Nigeria: The Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF), including structure, membership, leadership, activities and areas of operation, currently and between 2005 and 2007; consequences for leaving the group (2005-April 2018)
1. Overview
1.1 Situation Between 2005 and 2007
According to a 2015 article published by International Business Times (IBTimes), a "digital global news publication" that focuses on "international business news" and has headquarters in New York and London (IBTimes n.d.), the Niger Delta region "has been marred by widespread violence, kidnappings for ransom and clashes between militant groups and the army since the early 2000s" (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015). Similarly, a 2007 report on criminal politics in Nigeria, published by Human Rights Watch, states that "[m]ilitias and gangs have proliferated, maintaining camps of fighters in the creeks that engage in oil bunkering and stage bank robberies and street battles in Port Harcourt [located in the Niger Delta region]" (Human Rights Watch Oct. 2007, 82). A June 2007 article by the BBC mentions that "[m]ore than 100 foreigners have been taken hostage in the Niger Delta area in the past six months" and that they are "usually" released in exchange for ransom money (BBC 23 June 2007).
According to a 2016 publication by Risk Intelligence, which "provides independent, unbiased, intelligence-led advisory services to private and governmental clients on security threats and risks" (Risk Intelligence n.d.), in 2003-2004 and 2006, "a budding Niger Delta insurgency fragmented into sometimes warring militant factions with competing agendas, united only in their hatred of the government" (Risk Intelligence 8 June 2016, 2).
1.2 Current Situation
Freedom House indicates a "resurgence of militants in the Niger Delta" in 2016 (Freedom House 2017). According to the 2016 Risk Intelligence report, "a number of groups have sprung up (or become more vocal) in 2015 and 2016 following president Buhari's reduction of amnesty payments, cancellation of security contracts for former militants and the indictment of former ex-militant leader Tompolo" which, among other factors, has led to "a situation similar to 2003/4 and 2006" (Risk Intelligence 8 June 2016, 2). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor at the University of Alberta, who has conducted research on the Niger Delta for a decade, also noted that the "situation has been exacerbated by the heavy handedness of the Buhari administration, particularly in late 2015 to 2016" (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018). According to the same source, there has been a "relative lull in insurgent activities since 2017 in the Niger Delta," but the "situation remains volatile and unpredictable" (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018).
2. Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF)
2.1 Leadership
According to sources, the NDLF was founded in 2005 (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018; This Day 5 July 2016; IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015). Sources indicate that the NDLF was founded and led by John Togo (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018; This Day 13 June 2016). According to sources, John Togo was also known as John Ipoko (US 24 May 2012, 21; This Day 16 May 2011). According to the 2015 IBTimes article, he was "one of the most well-known warlords" in the Niger Delta region (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015). According to a June 2016 article published by This Day, a Nigerian newspaper, "Togo was notorious on the waterways in both Bayelsa and Delta States robbing and maiming his victims at will" (This Day 13 June 2016). According to sources, John Togo was killed in 2011 in a bombing by the Nigerian air force (This Day 13 June 2016; IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015).
According to a 2012 article by Vanguard, a Nigerian newspaper, "'General' Peter Dolo-Ebiowei" was the "second-in-command" to John Togo and the new leader following Togo's death (Vanguard 22 Apr. 2012). According to the same source, the group "preferred to be called 'Voice of John Togo'" and said it wanted to "carry on with the 'struggle' which John Togo was pursuing in the Niger Delta region" (Vanguard 22 Apr. 2012). According to a 2013 article by Vanguard, Peter Doloebiowei was replaced by Asi Eniegbolokumor as leader of the NDLF, although the former's faction "insisted that he was still in-charge of the NDLF leadership" (Vanguard 22 Feb. 2013). The same source mentions a statement, endorsing Asi Eniegbolokumor as a leader, that was co-signed by the following "leaders" of the NDLF: "Commanders Asi Eniegbolokumo, Adobo Ozidi, Ogbowei Allah and Jerome Demebide" (Vanguard 22 Feb. 2013). Without providing further detail, IBTimes notes that the NDLF "suffered from internal violence when two people claimed they were at the head of the movement in 2013" (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015).
Sources name "Mark Anthony" as [former] NDLF spokesperson (Sahara Reporters 13 June 2016; Vanguard 22 Feb. 2013; Stratfor 8 Dec. 2010).
2.2 Locations and Size
According to the June 2016 article by This Day, Togo was active in Bayelsa and Delta states (This Day 13 June 2016). The Assistant Professor indicated that the NDLF mainly operated in Delta state, as well as elsewhere in the Niger Delta region, including Bayelsa and Rivers states (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018). According to a 2010 article by Stratfor, a "geopolitical intelligence platform" that aims to provide "comprehensive, independent and unbiased analyses by examining global events" (Stratfor n.d.), the NDLF's "base camp is believed to be at Ayakoromo in Delta state" (Stratfor 8 Dec. 2010). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, Benjamin Okonofua, the Executive Director of the African Center for Conflict Transformation (ACCT) [1] in Atlanta, Georgia, who has publications on Nigeria, including on the Niger Delta region (Okonofua n.d.), indicated that "John Togo recruited primarily from Ijaw members of cult-gangs [2] in areas around Warri, extending to Okrika, Ogodobiri, and Ayakoromo" (Okonofua 30 Mar. 2018). According to sources, Niger Delta militant groups are predominantly Ijaw (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018; Aghedo and Osumah 23 Feb. 2014, 212; CFR 21 Mar. 2007).
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a senior lecturer at Federal University Lafia in Nigeria, who conducts research on the Niger Delta, stated that the NDLF operated in "the Niger Delta - initially in Port Harcourt and later in Warri," noting that between 2005 and 2007 the group operated in Warri (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018). According to the Assistant Professor, the "NDLF had multiple camps at the peak of its operations in late 2010 and 2011" (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018). Similarly, the Senior Lecturer stated that the NDLF had "camps controlled by a boss or a commandant" that could house "up to 1,000 people or more," and were "located outside towns and cities, and deep in the mangrove swamps," with members "based in the camps during the weekdays and returning to the towns and cities during the weekends" (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018). The same source also indicated the following information about membership: "about 4,000 at inception and 2,500 in 2011" (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018). Further and corroborating information on the size of the NDLF could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
2.3 Aims
According to a December 2010 interview with John Togo by Sahara Reporters, an "online community of international reporters and social advocates" that provides "commentaries, features, [and] news reports from a Nigerian-African perspective" (Sahara Reporters n.d.), his goals included "disarmament" and withdrawal of the Nigerian government's soldiers from villages in Ayankoromo, Amasomo, Obokiri, and Igbo areas (Sahara Reporters 28 Dec. 2010). According to the same source, other aims include "state creation" in the Niger Delta region, equal sharing of oil and gas with the Niger Delta, and "abolition of Land Use Acts," or of the "1978 Land Use Decree by General Obasanjo" (Sahara Reporters 28 Dec. 2010). According to sources, the NDLF seeks independence for the Niger Delta region (This Day 13 June 2016; IHS Global Insight 15 July 2011).
2.4 Links with the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
According to the 2015 IBTimes article, MEND was "founded in 2004 and is currently one of Delta's largest militant groups. It is sometimes considered as an umbrella group that includes some 100 factions, some of which carry out attacks on oil pipelines in the area" (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015). For further information on MEND, see Response to Information Request NGA103789 of August 2011.
According to sources, the NDLF was affiliated with MEND (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018; This Day 13 June 2016; NDLF 16 May 2011). A 2011 article by IHS Global Insight, a forecasting company that provides "economic, financial, and political coverage" of countries and industries (IHS Global Insight n.d.), refers to the NDLF as "a MEND break-off group" (IHS Global Insight 15 July 2011). According to the 2010 Stratfor article, John Togo was a former member of MEND and NDLF spokesman Mark Anthony stated that the group "comprises nine former members of MEND" (Stratfor 8 Dec. 2010). In the December 2010 interview with Sahara Reporters, John Togo stated that MEND has become "pollute[d]" or "corrupted" and that he did not "want to do anything in the name of MEND," which was why he formed his own group, the NDLF (Sahara Reporters 28 Dec. 2010). According to IBTimes, "[f]ollowing Togo's death, many members of the group left and joined M[END]" (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015). Further and corroborating information on former NDLF members joining MEND could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
2.5 Links with the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force (JNDLF)
Risk Intelligence's 2016 report notes that the JNDLF, "first publicly mentioned on 2 June 2016," is "most likely a confederation of Bayelsa-based groups" and that "the name is reminiscent of the late John Togo's [NDLF]" (Risk Intelligence 8 June 2016, 2). A 2016 article by Sahara Reporters cites Mark Anthony, "former spokesman of the defunct NDLF," as pledging support for President Buhari and drawing "attention to a fake militant group which styles itself as the [JNDLF], which purports to be fighting for Niger Delta, using the name of the NDLF to issue fake threats to shoot missiles and attack military formations and top government establishments" (Sahara Reporters 13 June 2016).
3. Activities
A 2012 article by IHS Global Insight states that the NDLF, along with MEND, was "one of the primary groups … behind the insurgency against oil companies and Nigerian security forces in the region at the height of the instability there between 2005 and 2009" (IHS Global Insight 11 June 2012). According to the Senior Lecturer, the NDLF's activities included oil bunkering, piracy, and hostage taking (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018). The Assistant Professor indicated that NDLF activities included "illegal oil bunkering, small arms trafficking, kidnapping oil workers, and pipeline vandalism" (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018).
According to sources, in late 2010, the NDLF claimed responsibility for attacks on pipelines in Delta state (Platts Oilgram Price Report 28 Jan. 2011; Stratfor 8 Dec. 2010). According to the December 2010 interview by Sahara Reporters, the NDLF's "renewed insurgency" had "shut down three refineries and inflicted substantial damage on the Nigerian oil industry," affecting companies including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell (Sahara Reporters 28 Dec. 2010).
According to sources, Togo initially accepted and later abandoned the Nigerian government's amnesty program extended to Niger Delta militants (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015; Sahara Reporters 28 Dec. 2010; Okonofua Apr.-June 2016, 12) in 2009 (IBTimes 24 Sept. 2015). Sources indicate that in 2011 the NDLF laid down arms and joined Nigeria's amnesty program (VOA 8 June 2012; NDLF 16 May 2011). A 2012 article by Voice of America (VOA) describes the NDLF as "a group that claims to be operational, but not currently fighting" (VOA 6 Sept. 2012). Similarly, the 2012 article by IHS Global Insight notes that the NDLF "has been largely inactive since government amnesty in the region" (IHS Global Insight 11 June 2012). According to sources referring to NDLF spokesman Mark Anthony, in 2012 the group re-emerged to issue a demand for $6 million, and threatened to resume fighting if this demand was not met (VOA 6 Sept. 2012; IHS Global Insight 11 June 2012).
The Senior Lecturer indicated that the NDLF was "active from 2005-2014. It has become inactive in recent times" (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018). A May 2016 article by Vanguard refers to the NDLF as "a non-operational militant group" (Vanguard 15 May 2016). A July 2016 article by This Day refers to the NDLF as existing or operating until 2014 (This Day 5 July 2016). In contrast, the June 2016 This Day article states that "[s]ecurity agents are now on the trail of members of the defunct [NDLF,] founded by the late ex-militant leader, John Togo[,] in connection with series of bombings of gas and crude oil pipelines in parts of Delta and Bayelsa States," and that "operatives of the Joint Task Force (JTF) [a federal task force against militant activity] and the Nigerian Navy Ship (NNS Delta) have linked members of the [NDLF] to the renewed crisis in the region" (This Day 13 June 2016).
4. Consequences for Leaving the NDLF
Benjamin Okonofua provided the following information on recruitment in correspondence with the Research Directorate:
There is a revolving door between Delta militias (including NDLF) and cult-gangs. For instance, militants who accepted amnesty easily revert to their cult-gangs until they are re-activated or re-mobilized into militancy. Membership of militant groups like the NDLF is transient, but membership of cult-gangs is lifelong even if members (due to any number of reasons, including extended overseas travel) become inactive. This means that the critical issue is not membership of militias (which are like ad hoc armed committees tasked with a particular mission), but membership of cult-gangs. Even the questionable decision to route amnesty payments through the hierarchy of militias is decidedly an effort to maintain camaraderie among members of cult-gangs, ensuring that militants are never truly demobilized. I am not aware that John Togo or any of those who succeeded him recruited from outside cult-gangs. (Okonofua 30 Mar. 2018)
The Senior Lecturer provided the following information:
In its active days, the group recruited restive youths, less educated teenagers and school drop outs. Generally members do not leave until a group becomes weak as a result of the death of the leader. In this case, there are no consequences [for leaving the group]. However, when a member leaves before this time, he becomes an enemy. (Senior Lecturer 29 Mar. 2018)
According to Benjamin Okonofua,
[p]eople leave militias all the time, reverting to their cult-gang membership, without facing serious recriminations beyond damaged friendships and disrupted monetary benefits. However, if an NDLF member leaves the group under circumstances involving theft of group funds or weapons or after providing information to law enforcement against members, he may be targeted for attack. The celerity and certainty that he will face violent recrimination is entirely dependent on his standing within the cult-gang, which always provides protection for members and mediates potentially destructive disputes among them. (Okonofua 4 Apr. 2018)
The Assistant Professor provided the following information:
The consequence of leaving a group such as the NDLF after the 2009 amnesty program may be at the risk of life and limb. Given the relatively small close-knit nature of such groups, and the size of the communities in which members are drawn, leaving such a group puts an individual and their family members at grave risk. Therefore, it is probable that an individual may continue to be part of the group long after becoming psychologically dissociated from the group. This is particularly important for those for whom relocation is not an option or whose families live in the Niger Delta. Simply put, leaving such a group is not impossible but it is a highly risky affair. (Assistant Professor 5 Apr. 2018, emphasis in original)
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
Notes
[1] The ACCT is a not for profit organization that researches and analyzes "conflict and peace conditions, and design[s], implement[s], and advise[s] on credible intervention(s) to help transform destructive conflicts into situations amenable to peace, political and social stability, and economic growth in divided and conflicted African societies" (ACCT n.d.).
[2] Benjamin Okonofua provided the following information on cult-gangs: "These groups, which are straddled between the militant and the political state, are a unique capability offering Delta militias trained recruits, weapons, tactics, ideological signification, techniques for neutralizing anti-militancy narratives, and access to the political state. … Nigerian cult-gangs have a long history, but may be understood as hybrid formations that derive from two historical movements: trado-communal cults (i.e. Ogboni) and campus cults (i.e. Black Axe). The former, a system of ritualized religious worship rooted in ancient customs and traditions, have their origins in pre-colonial state formation, but continue to wield enormous influence in Nigerian society, particularly in the south. The campus cult, on the other hand, originates from state proscription and criminalization of campus fraternities in the 1980s, but uses violent tactics to influence the complex of activities (socioeconomic, academic, political) on Nigerian campuses" (Okonofua 30 Mar. 2018).
References
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Assistant Professor, University of Alberta. 5 April 2018. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
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Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Center for Niger Delta Studies; Institute of African Studies, Carleton University; researchers that study insurgency in the Niger Delta region.
Internet sites, including: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes; African Security; Amnesty International; Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation; Commonwealth & Comparative Politics; ecoi.net; German Institute of Global and Area Studies; International Crisis Group; IRIN; Jane's Terrorism Watch Report; Naija.ng; Refugee Documentation Centre; Reuters; Review of African Political Economy; Small Arms Survey; UK – Home Office; UN – Refworld; US – Institute of Peace.