Responses to Information Requests

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

Sources state that the CJNG emerged from the Milenio Group and the Sinaloa Cartel (InSight Crime 2021-05-05; Justice in Mexico 2021-10, 48). According to the US Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA), the CJNG is among Mexico's "fastest growing cartels" (US 2021-03, 67). According to other sources, the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel are the two "largest" (Felbab-Brown 2022-04-03) or "most powerful" (IEP 2023-05-23, 2; Vice 2022-09-06) criminal groups in Mexico (Felbab-Brown 2022-04-03; IEP 2023-05-23, 2; Vice 2022-09-06).

Sources indicate that the CJNG is "embroiled in a patchwork of rivalries nationwide" (Insight Crime 2020-06-11), or "exists in the majority of Mexican states," (Vice 2022-09-06). According to an opinion article authored by Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution who completed "fieldwork in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Baja California Sur in October and November 2021," the CJNG's "rule and governance" varies over time and from region to region, as it is influenced by "local structural conditions and political culture" and its own "local leadership" (Felbab-Brown 2022-04-03). Citing an "expert on criminal dynamics from Mexico's Ibero-American University [Universidad Iberoamericana]," InSight Crime, a non-profit think tank and media organization that focuses on organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (InSight Crime n.d.), reports that the group's use of "disproportionate violence may also be explained by its internal structure," which is not "monolithic," but rather an "extensive series of largely independent cells working under the CJNG label," (InSight Crime 2023-05-31). In an interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of criminology at a Canadian university, whose research focuses on organized crime networks and police practices in Mexico, noted that in states where CJNG is the "dominant" actor, it functions like a "formal organization," operating "out in the open" with a "clear chain of command," while in states where it does not have a dominant presence, the CJNG may function "more informally," operating as "individual cells" and with "shifting local alliances" (Assistant Professor of criminology 2023-08-15).

According to sources, the CJNG is distinct among other major criminal groups through its "extreme and public use of violence" (ACLED 2023-04-13) or its "[b]razenness, brutality" and use of "public executions" (Felbab-Brown 2022-05-29). Justice in Mexico, a program in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of San Diego, reports that the group's "willingness" to engage in "violent, bloody confrontations" extends to rivals such as the Mexican government (2021-10, 50).

2. Areas of Operation and Influence

According to the US 2020 NDTA, the CJNG "has a significant presence in 23 of the 32 Mexican states," and continues to expand in "central Mexico and strategic locations on the border between the United States and Mexico" (US 2021-03, 67). According to a map published by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) and based on open-source data gathered by a Latin America regional analyst, Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Jalisco, Colima, Aguascalientes, Querétaro de Arteaga are dominated by the CJNG, while Baja California, Sonora, Zacatecas, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, Michoacan de Ocampo, Guanajuato, Morelos, Mexico State, Veracruz and Tabasco are areas disputed between the CJNG and other groups (US 2022-06-07, 10).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, a full-time researcher at the Universidad Autónoma de Baja California (UABC), whose work focuses on transnational organized crime and the criminal economy in Mexico, stated that the CJNG has gained an "integral territorial dominance" from southern to northern Mexico, namely from Quintana Roo to parts of Chihuahua (Researcher 2023-08-14). InSight Crime reports that the CJNG is "truly the dominant criminal actor" in Jalisco, Nayarit, Colima, Veracruz, Guanajuato, Puebla, Querétaro, Hidalgo, and the Lázaro Cárdenas port in Michoacán (2020-07-08). Global Guardian, an international security firm based in the US, led by former members of the US military and federal security forces, as well as "business professionals," and which provides security services and intelligence analyses to clients in "more than 130 countries" (Global Guardian n.d.), indicates that the CJNG "controls or fights for territory" in Guanajuato, Michoacán, Baja California, the state of Mexico, Jalisco, Chihuahua, and Guerrero, "among other locations," and that these states represent "over half of the national total of homicides in the first six months" of 2022 (Global Guardian 2022-10-10). The researcher stated that the states of Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Jalisco, have faced "significant societal erosion" due to the CJNG's territorial gains and control (2023-08-14).

The Assistant Professor of criminology stated that Mexico's ports of entry, including airports and land borders, are "strategic locations" for the CJNG's smuggling of drugs, people, and weapons, and the group places lookouts there, such as police officers, soldiers, cartel members and port employees, who report back to the CJNG on "who or what has arrived" (2023-08-15). The same source added that criminal groups, including the CJNG, also control "a lot" of the major highways in Mexico, where they install "roadblocks and checkpoints" to "stop commuters, verify their IDs, identify potential rivals," and impose extortion payments (Assistant Professor of criminology 2023-08-15). Justice in Mexico notes that the CJNG has "gained access to the Mexico City International Airport" through its presence and ties to "local gangs" in Mexico City (2021-10, 49). According to the US DEA, the CJNG has "influence over" the Port of Manzanillo, Mexico's "busiest port" (US 2021-03, 67). Justice in Mexico notes that the CJNG "controls" the ports of Veracruz in Veracruz state, Manzanillo in Colima state, and Lázaro Cárdenas in Michoacán state (2021-10, 49).

According to InSight Crime, the "[c]hanging criminal dynamics" in Mexico, "mean there is no guarantee that zones currently considered relatively safe are likely to remain so" (2023-05-31). The same source states, citing an International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) "analyst," that in historically more stable states like Chiapas, located along the southern border with Guatemala, "clashes between organized crime groups have displaced thousands of inhabitants" in 2023 (InSight Crime 2023-05-31). Sources indicate that Chiapas has seen clashes between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel (N+ 2023-06-28; InSight Crime 2023-06-02), over drug trafficking routes through the border with Guatemala (InSight Crime 2023-06-02). According to N+, a digital news provider launched in 2022 by the Mexico-based telecommunications company Televisa (Televisa 2022-03-28), the municipalities of Frontera Comalapa, Mazapa de Madero, Amatenango de la Frontera, and Motozintla, are particular [translation] "hotspots" of cartel-related violence (N+ 2023-06-28). Figures provided by a Catholic church in a community near Frontera Comalapa in Chiapas, and cited by Animal Político, a Mexico-based online news source (Animal Político n.d.), find that 3,000 residents were displaced by the conflict between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel (Animal Político 2023-05-29).

2.1 International Presence

Citing "some analysts," the US CRS states that the CJNG has activities "throughout" the Americas, Asia, and Europe (US 2022-06-07, 33). According to InSight Crime, CJNG has "contacts in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, the US, Central America, Canada, Australia, China and Southeast Asia," allowing it to "control large parts of marijuana, cocaine and synthetic drug trafficking in Mexico" (2020-07-08). According to another report by the US CRS, as of 2019, the "primary source of U.S.-bound illicit fentanyl" shifted from China to Mexican criminal groups like the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel, who distribute it through affiliate criminal groups based in the US (US 2023-05-17, 15-16). In addition, InSight Crime indicates that the CJNG transports drugs through "Pacific routes," and brings in cocaine from Colombia and fentanyl from China "through the port of Manzanillo in Colima" (2022-08-07).

3. Activities of the CJNG

Global Guardian reports that the CJNG's activities include "drug trafficking (primarily synthetics, including methamphetamine and fentanyl), kidnapping, extortion (particularly of avocado & lime farmers), oil pipeline tapping," among others (2022-10-10). Similarly, InSight Crime states that the CJNG has taken over "numerous criminal economies" in Mexico, such as "cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and fentanyl" trafficking, and also engages in "extortion, avocado production, cigarette trafficking, and human smuggling" (2022-08-07). The researcher indicated that the CJNG's extortion of civilians has increased in the last two years, particularly in territories under their control in central Mexico (2023-08-14). El Universal, a Mexican daily newspaper, reports that Mexico's Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera, UIF), according to figures in its National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (Evaluación Nacional de Riesgos de Lavado de Dinero y Financiamiento al Terrorismo, ENR), identifies the CJNG as the criminal group with the most money laundering operations in Mexico, with such activities undertaken in 27 states (El Universal 2020-09-22). Felbab-Brown reports that the CJNG's principle strategic activity is "to act as a tax master and sometimes franchise licenser," which includes

taxing all local businesses, without, at least initially, seeking full control across the entire vertical chain of an economy. Replicating its policies in the state of Jalisco, in the new territories that it conquers, the Cartel licenses not just a variety of criminal rackets, such as drug dealing and trafficking and prostitution, but also legal sales, such as of tobacco, alcohol, and even tortillas. (2022-05-29)

The same source adds that the CJNG has "slowly and sporadically" moved "toward a more systematic effort to take over the entire vertical chain" of industries and the economy through the use of "brazen violence," including the use of "heavy assault weapons" that "mostly outmatch the arms and equipment that Mexican police and National Guard have" (Felbab-Brown 2022-05-29). Similarly, the researcher stated that the CJNG's weaponry is "very powerful," surpassing that of the Mexican armed forces (Researcher 2023-08-14). According to an author and professor at George Mason University in the US, cited in an InSight Crime article, the CJNG uses "military tactics, weaponry, and drones as weapons" as part of its continued "'militarization'" (2023-05-31).

A June 2023 article by the Associated Press (AP) reports that a video, posted on social media platforms and being investigated by state authorities, shows gunmen in "tactical vests" with CJNG initials threatening the hostess of a bar with a firearm, demanding the payment of "protection money" (2023-06-23). The same article notes that the gunmen stated that they would issue "bracelets to show who has paid and who hasn't" among the bar's staff, threatening that "[t]hose who don't pay will be killed" (AP 2023-06-23). In another case reported by The Guardian, four police officers and two civilians were killed in Jalisco by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) "planted in a road," in July 2023, by an "unnamed drug cartel"; however, the article notes that the CJNG has been engaged in fighting in the state and has been "blamed for the previous use of IEDs in Mexico" (The Guardian 2023-07-12).

Global Guardian reports that "much of the uptick in violence over the last several years" in Mexico is due to the CJNG's expansion activities (2022-10-10). InSight Crime writes that "in keeping" with its militarization, the CJNG has "numerous alliances" with other criminal groups that contribute to its expansion; however, citing the expert from the Universidad Iberoamericana, the same source notes that as these alliances "'are not necessarily maintained,'" new "'possibilities of [the CJNG] expanding, causing terror, and co-opting territories'" arise (2023-05-31). For instance, according to SinEmbargo, an online news publication from Mexico, the CJNG [translation] "is behind the extreme violence" in Mexico and "some of the scenes" of that violence in 2021 include "[d]rone attacks in Michoacán, bodies hanging from bridges in Zacatecas, attacks with remotely detonated explosives in Guanajuato, massacres in Jalisco and Tamaulipas, bodies scattered across streets in Baja California" (2021-12-23). According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, 3,000 individuals living in Tepalcatepec, Michoacán, "were displaced after alleged attacks" by the CJNG against another criminal group, the United Cartels, which included the use of explosives (US 2023-03-20, 21-22). A February 2022 article by the BBC reports that the Mexican army had "tak[en] control" of the hometown of the CJNG's leader, in the municipality of Aguililla, in the state of Michoacán, where landmines planted in a fight for control between the CJNG and a rival cartel had recently caused injuries among soldiers and the death of a farmer (BBC 2022-02-19).

In its 2023 edition of the Mexico Peace Index, the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP), an "independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank" based in Australia which researches and produces reports that measure the economic impact of violence, states that based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) [1], "clashes involving the two most powerful cartels," the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel, represented 42 percent of the share of all fatalities from cartel violence in Mexico in 2015; by 2021, that share increased to 95 percent (IEP 2023-05-23, ii, 38). According to data from the UCDP, 19,603 deaths have resulted from the conflict between the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel since 2015, 4,890 of which were recorded in 2021, and 3,726 deaths for part of 2022 (Uppsala University [2022a]). According to the same source, 14,576 deaths were attributed to the CJNG in 2020, 14,411 deaths in 2021, and 10,549 deaths for part of 2022 (Uppsala University [2022b]).

SinEmbargo reports that according to [translation] "security experts," the CJNG is "rapidly expanding" and is responsible for "the escalation of violence" in Zacatecas, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Baja California, and Chihuahua (SinEmbargo 2021-12-23). According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a US-based non-profit organization that collects data on political violence and protest in various regions around the world (ACLED n.d.), the states of Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Zacatecas have the "highest levels of activity by the CJNG and its affiliates" since 2018 (2023-04-13). The same source adds that the states of Michoacán and Zacatecas have the "highest levels of inter-armed groups clashes" attributable to the presence of the CJNG, while in Guanajuato state, "civilian targeting" is the "mai[n]" form of "indirect confrontations" between the CJNG and its rivals (ACLED 2023-04-13). ACLED further notes that in Guanajuato, the CJNG uses "localized violence" aimed at "businesses, pipelines and actors involved in oil trafficking, and other sources of revenue" (2023-04-13). According to Felbab-Brown, the CJNG relies on "fear-based control" and "intimidation" to "neutralize or coopt local community organizers" and to prevent communities, including those "supported by other criminal groups or militias (often one and the same)," from "ris[ing] against the CJNG domination" (2022-05-29). The same source adds that in territories under its influence, the CJNG does not engage in "social intrusion to dictate what teachers or priests should preach"; instead, they focus on ensuring that community actors are "not opposing CJNG or organizing against it" (Felbab-Brown 2022-05-29).

AP reports that the beyond "traditional" activities of "drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping," the CJNG also "operates call centers" aimed at scamming "money from Americans and Canadians through fake offers to buy their timeshares" (2023-06-06). El País, a newspaper based in Madrid, indicates that shell companies, "allegedly" connected to the CJNG, "issue[d] fake documents to tourists and demand that they pay taxes on properties that don't exist," as part of the CJNG illicit real estate activities (2023-06-11). According to the AP, "[a]s many as eight young workers were confirmed dead" in early June 2023 after "apparently" attempting to "quit their jobs" at a timeshare call centre run by the CJNG in Jalisco (2023-06-06).

In interviews conducted by Felbab-Brown, "[e]lectoral monitors and survey firm representatives" stated that in the "days" leading up to the June 2021 mid-term elections, the CJNG "kidnapp[ed]" and "murder[ed]" political party operatives (2022-05-29).

Further, according to Felbab-Brown, the CJNG has "gradually" built up "some political capital" through "greater social handouts," notably since 2020 (2022-05-29). According to Justice in Mexico, the group "took advantage of the void left by the federal government" during the COVID-19 pandemic to "help communities negatively affected" (2021-10, 52). An article published by El Universal states that the CJNG's leader, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, colloquially known as "'El Mencho'," had a hospital built in the town of El Alcíhuatl, Jalisco, to provide medical services to [translation] "him, his security team, and local residents" (2020-07-20).

4. Ability and Motivations of the CJNG to Track and Retaliate Against Individuals

According to the researcher, the CJNG has "what it needs," in terms of technological and weapons capabilities, "to reach whoever they want, wherever they want" in Mexico, "even if they are not the dominant actor" in that state (2023-08-14). The Assistant Professor of criminology stated that the if the CJNG "really" want to track someone down, they have "many resources" at their disposal to do so, "even outside of Mexico" (2023-08-15). In an interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor at New Jersey City University, whose research focuses on drug trafficking, organized crime, and security in Latin American countries, including Mexico, noted that while the CJNG "doesn't operate in the entire country," it has links to "enough corrupt state and non-state actors" to allow them to "locate individuals in other areas of Mexico" (Assistant Professor 2023-08-14). The same source stated that if the CJNG "wants to kill or torture someone," they possess the "capacity to do so," and "simply relocating" within Mexico "is not a solution" for someone fleeing the CJNG's reach (Assistant Professor 2023-08-14).

According to a [translation] "journalist who specializes in security and organized crime" in Mexico cited by SinEmbargo, criminal groups' "fragmentation" and "dissemination" across the country, along with inadequate response to "police and political corruption," have resulted in "persistent violence" (2021-12-23). The same journalist stated that criminal groups "'control'" the police and have [translation] "'political control'" of certain municipalities, with 85 percent of municipalities in Mexico being "'governed by mayors financed by organized crime'" (SinEmbargo 2021-12-23). Cited by SinEmbargo, an associate professor in the drug policy program at Mexico's Centre for Economic Research and Studies (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE) stated that the problem of criminal organizations

[translation]

is so out of control that a single group, the CJNG, has managed in such a short time to build up this immense firepower and economic and political power in the regions. And it is worth remembering that the CJNG is only one organization; … organized crime as a whole has overwhelmed the State ever since the war against drug trafficking was declared. (SinEmbargo 2021-12-23)

The researcher stated that the CJNG tracks and locates individuals who move to another region by leveraging their own internal intelligence operatives, or "community intelligence," their armed personnel, and finally, their political contacts (2023-08-14). The Assistant Professor similarly noted that the CJNG's "own internal intelligence" and "sophisticated armed apparatus," which include informants, armed members, connections with local politicians, and allied gangs, is used to track and locate individuals (2023-08-14). The same source specified that the CJNG relies on "criminal alliances of convenience" with "hundreds of criminal groups operating" across the country, from "small neighbourhood gangs to major organized criminal groups," with whom they "cooperate at different moments and under different circumstances" to locate individuals across Mexico (Assistant Professor 2023-08-14). Additionally, the Assistant Professor of criminology noted that within Mexico, the CJNG can "outsource" the tracking and location of an individual to their contacts in the police or armed forces, whom they pay in exchange for access to their technological resources (2023-08-15). The same source added that the "monitoring infrastructure" of criminal groups in Mexico, including that of the CJNG, is "pervasive" and "routine" across the country's highways, seaports, and airports (Assistant Professor of criminology 2023-08-15). The Assistant Professor of criminology further noted that, as a result, if a target passes through that infrastructure, the CJNG will be aware of it, not necessarily because they "actively" tracked down that target, but because they have the monitoring capabilities to catch such "comings and goings" (2023-08-15). The Assistant Professor stated that the CJNG possesses the ability to "run the license plate" of an individual it wishes to track down, "especially in small municipalities or in rural areas" (2023-08-14). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The researcher indicated that the states of Campeche and Baja California Sur (the latter to a "lesser" degree), might represent a possibility of temporary refuge from the CJNG, but if the group "wants to track someone down" in either state, it is "equipped" to do so with "within a year," as "there is no permanent refuge in Mexico from the CJNG's reach" (2023-08-14). According to the Assistant Professor of criminology, while states like Campeche and Yucatan may not have "such a huge cartel presence," this doesn't necessarily indicate an "absence," as criminal groups operate differently from state to state (2023-08-15). For instance, a former attorney general of Campeche informed the same source that police officers in their state would sometimes "disappear for three weeks at a time," without reporting for duty or presenting a reason, which they understood to mean that the officers "were receiving training or briefings" from a cartel (Assistant Professor of criminology 2023-08-15). Additionally, the Assistant Professor of criminology reported that Campeche is mostly made up of small villages, and its capital city is "very small," and not an easy place to "keep a low profile" (2023-08-15).

According to a report authored by Crisis Group's analyst for Mexico, who travelled to Michoacán in November 2021 to interview contacts and document the organized crime situation in the state, "commanders and fighters from three different illegal armed groups" said that there were varying degrees of collaboration between Mexican soldiers and "non-state armed outfits" against the CJNG; however, "all agreed that a common front existed, with the shared goal of pushing back" the CJNG (Crisis Group 2022-04-26). AP reports that in Michoacán, Mexican authorities have been "hold[ing] off incursions" made by the CJNG, "while doing little to stop the other gangs" (AP 2022-01-25). For information on the profiles of individuals targeted and tracked by other criminal organizations and cartels, including their motivation to track and locate targeted individuals, see Response to Information Request MEX201601 of September 2023.

4.1 Profiles of Individuals Targeted for Tracking and Retaliation

The researcher indicated that for the CJNG, "everyone is a target," including the state's military, civilians, and rival armed groups (2023-08-14). However, the same source added that for the CJNG to be motivated to deploy the resources necessary to track and locate someone in another region of Mexico, that target "must be someone special" and that those "typical targets" include "high profile" individuals like a rival criminal actor, businessperson, or journalist who has privileged information, financial resources, and/or important contacts that the CJNG "perceives" to be a "threat" to its interests (Researcher 2023-08-14). The Assistant Professor of criminology indicated that the CJNG leadership is motivated to track and locate someone if they have "valuable" or "sensitive" information, betrayed them, or if they hold a personal animosity with them, such as previous romantic partners, leaders or high-ranking members of rival criminal groups, journalists, former government employees, or former police officers (2023-08-15). According to the Assistant Professor, the CJNG targets "people it finds useful" and with "varying levels of importance," such as police, judges, lawyers, other criminal actors, and perceived informants; on a personal level, the CJNG targets people who "refuse their advances, including women or politicians" (2023-08-14). The same source added that targets also include witnesses of the CJNG's crimes, perceived government collaborators, individuals who have testified against them or challenged their rule, returnees, and "in particular," women and family members; the latter are "used in symbolic attacks" meant to "send a message" to rivals or the communities where they operate (Assistant Professor 2023-08-14). Finally, sources stated that the CJNG is also motivated to pursue targets based on "economic" reasons (Assistant Professor 2023-08-14; Researcher 2023-08-14).

According to AP, the CJNG is known for "its ruthless treatment of supposed traitors, informants or turncoats," and for individuals who previously worked for the group, whether "knowingly or unknowingly," an "unwritten rule" dictates that "the only way out of the gang is death or prison" (2023-06-06). The researcher provided the example of the "many young men who have been forcibly disappeared" by the CJNG, and who were "rumoured to have been recruited" in camps run by the group, notably the Talpa de Allende recruitment camp in Jalisco (2023-08-14). A 2019 article by Noticias Telemundo, a US-based Spanish-language news provider (Noticias Telemundo n.d.), includes testimony from the [translation] "only" individual "to date" who has spoken about the experience of unknowingly being hired by the CJNG in 2018 to "become a hitman" (2019-05-23). The individual interviewed by Noticias Telemundo stated that he [translation] "learned that the only way to escape from the camp" in Talpa de Allende, Jalisco, was to die; in the camp, he was trained to "handle handguns and long guns, set up ambushes, follow the rules, keep his mouth shut" and kill (Noticias Telemundo 2019-05-23). The same article notes that the Attorney General's Office in Jalisco [translation] "has uncovered at least five camps that the cartel was using as clandestine training centers and drug laboratories," and that there were two others "dismantled" in Veracruz and Tabasco (Noticias Telemundo 2019-05-23).

According to the US CSR, "[p]ress reports" indicate that the CJNG targets public officials in Jalisco, with attacks "exceed[ing]" 100 assassinations against figures such as "lawmakers; federal, state, and local police; soldiers; and, allegedly, Jalisco's minister of tourism" (US 2022-06-07, 34). Additionally, Crisis Group indicates that residents of villages located on the "shifting front lines" of cartel conflict involving the CJNG in Michoacán are "[b]earing the brunt" of the violence (2022-04-26). According to a Catholic priest interviewed in an AP article on displacement caused by organized crime in Mexico, "at least 35,000 people have been forced to flee their homes and farms in recent years" in Michoacán, as "warring drug cartels," including the CJNG, "extort money from almost all merchandise" flowing through the state (2022-01-25). Another cause of displacement cited by Crisis Group is "that locals left behind" are suspected of "passing information on to enemies" (2022-04-26). Citing a "man whose village was seized by the Jalisco Cartel following weeks of shootouts," Crisis Group writes that the CJNG came to his residence and

"demanded to check our phones." When the gunmen spotted seemingly compromising messages on his daughter’s WhatsApp – merely a statement of fact that "the jaliscos" had mounted barricades around the town – they immediately issued an eviction order. "They gave them [the daughter and her husband] two hours to pack up their things – or else," he said in the matter-of-fact tone of someone long used to accepting the rules essential to survival in the Hot Land. (2022-04-26, brackets in original)

The Assistant Professor noted that in rural areas, where "there are many ungoverned spaces" that fall "under the radar" of state authorities, such as in rural areas of central Mexico under CJNG control, the targeting of individuals "can be more dangerous" as "all civilians can be targeted, particularly landowners" (2023-08-14). According to the Assistant Professor of criminology, the CJNG has a "much stronger presence and territorial control" in rural areas compared to urban areas, as they can "literally fully control" villages where they operate and "become the law," while in cities, the presence of various authorities and security forces makes such control harder (2023-08-15). The same source added that residents living in rural areas are therefore "more vulnerable" to being targeted (Assistant Professor of criminology 2023-08-15).

According to the Assistant Professor, Mexican nationals who are deported to Mexico from Canada or the US, for instance, are "vulnerable" to being targeted by the CJNG upon their return (2023-08-15). The Assistant Professor of criminology specified that individuals deported back to Mexico are "highly" likely to be "noticed" by the CJNG's lookouts at Mexico's ports of entry, and the likelihood of that returnee being pursued "depends" on whether they were, for instance, a "former member of a rival armed group, a personal rival of a high-ranking CJNG member, a former politician, or journalist with sensitive information" (2023-08-15).

The researcher noted that for individuals who relocate to flee extortion payments imposed by the CJNG, an activity that targets civilians "to a large extent," the CJNG will "likely let them go" (Researcher 2023-08-14). According to the Assistant Professor of criminology, individuals who were previously extorted by the CJNG might face retaliation if they come under the CJNG's notice, such as through a port of entry to Mexico where CJNG lookouts are posted; however, the CJNG "won't necessarily do everything in its power to pursue that person for extorsion reasons" (2023-08-15). The same source added that individuals targeted by lower ranked members of the CJNG, such as "small time drug dealers," may be tracked "in a limited way" but will not be deemed a priority to the CJNG leadership, who will not "even" be "made aware" (Assistant Professor of criminology 2023-08-15).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Note

[1] The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden is a program that provides data on instances of "fatal organized violence" based on news media sources (Uppsala University 2023-04-12).

References

Animal Político. 2023-05-29. "Chiapas: suman más de 3 mil personas desplazadas desde Frontera Comalapa por la violencia entre grupos criminales." [Accessed 2023-07-27]

Animal Político. N.d. "Quiénes somos." [Accessed 2023-08-31]

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). 2023-04-13. "Actor Profile: The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)." [Accessed 2023-07-18]

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). N.d. "About ACLED." [Accessed 2023-08-30]

Assistant Professor, New Jersey City University. 2023-08-14. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Assistant Professor of criminology, University of Montreal. 2023-08-15. Interview with the Research Directorate.

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: assistant professor at a university in the United Arab Emirates whose research focuses on drug cartels and paramilitary crime organizations, including in Mexico; independent consultant whose work focuses on public security and crime prevention in Mexico; instructor at an American university whose research topics include drug cartels and state relations in Mexico.

Internet sites, including: ACAPS; Al Jazeera; Amnesty International; Bertelsmann Stiftung; The Conversation; Council on Foreign Relations; Diario del Sur; El Financiero; El Informador; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; France – Office français pour la protection des réfugiés et apatrides; France24; Freedom House; Grey Dynamics; Human Rights Watch; International Sociology; La Jornada; La Orquesta de Comunicaciones S.A. de C.V.; La Razón; Milenio; The New Humanitarian; REFORMA; Reuters; Small Wars Journal; Transparency International; UK – Home Office; UN – Refworld, ReliefWeb; Washington Office on Latin America; The Wilson Center; The Yucatan Times.