Responses to Information Requests

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

Sources translate the GBT as "Extended Background Search" (UK 2019-10, 101) or as "General Information Gathering" system (Assistant Professor 2024-11-10; Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28; Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22). The website of the Türkiye Ministry of Interior's General Directorate of Security indicates the following:

[translation]

GBT is a program that keeps records of ex-convicts, people who have committed crimes but have not been captured, and all kinds of documents that are stolen, lost, or serve as proof of identity. The program is designed to take preventive and protective measures to ensure the security of the constitutional order and general security of the state. It also supports law enforcement officers … to obtain results in a shorter time. (Türkiye 2018-01-02)

Citing a 2015 letter from the Türkiye Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Anti-Smuggling, Intelligence, Operations and Information (Kaçakçılık İstihbarat, Harekât ve Bilgi Toplama Dairesi Başkanlığı, KİHBİ), a journal article written by Bilal Osmanoğlu, a research assistant in the Faculty of Law at the Turkish-German University (Türk-Alman Üniversitesi) (Türk-Alman Üniversitesi n.d.), notes that the GBT supports law enforcement, as well as administrative services provided to citizens (Osmanoğlu 2020-12, 951). According to Kadim Law and Consultancy (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık), a law firm based in Ankara whose practice areas include criminal law (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık n.d.), the GBT is a database system containing information on individuals who have been arrested, detained or banned from exiting Türkiye; individuals who have committed a crime, even if they have not been arrested; and individuals who face judicial prosecution (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28). The same source adds that the GBT executes Turkish ID number searches and personal data checks (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28). Sources indicate that the GBT is used by law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Interior (Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22; Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28), including the police, Coast Guard, Gendarmerie and Customs (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28). A 2019 report on police databases, including the GBT, by the Swiss Refugee Council (Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés, OSAR) [1], citing 2019 correspondence from an unnamed researcher studying the Turkish judiciary who was previously a high-level security official in Türkiye, similarly indicates that the GBT database is shared between the police, the gendarmerie and border services (OSAR 2019-06-14, 5, 9).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an associate professor of criminal justice, cybersecurity and sociology at the Center for the Analysis and Prevention of Crime at the University of Scranton, who has conducted research on the criminal justice system in Türkiye, indicated that the GBT system is maintained by the KİHBİ (Associate Professor 2025-04-03). In follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Associate Professor stated that the finalized GBT system was launched in the 2000s as a national digital profiling system (2025-04-23). The OSAR indicates, citing the researcher studying the Turkish judiciary, that GBT is a database of the Police Information Network (Polis Bilgi Ağı, PolNet), an internal network of the Turkish police (2019-06-14, 8). In an interview with the Research Directorate, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Copenhagen, who focuses on minority rights in Türkiye, indicated that PolNet is an online system connected with 40 databases, including the GBT (Postdoctoral Fellow 2025-04-14). The same source also stated that it is a "very effective and sophisticated system" due to long-term investment in digitalization by the State (Postdoctoral Fellow 2025-04-14).

Sources indicate that GBT checks are conducted

• at security checkpoints (Associate Professor 2025-04-03).
• at airports (Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22; Postdoctoral Fellow 2025-04-14).
• when an individual enters Türkiye (Associate Professor 2025-04-03; UK 2019-10, 101; Postdoctoral Fellow 2025-04-14) or exits Türkiye (Associate Professor 2025-04-03)
• when an individual is arrested (Associate Professor 2025-04-03).
• when law enforcement officers conduct identity checks in public places (Associate Professor 2025-04-03; Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22), such as on public transportation (Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22) or in restaurants (Associate Professor 2025-04-03).
• during background checks when seeking employment (Associate Professor 2025-04-03).
• at Turkish consulates and embassies (Associate Professor 2025-04-03).
• when an individual obtains the services of a notary public, since the National Notary System is "indirect[ly] integrat[ed]" with the GBT (Professor 2025-04-03).
• when an individual accesses civil registry services, since law enforcement can enter "alerts" on the civil registry (Postdoctoral Fellow 2025-04-14).
  
  

2. Information Contained Within the GBT

Sources indicate that GBT records are regulated by the Information Gathering Directive [also known as the KİHBİ Directive (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)], which is classified as [translation] "[r]estricted" and is not publicly accessible (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28; Osmanoğlu 2020-12, 947-948). The OSAR report, citing an unnamed diplomatic source based in Türkiye interviewed in 2018, notes that [translation] "complete and clear information" on the GBT's contents is not available to anyone outside the police (2019-06-14, 6, 9). The Postdoctoral Fellow similarly indicated that the GBT is not accessible to members of the public and the public does not know how the system works or how much information is stored in it (2025-04-14). Additionally, the 2019 OSAR report notes that there is conflicting information on the type of data stored in the GBT (2019-06-14, 9).

A 2009 UK Home Office country report quotes a fax sent to the British Embassy in Ankara on 7 October 2005 from the Assistant Director of the Trafficking and Organized Crime Directorate of the Türkiye Ministry of Interiors as follows:

"Records relating to individuals who are being prosecuted or are subject to investigation are being kept in the GBT system. Records relating to individuals who have been taken into custody and subsequently released are not registered in the GBT system." (UK 2009-10-20, para. 31.27)

A 2019 journal article on personal information related to criminal proceedings in the GBT written by Naciye Betül Haliloğlu [2] cites article 20/d of the KİHBİ directive, which was publicly available online when Haliloğlu was preparing the article in September 2019, as indicating that GBT data includes the following information:

[translation]

surname, previous surname, given name, father's name, mother's name, gender, place of birth, country of birth, date of birth, nickname, marital status, information contained in the identity card, crime, date of crime, city/district, subdivision/village[; and] in the case of terrorist crimes, the organization, faction to which the defendant belongs, the clause of the finalized criminal conviction, and the duration of the conviction. (Haliloğlu 2019, 363)

Other sources indicate that the GBT contains the following information:

• identity information, including name, date and place of birth (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28; Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22), sex, marital status, Turkish ID number, current residential address and, if applicable, previous residential addresses (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)
• [translation] "[b]rief information" about the individual's family and social circles (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)
• arrest warrants (Australia 2025-05-16, para. 5.26; Associate Professor 2025-04-03; Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28) and their status (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)
• search warrants (Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22; Haliloğlu 2019, 362)
• previous detentions (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)
• criminal proceedings (Associate Professor 2025-04-03)
• current and previous prosecutions, including the outcome and case status (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)
• sanctions or prohibitions imposed on an individual (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28) or an order to [translation] "depriv[e]" a person of "certain rights" (Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22; Haliloğlu 2019, 362)
• criminal records (UK 2019-10, 101) or prior offences, including the nature of the offence, the decision of the court and the length of the sentence (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28)
• travel bans (Associate Professor 2025-04-03; Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22)
• military service records (Australia 2025-05-16, para. 5.26) or information on individuals wanted by military recruitment (Çapa Hukuk Bürosu 2024-02-22)
• taxation status (Australia 2025-05-16, para. 5.26)
• missing individuals (Haliloğlu 2019, 362; Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28).
  
  

The information in the following 2 paragraphs was provided by the 2019 journal article by Haliloğlu, which cites the KİHBİ Directive and an interview the author conducted with a KİHBİ official in September 2019:

The GBT records information about individuals [translation] "who have been ordered to be deprived of the exercise of certain rights or who are missing, as well as persons against whom a search warrant has been issued, or an apprehension warrant has been issued in their absence"; these records are known as "'personal information forms'."

The KİHBİ Directive also mandates the creation of personal information forms when the crime involved is listed under article 9/b of said directive, even when the individual involved has been "apprehended" or when no search or arrest warrant has been issued. Article 9/b contains "a list of 57 articles covering a wide range of offences such as tax evasion, blackmail, invasion of privacy, bribery, embezzlement, looting, sexual assault, theft and offences covered by the Anti-Terrorism Law." The records for individuals whose alleged offence is covered under article 9/b are initially created during the investigation phase; if the case is prosecuted, the forms continue to be kept and updated; if the individual is convicted, these records are maintained. Unlike criminal records that are created only when an individual is convicted, GBT data can include information from the investigation and trial phases (Haliloğlu 2019, 362–363, 370–371).

According to the Associate Professor, there are two categories of information in the GBT: "active" information about individuals with search warrants or travel bans, and "passive" information used for background checks (2025-04-03). The same source indicated that the type of "accusation or conviction" determines how long a passive record is kept in the GBT system; records related to terrorism investigations "remain in the system forever, visible to all law enforcement at all times," whereas records of "less severe" crimes "are removed from the system after certain periods" when the status of the case is "clarified" (Associate Professor 2025-04-03). For example, the record of an individual who was convicted of a "simple" assault will be purged a "couple of years" after they have served their sentence (Associate Professor 2025-04-03). Osmanoğlu notes that according to the KİHBİ Directive [3], information for [translation] "certain offences" is kept in the GBT until the individual dies, and that information is used for "security screening and security investigations"; even a conviction that has been removed from someone's criminal record "a long time ago" can remain in the GBT (Osmanoğlu 2020-12, 947). The same source notes that since the KİHBİ Directive is classified, it is not possible to predict "why, when and for how long" someone's data will be kept in the system (Osmanoğlu 2020-12, 947).

Sources indicate that the GBT is integrated with the National Judiciary Network Project (Ulusal Yargı Ağı Projesi, UYAP) or National Judiciary Informatics System (Ulusal Yargi Ağı Bilişim Sistemi, UYAP) (Associate Professor 2025-04-03; Netherlands 2021-03, 27). According to a report on UYAP by the Türkiye Ministry of Justice, UYAP is a "central network project" that integrates "all of the courts, public prosecutors['] services, prisons, other judicial institutions and other government departments" in Türkiye (Türkiye n.d., 2). For further information on UYAP, see Response to Information Request TUR202452 of November 2025. According to the Associate Professor, judicial and law enforcement officials can enter warrants, convictions and other information "into the system for those … subject to a criminal proceeding" (2025-04-03).

3. Access to the GBT

According to the Associate Professor, Türkiye has a centralized national law enforcement system that consists of police in urban areas, gendarmerie in rural areas, and coast guards located across 81 provinces, 922 municipalities, and all ports, including seaports and airports (2025-04-03). Sources report that GBT is accessible by "all" law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges (Associate Professor 2025-04-03) or by judicial authorities and security forces, including the police and gendarmerie (Netherlands 2021-03, 27).

According to an article in a quarterly magazine published by Havelsan, a technology firm "affiliated" with the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation that provides "products, solutions, and services for the armed forces, public, and private sectors" (Havelsan n.d.), law enforcement can perform GBT scans through relevant networks such as the PolNet and the Gendarmerie Integrated Communication and Information System (Jandarma Entegre Muhabere ve Bilgi Sistemi, JEMUS) (Şenol & Karaçuha 2020-07-22, 56). According to Aselsan, a defence electronics company based in Türkiye (Aselsan n.d.a), JEMUS is an information processing system made up of telephone, radio, computer and cameras that can be used while mobile or in fixed locations (Aselsan n.d.b).

According to an executive of the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği, İHD), an organization working to improve human rights in Türkiye, who was interviewed by the UK Home Office for a fact-finding mission, different types of records are used by the police when a person enters the country, including the following:

1. [GBT] reveals whether the person has any criminal records.
2. Law Enforcement Procedures Project (Emniyet Kolluk İşlemleri Projesi, Polnet4 EKİP) reveals whether the person has any criminal records.
3. [UYAP] reveals whether the person has any legal investigations or prosecutions against her/him.
4. Guidelines for Collecting Intelligence, Operations and Information [A]gainst Smuggling (Kaçakçılık İstihbarat Harekat ve Bilgi Toplama Yönergesi - KİHBİ) reveals whether the person has any records.
5. KOMBS - reveals whether the person has any records in the search screen updated by the intelligence services referred to as the FETÖ/PDY (Fethullah Gulen Organization, a.k.a. the Parallel State Structure) New Bylock Search [4]. (UK 2019-10, 98, 101)
   
   

Citing a confidential source interviewed in November 2020, a country information report by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that when a customs officer queries the ID number of an individual departing Türkiye in the GBT, the database will display whether the court has issued an exit ban (Netherlands 2021-03, 27). The same confidential source indicated that police and gendarmerie officers can add notes on PolNet without a judge or the individual knowing; these notes will alert customs officers that the individual should not leave Türkiye, even if there is no exit ban in place (Netherlands 2021-03, 28). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to Kadim Law and Consultancy, individuals can request information about their GBT records by

1. applying to the Provincial or District Security Directorates in person and providing their Turkish ID number and proof of identity, or
2. applying to the General Directorate of Security with a written application or through a notary public (Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık 2025-04-28).
   
   

Further and corroborating information on the process of requesting a GBT record, including challenges in obtaining the records, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Police Access and Tracking Ability

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a professor at the Sul Ross State University in Texas who has written on law enforcement and crime in Türkiye noted that the GBT is "indirect[ly] integrat[ed]" with the National Notary System, which automatically checks the name and ID number of anyone using notary services; if that person has a search or arrest warrant, an alert is generated and law enforcement will be sent to that notary's office (Professor 2025-04-03). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Postdoctoral Fellow indicated that security forces can place alerts in the civil registry, and individuals wanted by security forces can be caught when attempting to enter a vital event into the civil registry (2025-04-14). Citing a 2015 letter from the KİHBİ to the Constitutional Court, Osmanoğlu notes that information recorded in the GBT has been used in the provision of certain government services to citizens (issuing gun licences, driver's licences, and passports), as well as in tracking "penalties" barring citizens from public services (Osmanoğlu 2020-12, 951).

According to the Associate Professor, "once an individual is subject to a criminal investigation or prosecution" and registered in the GBT, they can be arrested when their names are checked in the GBT by law enforcement (2025-04-03). The same source also stated that individuals registered in the GBT can be denied consular and embassy services abroad (Associate Professor 2025-04-03). A 2023 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report notes that Türkiye is one of the governments that "[m]ost [f]requently" attempts to silence dissidents abroad (US 2023-10, 1, 11). The Associate Professor observed that the GBT database provides "a baseline" for the repression of political opponents abroad mentioned in the US GAO report (2025-04-03).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Toronto whose research focuses on modern Turkish and Kurdish politics indicated that it is "very common" for police in Türkiye to stop people on the street and ask for identification (2024-11-07), noting in follow-up correspondence that authorities can run the individual's ID card or citizenship number through the GBT (Assistant Professor 2024-11-10).

An article by the Daily Sabah [5] with Anadolu Agency (AA) [6] cites the Mayor of Istanbul as stating that, in Istanbul in the first four months of 2024, GBT "inquiries were conducted for 27,361,562 individuals and 3,906,860 vehicles. Penalties were imposed on 219,562 vehicles" (Daily Sabah with AA 2024-05-08).

The information in the following paragraph was provided in a master's thesis by Özgün Erdener Topak, submitted to the Middle East Technical University in 2009, citing other sources:

The government website for Mobile Electronic System Integration (Mobil Elektronik System Entegrasyonu, MOBESE) is quoted describing MOBESE as "'[t]he City Information and Security System'," which allows police officers access to "police database archives" from anywhere. The same website is further cited as indicating that MOBESE was installed in Istanbul in January 2005 and that as of 2008, it was operating in 3,500 vehicles and 570 cameras, and was incorporated into 32 district police departments and 85 police stations. A 2008 report by Polis Haber, a Turkish news source focusing on the police, is cited as indicating that as part of the implementation of MOBESE, 2,000 "palmtop computers" were allocated to the mobile police forces to enable them to search the police databases; in 2008 the police in Istanbul, using these palmtop units, checked the identity of 9,443,000 individuals through the GBT, and caught 41,464 "fugitives" (Topak 2009-06, 126).

A 2008 Human Rights Watch report notes that in June 2007, a "revised law on the power and duties of the police" provided for the first time a legal basis for "the practice of police conducting identity checks, asking people to produce ID on demand" and checking the ID with the GBT (2008-12-05, 57).

The Law on Duties and Powers of Police (Polis Vazife ve Salâhiyet Kanunu) provides the following:

[translation]

Stopping and asking for identification

Article 4/A- (Added: 2007/06/02 - 5681/Art.1)

The police may stop individuals and vehicles for the following purposes:

a) To prevent the commission of a crime or offence;

b) To ensure the apprehension of perpetrators who flee after committing a crime, to identify the perpetrators of crimes or offences;

c) To identify persons for whom an apprehension warrant or a subpoena has been issued;

ç) To prevent an existing or potential danger to the life, physical integrity, or property of individuals or to society.

In order for the police to exercise their power to stop, there must be reasonable grounds based on their experience and their impression of the situation. The act of stopping cannot be carried out in a manner that is continuous, creates a de facto situation, or is arbitrary.

The police shall inform the person they have stopped of the reason for stopping them and may ask questions related to the reason for stopping them; they may request that the person present their identity or other documents that must be carried.

…

If the identity of an individual cannot be established due to lack of documents, refusal to provide information, or untruthful statements, or for any other reason, the individual shall be detained, and the public prosecutor shall be immediately informed of the situation. This individual shall be detained until their identity is clearly established and, if necessary, arrested.

…

An individual detained for the purpose of establishing their identity shall be provided with a document stating that they have been detained for that purpose and the duration of their detention, after their identity has been established and if they so request. If the identity of the individual is established, detention or arrest shall cease immediately.

In cases where the identity of individuals cannot be determined because they are not recorded in the civil registry, the necessary procedures shall be taken to register them in the civil registry, after which they shall be registered with their photographs and fingerprints taken in accordance with Article 5 (Türkiye 1934).

According to Human Rights Watch, the revised law also enabled the police to create a data bank of fingerprints and photographic identification and to conduct "preventive searches of public places" (2008-12-05, 24).

5. Cases of Individuals Being Tracked

Information on cases of individuals being tracked by the police using these databases could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The OSAR is a politically and religiously independent non-profit public benefit organization with its head office in Bern, Switzerland (OSAR n.d.). ^[back]

[2] Naciye Betül Haliloğlu is a research assistant at the Faculty of Law at Istanbul University (Istanbul University n.d.). Her 2019 journal article was published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Constitutional Justice (Haliloğlu 2019, i). ^[back]

[3] Since the KİHBİ Directive is not publicly available, when Osmanoğlu cites the KİHBİ Directive in his article, he is citing court decisions or other texts that cite the directive (Osmanoğlu 2020-12, 929). ^[back]

[4] For information on the ByLock application, see Response to Information Request TUR201739 of November 2024. ^[back]

[5] Daily Sabah is a "pro-government" Turkish newspaper (AP 2021-12-06). ^[back]

[6] AA is a "state-run" news agency in Türkiye (Reuters 2020-01-15). ^[back]

References

Aselsan. N.d.a. "Contact." [Accessed 2025-06-13]

Aselsan. N.d.b. "JEMUS: The Gendarmerie Integrated Communication and Information System." [Accessed 2025-06-13]

Assistant Professor, University of Toronto. 2024-11-10. Follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Assistant Professor, University of Toronto. 2024-11-07. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Associated Press (AP). 2021-12-06. "Turkey Says Mosque Attacks on Cyprus Won't Go 'Unanswered'." [Accessed 2025-03-11]

Associate Professor, Center for the Prevention and Analysis of Crime, University of Scranton. 2025-04-23. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Associate Professor, Center for the Prevention and Analysis of Crime, University of Scranton. 2025-04-03. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Australia. 2025-05-16. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Türkiye. [Accessed 2025-06-09]

Çapa Hukuk Bürosu. 2024-02-22. Buğra Çapa. "GBT Nedir? GBT’de Neler Çıkar?" Excerpt translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-04-11]

Daily Sabah with Anadolu Agency. 2024-05-08. "Did Crime Decrease? Governor Unveils Istanbul's Security Stats." [Accessed 2025-09-08]

Haliloğlu, Naciye Betül. 2019. "Yargılamaya ve Mahkûmiyete Ilişkin Verilerin Genel Bilgi Toplama (Gbt) Sisteminde Tutulması: Anayasa Mahkemesinin Bülent Kaya ve E.Ç.A. Kararlarının Avrupa Insan Hakları Mahkemesi Içtihatları Işığında Değerlendirilmesi." Anayasa Yargısı. Journal of Constitutional Justice. Vol. 36, Issue 2. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-05-27]

Havelsan. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2025-03-18]

Human Rights Watch. 2008-12-05. Closing Ranks Against Accountability: Barriers to Tackling Police Violence in Turkey. [Accessed 2025-09-08]

Istanbul University. N.d. "Res. Asst. Naciye Betül Haliloğlu Pakdil." [Accessed 2025-06-09]

Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık. 2025-04-28. Umur Yıldırım. "GBT Nedir? GBT'de Neler Çıkar?" Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-05-15]

Kadim Hukuk ve Danışmanlık. N.d. Homepage. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-04-29]

Netherlands. 2021-03. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Country of Origin Information Report: Turkey. [Accessed 2025-09-08]

Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés (OSAR). 2019-06-14. Turquie : bases de données des autorités de sécurité turques (PolNet, GBTS). [Accessed 2025-06-16]

Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés (OSAR). N.d. "Organisation." [Accessed 2025-06-05]

Osmanoğlu, Bilal. 2020-12. "Genel Bilgi Toplama (GBT) Sisteminde Kişilere İlişkin Tutulan Kayıtlar Üzerine Bir İnceleme. An Analysis of the Records Regarding Persons in the General Information Collection (GBT) System." Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi. Vol. 26, No. 2. [Accessed 2025-04-07]

Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Copenhagen. 2025-04-14. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Professor, Sul Ross State University, Texas. 2025-04-03. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Reuters. 2020-01-15. "Turkey Summons Egypt Diplomat After Raid on Anadolu Agency in Cairo." [Accessed 2025-06-16]

Şenol, Mustafa & Ertuğrul Karaçuha. 2020-07-22. "Power of Networks: Network Enabled Life, Management and Warfare." Havelsan. No. 6. [Accessed 2025-09-08]

Topak, Özgün Erdener. 2009-06. E-Governmentalisation of the State: On the Way to Society of Control? Master's Thesis. Middle East Technical University, Türkiye. [Accessed 2025-03-14]

Türk-Alman Üniversitesi. N.d. "Res. Assist. PhD Bilal Osmanoğlu." [Accessed 2025-06-05] 

Türkiye. 2018-01-02. Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Security. "Projeler." Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-04-03]

Türkiye. 1934 (amended 2007). Kaçakçılıkla Mücadele Kanunu. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-03-31]

Türkiye. N.d. Ministry of Justice. UYAP National Judiciary Informatics System. [Accessed 2025-06-10]

United Kingdom (UK). 2019-10. Home Office. Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission. Turkey: Kurds, the HDP and the PKK. [Accessed 2025-03-28]

United Kingdom (UK). 2009-10-20. Home Office. Country of Origin Information Report: Turkey. [Accessed 2025-06-16]

United States (US). 2023-10. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Human Rights: Agency Actions Needed to Address Harassment of Dissidents and Other Tactics of Transnational Repress in the U.S. [Accessed 2025-06-13]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: İnsan Hakları Derneği; investigative journalist who writes about political affairs and human right violations in Türkiye; law firms based in Ankara (2); law firms based in Istanbul (2); lawyers based in Istanbul (3); research assistant in a law department at a Turkish university; Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; BBC; Bicak Law Office; Dünya; Erol Avukatlık & Danışmanlık; EU – European Commission; Euronews; Freedom House; International Criminology; The Jamestown Foundation; Jurix; Middle East Eye; Nordic Monitor; Ozan Soylu Law Firm; Syrians for Truth and Justice; Turkish Minute; US – Congressional Research Service, Department of State; Voice of America.