Algeria: Crime situation, including organized crime; police and state response, including effectiveness; state protection for witnesses and victims of crime (2021–May 2023)
1. Crime Situation
The Government of Canada's travel advice for Algeria indicates that there is a "moderate" crime rate in the country (Canada 2023-04-24). According to a report on crime for 2022 by Algeria's Ministry of National Defence, the National Gendarmerie handled 646,328 cases, representing an "increas[e]" in crime (Algeria [2023]). In its 2022 edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), a report that "ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness" and considers 23 indicators including levels of "violent crime," the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), an international think tank based in Australia that researches and produces reports that measure the economic impact of violence (IEP n.d.), ranked Algeria 109th, an increase of 10 ranks from 2021, representing one of the five countries "with the biggest improvements" in "peacefulness" from 2021 (IEP 2022-06, 2, 7, 11, 86). On a regional level, the same report ranks Algeria 9th among 20 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (IEP 2022-06, 18). The Africa Organised Crime Index 2021, a report produced by the EU Pan-African Programme's project Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime (ENACT), categorizes countries based on both the prevalence of criminality and the resilience capabilities of the state, and classifies Algeria under "low criminality" and "low resilience" (ISS, et al. 2021a, 92–93, 158). This classification is defined as follows: while "the organised crime threat in these countries is thought to be comparably small," the "resilience mechanisms are underdeveloped and incapable of adequately responding" to threats, should organized criminal activities evolve to reach a "very high level" (ISS, et al. 2021a, 89). ENACT also notes, based on their 2021 data, that Algeria ranks 37th out of 54 African countries on its "criminality score," and 15th on its "resilience score" [1] (ISS, et al. 2021b).
The 2022 report on crime and safety in Algeria published by the US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) states that "crimes of opportunity" are the "most common" crimes in Algeria, including "pickpocketing, purse snatching, burglary, and similar crimes," perpetrated by "criminals operating primarily in high-traffic and high-density areas" (US 2022-05-12). The same source notes that the crime rate in urban areas outside of Algiers "is worse than in Algiers" (US 2022-05-12). Canada's travel advice indicates that "[p]etty crime, such as pickpocketing and purse snatching," as well as armed robberies, occur in urban areas, most notably "after dark" (Canada 2023-04-24).
1.1 Organized Crime
According to Canada's travel advice for Algeria, while the "threat of terrorism" and "risk of kidnapping" exists throughout Algeria, border areas "often see greater criminal activity" with a "high threat of terrorism, banditry and kidnapping" (Canada 2023-04-24). In the ENACT data on Algeria, the three most prevalent "criminal markets" identified are "human smuggling," "non-renewable resource crimes," and "cannabis trade," and the most prevalent criminal actors are "criminal networks" and "state-embedded actors" (ISS, et al. 2021b).
Regarding non-renewable energy smuggling, the ENACT report expands on the country's "significant oil-smuggling industry," noting that it is linked to "widespread cronyism leading to substantial losses to the public purse" (ISS, et al. 2021a, 70).
The information in the following two paragraphs was provided in ENACT's organized crime index for Algeria:
Corruption is "pervasive" and ties between state institutions and "high-level criminal actors" are "increasin[g]." Criminal networks are identified as "among the most active, geographically widespread, and economically dominant actors," with "significant transnational linkages" and involvement in activities such as "long-standing hashish-trafficking," the "smuggling of basic products," notably along the southern national border, "illicit trafficking of oil, human smuggling, the illicit gold trade and arms trafficking." These networks are "highly active" in "northern city hubs," including Algiers, Annaba, and Oran.
Regarding organized crime activities, arms trafficking is "thriving" in southern Algeria as a result of "the outflows from neighbouring Mali and Libya," with seizures of "large stocks of small and light weapons" being a "regular occurrence." Additionally, "the convergence with Libya and Algeria," also known as the "Salvador pass in Niger," is a "strategic corridor for traffickers" and a "primary transit point," while the corridor connecting the "city of Djanet in the southeast to Bordj Baji Mokhtar in the southwest" is identified as the "most important corridor for arms trafficking" (ISS, et al. 2021b).
1.1.1 Terrorism
Sources report that terrorist groups are present in Algeria's "mountainous" and "desert" areas, including areas bordering Mali, Niger, Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania (Canada 2023-04-24; UK 2022-11-04). Canada's travel advice on Algeria adds that "a heightened risk of kidnapping and terrorist attacks" is also present in rural areas and that terrorist groups and "extremist militants" in those regions are involved in "human, drug and weapons trafficking" (Canada 2023-04-24). According to Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2022, which "assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries," a "persistence of small, fragmented terrorist groups" with origins from the "Islamist violence of the 1990s," hold ties to the "criminal networks" that exist throughout the Sahel region of the country, and "continue to operate, primarily in the Sahara" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 2, 33). ENACT reports that terrorist groups are present "around" Mount Chaambi, located at the border between Algeria and Tunisia (ISS, et al. 2021b).
Sources report that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in Algeria (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. F3; UK 2022-11-04). Sources also indicate that Islamic State (IS) [Daesh] militant groups (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. F3), or groups that have links to the IS (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 33; UK 2022-11-04), operate in Algeria (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 33; Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. F3; UK 2022-11-04). According to the UK's travel advice, Al Murabitun is another "regional Islamist" group that operates in Algeria (UK 2022-11-04).
According to BTI 2022, while the "small, fragmented" terrorist groups remaining in the Sahel region are still "recruiting in Algeria (with little success) and the wider region," the groups "face waning popular support in Algerian society" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 33). Similarly, Freedom House indicates that while groups such as AQIM and IS "continue to operate in Algeria," their attacks "have grown less frequent in recent years" (2023-03-09, Sec. F3). The UK lists in its travel advice for Algeria the following terrorist attacks carried out against the Algerian state and its security forces in 2020 and 2021:
- On 14 October 2021, a soldier was killed by an Improvised Explosive Device [(IED)] whilst conducting a routine patrol in the province of Tlemcen
- on 6 August 2021, two soldiers were killed by an [IED] whilst conducting a search and sweep operation in the province of Ain Defla
- on 2 January 2021, two soldiers were killed whilst conducting a search and sweep operation in the province of Tipasa
- on 20 June 2020, an ambush in Ain Defla, North West Algeria, led to the death of an Algerian army corporal. AQIM is reported to have claimed responsibility
- on 9 February 2020, one Algerian soldier was killed in a suicide attack on a military outpost in Timeaouine, close to the Malian border. Daesh is reported to have claimed responsibility. (UK 2022-11-04)
The same source notes that civilians were the target of two other terrorist attacks in 2021, one of which occurred on 8 October involving IED explosions in Tebessa and Batna that caused serious injuries to three individuals (UK 2022-11-04). According to the source, the other attack occurred on 16 January in Telidjane, near the Tunisian border, killing five civilians with a roadside bomb; the "placement of the landmines" used in the attack was claimed by Al Qaeda (UK 2022-11-04).
1.1.2 Human Trafficking
According to BTI 2022, the "[s]muggling and trafficking of migrants" in Algeria's southern regions and near the Tunisian and Libyan borders continue to be "challenges" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 7). ENACT reports that while the country's "highly sophisticated" human trafficking criminal market originated in southern Algeria, most notably in Tamanrasset, it has "spread to northern cities," including Algiers, Oran, and Annaba (ISS, et al. 2021b).
A submission by China Labor Watch (CLW) [2] to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' (OHCHR) 2022 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), referencing "the International Labor Organization's indicators of trafficking in persons," notes that "deceptive" and "coercive" recruitment, and "coercion at destination, in addition to violations" of labour and human rights, were among the evidence found of "multiple indicators of trafficking among Chinese workers" (CLW 2022-03, 3 ). ENACT states that given Algeria's "poor" labour standards and "regulatory capacity," migrants transiting through the country to Europe face a degree of "exploitative practices" and "bonded labour" that is "common" and goes "largely unremarked upon" (ISS, et al. 2021b).
Sources report that "[u]ndocumented" (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. G4) or "[i]rregular" (ISS, et al. 2021b) sub-Saharan African migrants are particularly vulnerable to such practices (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. G4; ISS, et al. 2021b). According to ENACT, criminal networks from Niger are the "primar[y]" drivers of Algeria's human trafficking market, "which is also the country of origin of most trafficking victims in Algeria" (ISS, et al. 2021b).
Africanews, an Africa-focused online news service (Africanews n.d.), reports that the Sahrawi [3] Polisario Front is a group "backed by Algeria" that supports the 2,200-member Polisario movement seeking autonomy in Western Saharan territory that is under Moroccan control and has "led to the diplomatic breakdown of relation between Algeria and Morocco" (2023-01-13).
A joint submission [4] to the OHCHR's UPR notes that among testimonies regarding the practice of [translation] "enslavement" of Black families include one of a young girl who was enslaved at the age of six by a Sahrawi family in the refugee camps; she later fled to Spain and filed a lawsuit for slavery against Polisario leader Brahim Ghali (Il Cenacolo, et al. 2022-03, 9). The same source indicates that given
[translation]
the complicit indifference of Polisario leaders, almost all of whom ["enslave" people] to carry out domestic work and graze their livestock, young Black people in the Tindouf camps have informally organized themselves into an entity called the "Freedom and Progress Association for the Fight Against Enslavement ([A]ssociation liberté et progrès pour la lutte contre l'esclavagisme)," which was able to record the existence of 7,130 "unfreed [enslaved people]" in the Tindouf camps, including women, who are raped, married against their will, and sent out into the desert to tend their [enslavers'] livestock. (Il Cenacolo, et al. 2022-03, 9)
The submission specifies that starting at the age of 5, children in refugee camps are recruited to armed [translation] "militias," "sent to indoctrination centres for programs designed to incite hatred and violence," and "integrated into military training centres where they face enslavement and abuse, and are trained in the use of firearms and explosives, before being assigned to the militia" (Il Cenacolo, et al. 2022-03, 9–10). The same source adds that other children are removed from their parents and "sent for indoctrination and weapons training" in Algeria or in other countries (Il Cenacolo, et al. 2022-03, 10).
2. State Response
According to the 2022 OSAC report, security agencies responsible for responding to crime events are the 200,000-member Ministry of Interior's Directorate General for National Security (Direction générale de la sûreté nationale, DGSN), a civilian police force that maintains law and order in cities and in urban areas, and the 130,000-member National Gendarmerie that covers "more rural areas, highways, and inter-wilaya [province] transit zones," and that contributes to "internal security efforts in combating terrorism and organized crime" (US 2022-05-12).
According to sources, the Algerian state maintains control over the national territory (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 7) or has maintaining territorial control as "one of the [state's] highest priorities," as demonstrated its "heavy" response to organized crime (ISS, et al. 2021b).
The information in the following paragraph was provided by ENACT:
While the country has "extremely tough and punitive laws on organized crime, including on drugs, human and arms trafficking and human smuggling," both a "clear political vision" to "effectively" address it and "a consolidated strategy to combat the rise of criminal economies," are absent. The state's organized crime prevention initiatives are "primarily" focused on "drug-related crimes" and "fall under the remit of law enforcement agencies." Additionally, Algeria's judiciary is
extremely weak in comparison to the country's law-enforcement apparatus. There are high levels of government interference in the judiciary and recent evidence suggests a significantly limited ability on the part of the judicial system to bring high-level organized crime figures to trial. Furthermore, physical and other forms of abuse are widespread within the detention system. (ISS, et al. 2021b)
2.1 Response to Terrorism and Organized Crime
The US Department of State's Country Reports on Terrorism 2021 indicates that Algeria's Ministry of National Defense shared "timely" public announcements on incidents related to the capture or "eliminat[ion]" of terrorists and their arsenals (US 2023-02-27, 127). According to ENACT, "[l]aw enforcement personnel are well trained, and the police's special investigation crime unit has strong operational capacities" (ISS, et al. 2021b). Canada's travel advice on Algeria reports that counterterrorism operations carried out by the government in "recent years" have "significantly diminished the capacity of terrorist groups to operate" (Canada 2023-04-24). Similarly, ENACT specifies in their Algeria report that the state "maintains strong law enforcement and military leadership against transnational organized crime" and terrorism, and that they rely "primarily on border securitization and prosecution" (ISS, et al. 2021b). However, according to the same source,
the vastness of Algerian territory is such that full control of the country's borders is impossible, in particular in light of the contiguity with conflict-torn states to the south and east. Security forces' tolerance for informal cross-border activities has steadily decreased in recent times, particular in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has adversely affected borderland communities. (ISS, et al. 2021b)
BTI 2022 reports that 37 armed militants were "'neutralized'" in 2020 compared to 189 in 2018 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 7). US Country Reports on Terrorism for 2021 indicates that no "Algeria-based terrorist groups" carried out "any domestic attacks in 2021" (US 2023-02-27, 127). According to 2021 figures provided by the Ministry of National Defence on operations of Algeria's army (Armée nationale populaire, ANP), the ANP "[s]hot dead" 9 "terrorists," arrested 8 "terrorists" and 222 "support[ers] [of] terrorist groups," and 6 other "terrorists" surrendered over the course of counterterrorism operations carried out that year (Algeria 2022-01-01). According to 2022 figures of ANP operations shared by the Ministry of National Defense, 20 "terrorists" were "[s]hot dead," 14 arrested, and 5 others surrendered to the military (Algeria 2023-01-02). The same source adds that 371 individuals supporting terrorist groups were arrested, and 623 weapons were seized (Algeria 2023-01-02).
The Ministry of National Defence's report on crime for 2022 states that the National Gendarmerie's "main line of effort" in its fight against crime during the year targeted "criminal networks," and resulted in the "dismantling" of 1,502 "criminal association" and 90 "neighborhood gangs" (Algeria [2023]). The same source adds that it seized 42,939 tonnes of treated kif [hashish] and 6,958,505 tablets of psychotropic drugs and 34,597 kg of cocaine, "by dragnets," resulting in "the neutralization of 186 drug trafficking networks" (Algeria [2023]).
2.2 Response to Human Trafficking
The US Department of State's 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report indicates that section 5 of Algeria's penal code criminalizes "most forms of sex trafficking and all forms of labor trafficking," with a penalty of 3 to 10 years' imprisonment and fines ranging from "300,000 to 1 million Algerian dinar[s (DZD)] ([US]$2,170 to [US]$7,230)" (US 2022-07-22, 83). Regarding state security institutions responsible for combatting human trafficking, the same source notes that the DGSN
maintained seven police brigades to combat human trafficking and illegal immigration; five additional brigades supported the seven specialized brigades as necessary. The Gendarmerie maintained 50 special brigades dedicated to managing children's issues, including child trafficking. (US 2022-07-22, 83)
Freedom House reports that although Algeria criminalized "all forms of trafficking in persons" in 2009 and has since "made an effort to enforce the ban," by prosecution and providing protection for survivors, these measures have not been applied "systematically," and its "first conviction under the law" was reported in 2015 (2023-03-09, Sec. G4). The US Trafficking in Persons Report specifies that during 2021, the Gendarmerie investigated 2,147 cases "linked to irregular migration and migrant smuggling," "some" of which may have been linked to trafficking (US 2022-07-22, 83). The same source adds that the government also "reported investigating at least six trafficking cases (three sex trafficking cases, two forced labor cases, including one on domestic servitude, and one for an unspecified purpose of exploitation)," representing "the first trafficking investigations" reported by the government in two years (US 2022-07-22, 83). Additionally, during the reporting period [of 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2022], the Trafficking in Persons Report indicates that Algeria prosecuted 35 alleged traffickers under the penal code provisions on trafficking, representing a "significant increase from zero prosecutions initiated in the previous reporting period," and 13 prosecutions in the one prior to that (US 2022-07-22, 83). The same source adds that Algeria had not reported "any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking crimes" (US 2022-07-22, 83).
Algeria's national report to the UPR states that it established a National Committee to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Persons in 2016; as of 2022, the state is "currently" working on implementing the 2022–2024 national action plan to combat human trafficking (Algeria 2022-09-02, para. 57, 58). According to the US Trafficking in Persons Report, Algeria operates three 24-hour hotlines and a public website for individuals who wish to file a report of "abuse and other crimes, including potential trafficking crimes"; however, "none of the hotlines reported receiving trafficking allegations in 2021" (US 2022-07-22, 84). ENACT indicates that the national anti-trafficking plan's implementation remains "slow" (ISS, et al. 2021b).
3. State Protection for Defendants, Survivors, and Witnesses of Organized Crime
3.1 Police and Judiciary
According to the National Gendarmerie website, in 2011 Algeria implemented the 1055 hotline, a free national emergency line for residents to access the "different services of the National Gendarmerie," which has, from 5 February 2011 until 31 March 2023, recorded "almost" 15,121,000 calls, and led to "more than" 610,000 cases of arrest by local units (Algeria [2023-04]). Additionally, the OSAC states that other crime emergency lines operating in the country include 1548 and 17 (US 2022-05-12). The same source adds that despite the existence of these emergency lines, the "reliability and response time for non-emergency services varies" and do not meet "U.S. standards" (US 2022-05-12).
MENA Rights Group, "a Geneva-based legal advocacy NGO defending and promoting fundamental rights and freedoms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region" (MENA Rights Group n.d.), indicates that "[d]espite Algeria's commitment to improve judicial independence and undertake reforms," the judicial branch "continues to suffer from interference by the executive" and to try civilians before military courts (2022-03, 5). Freedom House similarly indicates that Algeria's judiciary is "susceptible to pressure from the civilian government and the military," noting that the appointment of judges is done through the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM), a body "headed by the president" (2023-03-09, Sec. F1). BTI 2022 finds that the judiciary "remains under the control of the executive" based on the "[n]umerous court cases against political protesters" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 12).
According to Freedom House, the "lack of judicial and prosecutorial independence" in Algeria, which "often erodes the due process rights of defendants," is most notable in "politically sensitive cases against former officials or civic activists" (2023-03-09, Sec. F2). Examples provided by the same source include the following:
- "Lengthy delays in bringing defendants to trial are common";
- "prosecutors' requests to extend pretrial detention periods are typically granted"; and
- "[s]ecurity forces frequently conduct warrantless searches and engage in arbitrary arrests and short-term detentions" (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. F2).
Similarly, US Country Reports 2022 indicates that "[p]rolonged pretrial detention remained a problem," "frequently" equalling or surpassing the maximum sentence for the alleged crime, and that judges "rarely refused prosecutorial requests" for pretrial detention extensions (US 2023-03-20, 8).
In a case reported by Amnesty International, "at least 266 activists and protesters" were imprisoned, "[m]any" of which are being held in pretrial detention "for excessively long periods of time" or served prison sentences of up to 5 years "on overly broad, trumped-up charges such as 'harming' national security, 'undermining national unity', 'offending' public officials, 'inciting unarmed gathering', spreading fake news, and terrorism," during the Hirak [5] protest movement (2022-06-30). In another case reported by Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières, RSF), a journalist was held in provisional detention for 114 days (RSF 2021-08-12). According to another article from RSF, the journalist was charged with "'creating an electronic account dedicated to spreading information likely to cause segregation and hatred in society', 'deliberately spreading false information likely to endanger public order', and 'using various means to undermine national security and unity'," punishable by "up to" ten years' imprisonment, for authoring three articles on demonstrations "against a decree changing provincial boundaries" that took place in the southern region of Tamanrasset (RSF 2021-07-27). According to sources, the journalist was sentenced in August 2021 to one year in prison, with four months suspended, and a fine of 20,000 (DZD) [C$199] (Amnesty International 2021-10-02; RSF 2021-08-12).
According to US Country Reports 2022, for individuals facing charges of "drug trafficking, organized and transnational crime, money laundering, and other currency-related crimes," the police may request that the prosecutor extends their detention past the allowed 48 hours, in order to "gather additional evidence," up to three times, while for charges concerning terrorism and "other subversive activities," extensions may be requested "five times for a maximum of 12 days" (US 2023-03-20, 6).
Amnesty International indicates, in its recommendations submitted to the OHCHR for states undergoing a UPR, that Algeria does not "precisely" define the crime of terrorism "in line with international human rights law and standards" and uses "bogus terrorism charges to prosecute peaceful activists and journalists" (2022-09, 2). US Country Reports 2022 similarly reports that "broad provisions under the penal code," such as "membership in a terrorism organization," are used by the authorities to "arrest or punish critics" of the government, including journalists and human rights activists (US 2023-03-20, 16). For instance, Freedom House indicates that in "recent years," the "increas[ed]" use by state authorities of "vaguely worded antiterrorism legislation to prosecute members of the opposition," is evidenced in the cases of the Rachad, which includes former members of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front islamique du salut, FIS), and the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylia (Mouvement pour l'autodétermination de la Kabylie, MAK), both of which are political parties that were recognized in 2021 by Algeria's High Security Council as "terrorist organizations," leading to "[n]umerous" individuals facing arrest due to their "affiliation" with these groups (2023-03-09, Sec. B1). In a public statement, Amnesty International notes that they interviewed 15 lawyers, activists, journalists and a judge, and documented 37 cases "of activists who were wrongfully summoned, arrested, prosecuted or detained between 26 March and 26 May [2021]" for Penal Code charges that include terrorism and conspiracy (2021-06-21).
3.2 Government Initiatives and Support Services
According to BTI 2022, Algeria's national anti-corruption office, established in 2012, and related government efforts, "have failed to change what the Algerian Anti-Corruption Association [6] has described as a 'culture of impunity'" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 37). The same source notes that the Court of Auditors and the National Agency for the Prevention and Combatting of Corruption (Organe national de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption, ONPLC), continue to face a shortage of staff and a lack of "independence, effectiveness and transparency" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 37). Freedom House notes that "[i]nadequate anticorruption laws, a lack of official transparency, low levels of judicial independence, and bloated bureaucracies contribute to widespread corruption at all levels of government," while whistleblowers "have few legal protections" that "often go unenforced in practice" (2023-03-09, Sec. C2). ENACT indicates that "high-level criminal actors" that are "increasingly linked to state institutions" receive a "high level of protection from the state," evidenced in the "2018 scandal known as 'cocainegate,'" [7] which showed the degree "to which high-ranking officials," including politicians, military elite, and businessmen, "are connected with criminal economies" (ISS, et al. 2021b).
The US Trafficking in Persons Report indicates that state protection services continue to be "inadequate," and are not "specifically" designed for trafficking survivors (US 2022-07-22, 84). The same source adds that "the government referred some foreign victims to NGOs and international organizations for assistance" (US 2022-07-22, 84). ENACT indicates that Algeria's social protection framework is "extremely weak" and that "only a small fraction of the necessary measures" to assist survivors leaving an enslavement situation are met (ISS, et al. 2021b). The same source notes that the implementation of the national anti-trafficking plan has been "slow, largely due to the fact that there are no public mechanisms to screen, identify and refer potential victims to protection services" (ISS, et al. 2021b). Similarly, the US Trafficking in Persons Report notes that the government has yet to establish a "formal mechanism to identify and refer victims [of human trafficking] to protection services," and that despite a "modes[t]" increase in government efforts to identify such victims, unidentified ones continued to be "penalize[d]" by authorities (US 2022-07-22, 84).
The information in the following paragraph was provided by the US Trafficking in Persons Report:
Algeria does not "consistently screen" for trafficking victims among "vulnerable migrants," individuals it deports, and "individuals in commercial sex, refugees, or asylum seekers," despite being "populations highly vulnerable to trafficking." Violations that unidentified victims of trafficking are "compelled" to commit by their traffickers and that result in their "arrest, detention, prosecution, and deportation" by the authorities, include violations related to immigration, "prostitution, and other unlawful acts." While authorities "rely on victims to report abuses to authorities," the country's deportation practices "discourag[e]" foreign nationals who are trafficking victims from presenting themselves to the authorities, as "most" of them are "undocumented migrants" who avoid public services "out of fear of deportation" (US 2022-07-22, 84).
3.2.1 New Law on Human Trafficking
The information in the following paragraph was provided by Algérie Presse Service (APS), a "state-run" news agency (AP 2022-01-24):
On 13 April 2023, Algeria's National Council (Conseil de la nation) adopted a law aimed at [translation] "preventing and combatting human trafficking," which stipulates in its text that "'the State is obliged to ensure the protection of victims of human trafficking and to strengthen institutional and international cooperation in the prevention of this crime'." The new law includes provisions on the role of local authorities and state institutions, establishes "'the electronic leakage procedure as an investigation and enquiry procedure, through which judicial police officers can, by judicial decision, access computer systems or any other electronic system aimed at controlling suspects'." The new law imposes life imprisonment penalties in cases where "the victim is subjected to torture, sexual violence or [incurs a] disability," as well as increased penalties against perpetrators that are part of "an organized group or in the case of cross-border crimes" (APS 2023-04-13). Information on the implementation of the new law on human trafficking could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] According to the ranking system, a higher criminality score indicates "more severe" "criminality conditions," while a higher resilience score indicates "more effective" response measures to organized crime (ISS, et al. 2021c).
[2] China Labor Watch (CLW) is an NGO based in New York that collaborates with "[u]nions, [l]abor [o]rganizations, [a]nd [t]he [m]edia" to produce assessments and reports from investigations of factory conditions in China (CLW n.d.).
[3] According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG), the Sahrawi "are of mixed Berber, Arab and [B]lack African descent" and reside in the southern desert regions of Morocco stretching to Niger and Senegal, [including in areas of Algeria's southern desert region contested by Morocco] (MRG [2007]). Since the partition of Western Sahara in 1976, approximately 160,000 Sahrawi out of a total population of around 250,000 "remain displaced in southern Algerian refugee camps" (MRG [2007]).
[4] The following organizations authored the joint submission to the UPR on Algeria:
Il Cenacolo, the Sahrawi Association Against Impunity in Tindouf Camps, the African Institute for Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation, the Citizenship and Human Development Association, the Sahrawi Association for Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights, Um Al-Tunisi Association for Social and Solidarity Economy, Al-Waha Association for the Protection of Mother and Child, Al-Amal Association for Supporting Autonomy and Expanded Regionalisation, the South Observatory for Territorial Development, the Saharan Association for Sustainable Development and the Promotion of Investment (ASDI), the African Forum for Research and Studies in Human Rights, and the Sahara League for Democracy and Human Rights (Il Cenacolo, et al. 2022-03, 1).
[5] The Hirak protest movement consisted of "massive weekly peaceful street marches for political reform" that began in February 2019 and continued intermittently into February 2021 (HRW 2022-02-21). It included "millions" of Algerians across several cities opposing the fifth presidential term of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, leading to his resignation as well as a "crackdown" by the authorities who have "moved against associations and political parties deemed supportive of the Hirak" and "beg[u]n to arrest the perceived leaders of the informal movement" (HRW 2022-02-21).
[6] The Algerian Association for the Fight Against Corruption (Association algérienne de lutte contre la corruption, AACC) is a civil society organization that seeks to "raise awareness of corrupt misconduct" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 37).
[7] In May 2018, Algerian authorities seized a "record" 701 kilograms of cocaine from a container ship in the port city of Oran (ISS 2019-01-28). The ship was transporting goods for the country's largest importer of frozen meat, and its seizure was followed by the arrest of the company's owner and "three other members" as well as the "dismissal of high-ranking [state] officials including [the] former national security director" (ISS 2019-01-28).
References
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Africanews. N.d. "A Vision for Africanews." [Accessed 2023-05-03]
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