for a hearing has been fixed, the person may change the language of the appeal by notifying the RAD and the Minister in writing without delay. The notice must be received no later than 20 days before the hearing date.Note 76

According to RAD Rule 24, before using any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge, the RAD must notify the parties and give them an opportunity to make representations. If a date for a hearing has been fixed, the parties may make their representations orally or in writing on the reliability and use of the information or opinion and provide evidence in support of their representations.Note 77

According to Rule 37(2) on general applications, even if an oral hearing is held, the RAD must not allow a party to make an application orally at the hearing unless the party, with reasonable effort, could not have made a written application before that date.Note 78

According to RAD Rule 42(3), even if an oral hearing is held, the RAD must not allow a person to make an application to have a proceeding conducted in public orally at the hearing unless the person, with reasonable effort, could not have made a written application before that date.Note 79

6.7.5 Person who is in custody

In some instances, the person may be in custody. In these cases, RAD Rule 58 allows the RAD to order the custodian to bring the person to a proceeding at a location specified by the RAD.

6.7.6 Interpreters

RAD Rule 59 covers the language of interpretation at a hearing at the RAD. If the person needs an interpreter for the hearing, they must indicate the language and dialect, if any to be interpreted. This must be indicated in the appellant’s record or in the respondent’s record, depending on whether the person is the appellant or the respondent.Note 80

The person may change the chosen language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. A person who initially did not indicate that an interpreter was needed, may decide an interpreter is required. This must be done by notifying the RAD in writing of the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. The notice must be received by the RAD no later than 20 days before the date of the hearing.Note 81

If any party’s witness needs an interpreter for the hearing, the party must notify the RAD in writing and specify the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. This must be done by notifying the RAD in writing of the language and dialect, if any, to be interpreted. The notice must be received by the RAD no later than 20 days before the date of the hearing.Note 82

The interpreter must take an oath or make a solemn affirmation to interpret accurately.Note 83

6.7.7 Observers

The requirements regarding observers at a RAD hearing can be found in RAD Rule 60. If an observer at a RAD hearing is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a member of the staff of the Board or if the person consents to or requests the presence of an observer other than a representative of the press or of other media of communication, it is not necessary to present an application for proceedings to be conducted in public under RAD Rule 42.Note 84

The RAD must allow the attendance of an observer unless it is of the opinion that the observer’s attendance is likely to impede the proceeding.Note 85

The RAD Rules allow the RAD to take any measures it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the proceeding despite the presence of an observer.Note 86

6.7.8 Designated representatives

RAD Rule 23(11)(d) sets out the responsibilities of a designated representative which includes assisting in gathering evidence to support the represented person’s case and in providing evidence and, if necessary, being a witness at the hearing.Note 87

6.7.9 Witnesses

RAD Rule 61 sets out the requirements for when a party wishes to call a witness at a RAD hearing. The party wishing to call a witness at a RAD hearing must provide the following witness information in writing to any other party and to the RAD:

  • the witness’s contact information;
  • a brief statement of the purpose and substance of the witness’s testimony or, in the case of an expert witness, the expert witness’s brief signed summary of the testimony to be given;
  • the time needed for the witness’s testimony;
  • the party’s relationship to the witness;
  • in the case of an expert witness, a description of the expert witness’s qualifications; and
  • whether the party wants the witness to testify by means of live telecommunication.Note 88

This information must be provided to the RAD together with proof that it was provided to any other party.Note 89 Documents provided under RAD Rule 61 must be received by their recipients no later than 20 days before the date of the hearing.Note 90

Should a party not provide the witness information, the witness must not testify at the hearing unless the RAD allows them to do so.Note 91 In these circumstances, the RAD must consider any relevant factors, including:

  • the relevance and probative value of the proposed testimony; and
  • the reason why the witness information was not provided.Note 92

RAD Rules 62 and 63 cover the use of a summons in connection with a RAD hearing. A party who wants the RAD to order a person to testify at a hearing must make a request to the RAD for a summons, either orally at a proceeding or in writing.Note 93 In deciding whether to issue a summons, the RAD must consider any relevant factors, including:

  • the necessity of the testimony to a full and proper hearing;
  • the person’s ability to give that testimony; and
  • whether the person has agreed to be summoned as a witness.Note 94

Once a summons has been issued by the RAD, the party who wants to use the summons must provide the summons to the person by hand and then provide a copy of the summons to the RAD, together with proof that it was provided to the person by hand. The party who uses the summons must pay, or offer to pay, the person who is summoned the applicable witness fees and travel expenses set out in Tariff A of the Federal Courts Rules.Note 95

If a person who is summoned to appear as a witness wants the summons cancelled, they must make an application in writing to the RAD in accordance with RAD Rule 37. However, there is no requirement to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.Note 96

RAD Rule 64 covers the use of arrest warrants in connection with a RAD hearing. There are consequences if a person who is summoned does not obey the summons and fails to appear as a witness. The party who requested the summons may make a request to the RAD orally at the hearing, or in writing, to issue a warrant for the person’s arrest.Note 97 The party who makes a written request for a warrant must provide supporting evidence by affidavit or statutory declaration.Note 98

The RAD must not issue an arrest warrant unless:

  • the person was provided the summons by hand or the person is avoiding being provided the summons;
  • the person was paid or offered the applicable witness fees and travel expenses set out in Tariff A of the Federal Courts Rules;
  • the person did not appear at the hearing as required by the summons; and
  • the person’s testimony is still needed for a full and proper hearing.Note 99

The arrest warrant issued by the RAD must include directions concerning detention or release.Note 100

RAD Rule 65 covers the exclusion of witnesses at a RAD hearing. If the RAD excludes a witness from a hearing room, no person may communicate to the witness any evidence given while the witness was excluded unless allowed to do so by the RAD or until the witness has finished testifying.

6.7.10 Changing the location of a hearing

Under RAD Rule 66, a party may make an application to the RAD to change the location of a RAD hearing.Note 101 The application must be made in accordance with RAD Rule 37. However, the party is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.Note 102 Documents provided under RAD Rule 66 must be received by their recipients no later than 20 days before the date of the hearing.Note 103

In deciding the application, the RAD must consider any relevant factors, including:

  • whether the party is residing in the location where the party wants the hearing to be held;
  • whether a change of location would allow the hearing to be full and proper;
  • whether a change of location would likely delay the hearing;
  • how a change of location would affect the RAD’s operation;
  • how a change of location would affect the parties;
  • whether a change of location is necessary in order to accommodate a vulnerable person; and
  • whether a hearing may be conducted by means of live telecommunication with the person.Note 104

Unless a party receives a decision from the RAD allowing the application, the party must appear for the hearing at the location fixed and be ready to start or continue the hearing.Note 105

6.7.11 Changing the date or time of a hearing

RAD Rule 67 deals with the procedural requirements with respect to changing the date or time of a hearing.Note 106

Under RAD Rule 67, a party may make an application to the RAD to change the date or time of a RAD hearing.Note 107 The application must be made in accordance with RAD Rule 37. However, the party is not required to give evidence in an affidavit or statutory declaration.Note 108 The party must give at least six dates and times, within the period specified by the RAD, on which the party is available to start or continue the hearing.Note 109 Notice of the period specified by the RAD must be made available in such a manner that is publicly accessible.Note 110

If the party wants to make an application two working days or less before the date fixed for the hearing, the party must make the application orally on the date fixed for the hearing.Note 111

In deciding the application, the RAD must consider any relevant factors, including:

  • in the case of a date and time that was fixed after the RAD consulted or tried to consult the party, any exceptional circumstances for allowing the application;
  • when the party made the application;
  • the time the party has had to prepare for the hearing;
  • the efforts made by the party to be ready to start or continue the hearing;
  • in the case of a party who requests more time to obtain information in support of their arguments, the RAD’s ability to proceed in the absence of that information without causing an injustice;
  • whether the party has counsel;
  • the knowledge and experience of any counsel who represents the party;
  • any previous delays and the reasons for them;
  • whether the date and time fixed were peremptory;
  • whether the change is required to accommodate a vulnerable person;
  • whether allowing the application would unreasonably delay the hearing or likely cause an injustice; and
  • the nature and complexity of the matter to be heard.Note 112

It is important to note that if the party made a previous application that was denied, the RAD must consider the reasons for the denial and must not allow the subsequent application unless there are exceptional circumstances supported by new evidence.Note 113

If a person makes the application for personal medical reasons they must provide, together with the application, a legible, recently dated medical certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner whose name and address are printed or stamped on the certificate. The person who has provided a copy of the certificate to the RAD must provide the original document to the RAD without delay.Note 114

The medical certificate must set out the following:

  • the particulars of the medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevent the person from participating in the hearing on the date fixed for the hearing; and
  • the date on which the person is expected to be able to participate in the hearing.Note 115

If the person fails to provide a medical certificate in accordance with the RAD Rules, the person must include in their application the following:

  • particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence;
  • particulars of the medical reasons for the application, supported by corroborating evidence; and
  • an explanation of how the medical condition prevents them from participating in the hearing on the date fixed for the hearing.Note 116

Unless a party receives a decision from the RAD allowing the application, the party must appear for the hearing at the date and time fixed and be ready to start or continue the hearing.Note 117

6.7.12 Abandonment

RAD Rule 68 and subsection 168(1) of the IRPA provide for the process of abandonment when there is a default in the proceedings, including by failing to appear for a scheduled hearing.Note 118

In determining whether an appeal has been abandoned after a hearing has been scheduled, the RAD must give the appellant an opportunity to explain why the appeal should not be declared abandoned. The RAD can give the appellant this opportunity immediately, if the appellant is present at the hearing and the RAD considers that it is fair to do so, or in any other case, by way of a special hearing, after notifying the appellant in writing.Note 119

In deciding if the appeal should be declared abandoned, the RAD must consider the explanation given by the appellant and any other relevant factors, including the fact that the appellant is ready to start or continue the proceedings.Note 120

If the appellant is the person and the explanation includes their personal medical reasons, they must provide, together with the explanation, the original of a legible, recently dated medical certificate signed by a qualified medical practitioner whose name and address are printed or stamped on the certificate.Note 121

The medical certificate must set out the following:

  • the particulars of the medical condition, without specifying the diagnosis, that prevented the person from pursuing their appeal; and
  • the date on which the person is expected to be able to pursue their appeal.Note 122

If the person fails to provide a medical certificate in accordance with the RAD Rules, the person must include in their explanation the following:

  • particulars of any efforts they made to obtain the required medical certificate, supported by corroborating evidence;
  • particulars of the medical reasons included in the explanation, supported by corroborating evidence; and
  • an explanation of how the medical condition prevented them from pursuing their appeal.Note 123

If the RAD decides not to declare the appeal abandoned, it must start or continue the proceedings without delay.Note 124

6.7.13 Refugee Appeal Division decision after hearing

A RAD decision, other than an interlocutory decision, must be rendered in writing, even if a RAD hearing has been held.Note 125

Although some RAD RulesNote 126 do mention the possibility of a decision given orally at a RAD hearing, paragraph 169(c) of the IRPA states clearly that a RAD decision must be rendered in writing.Note 127

6.7.14 Virtual hearings

In accordance with the Practice notice on Scheduling Virtual hearings at the Refugee Appeal Division,Note 128 the RAD schedules virtual hearings for all appeals that require a hearing since November 2, 2020. When scheduling a hearing, counsel for the appellant will continue to be asked to confirm their availability for the proposed hearing date. They can also request an in-person hearing if they have specific concerns with holding the hearing virtually. The RAD will consider the circumstances of each request on a case-by-case basis.

Notes

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27.

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257.

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(6).

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(3) states:

110(3) Subject to subsections (3.1), (4) and (6), the Refugee Appeal Division must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division, and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal and, in the case of a matter that is conducted before a panel of three members, written submissions from a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and any other person described in the rules of the Board.

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(5). See also RAD Handbook Chapter 4: The Admissibility of Evidence for a more in-depth discussion on Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsections 110(3). 110(4) and 110(5).

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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 51 (CanLII).

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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 51 (CanLII). See also Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 223, paragraph 43 (CanLII).

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Khudeish v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1124, paragraph 47 (CanLII).

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Limones Munoz v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC 1051, paragraphs 33–35 (CanLII); Malambu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 763, paragraphs 32–38 (CanLII); Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1145, paragraphs 22–23 (CanLII); Chaudry v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 799, paragraphs 20–24 (CanLII).

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See for example: Limones Munoz v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC 1051, paragraphs 33–35 (CanLII); Malambu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 763, paragraphs 32–38 (CanLII); Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1145, paragraphs 22–23 (CanLII); Chaudry v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 799, paragraphs 20–24 (CanLII); Agunrege v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1546, paragraph 4 (CanLII).

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Malambu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 763, paragraph 36 (CanLII); Abdi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 54, paragraph 29 (CanLII); Santos De Pacas v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 97, paragraph 18 (CanLII); Homauoni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1403, paragraphs 38–39 (CanLII).

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Ejere v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 749, paragraph 14 (CanLII).

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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 71 (CanLII); Sow v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 584, paragraph 33 (CanLII); Abdi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 54 (CanLII); Galamb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2019 FC 580, paragraph 11 (CanLII)Mofreh v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2019 FC 97, paragraph 26 (CanLII)

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A.B. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 61, paragraph 17 (CanLII); Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1145, paragraphs 19–23 (CanLII); Homauoni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1403, paragraph 39 (CanLII); Abdulai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 173, paragraph 57 (CanLII);  Marquez Obando v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 441, paragraphs 26–29 (CanLII).  However, in two cases the Court has suggested otherwise where no new evidence was found admissible. In Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 438, paragraph 35 (CanLII), the FC indicated that the RAD could have held a hearing to assess the credibility of the evidence and in Asri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 303, paragraphs 61–62 (CanLII), the FC indicated that the RAD could have held a hearing to obtain information on​ why the new evidence was withheld by the family and therefore was not reasonably available earlier. These decisions are contrary to the majority of the FC decisions on this issue.

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See for example: Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 223, paragraph 43 (CanLII); Balde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 624, paragraphs 30–32 (CanLII); Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraph 11 (CanLII); Paz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 208, paragraph 34 (CanLII); C.D. v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2022 FC 1582, paragraph 15 (CanLII).

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Balde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 624, paragraphs 30–32 (CanLII).

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Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraphs 9–11 (CanLII).

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Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraphs 2,4, 9–11 (CanLII).

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Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraph 11 (CanLII); Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraph 18 (CanLII).

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Smith v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1472, paragraph 46 (CanLII).

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Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraph 11 (CanLII) .

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules SOR/2021-257, rules 3(3)(d)(ii), 3(3)(g)(v), 4(2)(e), 5(2)(d)(iii)  and Refugee Appeal Division Rules SOR/2021-257, rules 9(2)(d)(ii), 10(3)(b)(i), 10(3)(e)(iii), 11(2)(c)(ii) provide for the person or the Minister the possibility to request an oral hearing at the RAD.

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Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraph 11 (CanLII); Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraph 18 (CanLII); RAD Reasons of Interest TB8-04091 X (Re), 2018 CanLII 151916 (RAD), paragraph 17. See also Kayitesi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 638, paragraphs 16, 21–22 (CanLII). However, it should be noted that in Sisay Teka v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 314, paragraphs 23–28 (CanLII), the Federal Court determined that the RAD Rules place an onus on the parties to inform the RAD why they are requesting an oral hearing and to provide full and detailed submission supporting this request. This decision is contrary to the majority of the Federal Court’s decisions on this issue.

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Tchangoue v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 334, paragraph 18 (CanLII)Hundal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 72, paragraph 28 (CanLII). See also Bukul v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 118, paragraphs 23–25 (CanLII); Montes Camacho v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1723, paragraphs 4, 11–13 (CanLII).

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 110(6)(a) .

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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 44 (CanLII).

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Paz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 280, paragraph 33 (CanLII).

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Nuri v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1783, paragraph 16 (CanLII).

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See RAD Handbook Chapter 4: The Admissibility of Evidence for a discussion on the credibility factor to be addressed in the admissibility of new evidence assessment under subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

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A.B. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 61, paragraph 17 (CanLII).

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A.B. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 61, paragraph 17 (CanLII); Tahir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1202, paragraph 20 (CanLII);  Marquez Obando v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 441, paragraphs 26–29 (CanLII); Paranych v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 891, paragraphs 31-33 (CanLII).

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A.B. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 61, paragraph 17 (CanLII); Paranych v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 891, paragraph 31 (CanLII).

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While there is no language in the legislation that indicates that the serious issue of credibility must be a new one, it should be noted that there is some jurisprudence that seems to suggest this. See Ajaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 674, paragraph 22 (CanLII); Ikheloa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1161, paragraph 29 (CanLII); Nteta–Tshamala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1191, paragraph 30 (CanLII). These decisions appear to be contrary to the majority of the FC and FCA jurisprudence that state that only the factors in subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act must be met. See for example: Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 71 (CanLII); Kreishan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 223, paragraph 43 (CanLII); Mofreh v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2019 FC 97, paragraph 26 (CanLII); Khudeish v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1124, paragraph 47 (CanLII).

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Tchangoue v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 334, paragraphs 16–17 (CanLII).

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Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraphs 8–10, 19 (CanLII).

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Tchangoue v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 334, paragraphs 16–17 (CanLII). In this case, the person produced several documents. The RAD gave little probative value to the documents given its finding that the person was not credible. The RAD concluded its analysis of the probative value of the two (2) news articles by stating that the submission of false or irregular documents, such as the various affidavits and the medical report, has an impact on the weight assigned to the other documents provided by the person and also the overall credibility of the person.

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Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraphs 8–10, 19 (CanLII). In this case the persons submitted new evidence in support of their appeal pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. All of the new evidence was accepted by the RAD. It confirmed that the persons did reside at the address they had claimed; a fact questioned by the RPD and that the principal person suffered from advanced “end stage” glaucoma (but did not indicate the cause), a matter of some concern to the RAD. The principal person alleged that he was blind as a result of a physical assault. Given the contradictory evidence provided to the RPD, the RAD was not satisfied that it was racially motivated. Also, an updated psychological report indicating that the principal person suffered from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder was also admitted but given little weight as according to the RAD, it could not be used to establish the credibility of the refugee claim.

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Galamb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 580, paragraphs 12–15 (CanLII).

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Idugboe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 334, paragraph 42 (CanLII).

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Akinyemi–Oguntunde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 666, paragraph 23 (CanLII).

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Tahir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1202, paragraphs 20–21 (CanLII).

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See also, for example, Talab v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 747, paragraphs 50–54 (CanLII); Mbouna v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 941, paragraph 13 (CanLII); Ibrahim v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1062, paragraph 3 (CanLII).

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Ahmed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1207, paragraph 32 (CanLII).

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 110(6)(b).

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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 71 (CanLII).

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See Tchangoue v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 334, paragraph 17 (CanLII) and Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraph 25 (CanLII).

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Mofreh v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2019 FC 97, paragraph 29 (CanLII).

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Tchangoue v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 334, paragraph 17 (CanLII).

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Ajaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 674, paragraph 22 (CanLII).

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Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraph 25 (CanLII).

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Ketchen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 388, paragraph 33 (CanLII).

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Onyeme v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1243, paragraphs 34–35 (CanLII).

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Ikheloa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1161, paragraphs 27–30 (CanLII). See also Rodriguez Palacios v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 760, paragraph 28 (CanLII).

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Idugboe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 334, paragraph 43 (CanLII).

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Ajaguna v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 556, paragraph 14 (CanLII).

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Simone v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1345, paragraphs 11–13 (CanLII). See also Shen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1456, paragraph 35 (CanLII).

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 110(6)(c).

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Tchangoue v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 334, paragraph 17 (CanLII).

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Denis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1182, paragraph 81 (CanLII) (in obiter).

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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 71 (CanLII). See also Oluwakemi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 973, paragraph 6 (CanLII);  Ikheloa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1161, paragraphs 27–30 (CanLII);  Ibrahim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1148, paragraph 25 (CanLII).

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Idugboe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 334, paragraph 43 (CanLII).

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Vigan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 398, paragraph 13 (CanLII).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257.

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rules 3(3)(d)(ii) and 3(3)(g)(v).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 5(2)(d)(iii) .

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 10(3)(b)(i) and 10(3)(e)(iii).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 9(2)(d)(ii).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 4(2)(e).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 11(2)(c)(ii).

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Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 911, paragraph 11 (CanLII); Horvath v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147, paragraph 18 (CanLII). See also in this chapter, section 6.4 Onus on RAD to consider and apply subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 171(a).

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See also RAD Handbook, Chapter 1: Introduction to the Refugee Appeal Division, section 1.3 Parties before the RAD.

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 165.

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Inquiries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c-I-11, Part 1.

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 171(a.1).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, Rule 22(3).

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See also RAD Handbook Chapter 4: Admissibility of Evidence and the paper on Weighing Evidence (December 2020), Chapter 10 for a discussion on specialized knowledge.

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See also RAD Handbook Chapter 1: Introduction to the Refugee Appeal Division, section 1.4.4.10 for a discussion on general applications.

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See also RAD Handbook Chapter 1: Introduction to the Refugee Appeal Division, section 1.4.4.12 for a discussion on proceedings conducted in public

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rules 59(1), 3(3)(d)(iii), and 10(3)(b)(ii).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 59(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 59(3).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 59(4).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 60(1). See also Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 166(e) concerning observation by a representative or agent of the UNHCR.

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 60(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 60(3).

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See also RAD Handbook Chapter 1: Introduction to the Refugee Appeal Division, section 1.4.4.5.

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 61(1).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 61(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 61(3).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 61(4).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 61(5).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 62(1).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 62(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 62(3).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rules 63(1) and 63(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 64(1).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 64(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 64(3).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 64(4).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 66(1) .

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 66(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 66(3).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 66(4).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 66(5).

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The Chairperson Guideline 6 - Scheduling and Changing the Date or Time of a Proceeding should  be consulted on all applications to change the date or time of a hearing (April 2010, Amended in December 2012).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(1).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(2)(a).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(2)(b).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(3).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(4).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(5).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(6).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(7).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(8).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(9).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 67(10).

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See also RAD Handbook Chapter 1: Introduction to the Refugee Appeal Division, section 1.4.4.16.

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 68(1) .

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 68(2).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 68(3) .

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 68(4).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 68(5).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 68(6).

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 169(c).

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 50(2)(b), 51(1)(b) and 51(2)(b).  

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See also RAD Handbook Chapter 1: Introduction to the Refugee Appeal Division, section 1.4.4.17 for a discussion on RAD decisions and reasons.

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See also the Practice notice Use of Videoconferencing in Proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (December 2010, Amended in April 2022).

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