Responses to Information Requests

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

INTERPOL states that organized crime in Bolivia includes activities such as "extortion, kidnapping, murder, firearms trafficking, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling" (n.d.). The same source indicates that Bolivia shares borders with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru, and that organized crime groups use "6,800 km of remote and often mountainous border lines" to transport people and drugs "in and out of the country" (INTERPOL n.d.). The Government of Canada's travel advice for Bolivia notes that violent criminal activities related to drug trafficking "pose risks in" the Chapare region, located between Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, and the Yungas region, located northeast of the capital, La Paz, in addition to "all" national border regions with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru (Canada 2023-08-31). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a research assistant at the Universidad Mayor de San Simón in Cochabamba, Bolivia, whose work focuses on organized crime and insecurity in Latin American countries, notably Bolivia, stated that organized crime groups involved in cocaine smuggling activities operate in the country's "lowlands," namely in the departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba (Research Assistant 2023-09-27). The same source noted that while statistics on violence are "low" in highland regions, such as La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, drug trafficking activities are "also present" there, particularly along the Peru national borders, which is a "corridor" for smuggling coca leaves and cocaine to Chile and Argentina (Research Assistant 2023-09-27). The Research Assistant added that organized crime is "more visible" in the lowlands due to an increase in murders while in the highlands, it is "present through collusion and alliances with local powers" (2023-09-27).

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), "an independent civil-society organization, headquartered in Geneva" (GI-TOC n.d.a), states that criminal violence in Bolivia is "rising" particularly in urban areas (GI-TOC 2021, 3). The Research Assistant specified that cities located along the national border with Brazil, as well as capital cities in the eastern and central valleys of Bolivia, face violence and "a threat to human lives and security" (2023-09-27).

1.1 Cocaine Production and Trafficking

GI-TOC notes that the growth and consumption of the coca leaf "for cultural reasons" are legal in Bolivia (2021, 3). According to Insight Crime, a media organization and think tank focused on organized crime in the Americas (Insight Crime n.d.), Bolivia is the "world's third-largest producer of coca" leaves and the world's "third biggest" cocaine producer (InSight Crime 2022-03-17). According to a report on the European drug market by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), "[m]ost" cocaine production "continues to take place in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru," and these countries report the "majority of cocaine laboratories dismantled globally" (EU 2022-05-06, 2). GI-TOC reports that cocaine is "the most produced and trafficked drug" in Bolivia, but domestic consumption is "low," and that Bolivia is a "transit" country for the Peruvian and Colombian cocaine trade (2021, 3). According to Insight Crime, "around half of all Peruvian cocaine" is flown to or through Bolivia and that "drug flights" between the neighbouring countries have "only grown" in number (2022-03-17). The same source indicates in a different article that cocaine is "[s]ourced" from Bolivia's western region of Chapare, as well as from Peru, and transported to the department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia, for smuggling into Brazil or Paraguay (InSight Crime 2022-02-10). Similarly, GI-TOC notes that organized crime groups in Bolivia smuggle "coca base [1]" to countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, and that violence related to coca smuggling in Bolivia "has risen in some cities and regions," including Santa Cruz (2021, 3). For instance, InSight Crime states that the town of Desaguadero, located at the southern end of Titicaca Lake, which separates Bolivia from Peru, is a "focal point" for coca base and cocaine smuggled from Peru into Bolivia (2022-11-30). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

1.2 Human Trafficking and Other Trafficking Activities

GI-TOC states that Bolivia is also a "transit and destination country" for human trafficking from African countries, Chile, and the Caribbean, while Bolivian nationals, notably "women and children," are trafficked to Argentina, Brazil, Panama, and Chile, by "national and transnational mafias" (2021, 3). According to Bolivia's Ombudsman, as of September 2022, reported cases of human trafficking in Bolivia had increased by 8.1 percent compared to 2021 figures (Bolivia 2022-09-23). Citing data obtained from the police and without specifying the time period, the same source states that 63 percent of human trafficking victims are women, and 46 percent are individuals between the ages of 11 and 20 (Bolivia 2022-09-23).

The information on other illegal trafficking activities in the following paragraph was provided by GI-TOC in its 2021 organized crime index for Bolivia:

Illegal mining and natural gas smuggling are Bolivia's "primary non-renewable resource crimes." The "micro-trafficking" of gas to Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay is "significant," while illegal gold mining is perpetrated "main[ly]" by "local illegal miners or jukus [2], who recruit legitimate mineworkers or bribe officers to let them steal metal or tools from mines." Illegal mining "mostly occurs" in the same areas where other violent crime, including "human, drug and arms trafficking are prevalent." With respect to arms trafficking, groups from Brazil and Paraguay smuggle arms through Bolivia, while Bolivian, Brazilian, Paraguayan, and Peruvian criminal groups "may exchange arms at border crossing points"; further, criminal groups "raid Bolivian military bases" (GI-TOC 2021, 3).

1.3 Crime Rates and Statistics

In its 2023 edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI) [3], the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), an international think tank based in Australia that researches and produces reports that measure the economic impact of violence (IEP n.d.), ranks Bolivia 78th out of 163 countries, a downgrade of 1 rank from 2022 (IEP 2023-06, 8). On a regional level, the same report ranks the country 5th among 11 countries in South America (IEP 2023-06, 18). Based on 2021 data, GI-TOC ranks Bolivia 131st out of 193 countries worldwide, and 11th out of 12 South American countries, on its "criminality score"; with respect to its "resilience score [4]," the country ranks 95th globally, and 7th in South America (2021, 1).

The website of Bolivia's Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (FELCN), [the country's "anti-drug agency" (InSight Crime 2022-03-17),] indicates that the period from 1 January to 31 July 2023 saw 6,057 operations conducted by the FELCN (Bolivia 2023). The same source indicates that those operations included the seizure of 13,479.45 kg of cocaine and, according to calculations made by the Research Directorate based on the FELCN's data, the destruction of 397 drug laboratories and 2,126 arrests related to those laboratories (Bolivia [2023-08]). According to calculations made by the Research Directorate based on the FELCN's data for the same period in 2022, the FELCN carried out 5,920 operations, seizing 11,986.71 kg of cocaine, destroying of 334 drug laboratories, and making 2,039 related arrests (Bolivia [2023]). The FELCN website breaks down the data for January to July 2023 by region as follows:

(Bolivia [2023-08])

Citing police figures, Página Siete, a Bolivian daily newspaper, reports that from January to September 2022, [translation] "at least" 29 people have been murdered in the country, and 23 of them were "linked" to drug trafficking (2022-10-16). The same source states that 16 of the murders took place in the department of Santa Cruz, with half of these taking place in the town of San Matías (which borders Brazil); additionally, 7 of the murders took place in Cochabamba, 5 in Pando, and 1 in the city of El Alto (Página Siete 2022-10-16). Página Siete further notes that according to police investigations, 8 of the victims were members of, or associated with, one of the [translation] "largest criminal organizations in Brazil," the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC), and two of the arrests related to the murders were of adolescent members of the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, CV), another Brazilian organized crime group that "contests control" of the Bolivia-Brazil border with the PCC (2022-10-16).

The information on the common targets of Bolivian organized crime groups in the following paragraph was provided by the Research Assistant in correspondence with the Research Directorate:

Homicide victims are "mostly men" between the ages of 30 and 50, as well as foreign nationals living in Bolivia. Additionally, indigenous peoples and communities residing in the lowland region are the "most vulnerable" to being targeted due to the presence of drug trafficking in the same region, particularly in the Chiquitanía and Amazon regions, given the presence of cocaine laboratories (Research Assistant 2023-09-27).

2. Organized Crime Groups

According to InSight Crime, Bolivia's family clans "serve as important cocaine suppliers to powerful organized crime groups" operating throughout the Andean region (2021-05-14). GI-TOC states that Bolivian organized crime groups "are smaller and easily replaced," and that "family clans in the Beni department," including the Candia Castedo, Lima Lobo, and Rodríguez clans, "control" coca base shipments to Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, have been operating for "decades" while maintaining "shifting relationships with international organizations" (2021, 4). According to the Research Assistant, local criminal family clans are "less violent in nature because their role is to coordinate the local cocaine business with foreign criminal organizations" (2023-09-27). As a result, the same source indicated, the use of homicidal violence by Bolivian criminal groups is a form of "disciplining local society" and is associated with cocaine trafficking activities, rather than cocaine production (Research Assistant 2023-09-27).

2.1 Lima Lobo Clan

Citing Bolivia's FELCN, El Deber a Bolivian daily newspaper, states that the Lima Lobo clan [translation] "controls" drug trafficking in the Amazon region, and that its other areas of influence in Bolivia include San Joaquín, Santa Ana del Yacuma, Guayaramerín, Riberalta, and Santa Cruz; in Brazil, they operate in northern and southern Mato Grosso state (El Deber 2021-08-26).

Citing Bolivia's police chief, InSight Crime notes that the clan uses land, river, and air routes, including aircraft fleets and "clandestine airstrips," to smuggle cocaine into Brazil (2021-05-14). According to El Doce, a television broadcast news channel in Argentina (El Doce 2023-04-18), in addition to Brazil, the Lima Lobo clan has operated in Argentina and Uruguay by air [translation] "for decades" (2023-07-19). For instance, in a case reported by media sources, a small aircraft crashed in Chaco [northern Argentina] in July 2023, carrying 324 kg of cocaine suspected to belong to the Lima Lobo clan (El Doce 2023-07-19; El Liberal 2023-07-21).

INTERPOL indicates that in September 2019, the Bolivian police with the "support" of INTERPOL, arrested Jesús Einar Lima Lobo, the alleged leader of the Lima Lobo clan which is "believed" to have ties to Brazil's PCC and Colombian drug cartels (2019-10-11). According to a statement published on the Facebook account of Eduardo Del Castillo Del Carpio, Bolivia's Minister of Government (Bolivia n.d.), the leader of the Lima Lobo family clan Jesús Einar Lima Lobo, has ties to Colombian and Brazilian cartels and was extradited to Brazil in May 2021 (Bolivia 2021-05-05). According to El Deber, Brazil sentenced Lima Lobo's leader to 14 years in prison (2021-08-26).

2.2 Rodríguez Clan

Information on the Rodríguez clan, including their areas of influence and current status, was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Media sources report that in 2019, a photograph released by a member of Bolivia's legislature shows Bolivia's former president, Evo Morales, posing with members of the Rodríguez clan (ANF 2019-09-14; Los Tiempos 2019-09-14), including Bernardo Winston Rodríguez Ardaya, the [translation] "head" of the family clan and San Joaquín's former mayor, as well as with other political figures and their family members (ANF 2019-09-14). Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF), a private Jesuit news agency in Bolivia, adds that the clan leader's father, Winston Julio Rodríguez Daza, has a [translation] "history of trafficking controlled substances" and was arrested in April 2018 when 205 kg of cocaine were located at his farm in Las Niñas (2019-09-14).

2.3 Castedo Clan

According to InSight Crime, the Castedo clan is "one of the most powerful drug trafficking clans" in northern Argentina and has "sole control" at almost every level of northern Argentina's drug trafficking chain (2019-01-30). In another article, the same source states that the clan "dominate[s]" the narcotic trade with Bolivia through its "extensive connections to authorities," including "security forces and actors in the provincial and federal justice system" (InSight Crime 2022-12-14).

InSight Crime reports that Bolivian authorities arrested Morfulis Herrera, the brother-in-law of the clan's imprisoned leader, Delfín Reinaldo Castedo, in the southern Bolivian town of Yacuíba, in mid-January 2019, and transferred him into the custody of Argentinian authorities (2019-01-30). According to Argentina's Public Prosecutor's Office website, the federal criminal court sentenced Delfín Reinaldo Castedo, the Castedo clan's leader, to 16 years' imprisonment on 7 December 2022, for drug trafficking and money laundering (Argentina 2022-12-07). The same source reports that six other members or affiliates of the Castedo clan were given prison sentences between three and nine years (Argentina 2022-12-07). According to La Nación, an Argentine daily newspaper, the Castedo clan leader also faces charges for the murder of an Argentine [translation] "rural farmer" in 2006 who had "publicly denounced" the Castedo clan's use of a farm in the country's border region, adjacent to land on the Bolivian side that was owned by Roxana Castedo, the clan leader's sister (2022-12-08). InSight Crime reports that Roxana Castedo owns "some 20,000 hectares" of "strategic" land in Bolivia while the clan "controls" 30,000 hectares in northern Argentina (2019-01-30).

In the wake of the arrests of the clan's leader and other members, InSight Crime reports, "[n]o other unified organization of the level of power of the Castedo Clan has emerged" in Salta province, though "small criminal groups" have set up other drug smuggling routes along the Argentine-Bolivian border (2022-12-14).

3. Alliances Abroad

GI-TOC indicates that Bolivia's "main foreign criminal actors" are the PCC [Brazil], CV [Brazil], Bandas Criminales (BACRIM) [Colombia], the Sinaloa Cartel [Mexico], the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG) [Mexico], and the 'Ndrangheta [Italy] (GI-TOC 2021, 4). GI-TOC reports that Bolivian producers "mostly" provide coca base, while Colombian and Brazilian criminal groups "control refinement processes" (2021, 4). For instance, the same source notes that BACRIM "controls Bolivian cocaine processing laboratories and trafficking routes" starting from Peru and through to Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile (GI-TOC 2021, 4). InSight Crime indicates that the Lima Lobo family clan has ties to "Colombian drug lords" (2021-05-14).

According to GI-TOC, the PCC sends "emissaries" along Bolivia's "poorly monitored" borders, and "has an agreement" with the CV in the Santa Cruz and Pando regions (2021, 4). According to InSight Crime, Santa Cruz department has seen "prolonged violence" as a result of the border it shares with Brazil, which serves "as one of the PCC's primary access points" for smuggling cocaine; the capital city of Santa Cruz is also where the CV "target[s]" the PCC for "a slice of the drug trade there" (2022-02-10).

GI-TOC indicates that Bolivian cocaine transits through San Matías before entering Brazil, as "part of a major drug trafficking corridor" (2021, 4). However, according to GI-TOC, while "foreign mafia-style" organized crime groups in Bolivia also purchase and transport drugs from the country, "they do not control territory, nor do they have a permanent, high-level presence" (2021, 4).

4. State Protection

According to the Research Assistant, although Bolivia has a system in place for protecting "whistleblowers and witnesses" involved in drug trafficking cases, it falls under the responsibility of "the Ministry of Government, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Bolivian Police," institutions that have faced questions as to their "possible corruption and collusion" with drug trafficking activities (2023-09-27). The same source reported that, as a result, there are "doubts about the integrity and quality of the possible protection granted," and that there is a lack of "focus on the victims of criminal violence," which makes state protection mechanisms "limited" (Research Assistant 2023-09-27). According to GI-TOC, despite Bolivia's participation in international accords against organized crime, in practice, "compliance is weak" (2021, 5). The same source indicates that while the government of former President Evo Morales "generally" opposed organized crime and corruption, "corruption scandals, marshalling challenges and a lack of action" impeded the effectiveness of its response (GI-TOC 2021, 5). In addition, GI-TOC notes that the political "instability" that followed "abrupt changes" in Bolivia's government in 2019 and 2020 [5] has resulted in "uncertainty and a degree of discontinuity with regard to public policies" (2021, 5).

GI-TOC reports that the leaders of "drug clans," including their family members and allies, have occupied "political positions" in Bolivia (2021, 4). Similarly, InSight Crime indicates that "high-level political elites" play a role in Bolivia's narcotics trade (2022-03-17). The same source states that the presence of Brazilian gangs and Bolivia's "local crime clans," together with "struggling government policies," have resulted in an increase in Bolivia's cocaine trade "in recent years" (InSight Crime 2022-10-25).

4.1 Judiciary

GI-TOC reports that Bolivian police, judiciary, and customs officers engage in bribery, and that "low-level corruption" related to drug trafficking and smuggling has "increased" due to the absence of civilian oversight during Bolivia's interim government from 2019 to 2020 (2021, 4). The same source notes that Bolivia's judiciary is "an obstacle to fighting crime" due to "delayed" criminal proceedings and "pervasive corruption among lawyers, prosecutors and judges, who profit from victims" (GI-TOC 2021, 5).

According to InSight Crime, public confidence in the country's judiciary is "low" (2022-03-17). GI-TOC notes that a "lack of capacity and resources," together with "low salaries, and an overstaffed and unprofessional bureaucracy," have "undermine[d]" state institutions and created "incentives for corruption, clientelism, and patronage" (2021, 4). For instance, in a case reported in 2020 by El Diario, a Bolivian daily newspaper, a member of parliament stated that there was a [translation] "'consortium of judges and prosecutors'" involved in the undisclosed release of an individual who was placed in "preventive detention" in September 2019, and who was later arrested in spring 2020, after a small airplane carrying 400 kg of his cocaine was found on a farm in Santa Ana de Yacuma, Beni department (El Diario 2020-05-04). The Member of Parliament further reported to El Diario that, after the individual was released from prison in September 2019, he "'pulled out his gun'" at a party in Santa Ana de Yacuma, "'saying that the bullet was for [the Member of Parliament in question]'" (El Diario 2020-05-04).

4.2 Police

According to INTERPOL, law enforcement in Bolivia falls under the Policía Nacional de Bolivia (PNB), which reports to the Minister of Interior (n.d.). According to GI-TOC, the public perception of police in Bolivia is in "[i]n general" "negative" (2021, 5). InSight Crime reports that Bolivia's security forces are "weak" and "corrupt" (2022-03-17). For instance, in February 2022, the former head of the FELCN was indicted in the US "for conspiring to import cocaine into the United States," and he was the fourth Bolivian high-level "anti-narcotic official" to be accused of "links to the cocaine trade" in "recent years" (InSight Crime 2022-03-17).

GI-TOC indicates that the country's "ratio" of police officers to residents is below international standards, due to "political interference, low salaries and pensions, poor working conditions and inadequate training" (2021, 5). The same source notes that despite the existence of "specialized units" in the police responsible for addressing crime and drug trafficking, challenges persist "due to the lack of equipment as well as corruption" (GI-TOC 2021, 5). The US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) indicates that Bolivian police have "limited resources" to respond to criminal activity, "particularly outside major cities" (US 2022-11-08).

4.3 Other State Responses

GI-TOC reports that national law mandates the "protection of victims and witnesses" of crime by the Prosecutor General's Office, the police, and the Ministry of Justice, as well as by the office for the "protection and assistance" of victims of crime in every department, headed by the Plurinational Service for Victim Support (Servicio Plurinacional de Asistencia a la Víctima, SEPDAVI) (2021, 5).

GI-TOC notes that a national "council" led by the Ministry of Justice was established to coordinate the government's response to human trafficking; however, as a result of "blurred lines and a lack of clear and distinct mandates with other units involved" in the effort, "cooperation on the matter is poor" (2021, 5).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Coca base is "used to produce cocaine" (InSight Crime 2022-11-30).

[2] "Jukus" is the local term for "mineral thieves" in Bolivia (InSight Crime 2019-04-02).

[3] The Global Peace Index (GPI) produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is a report that "ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness" and considers 23 indicators, including levels of "violent crime" (IEP 2023-06, 2, 18, italics omitted).

[4] According to the ranking system used by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime [GI-TOC], a higher criminality score indicates "more severe" "criminality conditions," while a higher resilience score indicates "more effective" response measures to organized crime (GI-TOC n.d.b).

[5] Following 14 years of "relative stability" under former President Evo Morales, Bolivia entered a period of political instability starting in 2019 that included contested elections, mass protests, changing governments, and a "cyclical pattern of opposition jailings" and corruption scandals (InSight Crime 2022-03-27).

References

Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF). 2019-09-14. "Monasterio muestra fotografía del presidente Evo con miembros del clan Rodríguez." [Accessed 2023-08-30]

Argentina. 2022-12-07. Ministerio Público Fiscal. "Salta: condenaron a Delfín Castedo a 16 años de prisión como jefe de una asociación ilícita dedicada al narcotráfico y al lavado de activos." [Accessed 2023-08-31]

Bolivia. [2023-08]. Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (FELCN). "Resultados obtenidos en la lucha contra el narcotráfico." [Accessed 2023-09-07]

Bolivia. [2023]. Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (FELCN). "Resultados obtenidos en la lucha contra el narcotráfico." [Accessed 2023-09-07]

Bolivia. 2022-09-23. Defensoría del Pueblo. "Defensoría del Pueblo advierte un incremento de casos de trata y tráfico de personas y convoca a las autoridades a reforzar la lucha contra este delito." [Accessed 2023-09-20]

Bolivia. 2021-05-05. Ministerio de Gobierno. "Eduardo Del Castillo Del Carpio." [Accessed 2023-09-21]

Bolivia. N.d. Ministerio de Gobierno. [Accessed 2023-10-18]

Canada. 2023-08-31. Travel.gc.ca. "Bolivia Travel Advice." [Accessed 2023-09-07]

El Deber. 2021-08-26. Ariel Melgar Cabrera. "¿Quién es Einar Lima Lobo?; el boliviano condenado a 14 años por narcotráfico en Brasil." [Accessed 2023-08-29]

El Diario. 2020-05-04. "Denuncian consorcio de jueces y fiscales que protegen a 'narcos'." [Accessed 2023-08-30]

El Doce. 2023-07-19. "Qué es Lima-Lobo, el cartel boliviano dueño de la avioneta que se estrelló en Chaco." [Accessed 2023-08-30]

El Doce. 2023-04-18. "El Doce festeja sus 63 años y va por más historia." [Accessed 2023-08-30]

El Liberal. 2023-07-21. "Clan boliviano Lima Lobo, 'dueño' de los 324 kg de droga en Chaco." [Accessed 2023-08-30]

European Union (EU). 2022-05-06. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDA) & European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). Coca and Cocaine Production. [Accessed 2023-09-21]

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). 2021. "Bolivia." Global Organized Crime Index – 2021. [Accessed 2023-08-23]

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). N.d.a "About." [Accessed 2023-08-23]

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). N.d.b. "About the Index." [Accessed 2023-08-23]

InSight Crime. 2022-12-14. Alicia Florez. "How Did the Castedo Clan Run the Drug Trade in Northern Argentina?" [Accessed 2023-08-31]

InSight Crime. 2022-11-30. Scott Mistler-Ferguson. "Lake Titicaca: A Smuggler's Paradise in Bolivia and Peru." [Accessed 2023-08-24]

Insight Crime. 2022-10-25. Alessandro Ford. "What Lies Behind Bolivia's Expanding Cocaine Trade?" [Accessed 2023-08-25]

InSight Crime. 2022-03-17. "Bolivia Profile." [Accessed 2023-08-24]

InSight Crime. 2022-02-10. Alessandro Ford. "How Brazil's Gangs Took Their War to Santa Cruz, Bolivia." [Accessed 2023-08-25]

InSight Crime. 2021-05-14. Parker Asmann. "Bolivia Family Clans Key Cocaine Suppliers to Brazil, Colombia." [Accessed 2023-08-25]

InSight Crime. 2019-04-02. Parker Asmann. "'Juku' Mineral Thieves Pilfering Bolivia State-Owned Mining Company." [Accessed 2023-08-25]

InSight Crime. 2019-01-30. Parker Asmann. "Argentina's Castedo Clan Continues to Survive Despite Top Arrests." [Accessed 2023-01-30]

InSight Crime. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2023-10-17]

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). 2023-06. Global Peace Index 2023. Measuring Peace in a Complex World. [Accessed 2023-09-08]

Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). N.d. "About." [Accessed 2023-09-08]

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). 2019-10-11. "Fugitive Drug Lord Arrested in Bolivia With INTERPOL Support." [Accessed 2023-09-21]

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). N.d. "Bolivia." [Accessed 2023-08-25]

La Nación. 2022-12-08. "Delfín Castedo. Condenaron al Patrón del Norte a 16 años de cárcel por asociación ilícita y lavado de activos." [Accessed 2023-08-31]

Los Tiempos. 2019-09-14. "Diputado muestra foto de Evo con clan ligado al narcotráfico." [Accessed 2023-10-18]

Página Siete. 2022-10-16. Leny Chuquimia. "Al menos 29 personas fueron acribilladas desde enero, 23 ligadas al narcotráfico." [Accessed 2023-08-24]

Research Assistant, Universidad Mayor de San Simón in Cochabamba, Bolivia. 2023-09-27. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

United States (US). 2022-11-08. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). "Bolivia Country Security Report." [Accessed 2023-09-08]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos; assistant professor at an American university whose research focuses on security and drug policies, as well as peacebuilding in the Andean region; Fundación UNIR Bolivia; lawyer and doctoral candidate at a university in Belgium whose research includes governance, security, and drug policies in Bolivia; research consultant based in Colombia whose work focuses on drug and resource-related conflicts in the Andean region; researcher and doctoral candidate based in the UK whose work focuses on conflict and peacebuilding in Latin America, including Bolivia.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project; Asociación de Periodistas de La Paz; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; Bolivia – Defensoría del Pueblo; CARE; Denmark – Danish Immigration Service; El País; El Potosí; Estadão; Factiva; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Freedom House; Fundación UNIR Bolivia; The Guardian; Human Rights Watch; Infobae; International Crisis Group; La Tercera; The Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project; Organization for American States – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Plan International – Plan International Bolivia; Radio FmBolivia; SWI swissinfo.ch; Tiempo Judicial; UK – Foreign Travel Advice, Home Office; UN – Office on Drugs and Crime.