Responses to Information Requests

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

For information on the origins and the history of the Red Command, see Response to Information Request BRA105251 of August 2015.

Sources call the Red Command a "drug gang" (Reuters 24 Apr. 2018) or a criminal group (Agencia EFE 20 Sept. 2018; InSight Crime 18 May 2018). Reuters states that the Red Command is Rio de Janeiro's "most powerful drug gang" (Reuters 24 Apr. 2018). According to a coordinator at the Igarapé Institute [1], the Red Command is "the second most powerful criminal organization in Brazil … and remains among the country’s best-organized criminal groups" (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019).

Sources also describe the Red Command as a "prison gang" (InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019; Reuters 7 Jan. 2019). Spanish news agency Agencia EFE indicates that it is operating from prisons in the state of Rio de Janeiro (Agencia EFE 20 Sept. 2018). InSight Crime reports that the Red Command started out in prisons in the 1970s "as a self-protection group for prisoners" (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). Imprisoned Red Command leaders, according to InSight Crime, control operations from inside the prisons (InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019).

According to the Igarapé Institute coordinator, the total number of members of the Red Command is unknown (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Regarding membership and recruitment, the same source indicated that

[i]nmates join factions of the CV (and other groups) in order to protect themselves and maintain their association after they are released. In addition, group leaders leverage their access to goods that are usually unavailable to regular inmates, such as soap and marijuana, to coopt new recruits. (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

The coordinator also said that

[t]he group recruits youth, including minors, by sponsoring neighborhood associations and special interest clubs and by organizing sporting events and subsidizing musical shows in the favelas and peripheries. … There are women members and associates, but their proportion is unknown. Occasionally, women will reach managerial positions … (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2. Activities

According to sources, the Red Command's activities include drug trade (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; AFP 8 Feb. 2019) and arms trade (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; Agencia EFE 20 Sept. 2018).

Sources indicate that the Red Command plays a "social" role in many of Rio de Janeiro's favelas by providing social services that are not offered by the state (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019) or by "providing employment to inhabitants long excluded from Brazilian society" (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). According to the Guardian, in poor favelas around Rio de Janeiro, "the government’s presence is barely felt, and gangs and evangelical churches have filled the vacuum" (The Guardian 28 Feb. 2018). Sources also state that the Red Command is also controlling the population of favelas through "coercion" (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019), or has set up "a parallel system of government inside the favelas" (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). According to Reuters, in Rio's favelas, "the gangs have long provided authority where the government does not. The gangs are tolerated, even welcomed, by many residents fearful of what they see as trigger-happy police" (Reuters 24 Apr. 2018).

The Igarapé Institute coordinator provided the following information regarding the criminal activities of the Red Command:

The CV regularly engages in armed confrontations with police and military forces as well as with rival criminal groups: both drug trafficking networks and right-wing militias. The CV also regularly resorts to killings, sexual violence, threats, and extortion of civilians that collaborate with rival groups. It has persecuted community leaders, human rights defenders, former members or those of rival factions; members’ relatives (sometimes mistakenly assumed to be part of other factions). These individuals are often forced to abandon their communities and municipalities in fear of these threats. (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3. Structure and leaders

According to InSight Crime, "[t]he Red Command has a relatively loose leadership structure, and has been described as a network of independent actors, rather than a strict hierarchical organization headed by a single leader" (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). The Igarapé Institute coordinator stated that "CV operates based on a cell structure, with prominent leaders often attaining national and international notoriety" (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). The same source also reported that "CV leaders typically continue to control the group’s activities even from prison due to access to communications such as cell phones and the collaboration of corrupt officials and lawyers" (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019).

Sources indicate that Marcinho VP [Marcio Nepomuceno, Márcio dos Santos Nepomuceno], who is incarcerated in Brazil, is a leader of the Red Command (Ayoobi 6 Sept. 2018; UOL 20 Oct. 2017). The same sources however report that he publicly denies this allegation (Ayoobi 6 Sept. 2018; UOL 20 Oct. 2017).

Other sources state that Marcelo Pinheiro [also known as Marcelo Pinheiro Veiga or Marcelo Fernando Pinheiro Veiga], alias "Marcelo Piloto," is a leading figure of the Red Command (The Guardian 22 Nov. 2018; InSight Crime 26 Oct. 2018). Marcelo Pinheiro was arrested in Paraguay (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; InSight Crime 26 Oct. 2018; AFP 13 Dec. 2017) in December 2017, and accused of murder and arm trafficking (InSight Crime 26 Oct. 2018; AFP 13 Dec. 2017). In November 2018, according to the Guardian, Marcelo Pinheiro was extradited to Brazil by Paraguayan authorities after he killed a woman in prison, and was incarcerated in a maximum security prison (The Guardian 22 Nov. 2018). The New York Times reports that Marcelo Pinheiro is currently detained in Brazil (The New York Times 3 Jan. 2019).

Leaders of the Red Command, as reported by sources, include:

• Nestor Baez Alvarenga, wanted in Brazil on drug trafficking charges, arrested in Paraguay in September 2018 (Agencia EFE 20 Sept. 2018);
• Luiz Fernando da Costa, alias Fernandinho Beira-Mar, imprisoned (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; InSight Crime 18 May 2018);
• Isaias da Costa Rodrigues, alias Isaias do Borel, released from prison in 2012 (InSight Crime 18 May 2018);
• Luis Claudio Machado, alias Marreta, arrested in 2014 in Paraguay (InSight Crime 18 May 2018);
• Mineuro da Cidade Alta, Elias Maluco, and Fabiano Atanazio (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019).

Information on the resources of the Red Command could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Areas of Operation
4.1 In Brazil

Sources report that the Red Command controls some favelas in Rio de Janeiro (InSight Crime 18 May 2018; The Guardian 28 Feb. 2018). According to the Igarapé Institute coordinator, since late 2017, the Red Command has expanded its area of control within Rio de Janeiro (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). InSight Crime indicates that the group is present in other parts of Brazil, including São Paulo (InSight Crime 18 May 2018), and in northern and western regions of the country (InSight Crime 8 Jan. 2018). According to the coordinator, the Red Command has expanded its presence to other municipalities in the state of Rio de Janeiro, including Baixada Fluminense, Niterói and Friburgo, and in other states in the southeast (São Paulo, Espírito Santo), the north (Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Rondônia and Tocantins), the northeast (Ceará, Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte), the center-west (Goiás, Mato Grosso) and the Distrito Federal, where the capital is located (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.2 Abroad
4.2.1 In Paraguay

Sources indicate that the Red Command is present in Paraguay (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; InSight Crime 18 May 2018). According to InSight Crime, it has been present there "for years … to traffic drug shipments" (InSight Crime 26 Oct. 2018). The Igarapé Institute coordinator indicated that members of the Red Command arrested in Paraguay pursue their criminal activities from inside the prison system by recruiting members and corrupting Paraguayan officials (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.2.2 In Bolivia

Sources report that the Red Command operates in Bolivia (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; InSight Crime 19 June 2018). BBC Monitoring Americas reports that according to Bolivian newspaper La Razón, intelligence services of Bolivia, Brazil and Peru indicated that the Red Command was recruiting members in Bolivia to obtain arms and drugs (BBC 13 July 2018). InSight Crime reports that the region of Pando in Bolivia is controlled by the Red Command (InSight Crime 19 June 2018). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.2.3 In Colombia

According to InSight Crime, Red Command "is thought" to have links to Colombia’s recently demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) rebels (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5. Enemies and Allies
5.1 First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC)

According to the Guardian, the PCC is currently an enemy or a rival of the Red Command (The Guardian 4 Jan. 2018). The group is based in São Paulo (AFP 8 Feb. 2019; Reuters 7 Jan. 2019). Sources categorize the PCC as one of Brazil's most important gangs (The Guardian 9 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 8 Jan. 2018) or "the country’s most powerful gang" (InSight Crime 15 May 2018). The Igarapé Institute coordinator stated that the Red Command is the "second most powerful criminal organization" in Brazil, "having lost some ground" to the PCC (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019).

Sources report that the PCC and the Red Command broke a long-standing alliance or truce in 2016 or 2017 (InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019; The Guardian 4 Jan. 2018). The coordinator indicated that the end of that alliance

trigger[ed] a wave of violent attacks and massacres in Brazilian prisons. This conflict has affected at least nine states: Acre, Amapá, Alagoas, Ceará, Pará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rondônia, Roraima [and] Tocantins. At the same time, the dispute with the PCC has spilled out of the prison system, sparking violent clashes in Rio de Janeiro and across Brazil's northern and [w]estern regions over drug trafficking routes and local drug markets, especially in border areas near Paraguay, Peru, and Colombia. (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

Other sources similarly state that the PCC and the Red Command are currently fighting for the domination of local drug trade (The Guardian 9 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 15 May 2018).

5.2 Pure Third Command (Terceiro Comando Puro)

Reuters indicates that the Pure Third Command is an enemy or rival of the Red Command (Reuters 24 Apr. 2018). According to InSight Crime, the Pure Third Command is based in Rio de Janeiro, it originates from a split within the Red Command in the 1980s, and it is also fighting Red Command for the control of territories (InSight Crime 26 Apr. 2018). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.3 Amigos dos Amigos (ADA)

InSight Crime indicates that ADA is an enemy of the Red Command (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). According to the same source, ADA is a gang based in Rio de Janeiro (InSight Crime 26 Apr. 2018). ADA has reportedly formed an alliance with the PCC to dispute the Red Command’s territorial control in Rio de Janeiro (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). However, the Igarapé Institute coordinator said that according to a July 2018 article by the news website Folha de S. Paulo, ADA has also collaborated with the Red Command in Rio de Janeiro (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

5.4 Family of the North (Família do Norte, FDN)

In January 2018, the Guardian described the Family of the North or Northern Family (FDN) as an ally of the Red Command (The Guardian 4 Jan. 2018). According to sources, that group is based in Manaus, in the Amazonas state (InSight Crime 15 May 2018; The Guardian 4 Jan. 2018; Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Sources report that a truce between the two groups ended in 2018 and that they are now fighting for control over a strategic drug trafficking route (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019; InSight Crime 15 May 2018). However, sources also report that FDN has recently agreed with the Red Command, PCC, and the Guardians of the State (Guardiões do Estado, GDE) to a pact against their "common enemy," the Brazilian state (The Guardian 15 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019).

5.5 Guardians of the State (Guardiões do Estado, GDE)

Sources indicate that GDE are "local rivals" of the Red Command (The Guardian 15 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019). According to the Guardian, GDE is based in Fortaleza, Ceará state (The Guardian 9 Jan. 2019). Sources report that they agreed to a truce with the Red Command and PCC in January 2019 (The Guardian 15 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019).

5.6 Militias

Among enemies of the Red Command, sources also include militias (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019) which according to Insight Crime, are "composed of active and former security force officers" (InSight Crime 18 May 2018). Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

6. Political Connections

Information on the Red Command's political connections was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Igarapé Institute coordinator stated the following:

The CV has deep political connections, especially in Rio de Janeiro state, and it has been known to interfere in local and state politics. For instance, in 2018 in the Northeastern state of Ceará, CV members prevented individuals linked to specific campaigns from circulating electoral materials and from working in certain communities. Because of this, the Armed Forces' presence was requested for 10 municipalities in Ceará during the electoral period. (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

The same source also indicated that as revealed by Brazilian news services Universo Online (UOL), a firm suspected of bribing politicians in 2018 had received bank deposits from a person tied to the Red Command (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

7. State Protection

Sources report that new president Jair Bolsonaro has promised to be "tough on crime" (AFP 8 Feb. 2019; The Guardian 9 Jan. 2019). His measures against crime in Brazil, according to sources, include confronting criminals with military personnel (The Guardian 9 Jan. 2019; TVLibertés 5 Jan. 2019). The Igarapé Institute coordinator reported the following about that measure:

These heavily militarized incursions into the favelas are designed to ostensibly root out drug cartel leaderships and apprehend weapons and drugs. However, these operations are heavily criticized for being ineffective and for contributing towards violence, including against innocent civilians. From February 16 to December 31, 2018, the government of Michel Temer implemented a federal intervention in public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro, led by the army. In addition to efforts to improve the organizational practices, soldiers also took part in the police incursions. This approach has been heavily criticized, not least because the number of police killings-- already epidemic in the state of Rio de Janeiro—further increased. More than 1,000 people died as a result of the confrontations during this period. (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

The government's measures against criminal activities also include combatting gang activities in prison (InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019; The Guardian 9 Jan. 2019). The means provided to achieve these ends are to prevent inmates from controlling gangs from within the prison (Reuters 7 Jan. 2019) by conducting thorough searches to crack down on cellphone use by inmates (InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019) and to stop dividing prison populations based on gang allegiances (The Guardian 15 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019). Sources however report that a flare of violence in the state of Ceará in January 2019 was probably triggered by the government's attempt to undercut the power of gangs in prison (InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019; Reuters 7 Jan. 2019). Sources further report that criminal groups are now coming together against the authorities (The Guardian 15 Jan. 2019; InSight Crime 9 Jan. 2019).

7.1 Police Response

Information on the police's response to complaints by victims of the Red Command was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the Igarapé Institute coordinator,

[p]eople can report organized crime activities via the police, whether in person or online, or by calling hotline numbers, or via the Public Defender’s office. Based on the reports, the police either investigates the allegations or files them away. However, due to widespread police corruption and high impunity rates, as well as threats against and killings/forced disappearances of those who report crimes, many citizens prefer not to turn to the police.

…

In the state of Rio de Janeiro, residents can also access Disque Denúncia, which allows users to report actions by criminal organizations anonymously. The information is then passed onto the relevant authorities. Disque Denúnica was created in 1995 and has since recorded over 2.3 million reports. It is a non-governmental initiative by Instituto Movrio, a private entity, but it has operated in partnership with the Office of Public Security of the State of Rio de Janeiro. In early 2019, Governor Winston Witzel dismantled this office, but Disque Denúncia continues to operate. (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019)

Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

7.2 Witness Protection Program

For information on Brazil's witness protection program, Programa de Proteção a Vítimas e Testemunhas Ameaçadas do Brasil (PROVITA), see Responses to Information Request BRA105474 of March 2016 and BRA105251 of August 2015.

Information on the efficiency of PROVITA was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Igarapé Institute coordinator indicated that PROVITA is considered by human rights and security experts as "deficient" in several areas, including a lack of effective security team, poor integration with other countries' programs, and inadequate funding (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). The lack of funding, according to the same source, can make the protection of witnesses "useless" and "non-viable" (Coordinator 22 Mar. 2019). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Note

[1] The Igarapé Institute is a non-profit, independent and nonpartisan organization that describes itself as "an independent think and do tank devoted to integrating security, justice and development agendas"; it is headquartered in Rio de Janeiro and has staff in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico (Igarapé Institute n.d.). The institute works on projects and with partner organizations in more than 20 countries (Igarapé Institute n.d.).

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 8 February 2019. Louis Genot. "Brazil Police Operation in Rio Favela Leaves 13 Dead." [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 13 December 2017. "Brazil's 'Most Wanted' Drugs Suspect Caught in Paraguay." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

Agencia EFE. 20 September 2018. "Reputed Brazilian Drug Lord Nabbed in Paraguay." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

Ayoobi, Thayana Marques Araujo. 6 September 2018. "Rio de Janeiro's Military Intervention: Treating Bullet Wound with Band-Aid." The Globe Post. [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 13 July 2018. BBC Monitoring Americas. "Brazil Crime Gangs 'Recruit Members' in Bolivia to Expand." Summary of report in Spanish by Bolivian newspaper La Razón. (Factiva) [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

Coordinator, Igarapé Institute. 22 March 2019. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

The Guardian. 15 January 2019. Jo Griffin. "'Climate of Panic': Bombings in Brazil Reveal Growing Power of Gangs." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

The Guardian. 9 January 2019. Anna Jean Kaiser. "'It's Complete Chaos': Brazilian State Overwhelmed by Rash of Gang Violence." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

The Guardian. 22 November 2018. Laurence Blair. "Outrage in Paraguay After Brazil Cartel Boss Kills Woman in His Prison Cell." [Accessed 28 Mar. 2019]

The Guardian. 28 February 2018. Dom Phillips. "Brazil's Military's Growing Role in Crime Crackdown Fuels Fears Among Poor." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

The Guardian. 4 January 2018. Dom Phillips. "'It Is a War': Brazil Prison Authorities Warn of More Violence After Deadly Riot." [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

Igarapé Institute. N.d. "About Igarapé." [Accessed 28 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 9 January 2019. Chris Dalby. "Ceará Gang Truce Shows Brazil Government Could Be Common Enemy." [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 26 October 2018. Parker Asmann. "Paraguay Authorities Foil New Plan to Free Red Command Leader." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 19 June 2018. James Bargent. "Red Command Arrests in Bolivia Point to Group's Likely Expansion." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 18 May 2018. "Red Command." [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 15 May 2018. Parker Asmann. "Turf Dispute Breaks North Brazil Gang Pact, Opening Door for PCC." [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 26 April 2018. "Pure Third Command." [Accessed 4 Mar. 2019]

InSight Crime. 8 January 2018. Mike LaSusa. "GameChangers 2017: Government and Gangs Battle for Brazil." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

The New York Times. 3 January 2019. Ernesto Londoño. "A Defiant Interview in a Jail Cell, Soon to Turn Into a Murder Scene." [Accessed 28 Mar. 2019]

Reuters. 7 January 2019. Leonardo Benassatto. "Brazil Gang Attacks Challenge Bolsonaro's Security Strategy." [Accessed 28 Mar. 2019]

Reuters. 24 April 2018. Brad Brooks. "Insight - Unfazed by Brazil's Army, Rio Drug Gangs Willing to Wait Out Occupation." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

TVLibertés. 5 January 2019. "Maintien de l'ordre musclé au Brésil." [Accessed 5 Mar. 2019]

Universo Online (UOL). 20 October 2017. Flávio Costa and Vinícius Andrade. "O poder do crime." ("The Power of Crime: Ties Between Drug Trafficking and Politics in Brazil.") Translated by Arman Kazemi, for RioOnWatch. [Accessed 28 Mar. 2019]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Anthropologist whose interests include gangs and prison life in Brazil; Human Rights Watch; Justiça Global; professor of social anthropology whose interests include Brazil; professor of social sciences whose interests include Brazil; professors at the University of Rio de Janeiro whose interests include criminality in Brazil.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; ecoi.net; Freedom House; Human Rights Watch; International Crisis Group; Transparency International; UN – Refworld; US – Department of State.