Afghanistan: The Uzbek minority, including size, locations, relations with authorities and with other ethnic groups and the ability to live in Kabul; treatment of returning Afghan citizens, including those of Uzbek origin who were born or lived abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia; state protection available (2016-June 2018)
1. Population Size and Location
According to sources, Afghanistan's population in 2017 was between 34 and 36 million (US 12 July 2018; UN [2018]). Sources indicate that Afghans of Uzbek origin represent 9 or 10 percent of the population in Afghanistan (MRG 19 June 2015; Political Handbook of the World 2017, 3; US 12 Jan. 2015, 4). According to the CIA World Factbook, the Uzbek language is spoken by 11 percent of the population of Afghanistan (US 13 June 2018).
Sources report that Uzbeks live in northern Afghanistan (Finke 2017, 253; MRG 19 June 2015; HuffPost 6 July 2016). According to Peter Finke, a professor of social anthropology at the University of Zurich (UZH) who has written several publications on Uzbek identity (UZH n.d.), in the city of Mazar-I Sharif [in the north of Afghanistan, close to the border with Uzbekistan] and its surrounding area, Uzbeks "form one of the major groups and dominate several urban neighbourhoods (mahalla) and rural districts" (Finke 2017, 254). According to sources, Uzbeks represent from 40 percent to 45 percent of the population in Imam Sahib, in Kunduz province, in northern Afghanistan (APPRO Apr. 2016, 79; CPAU 2013). A 2016 report by the Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan, an independent commission established by national decree, citing reports by the World Bank and The Liaison Office (TLO), an Afghan NGO (TLO n.d.), indicates that in the Faryab province [in the north of Afghanistan, bordering Turkmenistan], "roughly half [of the inhabitants] are Uzbek, followed by Tajik, Aimaq and Pashtun" (Norway 6 June 2016, 121). According to the Jawzjan [Jowzjan] Governor Office, Uzbeks and Turkmens are the main ethnic groups living in the northern Jawzjan province (Afghanistan n.d.a).
2. Relations with Authorities
Sources state that Afghanistan's constitution recognizes ethnic groups, including the Uzbek community (US 13 June 2018; MRG 19 June 2015). Article 4 of the constitution provides that "Afghanistan shall be comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes" (Afghanistan 2004, Art. 4). According to sources, in Afghanistan, Uzbeki is a third official language (US 13 June 2018; MRG 19 June 2015; Political Handbook of the World 2017, 3), "in areas where the majority speaks [it]" (US 13 June 2018; Political Handbook of the World 2017, 3). Article 16 of the constitution provides the following:
From amongst Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pachaie, Nuristani, Pamiri and other current languages in the country, Pashto and Dari shall be the official languages of the state. In areas where the majority of the people speak in any one of Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages, any of the aforementioned language [sic], in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be the third official language, the usage of which shall be regulated by law. … (Afghanistan 2004, Art. 16)
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative from the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), a non-profit policy research organization that has a Kabul-based team and produces analysis on Afghanistan (AAN n.d.), explained that according to Afghan law, "all Afghan citizens enjoy the same rights" and that "there is no group persecution of Uzbeks in Afghanistan" (AAN 27 June 2018). The same source added that,
however, there is widespread and growing ethnic prejudice in Afghan society, which, in cases, can be expressed by members of the authorities and might be perceived as a state-supported discrimination. Members of certain ethnic groups might also come under discrimination or even persecution by pro-government armed forces, particularly semi- or irregular ones, mainly in areas of conflict. (AAN 27 June 2018)
According to a 2017 report on Afghanistan by International Crisis Group, President Ghani and Afghanistan's Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah "are stacking the government and security agencies with allies, mainly on ethnic grounds," with, respectively, "fellow Pashtuns" and "fellow Tajiks," which results in a "perception of discrimination within excluded communities, particularly Hazaras and Uzbeks … contributing to a widening ethnic and regional divide" (International Crisis Group 10 Apr. 2017, i). The source adds that, according to data collected by a diplomatic mission, in the National Unity Government (NUG) cabinet and provincial governorships, 14 of 23 appointments made by Abdullah were Tajiks, along with 5 Hazaras, and 3 Pashtuns or Uzbeks; 29 of 40 appointments made by President Ghani were Pashtuns, along with 5 Uzbeks and 5 Tajiks and Hazaras (International Crisis Group 10 Apr. 2017, 16). The same source further states that a "June 2016 study by an Afghan newspaper found that 16 senior posts were filled by Pashtuns, 14 by Tajiks and 2 each by Uzbeks and Hazaras in 46 Afghan embassies and consulates" (International Crisis Group 10 Apr. 2017, 16).
According to a September 2017 article by Reuters, a leaked memo from President Ghani's office indicates that "'Tajiks and Uzbeks, who work completely under us, should be appointed symbolically so that people think every ethnicity is represented here'"; President Ghani's office explained that the memo was "'a personal document sent by one of its staff and does not represent the overall policy of the office'" (Reuters 21 Sept. 2017). The same source also quotes Ghani's spokesman as saying that "there was no place for ethnic discrimination in the government" (Reuters 21 Sept. 2017). In 21 June 2018 correspondence with the Research Directorate, a reader in sociology at City, University of London, who has published on forced return to Afghanistan, conducted fieldwork in Kabul, and visited other cities in Afghanistan, including Mazar-i-Sharif and Samangan in northern Afghanistan, provided a report regarding risks for Afghan returnees she prepared in July 2017 for a country guidance case in the UK; in this report, she explains that there is "discrimination and ethnic segregation" in job recruitment, including for government positions; she provides the following example:
[I]n the Ministry of Refugees [and Repatriation (MoRR)], all the Minister['s] advisors are, like the Minister himself, Sayyed [descendant of the Prophet Mohammad]. His Deputy Minister for Finance and Administration is Pashtun from Sorkh Rod district, Nangarhar. His secretary, advisors, [d]epartment [h]eads, body guards and driver are all Pashtuns from Sorkh Rod. The MoRR is not unique in this regard. (Reader 20 July 2017)
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a professor of Islamic history at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, whose fields of research include conflict in Afghanistan and nationalism and identity in Central Asia, explained that, in Afghanistan, "[t]here is considerable tension between the Turko-Mongol Uzbeks and the government, which is dominated by their hereditary enemies, the Aryan Pashtuns, and to a lesser extent the Persian Tajiks" (Professor 20 June 2018). Similarly, MRG reports that, within the state, "Pashtuns have largely dominated Afghan politics though other ethnic groups, notably the Tajiks, have at various stages of history also maintained a strong political influence" (MRG n.d.). A 2015 report on Afghanistan published by the British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) and by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) [1], states that, in Afghanistan, "[t]here are perceptions that Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras are respectively prioritised in [g]overnment and NGO recruitment" (BAAG and RUSI 16 Dec. 2015, 10). According to the Professor, "Uzbeks feel under-represented and there have been protests against the government's placing of unpopular Pashtun governors and police chiefs in Uzbek territories like Jowzjan" (Professor 20 June 2018). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
According to sources, Abdul Raouf [Rauf] Ibrahimi, an Uzbek, was selected in 2011 to be the speaker for the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) (US 12 Jan. 2015, 9; Asia-Plus 9 June 2015), "as a compromise candidate" (US 12 Jan. 2015, 9).
MRG indicates that Uzbeks, because they were part of the Northern Alliance that fought against the Taliban regime, have gained "more influence in the military and political life of Afghanistan" since the fall of the Taliban regime (MRG 19 June 2015). Sources indicate that the Jumbish-i-Milli Islami [Jumbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan, Junbesh-e Melli] is a predominantly Uzbek party led by [First] Vice-President of Afghanistan General Abdul Rashid Dostum [Dostam] (Political Handbook of the World 2017, 11-12; International Crisis Group 10 Apr. 2017, 24). Similarly, in a report on Afghanistan, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) of the European Union (EU) indicates that Jumbish-i-Milli has support predominantly from the Uzbek ethnic community in northern Afghanistan (EU May 2018, 11). The 2016 report by the Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan indicates that Jumbish-i-Milli has a "network extending to Kabul and its neighbouring provinces" (Norway 6 June 2016, 126). According to EASO, the party, as well as its leader, Dostum, "play a central role in Afghan politics, specifically in northern and western Afghanistan" (EU May 2018, 11).
According to sources, Ahmad Ishchi [a tribal elder, political rival of Dostum (US 20 Apr. 2018, 3) and former Governor of Jowzjan (UN 3 Mar. 2017, para. 5)] alleged that, in November 2016, he was detained, sexually abused (UN 3 Mar. 2017, para. 5; US 20 Apr. 2018, 3), beaten and tortured by Dostum and his men (US 20 Apr. 2018, 3). Regarding these allegations, the UN reports that, in December 2016, Dostum was "formerly named as a suspect" and that he refused to comply with summons for questioning (UN 3 Mar. 2017, para. 5). Prominent figures from Jumbish-i Milli accused the government of "attempting to marginalize the ethnic Uzbek community" and organized protests against the treatment of Dostum (UN 3 Mar. 2017, para. 5). According to a March 2017 article by Pajhwok Afghan News (Pajhwok), an independent Afghan news agency with headquarters in Kabul (Pahjwok n.d.), Dostum was under "house arrest" and reportedly said that "the Presidential Palace was deliberately omitting an ethnic group from the country's political arena" and that the government "wanted to sideline the presence of a strong ethnic group in the country's politics" (Pajhwok 27 Mar. 2017). According to MRG, "following accusations of the torture and rape of a political opponent," Dostum fled the country in May 2017 (MRG n.d.). The Professor explained that the Uzbeks "feel that their leader General Dostum was exiled to Turkey without the right to defend himself" (Professor 20 June 2018). The UN indicates the following:
In Mr. Dostum's absence, ["outside of the country … while under indictment for alleged sexual assault in Afghanistan"] Mr. Ghani took steps to revive his ties with the Uzbek community, holding a meeting on 23 October [2017] with several former associates of the First Vice-President [Dostum] and members of the Junbish-i Nawin party, a new political group that seeks support among ethnic Uzbek voters. Following the meeting, several prominent Junbish-i Milli members accepted positions within the Government. However, the founder of Junbish-i Milli, Mr. Dostum, continued to command a loyal support base among provincial party representatives and Uzbek community members in the north. (UN 15 Dec. 2017, para. 9)
The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 indicates the following:
According to some reports, in February [2017] a group of Uzbek elders from Takhar Province [in northeastern Afghanistan] alleged abuses of the local population by local commander and former parliamentarian Piram Qul. They claimed that in addition to having killed popular Takhar Provincial Council member Ainuddin Rustaqi in April 2016, Piram Qul’s men killed four local police officers during the year and continued to torture detainees and jail residents in extrajudicial prisons. They complained that Piram Qul received government support for his leadership of a "people’s uprising group"--a progovernment militia. (US 20 Apr. 2018, 13-14)
3. Relations with Other Ethnic Groups
The Professor explained the following:
There is a long history of Pashtuns (Afghans) carrying out brutal conquests of Uzbeks for over a century and the collective memory of their people's brutal subjugation and conquest at the hands of the Pashtuns in the 1880s is still strong. … The Taliban were primarily Pashtuns and slaughtered Uzbeks, burnt villages, raped women, etc., so this layer of antagonism was heightened from 1997-2001. Relations were also tense with the Tajiks who vie for power in the north with the Uzbeks and there were tank battles between the two leaders Dostum and Atta the Tajik in 2002-2004, [as well as] retaliatory raids. The Uzbek Mongols are closer to the Hazara Mongols even though the latter are Shiites, unlike the Uzbek Sunnis. (Professor 20 June 2018)
According to Peter Finke, as they were part of the Northern Alliance, Uzbeks in Afghanistan "have sided with most of the other minorities in the region, particularly Tajiks, although this would often be a fragile relationship" (Finke 2017, 254). The 2016 report by the Norwegian Commission on Afghanistan indicates that, in Faryab, "the main challenge" in the political dynamic from 2001 and 2014 was "ethnic rivalries, particularly between the two main groups populating the least developed districts: the Uzbek majority and Pashtun minority. Disputes between the Tajik and Uzbek were also common in the province" (Norway 6 June 2016, 126). Similarly, according to a 2017 report by EASO, Ahmad Waheed, "an independent researcher on Afghanistan who also works with the US Naval Postgraduate School program on culture and conflict" explained, in an August 2017 interview with EASO, that disputes "are likely to develop between different ethnic groups living in the same area, for instance … in regions where Pashtun and Tajik or Uzbek groups border each other" (EU Dec. 2017, 84).
US Country Reports 2016 indicates the following:
In September [2016], Tajik supporters assembled to rebury the remains of a former king on a hill important to the Uzbek community in Kabul, leading to a standoff. After an agreement was reached, the reburial took place, although some criticized the government for not handling the issue properly. (US 3 Mar. 2017, 24)
Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
A February 2017 Pajhwok article refers to a land dispute between Pashtun and Uzbek tribes, during which a Pashtun tribesman was killed (Pajhwok 15 Feb. 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
According to MRG, "some" intermarriage exists between Hazaras and Uzbeks in Afghanistan (MRG n.d). Peter Finke indicates that, in Afghanistan, "[i]n terms of intermarriage, Uzbeks and Tajiks consider each other most acceptable, and mixed families are a common phenomenon" (Finke 2017, 254).
4. Relations with the Taliban
According to the AAN representative, Uzbeks, in Kabul and elsewhere, "might be targeted by Taliban forces, particularly if they (or possibly family members) [have engaged] in anti-Taliban military forces, official or paramilitary (militias,' uprising forces', etc.)" (AAN 27 June 2018).
EASO notes that the Jundullah, an armed opposition group that split from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), recruits "mainly from the Uzbek community in the north of Afghanistan" (EU May 2018, 11). Sources indicate that the Taliban recruits members of ethnic minority groups in Afghanistan, including from the Uzbek community in the northwestern province of Faryab and the northern province of Jowzjan (MRG 19 June 2015; FP 15 June 2016).
Further information on relations between the Uzbek minority and the Taliban could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
5. Ability to Live in Kabul
Information on the ability of Uzbeks to live in Kabul was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Without providing further details, sources indicate the presence of Uzbeks in Kabul (US 7 Mar. 2017, 24; Pajhwok [2014]). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Reader explained that "there are a handful of areas around Kabul where Uzbek communities can be found" (Reader 21 June 2018).
A 2017 report published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) [2] describes Kabul as having "three concentric rings [that] define ethnic stratification" and adds that "[t]he most recent settlements in the outer ring are often more ethnically homogenous than the center or even some neighborhoods understood to be historically the domain of a specific group" (USIP 2017, 6). Similarly, a 2012 report by the Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO), an NGO headquartered in Kabul (APPRO Oct. 2012, ii), provides the following information:
There are … distinct patterns of urban settlement in Kabul. First, people have tended to move to areas where they already have kin or moved into particular districts as part of a larger group with the same ethnicity. As a result, different neighbourhoods of Kabul have become associated with different ethnic groups. (APPRO Oct. 2012, 8)
According to the AAN representative, "there are no reports that Uzbeks, as a group, are discriminated against [in Kabul]" (AAN 27 June 2018). The same source stated that, Uzbeks, as other Afghan citizens, face the same socio-economic and security-related problems (poverty, terrorist attacks, war, etc.) (AAN 27 June 2018).
6. Situation of Returnees
According to a 2018 Oxfam report on the situation of returnees in Afghanistan,
[i]n the past few years, Afghanistan has witnessed unprecedented numbers of returnees, mainly from Iran and Pakistan and to a lesser extent from Europe. Since the beginning of 2015, more than two million Afghans have returned, many involuntarily as a result of changing domestic policies in the countries to which they fled or migrated. (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 2)
The same source reports that returnees from Iran and Pakistan accounted for 58.6 and 40.8 percent of returns, respectively, while persons returning from European countries represented 0.6 percent of returns (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 9).
According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the highest levels of civilians casualties in Afghanistan are recorded in Kabul province, "mainly from indiscriminate attacks in Kabul city"; there were 1,831 civilian casualties (479 deaths and 1,352 injured) in Kabul province in 2017, including 1,612 civilian casualties (440 deaths and 1,172 injured) in Kabul city (UN Feb. 2018, 3-4). MRG indicates that attacks by the Taliban and by the Afghan branch of the Islamic State (IS) [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Daesh, Da'esh] have "particularly afflicted the capital Kabul and other urban areas" (MRG 13 June 2018, 7). According to the Reader's 2017 report, the attacks that happened in Kabul in 2016-2017
were in [the] East and West [of the city]. Whereas three years ago, targets were confined to diplomatic and government areas such as Wazir Akbar Khan, Shahre Nau or Shirpoor, today they can and do occur all across the city, making it harder for people to manage or avoid risk. Until relatively recently I would have argued that someone returning to Kabul who is unfamiliar with the city and has no support networks to advise on where and when to move would be at significantly greater risk than a person with such networks. While that is still the case, [the] gap has narrowed and the risk even to those familiar with the city has significantly increased in the last year. (Reader 20 July 2017)
Amnesty International reports that Alema Alema, Afghanistan's Deputy Minister for Refugees and Repatriation, explained, in a May 2017 interview with Amnesty International researchers, that "'Afghanistan is not safe at all'" for people who return from European countries (Amnesty International Oct. 2017, 38).
Oxfam states that, based on field research in Herat, Kabul, Kunduz and Nangarhar, "forced returns remain dangerous, as safety and dignity cannot be guaranteed" (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 2). According to a joint report on returns to Afghanistan by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR, of 610,000 Afghans who returned from Iran and Pakistan in 2017, "68% returned to Kabul, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Logar, and Sar-e-Pul provinces. Kabul, Nangarhar and Kunduz remain the top provinces of return since 2002" (IOM and UN Feb. 2018, 4-5).
According to the UNHCR, 60 percent of the 2,765 Afghan returnees they interviewed in 2017 were living in their province of origin (UN Oct. 2017, 2-3). Human Rights Watch reports that "[a]lmost" all of the 92 Afghans returning to Afghanistan from Pakistan they interviewed in October and November 2016 "were unable to return to their homes due to a lack of land, property or security" (Human Rights Watch Feb. 2017, 59). Similarly, according to a 2016 report by the Refugee Support Network (RSN) [3], "insecurity" can sometimes prevent returnees from moving to live with their friends or family (RSN Apr. 2016, 19).
Sources mention the support of family or social networks as an important element for the successful reintegration of returnees (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 3; Reader 20 July 2017; MPI 25 Feb. 2016). Oxfam reports that returnees "who are unable to return to areas in which they own land – or can be supported by their family or community – often end up in situations of internal displacement" (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 2). Similarly, the report prepared by the Reader indicates that "relocation to an area where one does not have the support of a network is very difficult" (Reader 20 July 2017). The same source explains that the "small number of successfully reintegrated returnees" she interviewed in Kabul had "dense family networks in Kabul itself with the resources to fund[,] in one case[,] a university education and[,] in the other two cases[,] to set up the young men in business" (Reader 20 July 2017).
6.1 Treatment by the Authorities
The Office of the President of Afghanistan reports that the High Commission for Migration, whose mission includes the formulation of policies to accommodate refugees returning to Afghanistan "on their own will," as well as the provision of "rights and social services" to returnees, was created in 2015 (Afghanistan n.d.b). According to the MoRR, in 2016, the Displacement and Returnees Executive Committee (DiREC) was created to define a strategy to coordinate programs regarding returnees and to establish the roles and responsibilities of relevant institutions (Afghanistan 27 Dec. 2016, 6). A 2017 report by Asylos [4] indicates that Anicée Van Engeland, a senior lecturer in international security at the Centre for International Security & Resilience of Cranfield University (Asylos Aug. 2017, 3), explained, in a June 2017 correspondence with Asylos, that DiREC uses a community-oriented financial support approach for the reintegration of returnees, which means that, "in the future, the financial support could be rather given to the community to encourage them to welcome back a returnee"; this approach has been criticized by experts who stress that it does not account for "local corruption" (Asylos Aug. 2017, 30-31). Further information on the implementation of returnee assistance programs could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
Sources indicate that the Afghan government assists returnees by providing help with employment, legal aid and shelter (AAN 19 May 2017, 7; Asylos Aug. 2017, 31), although "the returnee has to take the initiative to go to each minist[ry] to receive help" (Asylos Aug. 2017, 31). According to Oxfam, in Afghanistan, "[t]here is very limited government capacity to address the proper reception and reintegration of returnees" (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 2). Similarly, AAN provides the following information about Afghan institutional support to returnees and deportees:
Although the Afghan government and local and international organisations managed to organise some kind of first response to both voluntary and forced returnees, it seems that services available to those returning are patchy and in many cases insufficient to provide a realistic chance to start a new life in Afghanistan. There is also no convincing approach yet on what to do in particular with "returnees" who have spent years in Iran and are out of touch with life in Afghanistan.
Despite certain improvements – such as setting up of a software-based registration system at most official border crossings and at the airport office [–] the government is still institutionally widely unprepared to cope with the massive influx of returnees. It is still in the process of developing policies and fundraising mechanisms. …
The available but very limited care and accommodation is far from sufficient for some returnees who need to re-acclimatise to a society that is effectively still war-ridden and under social duress. The mass return from Iran and Pakistan significantly adds to this duress. There is a great chance, therefore, that those returning from Europe in comparatively low numbers will end being sidelined, as a quantitatively less important and therefore less urgent humanitarian issue. (AAN 19 May 2017, 11)
The information in the following paragraph comes from a 2017 report by AAN:
In February 2017, 18 Afghan men whose asylum applications had been rejected by Germany returned to Afghanistan and were met by the airport police. They were subsequently registered at the office of the MoRR in the airport. Officials from the Afghan foreign ministry and from the Ministry of Interior's Criminal Investigation Department, as well as representatives from other organizations, including the IOM, were also present. The IOM brought a doctor to provide immediate medical assistance. Returnees who wished to travel to their home provinces or to relatives outside of Kabul were provided with travel money from IOM. Some accepted to stay in temporary accommodation funded and managed by the IOM (AAN 19 May 2017, 4-5).
The 2017 report by Asylos indicates that in a May 2017 interview with Asylos, Abdul Ghafoor, a refugee rights activist and director of the Kabul-based Afghanistan Migrants Advice and Support Organization (AMASO) (Asylos Aug. 2017, 3), explained that the police is "'not very friendly'" with the returnees, especially with those who have never lived in Afghanistan (Asylos Aug. 2017, 19). Abdul Ghafoor explained to Asylos that there are "'lots of cases'" of returning boys, who have never lived in Afghanistan, and are stopped and asked for their tazkira [tazkera] (national identity card) by the police because they look different; if they do not have their tazkira, they can be taken to the police station "'for a day or two of questioning'" and then have to "'bribe t[he] police to let them go'" (Asylos Aug. 2017, 20). According to the same report, Anicée Van Engeland explained that there is "'very little sympathy for returnees'" from the authorities, which is "'often expressed through rudeness and insults … but also an unwillingness to address returnees' claims or requests'" (Asylos Aug. 2017, 20-21). Anicée Van Engeland added that "'the Afghan National Police or local institutions are keen to avoid granting protection to returnees'" (Asylos Aug. 2017, 21).
6.2 Treatment by Society
According to the 2017 report by the Reader, "[t]here are a handful of cases of individuals who have been returned from Europe who have fallen victim to violence and crime" (Reader 20 July 2017). The same source explains that returnees from Europe and Australia are targeted by criminals who assume they have money or resources (Reader 20 July 2017, 26). Similarly, according to the 2016 report by the RSN, a young returnee explained that the Taliban are active in some areas and as a returnee, he "'can be a soft target for them'"; another "'problem is the fear of abductions and ransom, if they know you have come from a foreign country like [the] UK'" (RSN 1 Apr. 2016, 28). According to the same report, "young people have been threatened or targeted as a result of issues connected to their original asylum claim, and, for a significant group, simply being identified as a returnee has put them at considerable risk of violence" (RSN 1 Apr. 2016, 31). For example, the same source reports that local residents warned a young returnee that "'enemies'" of his father who was a member of Hezb-e-Islami [a political party with an ex-insurgent faction (AAN 25 Nov. 2017)] "'could easily find [him] and get rid of [him]'" (RSN 1 Apr. 2016, 28).
The Reader, in her 2017 report, indicates that returnees could be at risk of being rejected by their families, if they are seen "as having 'lost [their] culture' or 'become contaminated'" (Reader 20 July 2017). Similarly, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism [5] states that "lawyers and NGOs have long argued it is unsafe to send people back to Afghanistan, particularly for young people who have grown up in the UK and who have become westernised" (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 17 July 2015). The same source explains the following:
Young men who spend their teenage years in suburban Britain rarely develop the life experiences that might help to keep them safe. On the contrary, experts suggest that, after years living in the UK, these young people’s British connections and Western mannerisms could make them an easy target. The British army pulled out of the country late last year, leaving NATO and US troops in the country. However, the persecution of interpreters formerly embedded with British troops continues: hundreds have asked to be relocated to the UK after being threatened by the Taliban. Young, westernised men could be mistaken for interpreters or other "collaborators," and are therefore especially at risk.
…
Despite the scale of the returns programme, little is known of what happens to those that are sent back to Afghanistan. [RSN] is currently undertaking long-term research tracking the experiences of these young men. So far they have found that a quarter of those tracked have experienced harm or difficulties as a result of being viewed as "westernised outsiders". (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 17 July 2015)
According to Oxfam's field research findings in Herat, Kabul, Kunduz and Nangarhar, "Afghan returnees are mostly perceived as part of society and do not suffer structural discrimination from host communities. This may change, however, especially when returnees settle in isolated groups rather than integrating" (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 4). Oxfam mentions "local fear, friction, tension and confrontations" as impacts of returns, "mostly connected to competition over scarce resources such as land and employment opportunities" (Oxfam Jan. 2018, 4). Similarly, the Reader, in her 2017 report, indicates that "[c]ompetition for the limited number of jobs available in Kabul is extremely fierce" (Reader 20 July 2017). According to the 2016 RSN report, young returnees experience "discrimination" in terms of finding or sustaining employment (RSN Apr. 2016, 42). The Migration Policy Institute (MPI), an "independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington, DC" (MPI n.d.), reports that there are "constraints in re-establishing livelihoods for returnees" because personal connections and candidates' place of origin are considered when recruiting employees (MPI 25 Feb. 2016). Similarly, according to a 2016 article published in an IOM bimonthly journal, hiring practices in Afghanistan are based on networks and connections which constitute a "major problem," particularly for returnees (Majidi and Hart June-Sept. 2016, 37).
6.3 Treatment of Returning Afghan Citizens of Uzbek Origin
Information on the treatment of returning Afghan citizens of Uzbek origin who were born or lived abroad was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
According to the Reader, returning Afghan citizens of Uzbek origin will "run the same risks as other Afghans who have lived abroad and been forcibly returned" (Reader 21 June 2018). The Professor explained the following regarding the treatment of returning Afghan citizens of Uzbek origin who were born or lived abroad:
There is a tendency to mistrust those who have lived abroad and return for whatever reason. The local authorities would potentially see them as spies for the US, as would local Taliban militias who have gained tremendous power in the north where Uzbeks live. The Taliban would most likely kill such an Uzbek if they found out about one returning from the dar al harb (land of war with infidels). (Professor 20 June 2018)
Similarly, the RSN report explains that, according to young returnees, for the Taliban and local residents, individuals who have been to European countries are seen as "'spying for those countries'" (RSN Apr. 2016, 28).
Information on treatment of returning Afghan citizens of Uzbek origin who were born or lived in Saudi Arabia could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
7. State Protection
According the 2017 report prepared by the Reader, victims of crimes are "unlikely to be able or willing to pursue complaints" because the police is "unable or unwilling to prosecute perpetrators" (Reader 20 July 2017). Based on a 2017 article written by Friederike Stahlmann [6], the same source further indicates that even where the police is active in Afghanistan, "access to protection depends on belonging to whichever ethnic groups is dominant in that area, so that those who are minorities in that area can expect even less protection, and may have to reckon with harassment or persecution by the police" (Reader 20 July 2018). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
The AAN representative explained that all Afghan citizens are protected by the state, although "in practice, the state is unable to protect its citizens from the war" and that this applies to all ethnic groups (AAN 27 June 2018). According to the Professor, there is no state protection "per se" available to Uzbeks in Afghanistan (Professor 20 June 2018). The same source further explained that "the security situation is very poor in the north now and there is little recourse in the state, which has lost control of vast swaths of Uzbek territory to the Taliban" (Professor 20 June 2018). Similarly, according to a June 2016 article by Foreign Policy (FP), the Taliban's "growing expansion in the north poses a challenge for Kabul. Overstretched Afghan forces suffering record casualties and high desertion rates risk being overwhelmed as new war fronts open in the north" (FP 15 June 2016). US Country Reports 2017 explains that, in 2017, "[s]ome areas were outside of government control, and anti[-]government forces, including the Taliban, oversaw their own justice and security systems" (US 20 Apr. 2018, 6). The February 2017 Pajhwok article reports that the Taliban kidnapped "dozens of local residents" in the Darzab district in northern Jawzjan province, allegedly to take them to a Taliban court, following a land dispute between Pashtun and Uzbek tribes (Pajhwok 15 Feb. 2017). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) is an "advocacy network" that commits to the development of Afghanistan and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is a think tank on defence and security matters (BAAG and Rusi 16 Dec. 2015, 2). The report was written by Lindsay Alexander, "a peace, security and development consultant" who "has advised the EU and European governments" (BAAG and RUSI 16 Dec. 2015, 2).
[2] The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is "an independent national institute, founded by Congress" that works abroad to prevent and end conflicts (USIP n.d.).
[3] The Refugee Support Network (RSN) is a London-based charity (RSN Apr. 2016, 2). The 2016 report is based on "primary data collected with forced returnees in Afghanistan" between March 2014 and December 2015 (RSN Apr. 2016, 14).
[4] Asylos is a global volunteer network that provides free-of-charge country-of-origin information research "for lawyers helping asylum seekers with their claim" (Asylos Aug. 2017, 4).
[5] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism is a UK-based (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism n.d.a) independent, not-for-profit organization (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism n.d.b).
[6] Friederike Stahlmann is a PhD candidate at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany whose "areas of expertise" regarding Afghanistan include "[f]ailures of justice institutions" and "vulnerable groups" (EIN n.d.).
References
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Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Norwegian Afghanistan Committee.
Internet sites, including: Afghanistan – Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Arab News; Community Response Map; Middle East Eye; Norwegian Afghanistan Committee; UN – HumanitarianResponse.info, Office of the High Commmissioner for Human Rights, Refworld.