Responses to Information Requests

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

According to sources, Alevis are the second-largest religious group in Turkey, after Sunni Muslims (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; DW 26 Apr. 2016; MRG June 2018). According to Germany's public international broadcaster Deutsche Welle (DW), there are approximately 8 to 15 million Alevis in Turkey, which has a total population of 77 million (DW 26 Apr. 2016). According to other sources, the Alevi population makes up an estimated 15 to 25 percent of Turkey's total population (Reuters 27 Apr. 2018; Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; Foreign Affairs 5 Jan. 2017; RLP n.d.).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, Howard Eissenstat, Associate Professor of Middle East history at St. Lawrence University and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) [1], stated that

[t]he Alevi identity, religious and cultural, is endogenous - like being Jewish, it is an identity one is born into. As such, you cannot convert to being an Alevi. One can be both Alevi and Kurdish simultaneously. There are other affiliations as well, including Bektasi and Nusayri, which are historically distinct but have merged culturally in the past few decades. [There is also a] group of Alevi Kurds, known as the Zaza, which have a distinct language. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

According to other sources, Alevis include both ethnic Kurds and Turks (Foreign Affairs 5 Jan. 2017; RLP n.d.; MEE 29 Sept. 2016).

1.1 Religious Rights

According to sources, Alevis are not officially recognized as a religious group in Turkey (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a; Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018), but rather as a cultural group (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a). Howard Eissenstat indicated, in a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, that "Alevi worship is not seen as a religious practice - it is considered a cultural practice within a unified Islam" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b). The New York Times states that "[f]or some [Alevis], Alevism is simply a cultural identity, rather than a form of worship" (The New York Times 22 July 2017). According to an article written by Alev Dudek [2], "some Alevis consider themselves a branch of Islam, whereas others [do not]" (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017). Other sources describe Alevism as a branch of Shi'a Islam (MRG June 2018; RLP n.d.), though Alevis "follow a fundamentally different interpretation than the Shi'a communities in other countries" (MRG June 2018).

According to sources, differences between Alevis and Sunnis include the following:

• Alevis revere Ali (Foreign Affairs 5 Jan. 2017; Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; RLP n.d.), the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law (Foreign Affairs 5 Jan. 2017);
• Alevis do not fast during Ramadan (MRG June 2018; Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; Foreign Affairs 5 Jan 2017), but instead during Muharram (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; MRG June 2018), the ten-day commemoration of Imam Husayn's martyrdom (MRG June 2018);
• Alevis do not take part in the pilgrimage to Mecca (RLP n.d.);
• Alevi women rarely cover their hair unless they are in a prayer hall (Foreign Affairs 5 Jan. 2017);
• Alevis do not pray five times a day (RLP n.d.; The New York Times 22 July 2017);
• Alevis worship on Thursdays rather than Fridays (DW 26 Apr. 2016);
• There is no gender segregation during Alevi worship (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; The New York Times 22 July 2017);
• Alevi worship includes "singing and Semah, a form of spiritual dance, whereas Sunnis worship via the Namaz ritual" (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017);
• Alevis' places of worship are cemevis [cem evi] (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017; DW 26 Apr. 2016; RLP n.d.), rather than mosques (RLP n.d.).

For further information on the principles and historic religious origins of the Alevi faith, see Response to Information Requests TUR43515 of April 2005, TUR102821 of May 2008, TUR104076 of June 2012, and TUR104391 of April 2013.

According to sources, Alevi children in Turkey are subjected to compulsory religious classes with a Sunni curriculum (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b; Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018). Without providing further details, sources indicate that they cannot be exempted from these classes (Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018) or that it is difficult to be exempted from these classes (Freedom House 2018; Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the President of the Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America [3] stated, without providing further details, that "Alevi parents can only get an exemption for their children if they file a lawsuit and go through the … court process" (Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America 22 Nov. 2018).

According to sources, cemevis are not recognized by the state and, unlike mosques, do not receive financial support from the government (Freedom House 2018; Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018; Dudek 10 Feb. 2017). Eissenstat stated that, unlike Sunni imams, cemevis' religious leaders are not paid by the state and, unlike Sunni mosques, cemevis must pay taxes and utilities (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a). Minority Rights Group International (MRG) reports that

[i]n January 2018, an Alevi leader complained that the most recent curriculum presented by the Education Ministry did not describe cemevis as places of worship but rather as buildings where cultural activities occur (MRG June 2018).

In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Oxford, who specializes on Turkey, stated that cemevis "often have to be built illegally" (Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018). The New York Times reports that

where Alevis have managed to build cemevis, the state has often constructed mosques nearby (or in Osmancik, installed a mosque in the cemevi itself). The implication is that while the state may tolerate Alevism as a cultural identity, it recognizes only the Sunni mosque as a place of Islamic worship. (The New York Times 22 July 2017)

Sources report that in 2016, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Alevis are denied the right to freedom of religion (DW 26 Apr. 2016; Hürriyet Daily News 26 Apr. 2016). According to sources, the ECHR ruled, with 12 out of 17 votes, that Alevis' right to freedom of religion had been violated, while 16 of 17 judges indicated that Alevis are subject to discrimination (DW 26 Apr. 2016; Hürriyet Daily News 26 Apr. 2016). DW cites the ECHR as stating that

"[t]he Court held in particular that the authorities' refusal amounted to a lack of recognition of the religious nature of the Alevi faith and its religious practices (cem), depriving the Alevi community's places of worship (cemevis) and its religious leaders (dedes) of legal protection and entailing numerous consequences with regard to the organization, continuation and funding of the community's religious activities." (DW 26 Apr. 2016)

The English-language Turkish newspaper Hürriyet Daily News reports that "[a]s a result of the verdict, Turkey has been ordered to pay 3,000 euros [approximately C$4,500] in damages to each of the 203 applicants" (Hürriyet Daily News 26 Apr. 2016).

1.2 Political Rights

According to Alev Dudek, there are no Alevi members of parliament (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017). Other sources report, however, that Alevis have political representation (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b; Freedom House 2018), "largely" through the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) (Freedom House 2018). Howard Eissenstat explained that the head of the main opposition party, CHP, is Alevi and that "[i]t is not difficult for an Alevi or an Alevi Kurd to reach a high political position within the opposition" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow, "there are Alevis who are politicians. However, their political platform is not based on being Alevi" (Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018). Information on platforms of Alevi politicians could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources indicate that Alevis tend to vote for ["left-leaning parties such as" (DW 26 Apr. 2016)] the CHP (DW 26 Apr. 2016; Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b), "but not always" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b). According to DW, the "pro-Kurdish" Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) "enjoyed broad Alevi support" in the 2015 elections (DW 26 Apr. 2016). According to Howard Eissenstat, "it is very rare for [Alevis] to vote for the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP)" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a). Without providing further details, Freedom House reports that Alevis "have long faced political discrimination" (Freedom House 2018). According to Howard Eissenstat, "as a result of AKP's consolidation of power, non-AKP actors are increasingly being locked out of the political sphere. The AKP has sought to consolidate its control over the state and society" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018b). The same source further explained that

[i]n terms of political rhetoric, the AKP hints at anti-Alevi tropes to highlight its own Sunni bona fides. The Alevi opening, which occurred in 2007, was an abortive attempt carried out to reach out to the Alevi voters. It was short-lived and came to little. Moreover, this occurred in a very different political context - now, Turkey is no longer an electoral democracy, but an electoral authoritarian regime where elections occur, but are no longer freely or fairly contested. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

2. Treatment by Society

The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 reports that Alevis "remained the subject of hate speech and discrimination" in 2017 (US 20 Apr. 2018, 59). According to Eissenstat,

[m]ost Alevis are not subject to violence or open discrimination as they go about their daily business in public. However, there are cases where Alevis have been subject to discriminatory attacks, including graffiti attacks on their houses and occasional violence. Alevis experience discrimination in their religious practice, but not daily harassment. An exception is an Alevi who has publicly protested or issued a public statement about the discrimination to which he or she is subjected. Other exceptions include the following: an Alevi who moved into a predominately Sunni neighbourhood; an Alevi who is [married to or is dating] a Sunni Muslim; or Alevis who markedly identify themselves as Alevis through Alevi symbols by means of necklaces or tattoos. Such tattoos could include the sword of Ali, the image of Ali, and/or Arabic text venerating Ali. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

According to sources, there are Alevi neighbourhoods across Turkey (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018; Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018). In correspondence following the interview with the Research Directorate, the Postdoctoral Fellow indicated that "Tunceli is the only province where there is a majority Alevi population" (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018). According to Eissenstat,

[i]n [Alevi] neighbourhoods it is possible to openly practice one's faith and [one's] cultural identity is easily expressed. There are also neighbourhoods that are mixed. Relocating comfortably to any such neighbourhood depends on one's financial wherewithal and ability to easily access employment, for example, in terms of proximity to one's work and one's employability within the job market. If Alevis move into a devout Sunni neighbourhood, it is likely that they will face discrimination from the people in the neighbourhood. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

According to Freedom House, Alevis "reportedly face discrimination in employment, particularly in senior public-sector positions" (Freedom House 2018). Similarly, the Postdoctoral Fellow stated that it is "challenging" for Alevis to access public sector jobs and that they have to "hide their Alevi identity in the workplace or to get a job" (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018). The New York Times, citing Aziz Yagan, an academic who researches the subject, indicates that Alevis have

reported discrimination in the workplace, particularly within state institutions. Few Alevis currently fill key roles in the state apparatus, such as governors or police chiefs. And although there is no concrete evidence of an official policy of bias, Alevis in low-level positions in the civil service regularly claim that the system is gamed against them. (The New York Times 22 July 2017)

According to Eissenstat,

[c]oncerning access to employment, Alevis may face discrimination as employers may inquire about their name or the neighbourhood in which they grew up. Typical Alevi names are Ali, Hussein, Hassan, or various versions of Aslan, although these names could also be held by people that are Sunni. Employers may also ask about one's religious practices or attempt to determine whether one is Alevi by inquiring about their home neighbourhood or town. It has become the norm in many businesses and government offices to promote attendance at Friday prayers. Demonstrating that one is not willing to do so might undermine one's standing and potential for promotion or continued employment. As the country has become more consolidated under the AKP's control, jobs have been created for its support base, including government jobs as well as jobs in large corporations. Government offices and friendly corporations have put a premium on employing and promoting staff who are seen as coming from the AKP base. Alevis seeking such employment do so at a significant disadvantage. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

2.1 Incidents

According to the Postdoctoral Fellow,

[t]here are no statistics or regular reporting of violations and discrimination against Alevis. However, there has been a clear deterioration in the human rights situation in Turkey in recent years as reported by international human rights organizations and Alevi organizations have also reported increased discrimination and violence against Alevis. (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018)

According to the same source, between 2015 and November 2018, "there were no large-scale targeted attacks against Alevis" (Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018). The New York Times similarly reports that, under Erdogan, "there has been no mass sectarian violence against Alevis" (The New York Times 22 July 2017).

Sources report the following incidents:

• US Country Reports 2017 reports that, in September 2017, after a service at a cemevi, more than a dozen persons attempted to block the burial of the mother of an "ethnically Kurdish Alevi former HDP member of parliament" and attacked mourners (US 20 Apr. 2018, 59). According to the same source, the "[p]olice stopped the attack, and the minister of interior intervened to facilitate the burial" (US 20 Apr. 2018, 59);
• A door of an Alevi family in the Bahçelievler district of Istanbul province was marked with a red cross and the expressions "'Get out, heathen'" and "'Islam'" in November 2017 (SCF 1 Dec. 2017);
• In November 2017, a cemevi in Istanbul was attacked [by "[u]nknown assailants" (Hürriyet Daily News 10 Nov. 2017)] who also attempted to set it on fire (Hürriyet Daily News 10 Nov. 2017; MRG June 2018). According to Hürriyet Daily News, the "[p]olice launched efforts to apprehend those involved in the attack" (Hürriyet Daily News 10 Nov. 2017);
• Red crosses [or X's] were painted on 13 homes of Alevi families in the Cemal Gürsel neighbourhood in Malatya (Hürriyet Daily News 23 Nov. 2017; Turkey Purge 23 Nov. 2017; Al-Monitor 28 Nov. 2017) on 22 November 2017 (Hürriyet Daily News 23 Nov. 2017).

3. Treatment by Authorities

The New York Times cites the head of the European Alevi Federation as stating that the Turkish government "'doesn't accept Alevism as a legitimate belief'" (The New York Times 22 July 2017). According to the Postdoctoral Fellow,

[t]he situation of Alevis has deteriorated [since] the 2016 coup attempt. During and after the 2016 coup attempt, pro-government media outlets were insinuating that Alevis would be used by the Gulenists to provoke conflict, [even though] Gulenists and [the] AKP have similarly negative views against Alevis and were previously cooperating in policies against the community. Since the 2016 coup attempt, the crackdown on the Alevi community has intensified. There have been arrests of Alevis and organizations have been targeted, which has included the closure of the Alevi media outlets.

The state has also closed down, through presidential decree, Alevi media outlets (e.g. Yol TV). State authorities have been randomly and arbitrarily arresting activists, including Alevi activists and members of Alevi organizations (such as from Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği). These activists who are arrested are not involved in violent or illegal activities. There is no clarity [regarding] how long these activists remain in custody or imprisoned.

Since the 2013 Gezi protests, there has been an increase in targetings of Alevi neighbourhoods by the security forces, including random shootings and killings of Alevis. (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018)

Al Jazeera similarly reports that "the Alevi neighbourhood [in Istanbul's Gazi district] has a long … history of anti-government protest and intense police crackdown. Fierce confrontations between residents and security forces have been a common occurrence for years" (Al Jazeera 21 July 2016).

According to the President of the Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America, the Turkish government used the 2016 coup attempt "to crack down on all of his opponents, including Alevi citizens" (Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America 22 Nov. 2018). According to the same source, "more than 115,000 public officials, including teachers, [members of the] police, soldiers, judges and [academics] were dismissed or suspended without any due process, most of [whom] were dissidents of Recep Tayyip Erdogan," including Alevis (Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America 22 Nov. 2018). For further information on the state of emergency after the coup attempt of July 2016, including the situation of Alevis, see Response to Information Request TUR105723 of January 2017.

The news website Middle East Eye (MEE) reports that Alevi television channels were shut down after the 2016 coup attempt (MEE 29 Sept. 2016). MRG reports that, after the 2016 coup attempt, "numerous journalists were imprisoned and media outlets were closed, including most of those broadcasting and publishing on Alevi culture" (MRG June 2018). According to Howard Eissenstat, there were Alevi media outlets that were shut down after the 2016 coup attempt, "not because they are Alevi per se, but because they are not seen to be part of the AKP base or were seen as critical of the government" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a). He noted that "[s]ince the 2016 coup attempt, the situation concerning Alevis has not changed dramatically in Turkey" and explained that "[s]ince 2016, there has been a crackdown on civil society organizations and general access to the public sphere has been curtailed. This has consequently affected Alevi civil society as well" (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a). According to the same source,

[i]n general, Alevis are not targets of hate crimes because of their Alevi identity - the police [do] not chase Alevis down. Alevis may become targets of violence or attacks if they wear Alevi symbols and/or if they speak out against any discrimination they face, or if they enter into specifically "Sunni" spaces. It is only when someone is perceived to challenge the status quo or one is vocal about their identity that one becomes a target. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

4. State Protection

According to Howard Eissenstat,

[c]ases on discrimination will often go uninvestigated, and as such, are not reported to authorities. It is more likely that a case on discrimination will be investigated if the state sees it as politically volatile. However, in everyday cases of anti-Alevi slurs or the vandalizing of homes, the police is unlikely to respond. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

According to the Postdoctoral Fellow,

[i]n 1993, there was the Sivas massacre, [in which] 35 Alevis were killed. The perpetrators were never brought to justice and recently, the case was dropped. This example shows that there are no repercussions for those committing major crimes against Alevis and [that there is] no political will to bring perpetrators of crimes against Alevis to justice. (Postdoctoral Fellow 21 Nov. 2018)

The same source provided another example in which, in late 2015, a young woman, Dilek Doğan, was shot by police authorities in her home in a neighbourhood in Istanbul where many Alevis live (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018). The same source explained that the young woman was shot after asking the police authorities to remove their shoes when they sought to enter and search her home (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018). Similarly, Hürriyet Daily Newsreports that, in October 2015, Dilek Doğan was shot in her home in Küçükarmutlu during a police raid by a "special operation police officer" after she "insisted that officers put on galoshes to avoid dirtying the floor" (Hürriyet Daily News 20 Dec. 2015). According to the same source, Doğan died on 25 October 2015, after being in a coma for one week (Hürriyet Daily News 20 Dec. 2015). The Postdoctoral Fellow stated that "[t]here were no repercussions for these police officials; they acted with impunity" (Postdoctoral Fellow 26 Nov. 2018). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The New York Times reports that in July 2017, the police protected thousands of Alevis who completed an annual march through Sivas in remembrance of the killing of Alevis in 1993 (The New York Times 22 July 2017). Eissenstat stated that

[e]vents organized by the Alevi population to commemorate the dead of the Sivas attack largely happen peacefully and authorities do not interrupt these public events. It must be noted that some of the figures most closely implicated in the Sivas attacks have now taken up leadership roles in the AKP. (Eissenstat 20 Nov. 2018a)

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) is a Washington DC-based "nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to examining how genuine democracies can develop in the Middle East and how the U.S. can best support that process. Through dialogue, research, and advocacy, [POMED] work[s] to strengthen the constituency for U.S. policies that peacefully support democratic reform in the Middle East" (POMED n.d.).

[2] Alev Dudek is a German-American researcher, analyst and author and has served on the executive board of the International Society for Diversity Management in Berlin (Dudek 10 Feb. 2017).

[3] The Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America is a US-based organization that is "committed to serv[ing] [the] Alevi-Bektashi community by establishing resources and the environment to promote education, [the] exchange of information, opinions and expertise in Alevi-Bektashi and Anatolian culture" (Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America n.d.).

References

Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America. 22 November 2018. Correspondence from the President to the Research Directorate.

Alevi-Bektashi Foundation of America. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 22 Nov. 2018]

Al-Monitor. 28 November 2017. Ayla Jean Yackley. "Turkey's Alevis on Edge After Homes Vandalized." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Al Jazeera. 21 July 2016. Jesse Rosenfeld. "Turkey: United Against a Coup, Divided on the Future." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Deutsche Welle (DW). 26 April 2016. Mark Hallam. "Turkey Discriminates Against Alevi Faith, ECHR Rules." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Dudek, Alev. 10 February 2017. "Religious Diversity and the Alevi Struggle for Equality in Turkey." Forbes. [Accessed 30 Oct. 2018]

Eissenstat, Howard. 20 November 2018a. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Eissenstat, Howard. 20 November 2018b. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Foreign Affairs. 5 January 2017. Fariba Nawa. "Turkey and the Alevis." Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). [Accessed 30 Oct. 2018]

Freedom House. 2018. "Turkey." Freedom in the World 2018. [Accessed 22 Nov. 2018]

Hürriyet Daily News. 23 November 2017. "Marking of Alevi Houses a Provocation: Turkish Police." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Hürriyet Daily News. 10 November 2017. "Cemevi in Istanbul Attacked." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Hürriyet Daily News. 26 April 2016. "ECHR Fines Turkey for Violating Alevis' Right to Religious Freedom." [Accessed 27 Nov. 2018]

Hürriyet Daily News. 20 December 2015. "Footage of Dilek Doğan’s Shooting Released, Added to Case File." [Accessed 29 Nov. 2018]

Middle East Eye (MEE). 29 September 2016. Alex MacDonald. "12 Kurdish and Alevi TV Stations Closed in Turkey, as Crackdown Extended." [Accessed 22 Nov. 2018]

Minority Rights Group International (MRG). June 2018. "Alevis." World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. [Accessed 28 Nov. 2018]

The New York Times. 22 July 2017. Patrick Kingsley. "Turkey's Alevis, a Muslim Minority, Fear a Policy of Denying Their Existence." [Accessed 30 Oct. 2018]

Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Oxford. 26 November 2018. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Oxford. 21 November 2018. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED). N.d. "Mission Statement." [Accessed 20 Nov. 2018]

Religious Literacy Project (RLP). Harvard Divinity School. N.d. "Alevism." [Accessed 30 Oct. 2018]

Reuters. 27 April 2018. Fariba Nawa. "For Turkey's Alevi Minority, Dam-Building Plans Threaten Way of Life." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Stockholm Center for Freedom (SCF). 1 December 2017. "The Door of Alevi Family Marked with Nationalist/Islamist Phrases in Istanbul." [Accessed 22 Nov. 2018]

Turkey Purge. 23 November 2017. "Alevis Worried as 13 Houses Marked With Crosses in Turkey's Malatya Province." [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

United States (US). 20 April 2018. Department of State. "Turkey." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017. [Accessed 19 Nov. 2018]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Academics specializing in human rights issues in Turkey; Alevi Federation of Australia; Alevitische Culturele Vereniging Den Haag; Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich; Canadian Alevi Cultural Center; European Alevi Youth Federation; Fédération union des Alévis en France; Human Rights Watch.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; ecoi.net; The Guardian; Human Rights Watch; UN – Refworld.