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Responses to Information Requests (RIRs) cite publicly accessible information available at the time of publication and within time constraints. A list of references and additional sources consulted are included in each RIR. Sources cited are considered the most current information available as of the date of the RIR.            

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15 August 2016

NGA105595.E

Nigeria: Information on the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), including areas of operation, objectives, and activities; state efforts to respond (2015-August 2016)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

Sources published in June 2016 indicate that the Niger Delta Avengers are the "latest" Nigerian "militant" armed group (IB Times 20 June 2016; BBC 2 June 2016). The Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), a Maryland-based think tank that advances "international maritime peace and security" (CIMSEC n.d.), states that the NDA originates in the Warri South West Local Government Area in Delta state (ibid. 14 June 2016). Corroborating information could not be found amongst the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources also indicate that since the beginning of 2016, the NDA have been attacking oil installations in Nigeria (ibid.; ISS 7 June 2016). According to the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington based policy institute focused on providing information about "societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information" (Jamestown Foundation n.d.), the NDA "[have] claimed responsibility for increasingly frequent attacks on oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta" (ibid. 13 June 2016). Sources report that assaults by the NDA have contributed to a reduction in oil production to its "lowest" level (CNBC 20 May 2016; RFI 26 May 2016) in about 20 years (ibid.; Vanguard 15 May 2016). Sources report that, due to the NDA's attacks on Nigerian oil installations, oil production dropped to 1.65 million barrels per day (ibid.; BBC 2 June 2016), compared to an expected production of 2.2 million barrels per day (ibid.).

1.1 Leadership and Membership

Sources report that there is little known information on the NDA leadership (Punch 31 May 2016; The Economist 25 June 2016b) or how they are funded (ibid.). The New York-based digital news publication, International Business Times (IBTimes), reports that "there are several and contrasting claims on whom is behind the NDA" (20 June 2016). The BBC reports that even though it is not known who officially leads the group, a Colonel Mudoch Agbinibo, which can also be a pseudonym, "has been signing the press releases on behalf of the NDA" (2 June 2015). According to The Economist, an "old kingpin known as 'Tompolo'" [Government Emuokpolo or Ekpemupolo], who is currently sought by the Nigerian police, has been pointed to as their leader (30 June 2016). Sources indicate that Tompolo is a former commander of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (IBTimes 20 June 2016; Jamestown Foundation 13 June 2016). Sources indicate that Tompolo has denied having links with the NDA (IBTimes 20 June 2016; The Economist 30 June 2016). The Economist reports that the NDA also denies links with Tompolo (ibid.). For additional information on the MEND, see Responses to Information Request NGA103789 of August 2011 and NGA103271 of October 2009.

The Economist reports that "many" of those who join the NDA are former fighters from the MEND (The Economist 30 June 2016). The article indicates that these fighters are reportedly "irritated" due to the reduction of payments that were arranged for them to disarm during the 2009 amnesty deal that ended previous violence in the Delta region (ibid.). However, CNBC states that, according to experts on the region, it is unclear if the NDA is made up of former militants of MEND, or if they are "an entirely new organization" (CNBC 20 May 2016). Sources indicate that the NDA has been critical of former militants (ibid.; ISS 7 June 2016) for kidnapping, killing soldiers, "allegedly enriching themselves after the 2009 amnesty program" (CNBC 20 May 2016), and for accepting payments from the government (ISS 7 June 2016). Sources also indicate that the NDA reportedly describe themselves as "young," "educated" (ISS 7 June 2016; CNBC 20 May 2016), "'well-travelled,'" and "'better armed and more civilized than past militants'" (ibid.). Newsweek also reports that the NDA has disavowed links with MEND (9 June 2016).

1.2 Size and Support

According to the Jamestown Foundation, even though the NDA "appears to be a relatively small insurgency," their activities show "a high degree of sophistication" (13 June 2016, 7). Similarly, CNBC cites an analyst from Stratfor, a US-based geopolitical intelligence firm (Stratfor n.d.), as stating that the NDA does not appear to be "a huge group," but that they seem "very effective" (ibid. 20 May 2016). The Economist indicates that the militants "probably number just a few hundred men" adding that their numbers are "fast-swelling" (The Economist 30 June 2016).

The Economist reports that "many" residents of the Niger Delta are sympathetic to the NDA after the national government cancelled pipeline security contracts that had been given to locals, reduced payments to ex-fighters by 70 percent, and proposed an oil-law amendment that would scrap royalties for local communities (ibid. 25 June 2016a). The Jamestown Foundation also indicates that the NDA is mostly made up of "angered" residents of the Niger Delta with the "continuing failure" of the government to redistribute oil wealth (13 June 2016, 7). CNBC reports that the NDA have "at least tacit support from some locals in the delta," and quotes an analyst and former US foreign service officer with experience in Nigeria as saying that local residents view the NDA as "'part bandit and part Al Capone, [and] part Robin Hood'" (CNBC 10 June 2016). The same source quotes the Stratfor analyst as saying that the NDA

[a]ppear to be attempting to generate solidarity with other parts of the Niger Delta that have historical grievances with oil companies … [claiming] their members come from different ethnic groups and regions and [evoking] the plight of the Ogoni [ethnic group], whose lands have been ravaged by crude pollution (ibid.).

1.3 Links with Other Groups

In May 2016, Newsweek cited an independent Nigeria-based conflict researcher as stating that there are operational links between the NDA and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), although "the extent of these connections is not yet clear" (Newsweek 27 May 2016). Sources report that the NDA has demanded the release of the IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kamnu (ibid.; Premium Times 13 June 2016), for whom the NDA has "proclaimed support" and who is in detention facing treason charges (Newsweek 27 May 2016). The Premium Times, an Abuja-based newspaper, reports that in June 2016, the NDA demanded that the governors of seven different states free all pro-Biafran activists held in their custody or risk attacks on police, military and government offices (13 June 2016). IBTimes reports that members of the pro-Biafran movement have claimed affiliation with the NDA (20 June 2016). Similarly, Vanguard, a Nigerian daily newspaper, reports that the IPOB has stated that it regards the NDA that it is "solidly behind" the NDA (25 June 2016). For further information about the Biafra independence movement, including the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and IPOB, see Response to Information Request NGA105577 of July 2016.

2. Areas of Operation

Sources report that the NDA has carried out attacks in the Niger Delta region (Jamestown Foundation 13 June 2016, 6; BBC 22 July 2016; Vanguard 15 May 2016). Specifically, sources report activities by the NDA in the following locations:

  • Warri, Delta State (Newsweek 9 June 2016; Vanguard 11 June 2016);
  • Warri South West Local Government Area, Delta State (ibid.);
  • Gbaramatu Kingdom, Delta State (The Advocate 26 July 2016);
  • Akwa Ibom State (The Independent 26 July 2016; International Crisis Group July 2016; This Day 26 July 2016a), specifically in Nsit-Ibom (ibid.; The Advocate 26 July 2016);
  • Bayelsa State (Vanguard 11 June 2016; International Crisis Group July 2016); and
  • Rivers State (ibid.).

3. Objectives

Sources indicate that the NDA's objectives are not clear (CNBC 10 June 2016; Jamestown Foundation 13 June 2016). However, according to CIMSEC, the NDA has the following "military and political objectives":

  1. Cripple the Nigerian Economy ('Operation Red Economy')
  2. Force the government to negotiate on their demands in a 'sovereign national conference'
  3. Re-allocation of Nigerian ownership of oil blocs (in favour of Niger Deltans)
  4. Autonomy/self-determination for the Niger Delta. (CIMSEC 14 June 2016)

The Jamestown Foundation reports that NDA's demands posted on their website vary from redistribution of oil wealth to the Delta region, to calls for its autonomy (13 June 2016). Similarly, CNBC reports that the group "seems to demand greater ownership of oil resources" for people living in the Delta region, as well as an environmental clean-up and compensation for damages "inflicted" by oil producers (20 May 2016). The BBC quotes an militant leader who "fights alongside" the NDA as stating that, through their actions, they seek to claim their rights, to bring development to their communities, and to control the oil resources (22 July 2016). A consultant of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), an African organization focusing on enhancing human security through research, police advice, training and technical assistance (ISS n.d.), quotes the NDA website as stating that "the struggle of the [NDA] is a genuine affront [sic] to ensure that the Niger Delta is developed in proportions that are only measurable with the immense wealth from our region and our environment remediated to its original state" (ibid. 7 June 2016). Sources report that the group also wants the continuation of amnesty program payments for former militants (CNBC 20 May 2016; The Economist 30 June 2016).

4. Activities

Sources report that the NDA has indicated that their actions target oil facilities and not people (ISS 7 June 2016; AFP 6 June 2016). Agence France-Presse (AFP) quotes a statement posted in the NDA website responding to another militant group's call to arms as indicating that the "we must desist from any life-threatening actions that will derail our genuine struggle for our people. All groups are hereby discouraged from indulging in harassing oil workers and soldiers... The war is on oil installations" (ibid.). Sources further indicate that, according to posts on the NDA website, the NDA has rejected kidnappings as a modus operandi (Jamestown Foundation 13 June 2016; RFI 26 May 2016).

Vanguard reports that the NDA carried out "[no] less" than 16 attacks between 10 February and 9 June 2016 (11 June 2016). The International Crisis Group states that the NDA claimed "at least fourteen attacks on oil and gas installations" between 1 and 24 July 2016 (July 2016, 7). Sources indicate that the NDA claimed an attack in February 2016 on a subsea Shell pipeline that shut down its Forcados export terminal (AFP 21 May 2016; Reuters 17 Apr. 2016 Vanguard 15 May 2016). In May 2016, sources reported that the NDA bombed the main electricity line to Chevron's Escravos oil facility, shutting down all of their on-shore activities (The Guardian 26 May 2016; Reuters 26 May 2016).

Sources further report on NDA attacks against oil facilities, including:

  • On 1 July 2016, a Nigerian National Petroleum Company pipeline was bombed in Warri (Newsweek 27 May 2016; Reuters 3 July 2016).
  • On 9 June 2016, an Eni oil pipeline was bombed (Vanguard 11 June 2016).
  • On 3 June 2016, the NDA attacked pipelines run by Shell and Eni, an Italian oil company (Wall Street Journal 5 June 2016).
  • On 18 May 2016, a gas pipeline run by Eni was bombed (AFP 21 May 2016; CBNC 20 May 2016).

5. State Response

Sources report that, as a response to the activities of the NDA, the Nigerian government has deployed more troops to the Niger Delta region (CNBC 10 June 2016; The Wall Street Journal 5 June 2016), from the north of the country where they are battling the Islamist insurgency Boko Haram (ibid.). The Wall Street Journal reports that the military contingent includes a group of US-trained troops with surveillance planes to assist in locating the NDA (ibid.).

Media sources report the following actions by state authorities against the NDA:

  • On 29 May 2016, in a confrontation with the NDA, the Nigerian military killed an "unknown" number of militants, preventing an attack on an oil pipeline in two communities in the Brass area of Bayelsa State (Vanguard 30 May 2016);
  • On 1 July 2016, the State security services announced that they had arrested two NDA members who were planning to attack an oil production facility (Premium Times 2 July 2016). The NDA reportedly denied the arrests on its website (ibid.);
  • On 20 July 2016, Punch, a Nigerian newspaper, reported that the Nigerian Navy stated it had arrested a person on 11 July 2016 believed to be a "major logistic supplier" for the NDA (20 July 2016a). The IBTimes reports that the NDA denied the arrest (21 July 2016);
  • On 20 July 2016, Punch reported that the Delta State Police arrested a bishop for allegedly financing the NDA and harbouring their weapons (20 July 2016b);
  • On 26 July 2016, a "highly placed security source" interviewed by Nigerian newspaper This Day, stated that there were a "'series of arrests of NDA members'" including some of their commanders (The Advocate 26 July 2016).

Additional information on these actions could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Jamestown Foundation states that, "despite reported arrests, government efforts to crackdown on militancy and prevent attacks have proven ineffective" (13 June 2016, 8). According to CNBC, the NDA "[takes] advantage of the Delta's complex, creek-filled terrain to stay one step ahead of the Nigerian soldiers chasing them" (CNBC 20 May 2016). The Wall Street Journal reports that, although the military posted troops around a Chevron facility that had been threatened by the NDA, the NDA managed to bomb two pipelines nearby to refineries (5 June 2016).

Sources report that the Nigerian government has stated that it was open to negotiating with the NDA (The Wall Street Journal 5 June 2016; Newsweek 7 June 2016; CNBC 10 June 2016). Media sources reported in July 2016 that the government stated it was engaged in negotiations with the NDA (Rhythm FM Radio qtd. in BBC 27 July 2016; This Day 26 July 2016b) through security agents and oil companies in the area (ibid.). Sources report that the NDA has reportedly denied the existence of these negotiations (ibid.; Rhythm FM Radio qtd. in BBC 27 July 2016).

The Wall Street Journal further reports that in response to the NDA's activities, the government has announced a "clean-up operation" for oil pollution in the Delta region to win the support from the Delta residents, and has said that it is "working as quickly as it can to repair the damage" to the oil infrastructure (5 June 2016). CNBC reports that the government has also started a dialogue with state and local leaders to address their grievances (10 June 2016). Additional and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

The Advocate. 26 July 2016. "Avengers Blasts NNPC Gas Pipeline in Akwa Ibom Again." (Factiva)

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 6 June 2016. "New Niger Delta Militant Group Warns of Widespread Attacks." [Accessed 8 July 2016]

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 21 May 2016. "Nigeria Beefs Up Security After Oil Installation Attacks." [Accessed 5 August 2016]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 27 July 2016. "Nigeria Insists It Is Negotiating With the 'Real' Niger Delta Militants." (Factiva)

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 22 July 2016. Martin Patience. "Why Nigeria's 'Avengers' Are Crippling the Oil Sector." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2 June 2016. Chris Ewokor. "The Niger Delta Avengers: Nigeria's Newest Militants." [Accessed 8 July 2016]

Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). 14 June 2016. Dirk Steffen. "Who Are the Niger Delta Avengers?" [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). N.d. "About Us/Membership." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

CNBC. 10 June 2016. Tom DiChristopher. "Nigeria Faces 'Almost Impossible' Fight Against 'Niger Delta Avengers'." [Accessed 15 July 2016]

CNBC. 20 May 2016. Tom DiChristopher. "'Niger Delta Avengers': Who They Are, and What They Want." [Accessed 15 July 2016]

The Economist. 30 June 2016. E.A.D.W. "Who Are the Niger Delta Avengers?" [Accessed 23 July 2016]

The Economist. 25 June 2016a. "Nigeria and Its Militants: Avengers Unite!" [Accessed 21 July 2016]

The Economist. 25 June 2016b. "The Niger Delta Avengers: Danegeld in the Delta." [Accessed 21 July 2016]

The Guardian. 26 May 2016. Ruth Maclean. "Niger Delta Avengers Militants Shut Down Chevron Oil Facility." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

The Independent. 26 July 2016. "Nigerian Militants Claim Attack on Pipeline." (Factiva)

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 7 June 2016. Simon Allison. "Boko Haram May Not Be Nigeria's Biggest Threat." [Accessed 15 July 2016]

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). N.d. "How We Work." [Accessed 29 July 2016]

International Business Times (IBTimes). 21 July 2016. Ludovica Iaccino. "Niger Delta Avengers Deny Nigerian Navy Arrest of Supplier As Oil-pipeline Attacks Continue." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

International Business Times (IBTimes). 20 June 2016. Ludovica Iaccino. "Pro-Biafrans Claim Niger Delta Avengers Link: Who Is Behind Group that Halted Nigeria's Oil Production?" [Accessed 29 July 2016]

International Crisis Group. July 2016. "Nigeria." Crisis Watch. [Accessed 3 Aug. 2016]

Jamestown Foundation. 13 June 2016. Jessica Moody. "The Niger Delta Avengers: A New Threat to Oil Producers in Nigeria." Terrorism Monitor. Vol. 14, No 12. [Accessed 15 July 2016]

Newsweek. 9 June 2016. Conor Gaffey. "Nigeria: Niger Delta Avengers Reject Dialogue with Government." [Accessed 25 July 2016]

Newsweek. 7 June 2016. Conor Gaffey. "Nigeria Is Prepared To Talk to Niger Delta Militants." [Accessed 25 July 2016]

Newsweek. 27 May 2016. Conor Gaffey. "Who Are the Niger Delta Avengers, Nigeria's New Oil Militants?" [Accessed 25 July 2016]

Punch. 20 July 2016a. "Niger Delta Avengers' Major Logistics Supplier Arrested." [Accessed 21 July 2016]

Punch. 20 July 2016b. "Police Quiz Bishop for Allegedly Sponsoring Avengers." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

Punch. 31 May 2016. "Dialogue with Niger Delta Avengers Not An Option - Army." [Accessed 21 July 2016]

Premium Times. 2 July 2016. Samuel Ogundipe. "Niger-Delta Avengers Denies Arrest of Its Members, Dares SSS to Parade Suspects before Reporters." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

Premium Times. 13 June 2016. "Niger Delta Avengers Issues 'Last Warning' to Seven Nigerian Governors." [Accessed 15 July 2016]

Radio France Internationale (RFI). 26 May 2016. "Nigeria: qui sont les Vengeurs du delta du Niger?" [Accessed 15 July 2016]

Reuters. 3 July 2016. Tife Owolabi and Alexis Akwagyiram. "Niger Delta Avengers Group Claims Five Attacks in Nigeria's Southern Delta." [Accessed 21 July 2016]

Reuters. 26 May 2016. Ulf Laessing and Tife Owolabi. "Nigeria Minister Wants Delta Grievances Addressed As Chevron Attacked" [Accessed 5 August 2016]

Reuters. 17 April 2016. Tife Owolabi. "Nigeria Pipeline Saboteurs Vow Further Niger Delta Attacks." [Accessed 5 Aug. 2016]

Stratfor. N.d. "About Stratfor" [Accessed 3 Aug. 2016]

This Day. 26 July 2016a. "Several Children Reported Missing As NNPC Pipeline Explodes in Akwa Ibom." (Factiva)

This Day. 26 July 2016b. "Ijaw Youths - Govt Preparing Grounds for Invasion of Niger Delta." (Factiva)

Vanguard. 25 June 2016. Nwabueze Okonkwo. "Biafra: IPOB Disowns Anti-Niger Delta Avengers Group." [Accessed 29 July 2016]

Vanguard. 11 June 2016. "Militants Threaten To Attack Govs, Make 7-point Demand, Including Defreezing Tompolo Bank Accounts." [Accessed 15 July 2016]

Vanguard. 30 May 2016. Emma Amaize et al. "Shootout in Niger Delta Creeks As Troops Kill Militants, Avert Attack on Oil Pipeline." [Accessed 15 July 2016]

Vanguard. 15 May 2016. "Who Are the Niger Delta Avengers?" [Accessed 15 July 2016]

The Wall Street Journal. 5 June 2016. Drew Hinshaw and Sarah Kent. "'Niger Delta Avengers' Sabotage Oil Output." [Accessed 21 July 2016]

Additional Sources Consulted

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Current History; ecoi.net; Factiva; Foreign Affairs; Human Rights Watch; Institute for War and Peace Reporting; IRIN; Jane's Intelligence Review; Norwegian Peace Research Institute; Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre; Stanford University – Mapping Militant Organizations; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Transparency International; United Nations – Refworld; United States – Department of State; University of Maryland – Minorities at Risk Project; The Warri Post.

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