Democratic Republic of the Congo: Situation of persons of Banyamulenge [Banyamurenge] descent or persons who are perceived as such, and their treatment by society and the authorities, particularly in Kinshasa, including in the context of tensions with Rwanda; physical characteristics, features, and behaviours commonly associated with the Banyamulenge; state protection (2021-April 2023)
1. Overview
In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate in 2015, a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Florida, who has researched ethnic conflicts in Central Africa, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), stated that although the Banyamulenge community, in the narrow sense of the term, is located in South Kivu, the term "Banyamulenge" is also used broadly to designate the Tutsi and other people of Rwandan origin in the DRC (Professor 2015-08-12). A report on the Banyamulenge and their situation with respect to the conflicts impacting eastern DRC, published by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) [1] in 2013, states that the term "'Banyamulenge'" may be used [RVI English version] "indiscriminately and often pejoratively for all Tutsi in the eastern DRC" (RVI 2013, 13).
An article by Delphin R. Ntanyoma, who holds a PhD from Erasmus University Rotterdam and who has conducted research on the violence in South Kivu and the situation of Banyamulenge military personnel (The Conversation n.d.a), published by the Conversation, a "nonprofit, independent" online media platform that publishes articles written by academics for the general public (The Conversation n.d.b), explains that the Banyamulenge settled in the current territories of Fizi, Mwenga, and Uvira in the South Kivu region between the 16th and 18th centuries having come from the lands that now make up Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda (Ntanyoma 2023-03-13). The same source reports that they were perceived as foreigners because they "are largely cattle keepers" in the Great Lakes region where, after colonization, cattle herders are largely considered "immigrants, foreigners and invaders" while farmers are seen as sedentary and, therefore, "native" (Ntanyoma 2023-03-13).
According to an article written by Gaston Nganguzi Rwasamanzi, a [translation] "public and private governance consultant" and "expert on the Great Lakes region," and published by Congo Indépendant, an online newspaper created by a group of Congolese journalists living in Belgium (Congo Indépendant 2005-10-30), the situation of the Banyamulenge stems from the post-colonial period, and [translation] "when independence was achieved in 1960, the Congolese Tutsi community was the only ethnicity without its own traditional chiefdom in a tribal country such as the Congo, where the distinctive mark of national authenticity is built on being part of a traditional (ethnic) chiefdom" (Rwasamanzi 2020-09-02). The same source also explains that there are other more recent causes for the current situation of Congolese Tutsis, including the Banyamulenge [2], in the DRC, namely, the 1990-1994 Rwandan civil war and genocide, as well as the Rwandan-Congolese wars in 1996-1997 and 1998-2002 (Rwasamanzi 2020-09-02).
2. Treatment of the Banyamulenge by Congolese Authorities and Society
Sources report the possibility of a genocide against the Banyamulenge (Saidi, et al. 2023-02-06; Genocide Watch 2021-09-03). Genocide Watch, an organization that "exists to predict, prevent, stop, and punish genocide and other forms of mass murder" (Genocide Watch n.d.), warns of a possible genocide against the Banyamulenge, explaining that they have been "persecuted" since the colonial era, that they have been the target of attacks from the Mai-Mai since 2017, and that "the violence worsened in March and April 2021" (Genocide Watch 2021-09-03). According to Genocide Watch, among the 10 stages of the genocide process, stage 9 (Extermination) and 10 (Denial) are currently underway in the DRC (Genocide Watch 2021-09-03). These 10 stages are not linear and can occur simultaneously; stage 9 is described as the process that "lawyers define as genocide, the intentional destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group," and stage 10 consists of the "attempt to destroy the victim group psychologically and culturally, to deny its members even the memory of the murders of their relatives" (Genocide Watch 2023).
The information in the following paragraph comes from a report published on 10 June 2021 by the Group of Experts on the DRC created by the United Nations Security Council:
The report notes that attacks against the Banyamulenge [UN English version] "escalated" in 2019 and that certain Mai-Mai groups conducted those attacks "jointly or separately" and with the involvement of several members of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, FARDC), "often while looting cattle, a key financial resource for MaiMai groups." With respect to the attacks in 2019, [UN English version] "[t]ypical patterns…involved burning dwellings, health facilities and schools, the forced displacement of populations, looting, including of cows, mainly from Banyamulenge civilians." The Group of Experts notes, without providing further details, that people were killed during those attacks, including local chiefs and Banyamulenge cowherds. In January 2020, around Kivumu, Mai-Mai combatants abducted a woman from the Banyamulenge community and kept her captive for two days. In April 2020, in the same area, Mai-Mai combatants killed two Banyamulenge women and mutilated their bodies; they also abducted a third woman before releasing her after a few days, telling her to leave the DRC. The same report also notes that interviewed sources, including representatives of six NGOs, one local authority, the FARDC and the United Nations, [UN English version] "described or displayed a strong anti-Banyamulenge sentiment among many members of the Babembe, Bafuliiru, Banyindu and Bavira communities, including community leaders and politicians," thus considering the Banyamulenge to be "Rwandans rather than Congolese" and generalizing responsibility for actions committed by armed Banyamulenge groups by attributing it to the entire Banyamulenge community (UN 2021-06-10, para. 133, 140, 144, 146, references omitted).
The information in the following paragraph was taken from an analytical note published in August 2020 by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) in the DRC, documenting the situation in the highlands of South Kivu from February 2019 to June 2020:
The UNJHRO reports having documented 171 abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the areas of Mikenge, Minembwe, and Itombwe, where 38 percent of the victims were from the Banyamulenge community. The same source reports that over the same period, [UN English version] "thousands of cattle" belonging to this community were either "killed, mutilated or looted" and that 32 (out of 95) villages inhabited by the same community were burned down by different armed groups in the context of "retaliation and counter retaliation against members of the communities involved." The same source also states having documented 92 human rights abuses particularly by Mai-Mai combatant groups, including:
- 32 cases of abuse of the right to life, where 41 of the 44 victims "of summary executions" were Banyamulenge;
- 18 cases of abuse of the right to physical integrity, where 18 of the 26 victims of sexual violence were of Banyamulenge descent and
- 5 cases of abduction, where 13 of the 14 victims were from the Banyamulenge community.
Of the human rights abuses attributable to the FARDC, the same source documented 25 human rights violations, including 10 violations of the right to life, where 7 of the 15 victims of extrajudicial executions were Banyamulenge; 8 cases of violations of the right to physical integrity, where 3 of the 5 female victims of sexual violence were of Banyamulenge descent; and lastly, 5 violations of the right to liberty and security of the person, where 5 of the 11 victims were Banyamulenge (UN 2020-08, para. 5-7, 10-13).
In another report on hate speech and incitement to hostility published in March 2021, the same source also notes having documented 30 cases of hate speech and messages that incited hostility between May and December 2020, and that 80 percent of these messages were related to ethnic identity, with 31 percent of these targeting the Banyamulenge and 37 percent targeting the Luba (UN 2021-03, para. 46, 57-58). In South Kivu specifically, the UNJHRO documented messages that came from influential figures in the political sphere or civil society and described the case of a message dated 20 January 2020 that [UN English version] "incited 'the Congolese people to equip themselves with machetes and spears to chase Banyamulenge foreigners so that they return home to Rwanda'" (UN 2021-03, para. 57-58).
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a lawyer and President of the Agence pour la gouvernance participative et droits humains (AGOPA-DH), an organization that promotes human rights through citizen engagement in the DRC, also stated that the Banyamulenge [translation] "enjoy and exercise their rights like any other citizens," but that some Congolese individuals who have a hard time distinguishing a Munyamulenge [singular of Banyamulenge] from a Rwandan Tutsi "feel uncomfortable" when it comes to Rwandans (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15).
The information in the following paragraph was provided in correspondence with the Research Directorate by the Program Officer in the DRC for the Ligue des droits de l'homme dans la région des Grands Lacs (LDGL), an NGO headquartered in Kigali, Rwanda, that advocates for the promotion and protection of human rights in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC (Irenees.net 2014-03):
Speaking on his own behalf, he stated that the situation of the Banyamulenge and their treatment dependon circumstances that change [translation] "from one period to another" in the DRC, but that this ethnic group does not "generally" have "problems because of their presence in the country's social, political, [and] economic life, and they navigate it well just like all other Congolese." The same source stated that the Banyamulenge are represented in the public security services (military and national police) and have members who are government ministers and members of Parliament, without it posing [translation] "any problem for the other communities." However, the same source noted that although the Banyamulenge do not have problems in various Congolese cities, they are [translation] "singled out" and accused of "collaborating with enemies of peace who cause desolation in certain parts of the country" when they are actively involved in "security disturbances with the various rebellions" such as the M23 [3], Twirwaneho and Android [4]. According to the same source, [translation] "in areas like Uvira [and] Fizi, the problem is permanent since their conflicts go beyond a simple rebellion and go so far as taking control of administrative bodies and seizing both administrative and customary power; this is considered unacceptable by the host communities of these areas." The same source also explained that although they [translation] "often feel that they are not appreciated, tolerated or accepted" depending on the context and period, the Banyamulenge have no difficulty being accepted by other Congolese communities "in places where they are [not] involved in conflicts" (Program Officer 2023-03-16). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
2.1 Situation in Kinshasa
Information on the treatment of the Banyamulenge by Congolese authorities and society in Kinshasa was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Sources indicated they were unaware of any particular treatment reserved for the Banyamulenge in Kinshasa (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15) or [translation] "of a case of a [Mu]nyamulenge who would be singled out in Kinshasa" (RENADHOC 2023-03-13). However, the President of the AGOPADH noted that there were [translation] "two isolated [cases] of assault against individuals considered to be Rwandan" (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the National Executive Secretary of the Réseau national des ONGs des droits de l'homme de la République démocratique du Congo (RENADHOC), an organization comprising more than 750 NGOs which operates across the DRC through its 11 provincial NGO networks (RENADHOC 2023-03-26), indicated that there may be [translation] "some isolated cases" of mistreatment of the Banyamulenge, although his organization "has not yet been informed of such cases" (RENADHOC 2023-03-13). These sources also report that in Kinshasa the safety of the Banyamulenge is affected by the presence of the M23 but that the Congolese [translation] "authorities' appeals" against violence have eased tensions (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15; RENADHOC 2023-03-13). The Executive Secretary of RENADHOC added that the Banyamulenge live in fear of retaliation and no longer feel [translation] "safe because of the stigma of other communities assimilating them with Rwandans, so with aggressors of the DRC" (RENADHOC 2023-03-13).
According to the LDGL Program Officer, the Banyamulenge who have settled in Kinshasa [translation] "all hold positions in politics, administration, the army, and police. They arrive there in waves of political and administrative promotion and in high-ranking military and police positions" (Program Officer 2023-03-16). The same source later stated that once they are no longer backed politically to keep their civil service positions, these Banyamulenge individuals [translation] "choose the path of exile, for the most part" (Program Officer 2023-03-16). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
3. Context of Tensions with Rwanda Since Late 2021 and Impact on the Banyamulenge
Information on the context of tensions with Rwanda since late 2021 and the impact on the Banyamulenge was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The LDGL Program Officer in the DRC stated that when tensions began, [translation] "there was no visible impact" on the Banyamulenge, but as the crisis escalated, "some started to have the finger pointed at them" and be singled out (Program Officer 2023-03-16). According to the same source, rebels [translation] "are justifying their fight based on the discrimination faced by the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi communities, such as exclusion, rejection" (Program Officer 2023-03-16). However, the same source also stated that [translation] "some highranking members of the Banyamulenge community" spoke out "to reject the rebels' statements" to avoid being included in the rebellion which other Congolese have condemned (Program Officer 2023-03-16). The same source also noted that as a result of these tensions, the Banyamulenge are [translation] "at times" subjected to "physical attacks and the destruction of their assets or goods," similar to what occurred "in the city of Goma with the advances of M23 rebels and their statements endangering other Congolese Tutsis, not just the Banyamulenge" (Program Officer 2023-03-16). Media sources report that on 6 February 2023 in Goma, during a day of protest against the East African forces' failure to take action against the M23, which was gaining ground, churches attended by Banyamulenge (France 24 2023-02-08) or "'Rwandophones'" were pillaged (Africanews and AFP 2023-02-07).
4. Physical Characteristics, Features, and Behaviours of the Banyamulenge
One of the main physical characteristics used by sources to describe the Banyamulenge is a nose that is [translation] "pointy" (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15; RENADHOC 2023-03-15; Program Officer 2023-03-16) or "elongated" (RENADHOC 2023-03-15). According to the LDGL Program Officer in the DRC, the Banyamulenge are [translation] "slender" and have "prominent physical features" (Program Officer 2023-03-16). Sources also noted that the Banyamulenge are part of the Tutsis (RENADHOC 2023-03-15; Program Officer 2023-03-16) and are therefore [translation] "easy to identify based on their appearance" or "by their face" (RENADHOC 2023-03-15).
In terms of the behaviours attributed to the Banyamulenge, the LDGL Program Officer in the DRC provided the behaviours widely perceived as being associated with the Banyamulenge that are listed in the following paragraph. The Banyamulenge do not integrate into other Congolese communities in that they have their [own] churches, and their marriages are monocultural. They [translation] "live in neighbourhoods bordering or close to Rwanda, and others live only in Rwanda." They serve mainly in the military and police forces, but they also work [translation] "in small-scale cross-border trade." Banyamulenge children live primarily outside the DRC, [translation] "while the parents stay and work there" (Program Officer 2023-03-16).
5. Ability to Access Housing, Employment, Education, and Health Care
Information on the ability to access housing, employment, education, and health care was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
According to the LDGL Program Officer in the DRC, the Banyamulenge are present [translation] "in all the provinces and cities, and most have good roles within the army and police" as well as in the private sector and in the services industry (Program Officer 2023-03-16). The same source states that the Banyamulenge can [translation] "easily" access education, health care, and all other services available in that they have the means or "the ability to afford them, sometimes even more so than other Congolese citizens, throughout the country" (Program Officer 2023-03-16).
5.1 Situation in Kinshasa
Information on the Banyamulenge's ability to access housing, employment, education, and health care in Kinshasa could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
6. State Protection
Information on state protection for Banyamulenge who are mistreated in the DRC was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The President of the AGOPA-DH stated that [translation] "the Congolese authorities view the Banyamulenge as full-fledged Congolese citizens. That is why there were calls to deter those who wanted to go up against them" (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15). According to the same source, [translation] "recourse is available for any victim, regardless of their tribe or ethnic origin"; these are both administrative and judicial (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15). According to the LDGL Program Officer, Banyamulenge who are victims of mistreatment can access legal recourse or support services; they [translation] "have the ability to take legal action, access security services, and receive protection when necessary" (Program Officer 2023-03-16).
6.1 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stipulates the following, particularly regarding the equality of citizens and the fight against all forms of discrimination:
[translation]
Article 13
No Congolese person may, in matters of education or access to public functions or in any other matter, be subjected to a discriminatory measure whether it results from the law or from an act of the executive, because of their religion, family origin, social condition, residence, political convictions or opinion, or their belonging to a certain race, ethnic group, tribe, or cultural or linguistic minority.
...
Article 51
The state has a duty to ensure and promote the peaceful and harmonious coexistence of all the ethnic groups in the country.
It also ensures the protection and promotion of vulnerable groups and all minorities.
It sees to their development.
...
Article 66
All Congolese have a duty to respect and treat their fellow citizens without any discrimination and to maintain relations with them that allow for the safeguarding, promotion, and strengthening of national unity, mutual respect and tolerance.
Moreover, they have a duty to preserve and strengthen national solidarity, especially when it is threatened. (DRC 2006, emphasis in original)
The President of the AGOPA-DH stated that he did not [translation] "document any cases in which a Banyamulenge citizen was denied their constitutional right to seek recourse before the police, the prosecutor's office, or administrative or judicial bodies, as is available to them under the law and the constitution" (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15).
In a February 2023 article, La Libre Afrique, a website dedicated to African news from the daily newspaper La Libre Afrique, notes that a lawyers' collective filed a complaint in September 2021 about abuses committed against the Banyamulenge in the province of South Kivu (La Libre Afrique avec Belga 2023-02-20). In a press release cited by La Libre Afrique, these lawyers state that
[translation]
to date, after more than a year, this complaint has not been investigated by the legal authorities of the DRC. The attorney general of Bukavu told one of the group's lawyers about the total lack of means to hear the complaint. Support for this work was requested, but so far, no further action has been taken (La Libre Afrique avec Belga 2023-02-20).
The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021 also reports that a complaint was filed in September 2021 by 2 lawyers on behalf of 71 Banyamulenge living in the highlands of South Kivu who alleged that an armed Mai-Mai militia made up of members of the Fuliro, Bembe and Nyindu ethnic groups "killed, raped, tortured, and kidnapped" individuals belonging to the Banyamulenge community after having burned their homes and looted their cattle "with the indifference or complicity of the FARDC" (US 2022-04-12, 48).
6.2 Government Measures and Support Services
Information on government measures and support services offered to Banyamulenge who are mistreated in the DRC was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The UNJHRO notes that [UN English version] "the 12th Rapid Reaction Brigade (RR) of the FARDC and PNC [Police nationale congolaise (National Congolese Police)] units were deployed to the highlands in September 2019," but that they "have been accused on numerous occasions of bias by the communities, mainly Banyamulenge" (UN 2020-08, para. 24). The President of the AGOPA-DH stated, without providing further details, that there are several NGOs willing to [translation] "offer support" to the Banyamulenge in the DRC (AGOPA-DH 2023-03-15).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The Rift Valley Institute (RVI) is dedicated to conducting research on Central and East African countries, notably in the areas of security, cultural conservation, and social development (RVI n.d.).
[2] The article by Gaston Nganguzi Rwasamanzi explains that the Banyamulenge used to be called [translation] "Batutsi of the highlands," contrary to the Banyarwanda, which included the Bahutu and Batutsi (Rwasamanzi 2020-09-02).
[3] According to TV5Monde, M23 or [translation] "'March 23 Movement"' (named after the agreements reached with the Congolese government on 23 March 2009) is a rebel group mostly made up of former soldiers of the Congolese army, most of whom come from Tutsi Rwandophone communities in the province of North Kivu, which resumed fighting in March 2022 after being disbanded and driven out of the DRC in December 2013 (TV5Monde 2022-05-27).
[4] Radio Okapi explains that Twirwaneho and Android are part of the armed groups in the province of South Kivu that [translation] "consist mostly of members of a local community living in the highlands of Uvira and Fizi/Itombwe" (Radio Okapi 2022-07-13). According to the report from the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, the Twirwaneho and Android militant groups are linked to the Banyamulenge community (UN 2021-06-10, para. 133).
[5] Sources report that "Gumino" or "Ngumino" is also part of the armed groups associated with the Banyamulenge (Radio Okapi 2022-07-13; US 2022-04-12, 48; UN 2021-06-10, para. 133).
References
Africanews & Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2023-02-07. "RDC : journée 'ville morte' à Goma contre l’inaction des forces de l’EAC." [Accessed 2023-04-25]
Agence pour la gouvernance participative et droits humains (AGOPA-DH). 2023-03-15. Correspondence from the President to the Research Directorate.
Congo Indépendant. 2005-10-30. "Charte." [Accessed 2023-03-14]
The Conversation. N.d.a. "Delphin R. Ntanyoma." [Accessed 2023-03-29]
The Conversation. N.d.b. "About The Conversation." [Accessed 2023-04-06]
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 2006 (amended in 2011). Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo. [Accessed 2023-03-06]
France 24. 2023-02-08. Les Observateurs. Corentin Bainier. "RD Congo : une journée 'ville morte' vire aux pillages à Goma." [Accessed 2023-04-25]
Genocide Watch. 2023. Gregory H. Stanton. "The Ten Stages of Genocide." [Accessed 2023-04-26]
Genocide Watch. 2021-09-03. "Genocide Emergency: The Banyamulenge of the DRC." [Accessed 2023-03-16]
Genocide Watch. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2023-03-16]
Irenees.net. 2014-03. "Ligue des droits de la personne dans la région des Grands Lacs (LDGL)." Robin Gerbaux. [Accessed 2023-03-27]
La Libre Afrique avec Belga. 2023-02-20. "RDC : les avocats de communautés congolaises alertent sur les exactions subies à l'est." [Accessed 2023-04-04]
Ntanyoma, Delphin R. 2023-03-13. "The Banyamulenge: How a Minority Ethnic Group in the DRC Became the Target of Rebels-and Its Own Government." The Conversation. [Accessed 2023-03-14]
Professor Emeritus of political science, University of Florida. 2015-08-12. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.
Program Officer in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ligue des droits de l'homme dans la région des Grands Lacs (LDGL). 2023-03-16. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
Radio Okapi. 2022-07-13. "Sud-Kivu : deux factions de la milice Twirwaneho s'affrontent à Mugeti, un mort." [Accessed 2023-03-28]
Réseau national des ONGs des droits de l'homme de la République démocratique du Congo (RENADHOC). 2023-03-26. Correspondence from the National Executive Secretary to the Research Directorate.
Réseau national des ONGs des droits de l'homme de la République démocratique du Congo (RENADHOC). 2023-03-15. Correspondence from the National Executive Secretary to the Research Directorate.
Réseau national des ONGs des droits de l'homme de la République démocratique du Congo (RENADHOC). 2023-03-13. Correspondence from the National Executive Secretary to the Research Directorate.
Rift Valley Institute (RVI). 2013. Jason Stearns, et al. Les Banyamulenge : insurrection et exclusion dans les montagnes du Sud-Kivu. [Accessed 2015-08-13]
Rift Valley Institute (RVI). N.d. "Aims of the Institute." [Accessed 2023-03-27]
Rwasamanzi, Gaston Nganguzi. 2020-09-02. "Les causes lointaines et récentes de la problématique de la citoyenneté des rwandophones congolais en RDC." Congo Indépendant. [Accessed 2023-03-14]
Saidi, Alina et al. 2023-02-06. "RDC : Mémorandum sur la situation des Tutsi congolais." [Accessed 2023-03-31]
TV5Monde. 2022-05-27. Margot Hutton. "RDC : qui sont les rebelles du M23 et pourquoi sont-ils source de tensions avec le Rwanda?" [Accessed 2023-03-28]
United Nations (UN). 2021-06-10. Security Council. Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur la République démocratique du Congo. S/2021/560 [Accessed 2023-03-16]
United Nations (UN). 2021-03. United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO). Rapport sur les discours et messages incitatifs à la haine en République démocratique du Congo. [Accessed 2023-03-16]
United Nations (UN). 2020-08. United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO). Note analytique sur la situation des droits de l'homme dans les hauts plateaux des territoires de Mwenga, Fizi et Uvira, province du Sud-Kivu, entre février 2019 et juin 2020. [Accessed 2023-03-16]
United States (US). 2022-04-12. Department of State. "Democratic Republic of Congo." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021. [Accessed 2023-03-08]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Action communautaire pour la promotion des défavorisés Batwa; Action des chrétiens pour l'abolition de la torture RDC; Action des chrétiens activistes des droits de l'homme à Shabundan; Action pour la paix et la concorde; Action pour la promotion des droits des minorités autochtones en Afrique centrale; Action pour la protection des droits de la femme et de l'enfant; Amis de Nelson Mandela pour la défense des droits humains; Les anges du ciel; Anglo Congolese Alliance; Association africaine de défense des droits de l'homme; Association des juristes pour les droits des enfants et des femmes; Association pour le bien-être familial/naissances désirables; Association pour le regroupement et l'autopromotion des Pygmées; attorney and head of works at the faculty of law of a Congolese university; Banyamulenge Mutuality Ubumwe; Barreau de Mbandaka; Centre national d'appui au développement et à la participation; Collectif des organisations des jeunes solidaires du CongoKinshasa; Collectif pour les peuples autochtones au Kivu; Comité national femme et développement; Conseil national des organisations non gouvernementales de développement; Democratic Republic of the Congo – embassy in Ottawa; Human Rescue DRC; Initiatives pour la promotion des femmes autochtones et vulnérables; Institut congolais de formation et d'alphabétisation pour la promotion des droits de l'homme; Journalistes en danger in Kinshasa; Justice et Paix Congo; Kivu Rise; law firms in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2); Ligue nationale des associations des autochtones pygmées du Congo; Ligue pour la paix et les droits de l'homme; Ligue pour la paix, les droits de l'homme et la justice; Nouvelle société civile congolaise; Organisation d'accompagnement et d'appui aux Pygmées; Pilier aux femmes vulnérables actives en RD Congo; Programme d'appui aux actions féminines; Réseau des femmes pour le développement et la paix; Réseau des femmes pour un développement associatif; Sauve la femme et la jeune fille du Katanga; Solidarité pour les initiatives des peuples autochtones pygmées; Toges noires; Union des jeunes entrepreneurs congolais; Union pour l'émancipation de la femme autochtone; La voix des sans-voix; Women as Partners for Peace in Africa; Women's Caucus.
Internet sites, including: Al Jazeera; Amnesty International; Australia – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; BBC; Belgium – Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides; CBC; Centre d'études stratégiques de l'Afrique; Commission africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples; Denmark – Danish Immigration Service; EU – European Union Agency for Asylum; Factiva; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Freedom from Torture; Freedom House; Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions; Human Rights Watch; Minority Rights Group International; The New Humanitarian; Reuters; Transparency International; United Kingdom – Home Office; United Nations – High Commissioner for Human Rights, High Commissioner for Refugees, Human Rights Council, International Organization for Migration, Refworld; United States – CIA; Voice of America.