Pakistan: Ability of the police and non-state actors to track and trace individuals across Pakistan; databases and methods of tracking individuals, including the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), tenant registration system and criminal record checks; information sharing between police, security and airport officials; instances when an individual is declared a person of interest by the authorities and travel restrictions placed upon them (2016–December 2022)
1. Legislation
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 provides the following:
21EE. Power to call information etc.- (1) The Superintendent of Police during the course of investigation or an equivalent officer of security forces operating in aid of civil power under sections 4 and 5, may by an order in writing, on the request of the Joint Investigation Team,-
…
(d) with the permission of the Anti-terrorism Court, require any bank of [sic] financial institution, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, to provide any information relating to any person, including copies of entries made in the bank's or a financial institution's book, including information of transactions saved in electronic or digital form which are reasonably believed to be connected with commission of an offence under this Act and the keeper of such books or records shall be obliged to certify the copies in accordance with law; and
(e) require information or obtain record of telephone and mobile phone data, e-mail, MMS [Multimedia Messaging Service] and CNIC [Computerized National Identity Card] and encrypted messages or any other information suspected to be linked in any manner with commission of an offence under this Act, from any service provider company of department.
(2) The copies obtained, information received or evidence collected in pursuance of clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall be kept confidential and shall not be divulged to any un-authorized person or used for any purpose other than the legal proceedings under this Act.
… (Pakistan 1997, bold in original)
The Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013 governs the ability of authorities to conduct surveillance of individuals under investigation for "an offence specified in schedule I," which are offenses related to "terrorist activities" (Pakistan 2013, preamble, Sec. 3(m), Schedule I). The Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013 provides the following:
16. Authorization under the warrant. --- (1) The warrant of surveillance or interception to be issued by the Judge may authorize and allow the lawful doing of any or all of the following acts, namely—
- interception and recording of telephonic communication of the suspect with any person;
- video recording of any person, persons, premises, event, situation etc;
- interception or recording or obtaining of any electronic transaction including but not limited to e-mails, SMS etc;
- interception and taking over of any equipment used in the communication in respect of which the warrant is issued, including but not limited to telephone, cell phone, mobile sims, electronic database, demonstrating linking of electronic communication with the database belonging to the persons in respect of whom the warrant has been issued:
… (Pakistan 2013, bold in original)
Section 7(4) of the Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules, 2021 provides the following:
The Service Provider, Social Media Company and Significant Social Media Company shall provide to the Investigation Agency designated or established under section 29 of the Act, any information or data or content or sub-content contained in any Online Information System owned or managed or run by the respective Service Provider, Social Media Company or Significant Social Media Company, in decrypted, readable, and comprehensible format or plain version in accordance with the provisions of the Act. (Pakistan 2021)
2. Ability of the Police to Track and Trace Individuals
A country information report on Pakistan by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) states that "[t]here are no centralised or national law enforcement databases or criminal records, which makes it hard to track or locate offenders" and "[p]rovincial police forces operate independently, with no nationwide coordination or training standards" (Australia 2022-01-25, para. 5.10).
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the director of a Pakistan-based human rights and online rights NGO stated that the "police under its investigative powers have a number of techniques to track individuals if they are involved in or suspected to be involved in crimes" (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04). Sources indicate that for the police to carry out an investigation, there must be a "registered case" (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04) or First Information Report (FIR) registered against an individual (Professor 2022-05-02). The same sources indicated that Pakistani police have "more" powers to investigate crimes for "cognizable offences" [1], without the need for oversight from the courts (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04; Professor 2022-05-02).
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of counterterrorism at the National Defense University in Islamabad indicated that the use of modern surveillance technologies has improved the ability of Pakistani police and law enforcement agencies to track and trace individuals (Assistant Professor 2022-01-26). In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a professor of sociology at the State University of New York Oneonta, who has conducted research on policing in Pakistan and specializes in comparative criminal justice, stated that the war on terrorism has increased the ability of police to find someone and that biometric technology, including the citizen registration system, has also changed the landscape for tracking and tracing individuals (2022-01-24). Sources indicate that the full extent of law enforcement surveillance capacities is unknown (PI 2017-03, para. 19) or is not entirely clear due to a "lack of transparency" by Pakistani authorities (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04).
3. Methods of Tracking Individuals
3.1 Call Detail Records (CDRs) [Call Data Records; Call Records]
The Professor stated that the widespread use of cellphones has made it "easier" for the police to track and trace an individual (2022-01-24). Sources indicate that CDRs can be used to track individuals (Assistant Professor 2022-01-26; human rights NGO 2022-02-04). The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, a federal government organization, notes that CDRs include details of calls, such as the date, time, duration, and location of a telephone call, and are kept by telecommunication companies (Pakistan 2016-04-28, Sec. 6.8.1, 13.2).
The Assistant Professor stated that until recently, CDRs from cellular companies were "easily" accessible, for state and non-state actors, by paying a small fee to cellular companies in exchange for "complete details with exact locations" of an individual (2022-01-26). However, the same source indicated that in 2021, the government of Pakistan enacted "strict" laws to discourage these practices (Assistant Professor 2022-01-26). The Assistant Professor further stated that law enforcement agencies are now required to produce an FIR to obtain an individual's CDR, after which the cellular company will decide, depending on the seriousness of the offence, what type of CDR to share; one that only shows call details, or a more detailed report with the geo-coordinates of the cellphone (2022-01-26). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The human rights NGO indicated that for cognizable offences, the police have more power to investigate crimes without oversight from the courts and that for certain offences, including terrorism, laws such as the Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013 allow law enforcement authorities to conduct surveillance and to intercept communication (2022-02-04). Section 3(g) of the Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013 provides the following:
(g) 'Intercepted material' means evidence collected under Section 17 and will refer,-
…
(ii) for the purposes of 'Interception' to, include-mails, SMS, IPDR (internet protocol detail record) or CDR (cell detail record) and any form of computer based or cell phone based communication and voice analysis. It also includes any means of communication using wired or wireless or IP (internet protocol) based media or gadgetry[.] (Pakistan 2013)
The human rights NGO also noted that the Investigation for Fair Trial Act permits judges to issue "secret warrants" to law enforcement agents to "surveil, collect evidence and intercept data on individuals" (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04). Section 3(p) of the Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013 provides the following:
'Warrant' means warrant of surveillance or interception, and includes warrant issued under Sections 11 whereby the applicant is allowed by the Judge to collect evidence through interception, recording through audio or video or any means of communication or surveillance of movements and actions through minimum interference in property and privacy of any person including human intelligence. (Pakistan 2013)
According to a report on COVID-19 and surveillance published by Freedom House in 2020, the Pakistani government "retooled" an antiterrorism system developed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency to bolster their "'track and trace'" efforts in combatting the COVID-19 pandemic (Freedom House 2020). The same source indicates that this system
allows for "geofencing" to identify all of the people who have passed through a specific area at a specific time. There are separate reports of intelligence agents tapping the phones of hospital patients to determine whether their friends and family express having symptoms themselves. Officials also have access to a national biometric database containing information on over 200 million citizens. Little is publicly known about the overall program, though reports indicate that data can be passed on to police, health departments, and provincial government agencies. (Freedom House 2020)
3.2 Biometric Databases and National ID Card
According to Privacy International (PI), a UK-based NGO that works to "promote the human right of privacy throughout the world" (PI n.d.), the registration of SIM card personal data in Pakistan is "widespread" and has a "high level" of public support (PI 2019-01-26). The same source notes that SIM cards in Pakistan must be registered and that they are also "biometrically verified" against NADRA's "national database" (PI 2019-01-26).
NADRA's website states that a National Identity Card (NIC) is issued to citizens of Pakistan and that it includes a "unique 13 digit identification number" which is "recognized all over the country" (Pakistan n.d.). The same source notes that every citizen of Pakistan 18 years and older is eligible to obtain an NIC and that it is required to obtain documents such as a license, National Tax Number (NTN), bank account, passport, and cellular connection (Pakistan n.d.).
PI indicates that
[i]n 2012 NADRA announced a so-called chip-based Smart [National Identity Card] (SNIC) containing its owner's biometric photo, a computer chip, address and parental information. NADRA has said that it aims to replace all current [Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs)] with SNICs by 2020. A SNIC is necessary in order to open a bank account, get a new driver's licence, passport, broadband internet connection or a SIM card.
Biometric data collected by NADRA include iris scans, fingerprints (both hands), a photograph taken at a NADRA centre, and a scan of the citizen's personal signature. (PI 2019-01-26)
Reuters reports that according to NADRA, 120 million people or 96 percent of Pakistan's population has been issued a CNIC (2022-07-26). The same source notes that each CNIC contains a unique 13-digit ID, a photograph of the individual, the individual's signature, and a microchip which contains the individual's iris scans and fingerprints (Reuters 2022-07-26).
The Professor stated that the process of purchasing many items, such as SIM cards, involves the use of biometric technology that scans an individual's fingerprints and verifies their identity (20220124). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The Reuters article reports that 300 public and private sector providers, including the tax department, the election commission, and mobile service providers, have access to the CNIC database (2022-07-26).
3.3 Tenant Registration System and Criminal Record Check
For further information on the tenant registration system in Pakistan, see Response to Information Request PAK106026 of January 2018.
According to the Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB), an "autonomous" body created by the Government of Punjab to modernize governance through transparency, digital literacy, and other services (Punjab n.d.a), by law it is "mandatory" for tenants and landlords in Punjab to "register" at police stations when signing rental contracts (Punjab n.d.b).
An article by the Express Tribune, a Pakistani daily newspaper, reports that according to the Sindh Information of Temporary Residents Act, 2015, landlords are required to inform a local police station when taking on new tenants (2022-03-08).
The same source notes that the Sindh government has introduced an online application for tenant registration verification (The Express Tribune 2022-03-08). Another Express Tribune article reports that in 2017 Islamabad launched an online tenancy registration system (2017-06-02).
The human rights NGO stated that a tenant verification system has been implemented in Punjab and parts of Sindh, and that it allows authorities to check the criminal records of individuals against their CNIC (2022-02-04). The same source stated that the Tenant Registration System "is part of a move towards the centralisation of information" (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04).
The PITB states that they developed a web-based application to "register and monitor" tenants and that "[a]ssistants at police stations use this system at front desks to register owners and tenants" (Punjab n.d.b). According to sources, the data collected on tenants is integrated with the Criminal Record Office (CRO) and the Police Station Record Management System (PSRMS) (Punjab n.d.b; human rights NGO 2022-02-04). The same sources indicate that a notification is sent to police if a tenant with a criminal record rents a house, and then police are able to respond to the notification "if required" (Punjab n.d.b; human rights NGO 2022-02-04).
The website of the Punjab Police states that the Criminal Record Management System (CRMS), a system that is used to manage criminal records and identify criminals through biometrics, physical appearance, and criminal history and which includes a database of digitized fingerprints of criminals, is integrated with the tenant registration system (Punjab 2021-01-28). The same source notes that to date [as of January 2021], 1,036,115 criminal records have been digitized (Punjab 2021-01-28).
The PITB also states that a mobile application was also developed for initial registration of tenants and that the system is operational "across" Punjab and "has provided police [with] a comprehensive record of temporary residents in their respective jurisdictions" (Punjab n.d.b). The same source provides the example of a suspect with more than 30 criminal cases who was living in Faisalabad and who was located in October 2016 through the PITB's Tenants Registration System (Punjab n.d.b). The PITB also notes that across Punjab, 637,635 tenants have been registered since the database was created and 7,532 criminals have been "traced" (Punjab n.d.b).
4. Communication and Information Sharing Between Police, Security, and Airport Officials
Information on communication and information sharing between police, security, and airport officials could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
5. Instances When an Individual Is Declared a Person of Interest by the Authorities and Travel Restrictions Within Pakistan Were Placed Upon Them
Information on instances when an individual is declared a person of interest by the authorities and travel restrictions within Pakistan were placed upon them was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Freedom House's 2022 annual report notes that the primary tool for limiting international travel is the Exit Control List (ECL), "which blocks named individuals from using official exit points from the country" and which is "intended to prevent those posing a security threat and those facing court proceedings from fleeing," but adds that it has been used to "control dissent" (2022-02-24, Sec. G1).
6. Non-State Actors' Ability to Track and Trace Individuals
Information on the ability of non-state actors to track and trace individuals was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Without providing further details, the human rights NGO stated that non-state actors "often rely on a complex system of social surveillance and connections with state authorities and/or private companies to conduct surveillance and track [individuals]" (2022-02-04). The same source also stated that because Pakistan does not have any personal data protection law, there is a lack of accountability which has made it "easy" and "common practice" for influential individuals "to gain access to data held by telecommunications companies" (Human rights NGO 2022-02-04). In contrast, the Assistant Professor stated that the passage in 2021 of legislation has restricted the ability of cellular companies to provide CDRs; previously, CDRs from cellular companies were "easily" accessible by non-state actors in exchange for a small fee (2022-01-26).
The human rights NGO also stated that political parties, "particularly those in power," "often use connections with state bodies to conduct surveillance on opponents" (2022-02-04). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Note
[1] According to the Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives Pakistan (CPDI Pakistan), a cognizable offence is "one in which the police may arrest a person without warrant. They are authorized to start [an] investigation into a cognizable case on their own and do not require any orders from the court to do so" (n.d., 2). A non-cognizable offence is "an offence in which a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant; the police cannot investigate such an offence without the court's permission" (CPDI Pakistan n.d., 2). The Professor explained that "cognizable offences" are similar to felonies in the US and include crimes such as terrorism (Professor 2022-05-02).
References
Assistant Professor, National Defense University, Islamabad. 2022-01-26. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
Australia. 2022-01-25. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan. [Accessed 2022-11-29]
Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives Pakistan (CPDI Pakistan). N.d. First Information Report (FIR) (A Guide for Citizens). [Accessed 2022-02-23]
The Express Tribune. 2022-03-08. Yasin Jabalpuri. "Tenant Verification Widely Ignored in Metropolis." [Accessed 2022-04-08]
The Express Tribune. 2017-06-02. "Islamabad Police Launch Online Tenancy Registration System." [Accessed 2022-02-09]
Freedom House. 2022-02-24. "Pakistan." Freedom in the World 2022. [Accessed 2022-12-12]
Freedom House. 2020. Adrian Shahbaz & Allie Funk. False Panacea: Abusive Surveillance in the Name of Public Health. [Accessed 2022-04-08]
Human rights NGO, Pakistan. 2022-02-04. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
Pakistan. 2021. Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication. Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules, 2021. [Accessed 2022-02-09]
Pakistan. 2016-04-28. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority. "Annex – F." The Award of 850 MHZ Spectrum: The Next Generation Mobile Services Award (NGMSA). [Accessed 2022-12-23]
Pakistan. 2013. Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013. [Accessed 2022-02-09]
Pakistan. 1997 (amended 2014). The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. [Accessed 2022-02-09]
Pakistan. N.d. National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). "National Identity Card (NIC)." [Accessed 2022-12-13]
Privacy International (PI). 2019-01-26. "State of Privacy Pakistan." [Accessed 2022-03-01]
Privacy International (PI). 2017-03. The Right to Privacy in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. [Accessed 2022-03-01]
Privacy International. N.d. "History." [Accessed 2022-12-12]
Professor, State University of New York Oneonta. 2022-05-02. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.
Professor, State University of New York Oneonta. 2022-01-24. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.
Punjab. 2021-01-28. Punjab Police. "Criminal Record Management System (CRMS)." [Accessed 2022-12-12]
Punjab. N.d.a. Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB). "About Us." [Accessed 2022-02-09]
Punjab. N.d.b. Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB). "Tenant Registration System." [Accessed 2022-02-09]
Reuters. 2022-07-26. "National ID Cards Still Distant Dream for Many." [Accessed 2022-12-12]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Allama Iqbal International Airport; assistant professor of human rights and politics at a university in the UK; Bacha Khan International Airport; Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives; digital rights specialist at an NGO in Pakistan; Faisalabad International Airport; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; human rights organization and research think tank in Pakistan; Islamabad – Islamabad Police; Islamabad International Airport; Jinnah International Airport; Multan International Airport; Pakistan – Civil Aviation Authority, Federal Investigation Agency, High Commission in Ottawa, Ministry of Interior; Pakistan International Airlines; Pakistan International Human Rights Organization; Punjab – Punjab Police; Sindh – Citizens-Police Liaison Committee, Sindh Police; Transparency International – Pakistan.
Internet sites, including: Al Jazeera; Allama Iqbal International Airport; Amnesty International; Asian Human Rights Commission; Atmateen.com; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; BBC; Bertelsmann Stiftung; Business Standard; Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives; Daily Times; Factiva; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; Global Information Society Watch; The Guardian; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; Human Rights Watch; International Human Rights Observer; INTERPOL; Islamabad International Airport; Jinnah International Airport; The Nation; The New York Times; Pakistan – Civil Aviation Authority, Federal Investigation Agency; Pakistan International Airlines; Pakistan International Human Rights Organization; Pakistan Observer; Punjab – Punjab Police; Sindh – Citizens Police Liaison Committee, Sindh Police; UK – Home Office; UN – Refworld; United States Institute of Peace; US – Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council; Voice of America; The Washington Post.