Côte d'Ivoire: The Wé ethnic group, including its location in the country and relations with the Dozos; treatment of members of the Wé ethnic group by authorities; state protection (2016-January 2018)
1. Wé Ethnic Group
Sources report that the Wé [We, Wè, Wê] ethnic group is part of the Krou ethnolinguistic group (Researcher 1 Jan. 2018; MRG n.d.). According to sources, the Wé are also known as the Guéré (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017; MRG n.d.). Sources also state that the Wé reside in the western (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017; Afriki Presse 8 May 2017) or west-central part of the country (MRG n.d.). An article in Afriki Presse, a website reporting round-the-clock current affairs and news on Francophone Africa and the world (Afriki Presse n.d.), reports that the Wé [translation] "mainly live" in the Guémon and Cavally regions and that they also live in part of Liberia (Afriki Presse 8 May 2017). The same source states that there are "approximately 2 million 400 [thousand]" Wé in Côte d'Ivoire (Afriki Presse 8 May 2017). Minority Rights Group International (MRG) reports that the population of the Wé is 318,000 people (MRG n.d.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a doctor of geography and associate researcher with the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité, GRIP), an independent research centre in Brussels (GRIP n.d.), who has done work on the increasing power of local selfdefence groups on the border between Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, said that the Wé [translation] "live in an area along the border with Liberia and the Bandama River (which winds through Côte d'Ivoire). Historically, they have been a mountain people living in Liberia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. Today, many live around the Nimba mountains" (Researcher 1 Jan. 2018).
According to MRG, the Wé were exclusively subsistence farmers until recently (MRG n.d.). According to the researcher, [translation] "culturally, the Wé were a 'clearing civilization'. They practised slash-and-burn agriculture. Today, they grow cash crops (coffee, cacao). They are still hunters and blacksmiths" (Researcher 1 Jan. 2018).
1.1 Land Dispute
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a geographer at the Université Bordeaux-Montaigne, who has written many articles on Côte d'Ivoire and texts on the geography of development and African geopolitics, stated the following:
[translation]
The Wé group … believes it is the underdog in the fight for farmland at the edge of the forest where it has always lived. … Consequently, since tensions arose over land ownership, … the Wé have often become involved in sometimes deadly incidents with other groups, both Ivorian and foreign (mostly Burkinabe), who settled the area long ago and believe they are on the land legally. (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017)
In a 2014 report on Côte d'Ivoire, the International Crisis Group describes the problem in the western part of the country as follows:
[International Crisis Group English version]
This vast area, which stretches along the Liberian border, from the [western] coast to the Nimba mountains, suffers from almost all the ethnic, land, political, security and identity problems that afflict contemporary Côte d'Ivoire. Two administrative regions [in the area] are especially problematic: Cavally and Guémon. Outside Abidjan, these are the two regions where the post-election crisis claimed the most victims. Deadly incidents have regularly occurred since the end of the crisis and the government in Abidjan has not adequately addressed the … root causes of the violence.
First, Cavally and Guémon are at the epicentre of Côte d'Ivoire's land question. Conflicts over agricultural land occur throughout the country but are much more acute in this area, where the population is diverse and the land [is coveted for being] very fertile. In short, three large population groups dispute ownership and use of the land: people "native" to the area … , migrants from other parts of the country and migrants from abroad. (International Crisis Group 28 Jan. 2014, 1)
The We's role in this conflict and the other forces there are described in the following terms:
[International Crisis Group English version]
The former [people native to the area, the Wê group] are traditionally landowners. They rent land to Ivorian migrants from the centre and north of the country, generally members of the Baoulé and Dioula groups, and to migrants from abroad, mainly from Burkina Faso.
These three groups shared land in a relatively fair way until the early 1990s. …
Land is not the only source of intercommunal conflict; with time, it became a political issue linked to nationality and identity beyond economic concerns. The three major Ivorian political forces have used it to mobilise the population in presidential elections over two decades. Each community has rallied behind the party able to defend its land interests, leading to polarisation exacerbated by years of war and deadly intercommunal clashes. The perpetrators of massacres in Cavally and Guémon since 2002 remain unpunished because of the ineffective justice system and the lack of any genuine interest in reconciliation on the part of successive governments. Land conflicts and political manipulation of the issue have generated tensions, exacerbated by a growing culture of vengeance that could, at any moment, lead to further bloodbaths. (International Crisis Group 28 Jan. 2014, 12)
1.2 Relations Between the Wé and Ivorian Authorities
A report on Côte d'Ivoire by the UNHCR published in June 2012 states that, according to MRG, members of ethnic communities from southern and western Côte d'Ivoire, including the Krou, of which the Guéré are a subgroup, are generally considered to be proGbagbo [Laurent Gbagbo, President of Côte d'Ivoire until 2011] (UN 15 June 2012, 16). According to the geographer, [translation] "the Wé group … has long defied authority and largely supported Laurent Gbagbo's party" (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017). The geographer added, however, that [translation] "[t]o my knowledge (and I often travel to the country for my political geography research), no imprisonments or deaths related to membership in the Wé ethnic group have been recorded. Therefore, they do not appear to be at risk in that country" (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017). The researcher also noted that it can be assumed that the Wé supported Gbagbo before the 2010 crisis, but he also stated, without giving any details, that he does not think that they are subject to any particular treatment by the Ivorian authorities (Researcher 1 Jan. 2018).
2. Relations Between the Wé and the Dozos
2.1 The Dozos
Sources describe the Dozos as [translation] "traditional hunters" in Côte d'Ivoire (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017; Amnesty International July 2013, 18). In a 2013 report, Amnesty International states the following:
[Amnesty International English version]
The Dozos are from a powerful brotherhood of hunters present in several countries in the sub-region. They have also been progressively involved in the Ivorian conflict over the past decade. In particular, they have ensured the safety of those [populations] … who were … subjected to threats and attacks by security forces and militias loyal to former President Laurent Gbagbo. These traditional hunters, have formed as a militia, and have consistently fought alongside the New Forces (that controlled the north of the country since the attempted coup in 2002) and have committed serious abuses, including during the 2011 postelectoral crisis, the deliberate killing of people often because of their ethnicity.
Since Alassane Ouattara's coming to power, the Dozos have gained considerable importance over the whole territory and their presence has increased notably in the west of the country where some of their members ransom the population and carry out arbitrary arrests assuming a self-appointed policing role. (Amnesty International July 2013, 18)
The geographer stated that [translation] "some [Dozos] joined militias working with northern rebels during the 2002-2011 crisis" (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017). In June 2016, the World Organization Against Torture (Organisation mondiale contre la torture, OMCT) and the Ivorian Human Rights Movement (Mouvement ivorien des droits humains, MIDH) reported the following:
[translation]
The day after the deadly post-election violence in 2010, President Ouattara created a national army to integrate forces loyal to the former president to ensure the safety of the population and strengthen national cohesion. Along with this new army, an armed militia - the Dozos - was also created. It has been accused of carrying out the worst atrocities against populations, especially those in western and southern Côte d'Ivoire, including acts of torture, killings and arbitrary arrests. (OMCT and MIDH June 2016, 5)
The researcher stated the following:
[translation]
[T]he Dozos … have multiple identities and have seen tremendous growth in their numbers in the last 20 years. They include some 200,000 men today, although many of them can be considered opportunists. In 2011, according to sources, the Dozos were associated with Alassane Dramane Ouattara and were directly responsible for the massacres of the Duékoué. They also apparently moved from northern to western Côte d'Ivoire in the wake of the 2011 crisis. Recently, there have been increasingly severe instances of retaliation for these events. (Researcher 1 Jan. 2018)
According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, in 2016, "Dozos … assumed an informal security role in many communities, although they had no legal authority to arrest or detain" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 6).
2.2 The Wé and the Dozos (2016-2017)
Information on relations between the Wé and the Dozos in 2016 was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
An article published in the Ivorian daily newspaper L'Intelligent d'Abidjan in October 2016, which criticizes, among other things, the [translation] "dispossession of western populations by the … Dozos," reports on an emergency plan developed by the Ivorian government in July 2016 to "put a definitive end to the abusive and illegal exploitation of Mount Péko Park, which is occupied by irregular populations who settled there following the crises in Côte d'Ivoire," that caused the displacement of 17,729 adults and 11,548 children belonging to the Guéré [Wé] ethnic group (L'Intelligent d'Abidjan 9 Oct. 2016). The same article also states the following:
[translation]
Alongside this concern, which affects nearly 22 Guéré villages in the departments of Duekoué and Bangolo, there is another problem. It concerns the heavily armed men in uniform who are putting up roadblocks at the entrances of villages throughout the Guémon region. Every time someone passes through this corridor, they have to pay between 1,000 [approximately C$2.30] and 2,000 CFA [African Financial Community] francs. This is the case with Pinhou-Gbapleu road, where more than seven roadblocks have been recorded, and the Kpôhô road (Duékoué crossroad in Ponan Vahy), which are maintained by unknown men in our army and who earn their pay at the expense of the poor populations. (L'Intelligent d'Abidjan 9 Oct. 2016)
Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Sources mention altercations between the Wé and the Dozos as part of a land dispute between the Wé and the Baoulé, in the Goin-Débé forest reserve (L'Infodrome 15 Oct. 2017; AIP 28 Sept. 2017). According to an article in Fraternité Matin, a government-owned Ivorian daily newspaper (Courrier International n.d.),
[translation]
after Wé youth occupied their plantations in the Goin-Debe forest reserve in early September 2017 and refused to allow them to return, Baoulé farmers supported by the Dozos, according to witness accounts, attacked the Wé youth, who were also supported by armed men. (Fraternité Matin 28 Sept. 2017)
The Agence ivorienne de presse (AIP) reports that "[t]he president of the Wê Youth Alliance [Alliance des jeunes Wê] believes that his 'brothers' were attacked on Tuesday by … Dozos hired by the Baoulés" (AIP 28 Sept. 2017). According to Fraternité Matin, around 30 Wé youth were captured by the Dozos (Fraternité Matin 28 Sept. 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
According to the researcher, in October 2017, four Dozos were beaten to death or injured in this conflict (Researcher 1 Jan. 2018). Describing the same event, Fraternité Matin states that four Dozos from Burkino Faso were killed [translation] "and four others were seriously injured" (Fraternité Matin 21 Oct. 2017). According to some sources, the Dozos were killed by Wé youth who suspected them of fighting alongside the Baoulés (Koaci 23 Oct. 2017; Fraternité Matin 21 Oct. 2017). The same sources add that some residents of the region, who feared retaliation by the Dozos, left their village and sought refuge elsewhere (Koaci 23 Oct. 2017; Fraternité Matin 21 Oct. 2017).
Articles published in November 2017 indicate that the land dispute between the Wé and the Baoulé is ongoing and also mention that the Dozos are participants in the conflict (AIP 16 Nov. 2017; Afrique sur 7 16 Nov. 2017). According to Afrique sur 7, an African news website (Afrique sur 7 n.d.), [translation] "the Dozos … are involved in the land dispute between the Guérés and the Baoulés in the west," and "the clashes between the people native to the region and migrants from abroad have resulted in the deaths of approximately 10 people, considerable property damage, and nearly a thousand people displaced" (Afrique sur 7 16 Nov. 2017). The AIP article states that the chief of a village in the region [translation] "lamented the killings because of the conflict and demanded the disarmament of the 'Dozos', who, [according to the chief], have unfortunately not shown a 'neutral' attitude in the conflict" (AIP 16 Nov. 2017).
3. State Protection for the Wé
In their June 2016 report, the OMCT and MIDH state the following about the Dozos in 2013:
[translation]
According to the UNOCI [UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire] mission report published in June 2013, members of both the new army and the Dozos enjoy almost total impunity on the pretense of ensuring national security. According to the ONUCI mission, the abuses perpetrated by these groups can be attributed to the Ivorian state, since the Dozos allegedly exercised the prerogatives of public authorities in terms of security or acted on the instructions or under the control of security forces or administrative authorities. Côte d'Ivoire also seems to have failed in its duty to protect its people from abuses by the Dozos, including by not bringing alleged perpetrators to justice. (OMCT and MIDH 28 June 2016, 5-6)
The US Department of State mentions that in 2016, "[t]he government discouraged the Dozos, whom most residents feared, from assuming security roles" (US 3 Mar. 2017, 6). In an article published on September 28, the AIP reports that there were [translation] "numerous mediation sessions at the local and government levels" and that "a large contingent of mixed police and gendarmerie forces was deployed in the Goin-Débé forest" (AIP 28 Sept. 2017). The same source states the following:
[translation]
According to security authorities, security forces were ordered to keep the populations safe and prevent communities from clashing with each other. Several ministers carried out such missions in the area, including the Minister of the Interior and Security, the Minister of Employment and Social Protection, the Minister of Animal Production and Fisheries, the Minister of Women, Child Protection and Solidarity, and the Minister of the Environment and Sustainable Development. (AIP 28 Sept. 2017)
Fraternité Matin similarly states that the gendarmerie and the Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (Forces armées de Côte d'Ivoire, FACI) were dispatched to end the clashes and that [translation] "approximately 30 Wê youth who were imprisoned by the Dozos were released by FACI soldiers, and those who were injured [were] evacuated to the Guiglo hospital" (Fraternité Matin 28 Sept. 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
In November 2017, Afrique sur 7 reported that [translation] "[t]he leader of the Ivorian army … sounded the alarm by officially ordering his men to '[d]isarm everyone in the forest, especially the Dozos'" (Afrique sur 7 16 Nov. 2017). Additionally, the AIP reports that high-ranking officials in the Ivorian army committed to [translation] "finding an answer" to the request from the region's village and community chiefs to disarm the Dozos and that "numerous roadblocks set up by 'Dozos' were dismantled" before they left (AIP 16 Nov. 2017). The geographer, speaking about the Wé's involvement in the rural land dispute, also stated, without providing additional details, that [translation] "the authorities have always intervened to enforce law and order" (Geographer 22 Dec. 2017). The researcher, however, stated that the Wé could not rely on protection from the Ivorian authorities [translation] "for two possible reasons: the state does not have much of a presence in western Côte d'Ivoire, and the Wé can be considered, for a number of reasons, to be part of the opposition to current president Alassane Dramane Ouattara" (Researcher 1 Jan. 2017).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
References
Afriki Presse. 8 May 2017. Philippe Kouhon. "Côte d'Ivoire : une association de Wê arrive, un des promoteurs dévoile les ambitions (Kolé Yékoula Laurent)." [Accessed 22 Dec. 2017]
Afriki Presse. N.d. "Accueil." [Accessed 9 Jan. 2018]
Afrique sur 7. 16 November 2017. Rufus Polichinelle. "Côte d'Ivoire : conflit à l'ouest, 'Désarmez les Dozos' dixit le CEMA." [Accessed 20 Dec. 2017]
Afrique sur 7. N.d. "A propos." [Accessed 9 Jan. 2018]
Agence ivorienne de presse (AIP). 16 November 2017. "Côte d'Ivoire / Conflit foncier dans le Cavally : le CEMAG appelle les populations à collaborer avec l'armée pour faire la lumière sur les crimes." [Accessed 20 Dec. 2017]
Agence ivorienne de presse (AIP). 28 September 2017. "Côte d'Ivoire/ Le conflit foncier sur la forêt classée du Goin-Débé connaît un rebondissement." [Accessed 20 Dec. 2017]
Amnesty International. July 2013. Côte d'Ivoire : "C'est comme si rien ne s'était passé ici." Un an après l'attaque du camp de Nahibly, la justice se fait toujours attendre. [Accessed 21 Dec. 2017]
Courrier International. N.d. "Fraternité Matin." [Accessed 8 Jan. 2018]
Fraternité Matin. 21 October 2017. Saint-Tra Bi. "Bloléquin/Conflit intercommunautaire : quatre (4) dozos tués à Zeaglo." [Accessed 22 Dec. 2017]
Fraternité Matin. 28 September 2017. Saint-Tra Bi. "Guiglo/Conflit Wê-Baoulé : des blessés et des campements incendiés." [Accessed 22 Dec. 2017]
Geographer specializing in Côte d'Ivoire. 22 December 2017. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP). N.d. "À propos du Grip." [Accessed 10 Jan. 2018]
L'Infodrome. 15 October 2017. F.D. Bony. "Affrontements interethniques à l'ouest : les vérités de Guikahué aux communautés Wê et Baoulé." [Accessed 20 Dec. 2017]
L'Intelligent d'Abidjan. 9 October 2016. "Mont Peko : Charles Ambroise Fié (cadre de Duekoué) dénonce une nouvelle spoliation des populations de l'Ouest par les FRCI et les Dozo." (Factiva) [Accessed 21 Dec. 2017]
International Crisis Group. 28 January 2014. Côte d'Ivoire : le Grand Ouest, clé de la réconciliation. Rapport Afrique n° 212. [Accessed 22 Dec. 2017]
Koaci. 23 October 2017. Donatien Kautcha. "Côte d'Ivoire: conflit à l'ouest du pays, quatre Dozos tués, les populations craignent des représailles." [Accessed 21 Dec. 2017]
Minority Rights Group International (MRG). N.d. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People. "Krou." [Accessed 20 Dec. 2017]
Organisation mondiale contre la torture (OMCT) and Mouvement ivoirien des droits humains (MIDH). 28 June 2016. Contribution à la liste des points à traiter pour la soumission du rapport initial de la Côte d'Ivoire devant le Comité contre la torture. [Accessed 21 Dec. 2017]
Researcher, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP). 1 January 2018. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
United Nations (UN). 15 June 2012. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Interim Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Côte d'Ivoire. HCR/EG/CIV/12/01. [Accessed 8 Jan. 2018]
United States (US). 3 March 2017. Department of State. "Côte d'Ivoire." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016. [Date de consultation: 20 Dec. 2017]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Associate professor, Howard University; Commission des droits de l'homme de la Côte d'Ivoire; doctor in geography, Université Paris 8; Mouvement ivorien des droits humains; professor of anthropology, Northwestern University; professor of Ethnology, Università di Mondena e Reggio Emiliana; professor of political science, Institut d'études politiques de Paris; Lecturer, Écoles des Hautes études en sciences sociales.
Internet sites, including: BBC; Côte d'Ivoire official government portal; ecoi.net; Ethnologue; Factiva; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Freedom House; Human Rights Watch; IRIN; Jeune Afrique; Radio France internationale; UN – Refworld.