Türkiye: Situation of Kurds, including in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir; situation of supporters or perceived supporters of the Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP); situation of Alevi Kurds (2022–November 2024)
1. Overview
Sources indicate that Kurds form the "largest ethnic and linguistic minority" in Türkiye, making up approximately 15 to 20 percent of the population (MRG 2024-02) or that ["[m]ore than" (US 2024-04-22, 68)] 15 million Turkish citizens are Kurdish (US 2024-04-22, 68; Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.2). According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG), Kurds speak "Kurdish, which is divided into Kurmanci [Kurmanji, Kurmancî], Zaza and other dialects" (2024-02). Sources indicate that Kurds in Türkiye are mainly Sunni Muslims [of the Shafi'i school, as opposed to most Muslim ethnic Turks who follow the Hanafi school of Islam (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.3)], and ["[m]any" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.19) or a "significant number" of (MRG 2024-02)] Kurds are Alevi (MRG 2024-02; Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.3, 3.19). Sources indicate that Kurds are historically the majority ethnic group in southeastern Türkiye (MRG 2024-02; Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.2), and form a "significant minority" in the northeast (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.2). Sources also indicate that "large numbers" (MRG 2024-02) or "[s]ignificant" populations of Kurds (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.2) now live urban areas of western Türkiye (MRG 2024-02; Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.2). An Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report states that eastern and southeastern Türkiye are less developed and have higher poverty rates, lower incomes, less industry and less government investment, noting that "approximately half of [Türkiye]'s Kurdish population has migrated to Western [Türkiye] both to escape conflict … and in search of economic opportunities" (Australia 2020-09-10, para 3.2). According to MRG, the Kurds are "one of the most discriminated against" minorities in Türkiye (2024-02). In an interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Toronto whose research focuses on modern Turkish and Kurdish politics, indicated that Kurds have been "systematically marginalized, racialized and discriminated against" by the state and society, and must hide their ethnic identity when they are in areas in which they are not the dominant group (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07). Sources stated that Kurdish identity is not legally recognized in Türkiye and thus, cases of hate crimes and hate speech against Kurds are not processed as such in the judicial system (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07; Postdoctoral Fellow 2024-11-06). According to the Assistant Professor, the protection of ethnic minorities by the Turkish legal system is not effective (2024-11-07). The same source stated that Kurds who are at a higher educational and socio-economic levels, and who embrace the Turkish identity, are "less prone" to problems and discrimination (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a professor of Middle East studies at the University of Florida noted that the enforcement of the existing anti-discrimination legislation, which would also apply to Kurds, "is somewhat arbitrary" (Professor 2024-11-21). In an interview with the Research Directorate, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Copenhagen who specializes in human rights and the protection of minorities indicated that Kurds who do not claim their ethnic or cultural identity or join Kurdish political parties can "easily" continue living in Türkiye without mistreatment, while those who "freely express" their Kurdish identity might be "at risk of persecution" by the state and society (Postdoctoral Fellow 2024-11-06).
According to the Assistant Professor, the Turkish state has enacted policies aimed at "assimilat[ing]" Kurds into the Turkish identity, which include a "ban" on Kurdish language (2024-11-07). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow, Kurdish language is "factually prohibited" in Türkiye: parliament members are not allowed to speak in Kurdish and there are few Kurdish schools (2024-11-06). The Australian DFAT report indicates that the "government's response to the resumption of the conflict in the southeast" of the country between the government and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) and the attempted 2016 coup have "significantly affected the rights and freedoms of some Kurds" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.5). Similarly, the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023 indicates that the conflict between the government and the PKK resulted in civilian deaths in the southeast of the country, "disproportionately" affecting Kurds (US 2024-04-22, 3). According to a 2024 country report on Türkiye by the EU [1], "[v]iolations of human rights by security forces" and "hate crimes and hate speech against Kurds continued" in the east and southeast regions of the country (EU 2024-10-30, 21). US Country Reports 2023 states that conditions in the east and southeast of Türkiye included lack of freedom of movement, blocked roads, checkpoints, curfews, and temporary restriction of movement by the authorities (US 2024-04-22, 42). The same source also notes that "Kurdish and pro-Kurdish civil society organizations and political parties continued to experience problems exercising freedoms of assembly and association" (US 2024-04-22, 69).
1.1 Visibility of Kurds
A UK Home Office report published in 2019, citing a human rights lawyer and the Director of a Turkish organization, states that Kurds in Türkiye can be recognized by their names or their accents (UK 2019-10-01, 23). However, the same report cites a co-founder of Peace in Kurdistan [2] as stating that, while possible, distinguishing a Turk from a Kurd could be "difficult" or "very difficult" (2019-10-01, 23). Sources indicated that Kurds could be distinguished by their accents when speaking Turkish (Professor 2024-11-21; Assistant Professor 2024-11-07) and by their distinct names (Professor 2024-11-21). The Assistant Professor indicated that Kurds could be distinguished through their language and could also have some distinctive physical features such as dark hair or skin despite those features not being exclusive to Kurds (2024-11-07). In contrast, the Professor stated that it is not possible to distinguish Kurds from other ethnicities in Türkiye based on physical features only (2024-11-21).
Citing the President of Türkiye's Federation of Women's Associations, the UK Home Office report published in 2019 also states that distinguishing between Turkish and Kurdish women in Istanbul was not possible and that women of both ethnicities dress similarly, whereas "'Kurdish women are more noticeable in the east as they wear traditional clothes'" (UK 2019-10-01, 30). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
According to the Assistant Professor, poverty rates are much higher among Kurds, who mainly belong to lower-middle and lower socio-economic classes, compared to other ethnic groups in Türkiye (2024-11-07). In follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Assistant Professor also noted that an individual's place of birth would be indicated on the "old-style ID cards" but not on the "new ID cards, which have a credit-card like chip," although authorities can run the individual's ID card or citizenship number through the General Information Gathering system (Genel Bilgi Toplama, GBT) [3] (2024-11-10). The Assistant Professor added that it is "very common" for police in Türkiye to stop people on the street and ask for identification and thus, Kurds are "more subjected" to profiling once they show their ID (2024-11-07). The Assistant Professor also noted that in Türkiye, motor vehicles' license plates are categorized by regions and there have been incidents where individuals in vehicles from Kurdish regions were harassed by authorities at checkpoints or even attacked by members of the public (2024-11-07).
1.2 Situation of Kurds in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir
Information on the situation of Kurds in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. Australia's DFAT report states that while many Kurds are "very poor," a "Kurdish middle class is growing in urban centres, particularly in western [Türkiye]" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.2). According to an interview with the co-founder of Peace in Kurdistan cited in the 2019 UK Home Office report, "a middle-class Kurdish person who lives in Istanbul or Ankara may give indirect support to the Kurdish cause, but not openly as this may hinder them in the future" (UK 2019-10-01, 28).
Sources indicate that a Kurdish population of 2 million live in Istanbul (HRF 2024-09-04; Harvard n.d.), which is the largest Kurdish population in Türkiye (Harvard n.d.). Australia's DFAT report states that "[m]any Kurds" in western Türkiye "who are not politically active, and those who support the [ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)], do not emphasise their Kurdish identity over their Turkish citizenship"; the source adds that "[h]uman rights observers report, however, that some Kurds in western [Türkiye] are reluctant to disclose their Kurdish identity, including through speaking Kurdish in public, for fear of provoking a violent response" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.7).
2. Treatment of Kurds by Authorities and by Society
Türkiye's Constitution provides the following:
Article 10- Everyone is equal before the law without distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds.
…
Article 42- … No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution of education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. (Türkiye 1924)
Australia's DFAT notes that Kurdish can be chosen as an elective language in public schools and as a "primary language of instruction – but not mother-tongue – in private schools, though this is limited in practice" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.4). The EU report indicates that a minimum of 10 students are needed for optional Kurdish language courses at public schools, which, combined with the fact that schools do not possess a sufficient number of teachers, is an "impediment" (2024-10-30, 35). The EU report adds that "Kurdish cultural and language institutions, media outlets and numerous art spaces have remained mostly closed since 2016" (2024-10-30, 35).
US Country Reports 2023 notes that journalists with present or past links to "pro-Kurdish outlets faced significant government pressure, including incarceration" (US 2024-04-22, 29). Sources indicate that 8 Kurdish journalists who worked for Mezopotamya Agency and JINNEWS, [pro-Kurdish outlets (CPJ 2024-07-03)], were sentenced to 6 years and 3 months in prison on charges of "membership in a terrorist organization" (SCF 2024-07-04; CPJ 2024-07-03).
The EU report adds that "numerous concerts, festivals and cultural events were banned by governorates and municipalities on the grounds of 'security and public order'" (2024-10-30, 35). According to a 2024 annual report by Freedom House, Kurdish citizens face "discriminatory measures" by the government, "including the prohibition of Kurdish festivals" (2024-02-29, Sec. F4).
Freedom House indicates that Turkish authorities periodically "make mass arrests in Kurdish-dominated provinces, accusing those arrested of supporting the PKK" (2024-02-29, Sec. F4). A Reuters article states that Turkish police "detained 110 people over alleged militant ties" in "Diyarbakir, the largest city in mainly Kurdish southeast [Türkiye]" including, according to a pro-Kurdish lawmaker, politicians, lawyers and journalists (2023-04-25). Similarly, Freedom House notes that Turkish "authorities detained Kurdish journalists in late April [2023] over alleged links to the PKK" (2024-02-29, Sec. D1). US Country Reports 2023 states that "[i]n some cases, prosecutors considered the possession of some Kurdish-language, pro-Kurdish, or Gulen movement books to be credible evidence of membership in a terror organization" (US 2024-04-22, 31). For information on the Gülen (Hizmet) movement, see Response to Information Request TUR201739 of November 2024. Freedom House further indicates that while Kurds are "represented in politics, pro-Kurdish parties face regular harassment by the government via hate speech, politically motivated prosecutions, and disinformation in progovernment media" (2024-02-29, Sec. B4). According to the EU report, a "broad interpretation of terrorism and judicial and administrative pressure on journalists, political opponents, bar associations and human rights defenders working on the Kurdish issue continued to raise concerns" (2024-10-30, 21). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow, antiterrorism laws in Türkiye put elected Kurdish officials at risk (2024-11-06). According to the Assistant Professor, Turkish state authorities "either encourage" or do not stop physical violence against Kurds and have "systematically failed" to investigate attacks on Kurds (2024-11-07). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. The Assistant Professor added that links to Kurdish political parties increase the risk of being targeted by violence, harassment, and discrimination by the state and society (2024-11-07). According to the Professor, the authorities continue their "crackdowns" on Kurds "with potential links to PKK" (2024-11-21). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow, Kurds have been the target of "aggression and violence" by nationalist Turkish parties in the western areas of the country which witnessed "increased racism and violence" against Kurds due to the impunity given by the legal system to the perpetrators (2024-11-06).
According to the Professor, anti-Kurdish sentiment levels from the society vary across regions and times with Kurds in urban cities facing "less to no discrimination" than those living in central Turkey (2024-11-21). According to the Assistant Professor, access to employment is hampered for Kurdish ethnic groups and this is aggravated through other factors such as education and socio-economic status (2024-11-07). The same source added that Kurdish seasonal workers experience communal violence and discrimination including from employers, workers from other ethnicities, and from society (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07). According to the Professor, employment opportunities for low-income citizens, including Kurds, are "limited" (2024-11-21). The Postdoctoral Fellow indicated that speaking Kurdish could impact access to employment by Kurdish individuals (2024-11-06). According to the Assistant Professor, Kurds could be discriminated against when it comes to access to housing as other ethnicities may not be willing to rent out residences for them, in particular in the major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (2024-11-07). The same source added that seniors from the Kurdish ethnicity may face discrimination when seeking medical services in major urban areas and cities (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07). In contrast, the Professor mentioned that medical services vary across regions and "there is no ethnic discrimination" in accessing those services (2024-11-21).
3. The HDP
Sources describe the HDP as follows:
- a "left-wing pro-Kurdish party" (CFR 2023-08-08)
- a "left-wing social democratic platform infused with Kurdish nationalism" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.3)
- a "leftist and pro-Kurdish party in service of rights, equality, and reforms" (Professor 2024-11-21).
According to a 2022 Netherlands country of origin information report on Türkiye, the HDP is a "left-progressive party" and the "largest opposition party" whose cadre and supporters "are largely ethnic Kurds" (2022-03-02, 9). A 2021 Netherlands country report on Türkiye indicates that "the HDP defends not only the political and cultural rights of the Kurdish community but also those of other religious and ethnic minorities," in addition to "women's and gay rights, the environment and the democratisation of Turkish society" (2021-03-18, 49). Sources state that Turkish authorities have made legal efforts to shut down the HDP (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07; Postdoctoral Fellow 2024-11-06; Human Rights Watch 2024-05-17). Sources indicate that the HDP is currently operating under the name Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) (AFP 2024-11-04; MEI 2024-07-09).
3.1 Treatment of Supporters and Perceived Supporters of the HDP
According to an MRG article published in March 2024, the Turkish government "recent[ly]" removed elected HDP mayors and other elected officials from office and replaced them with trustees (2024-03-30). Sources indicate that in June 2020, Turkish authorities removed the parliamentary status of two HDP parliamentarians, noting that the government accuses the HDP of having ties to the PKK (The Guardian 2020-06-05; Reuters 2024-06-04), though the HDP "denies such links" (Reuters 2024-06-04). According to interviews with "confidential sources" cited in the 2021 Netherlands report, HDP members and people with an "HDP background" can "experience problems" from the Turkish authorities including night raids by "anti-terror" units, arrests, and "physical coercion or violence" (2021-03-18, 51). Another confidential source interviewed in August 2020 and cited in the same report stated that in the preceding five years, "more than 16,000 HDP members and employees [had] been arrested and detained," including detention in areas distant from their "original places of residence" (Netherlands 2021-03-18, 51). According to MRG, "the attack on the HDP has seen raids and crackdowns as well as the arrest and detention of thousands of its members and officials" (2024-03-30). Freedom House indicates that, "[f]or years," Turkish prosecutors have "launched criminal investigations" into members of the HDP for having "alleged links" to the PKK (2024-02-29, Sec. B1). Sources mention that 24 Kurdish politicians from the HDP were sentenced to prison for "crimes against the state" in May 2024 (EU 2024-10-30, 21; Human Rights Watch 2024-05-17). According to Human Rights Watch, the court sentences ranged from 9 to 24 years and followed "a manifestly political and unjust trial" (2024-05-17). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. Confidential sources interviewed and cited in the 2021 Netherlands report indicated that relatives of HDP members "are mistrusted by the Turkish authorities" and can "encounter difficulties" including the denial of "certain services and products, such as a loan, building permit or subsidy," the deliberate delay of passport issuance and, "in some cases," loss of employment (2021-03-18, 52).
According to the Assistant Professor, supporters and perceived supporters of the HDP have been "systematically targeted by the authorities," including through the dismissal of elected officials and the risk of legal harassment (2024-11-07). According to the same source, supporters and perceived supporters and members of the HDP are also targeted by the society outside of areas with Kurdish majority, and there have been several attacks on HDP branches by members of society (Assistant Professor 2024-11-07). In contrast, the Professor noted that Kurds "who are active in pro-Kurdish political parties, e.g., the HDP, are not subject to police scrutiny and punitive action such as arrests and legal action" except in "extreme" cases such as raising PKK flags (2024-11-21). However, the same source added that "HDP supporters may be stigmatized as sympathizers of terrorism if they are open about their views" and there have been reported cases of Kurds who were fired from their jobs for supporting the HDP (Professor 2024-11-21). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
4. Situation of Alevi Kurds
Sources indicate that Alevis form the "largest religious minority" in Türkiye (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 2.32; Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.). Sources also mention that Alevis are "heterodox" Muslims (AFP 2023-04-20; MEI 2023-04-24). The Australian DFAT report explains that "[w]hile most Alevis regard their faith as a separate religion, some identify as Shi'a or Sunni or see their Alevi identity predominantly in cultural rather than religious terms" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.20). Sources estimate that the Alevi population numbers 10 to 25 million (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.19) or 15 to 20 million individuals (AFP 2023-05-07). According to Australia's DFAT report, it is estimated that there are 0.5 million to "several" million Alevi Kurds in Turkey (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.19). Citing "[l]eaders of Alevi foundations," the US Department of State's Country Reports on International Religious Freedom for 2022 notes that Alevis form "25 to 31 percent of the population" (US 2023-05-15, 3). Sources indicate that Alevis are predominant in central and eastern parts of Anatolia, major cities (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.19; Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.), and "rural coastal areas" (Encyclopædia Britannica n.d.). Australia's DFAT report adds that Alevis are "widely distributed" across the country and are present in Istanbul (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.19). The Postdoctoral Fellow similarly states that Alevis are geographically widespread across Türkiye and adds that they continue to be "persecuted" in the country (2024-11-06).
According to US Country Reports 2023, Alevis "remained the subject of hate speech and discrimination" (US 2024-04-22, 80). According to MRG, "[n]egative perceptions, bureaucratic obstacles and security concerns persist" for non-Muslim communities and Alevis in Türkiye (2024-04-29, 3). The EU report mentions that Alevi communities lack "legal personality" in Türkiye and continue to be targeted by "[h]ate speech and hate crimes" (2024-10-30, 31, 35). According to the Professor, Alevism is not officially recognized as a separate religion or sect within Türkiye (2024-11-21). Sources indicate that Alevi cemevis (places of worship) are still not officially recognized in Türkiye (MRG 2024-04-29, 13; US 2023-05-15, 13). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow, the Turkish state has been trying to convert Alevis to Sunni Islam and still does not officially recognize their places of worship as such, but rather views them as "cultural entities" (2024-11-06). A BBC article states that the faith of Alevis "is not legally recognised by the government" (2022-04-05). According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), Alevis in Türkiye are "widely discriminated against" and " face death threats and attacks for not observing Ramadan, and their houses are often marked with a cross" (2023-05-07). According to the Professor, "Alevi Kurds are marginalized due to their ethnic and religious identity" and they "encounter prejudice from Sunni-majority communities, who often view them as heretical" (2024-11-21). The same source added that in "conservative regions in central Turkey, Alevi Kurds are sometimes ostracized or face hostility due to their religious practices" (Professor 2024-11-21).
According to the DFAT report, Türkiye "does not recognise Alevism as a separate religion and considers Alevis to be Muslims" and Alevi students must attend mandatory religious education classes which are "based entirely on Sunni Islam" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 3.21, 2.32). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow, Kurdish Alevis' treatment remains "worse" than that of Turkish or Arab Alevis (2024-11-06). The same source added that Alevis are still not exempt from religious courses at schools, which are based on Sunni Islam (Postdoctoral Fellow 2024-11-06). US Country Reports on International Religious Freedom for 2022 states that Alevis, along with other religious minorities, continued to "raise concerns" about the Turkish government's educational policies which did not comply with the European Court of Human Rights 2013 ruling "that found the compulsory religion courses in public schools violated educational freedom" (US 2023-05-15, 16). Following this ruling, authorities added information on Alevism to the curriculum, but Alevi groups felt the information was "inadequate and, in some cases, incorrect, and that teachers often ignored it" (US 2023-05-15, 16).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The 2024 Türkiye EU report was published in the context of the EU's enlargement policy under which countries that seek to join the EU are evaluated by the European Commission and receive support to undertake "democratic and economic reforms" (EU n.d.).
[2] Peace in Kurdistan is a UK-based "campaigning organisation dedicated to advancing the rights of the Kurdish people and achieving a political resolution of the Kurdish question" (Peace in Kurdistan n.d.).
[3] The Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report states the following about the General Information Gathering system (Genel Bilgi Toplama, GBT): "Turkish authorities maintain a range of databases that provide information to immigration and law enforcement officers. The [GBT], which provides information on arrest warrants, previous arrests, travel restrictions, military service records … and taxation status, is available at most air and seaports across the country" (Australia 2020-09-10, para. 5.25). The Swiss Refugee Council (Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés, OSAR), a politically and religiously independent non-profit public benefit organization with its head office in Bern, Switzerland (OSAR n.d.), indicates that the GBT is an identity document verification technology created in 2002 that is a database of PolNet, an internal network of the Turkish police (2021-04-08).
References
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Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Associate professor at a university in the US who specializes in Middle East and North Africa politics; The Brookings Institution; lecturer at a university in the UK who specializes in Kurdish studies; Middle East Consultancy Services; professor at a university in the UK who specializes in contemporary Turkish studies; professor at a university in the UK whose research and publications focus on Kurds and Kurdistan; professor emerita at a university in Sweden who specializes in Turkish politics and ethnic identity; professor emeritus at a university in the Netherlands who specializes in Turkish and Kurdish studies; professor of politics and global studies at a university in the US who specializes in Kurdish and Turkish human geography; senior lecturer at a university in the UK whose research focuses on Alevis and Kurds.
Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; CNN; Deutsche Welle; Factiva; Fondation-Institut kurde de Paris; The Globe and Mail; International Crisis Group; Middle East Eye; Organisation mondiale contre la torture; US – Congressional Research Service.