Date(s) of hearing: N/A
Place of hearing: Vancouver, BC (In Chambers)
Date of decision: December 18, 2020
Panel: Linda Taylor
Counsel for Mr. Khan: William Macintosh
On this page
 On March 25, 2020 the Chairperson of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) delegated to me, an Assistant Deputy Chairperson of the Immigration Appeal Division, his powers under the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)Footnote 1 as Chairperson and chief judicial officer of the IRB to convene a proceeding to:
- find facts with respect to the conduct of Mumtaz Khan in IRB File No VB8-01910; and,
- take any appropriate remedial action that I may regard as necessary to safeguard and protect the integrity and effectiveness of IRB proceedings, including prohibiting Mr. Khan from representing and appearing on behalf of any person before any of the Divisions of the IRB.
 This is my decision and reasons in respect of the proceeding convened pursuant to this delegation of powers, including the application made by Mr. Khan during the proceeding.
 Mr. Mumtaz Khan is an immigration consultant registered as Member R413223 with the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council (ICCRC).
 On September 30, 2019, Mr. Khan appeared before the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the IRB to represent the claimant in IRB File No. VB8-01910. It is alleged that during the hearing, Mr. Khan attempted to send text messages to an anticipated witness waiting outside the hearing room, but mistakenly sent the text messages to the RPD Registry. The Registry informed the presiding RPD member, who suspended the hearing.
 The text messages that were received by the RPD Registry from a “Mumtaz Khan +16048395824” read as follows:
1:35 PM Her husband died in 2014
1:35 PM And you brought the affidavit
1:35 PM For the Lawyer
1:37 PM Make sure that you say you faxed me something from him
1:38 PM And it was wrong so you went to him again and brought it to me when you case six weeks ago
1:38 PM *six weeks ago
Response from the Registry:
1:40 PM Hello This is RPD scheduling, you are texting the wrong number
1:41 PM Fuck
1:41 PM Rrally
1:41 PM Sorry
 As stated above, on March 25, 2020 the IRB Chairperson delegated to me his powers to convene a proceeding.
 On April 17, 2020, I made a Confidentiality Order in the proceeding to protect the identity of the refugee claimant in IRB File No VB8-01910 and any person associated with that refugee claim.
 By letter dated April 22, 2020 I wrote to Mr. Khan, by e-mail and Canada Post registered mail, to inform him that a proceeding was being convened with respect to his conduct before the RPD on September 30, 2019. He was asked to respond to the following allegations:
It is alleged that on 30 September 2019, while appearing as counsel for the claimant at a hearing before the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) in refugee case number VB8-01910, Mr. Khan attempted to send a series of text messages from the hearing room to a witness. The witness was outside the hearing room waiting to testify in support of the claimant’s case. It is alleged that Mr. Khan sent the text messages in an attempt to tamper with the witness by instructing or influencing the testimony of the witness.
Enclosed with the letter were copies of the Chairperson’s delegation of authority, the allegations, the Referral Report on Counsel Conduct with screen shots of the alleged texts, a transcript of the hearing in VB8-01910 redacted to remove the names of the claimant and witness, and the Confidentiality Order.
 In that April 22, 2020 letter, Mr. Khan was offered a choice of two procedural options to respond to the allegations:
Option 1 – Proceed entirely in writing
Option 2 – Oral hearing combined with submissions
He was asked to provide written representations in response to the allegations within 45 days of April 22, 2020 if he chose Option 1 or advise if he chose Option 2 within 20 days of April 22, 2020.
 On May 12, 2020 Mr. Khan e-mailed me to acknowledge receipt of the April 22, 2020 letter and enclosures, and request an extension of time to July 20, 2020 to retain and instruct counsel and then advise me of his decision with respect to the two options.
 By e-mail dated May 15, 2020 I extended the deadline for written submissions under Option 1 to July 10, 2020 and extended the deadline for advising if he chose to proceed under Option 2 to June 15, 2020.
 On July 9, 2020 I received by e-mail a letter from Mr. Khan’s counsel, who had been retained on July 8, 2020, requesting a further extension of time on the basis of the same time periods offered in my letter dated April 22, 2020; namely, written submissions within 45 days or advising of an intention to proceed orally within 20 days of the date of a decision to postpone the review.
 By e-mailed letter dated July 17, 2020 I responded to the request from Mr. Khan’s counsel. I noted that the June 15, 2020 deadline for choosing Option 2 had passed without any communication from Mr. Khan. He provided no information as to what, if any, efforts he had made to retain counsel prior to June 15, 2020 or what circumstances had precluded him from retaining counsel prior to June 15, 2020. He did not seek a further extension of time prior to the expiry of the June 15, 2020 deadline. I considered Mr. Khan’s failure to respond to the June 15, 2020 deadline to choose Option 2 as an election on his part to proceed with Option 1. I granted an extension of time to August 10, 2020 to provide written submissions under Option 1.
 On August 11, 2020 I received by e-mail a letter from Mr. Khan’s counsel requesting a further extension of time to perfect submissions. In support of his request, counsel attached an outline of his anticipated submissions and a medical note.
 On August 17, 2020 I granted an extension of time to August 31, 2020 to provide written submissions. I requested that the written submissions include:
- any written submissions speaking to the allegations that are the subject of the proceeding;
- any written submissions Mr. Khan wished to make with respect to jurisdictional arguments; and,
- any written submissions Mr. Khan wished to make going to the question of whether the proceeding should be bifurcated for the purpose of first addressing jurisdictional issues.
 By e-mail dated September 1, 2020 Mr. Khan’s counsel brought an application in the proceeding seeking: an order dismissing the conduct review; alternatively, an order that a determination be made on jurisdiction before dealing with any hearing on the substantive elements; and if necessary an order that an oral hearing be held to determine the substantive elements of the proceeding. No submissions were included with respect to the allegations about Mr. Khan’s conduct.
 Mr. Khan raised many arguments in support of his position. I have grouped the issues and will deal with them as follows:
- Jurisdiction to convene the proceeding and order remedies
- The decision in
Rezaei v. Canada
- The doctrine of
- Has there been a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate?
- Do the legislative changes in section 91 of the IRPA and the creation of the ICCRC impact the IRB’s jurisdiction to convene a conduct proceeding, since the ICCRC did not exist when
Rezaei was decided?
- Has paragraph 161(1)(b) of the IRPA fundamentally shifted the debate?
- Has a new legal issue been raised?
- Can remedies be extended to more than one IRB Division?
- Bifurcation of the proceeding
- Merits of the allegations
A. Jurisdiction to convene the proceeding and order remedies
 Mr. Khan asserts that there is no legal authority to conduct this proceeding. I disagree, for the reasons elaborated below.
 This proceeding is conducted pursuant to a delegation of authority from the IRB Chairperson to me dated March 25, 2020. It is a delegation of the Chairperson’s general power to protect the integrity of proceedings at the IRB. The delegation instrument indicates that I have authority to find facts with respect to the conduct of Mr. Khan in IRB File No VB8-01910 and to take any appropriate remedial action that I may regard as necessary to safeguard and protect the integrity and effectiveness of IRB proceedings, including prohibiting Mr. Khan from representing and appearing on behalf of any person before any of the Divisions of the IRB.
1. The decision in Rezaei v. Canada
 The issue of whether an Assistant Deputy Chairperson, delegated the power by the IRB Chairperson, has the jurisdiction to look into concerns about the conduct of a representative before the IRB and take remedial action was dealt with in
Rezaei v. Canada.Footnote 2 The Federal Court-Trial Division found that subsection 58(4) of the former
Immigration ActFootnote 3 granted to the Chairperson the power to delegate authority to an Assistant Deputy Chairperson. Moreover, the Court found that the IRB has the authority to monitor its own procedures in order to ensure its integrity, and that in the absence of specific procedures laid down by statute or regulation, the IRB has the ability (through the Assistant Deputy Chairperson with the delegated power of the Chairperson) to suspend an agent or representative from appearing before the IRB on behalf of another person.
 With respect to the question of jurisdiction, the Court in
RezaeiFootnote 4 referred to a general principle of jurisdiction with respect to adjudicators enunciated by Sopinka J. in
Prassad v. CanadaFootnote 5:
In order to arrive at the correct interpretation of statutory provisions that are susceptible of different meanings, they must be examined in the setting in which they appear. We are dealing here with the powers of an administrative tribunal in relation to its procedures. As a general rule, these tribunals are considered to be masters in their own house. In the absence of specific rules laid down by statute or regulation, they control their own procedures subject to the proviso that they comply with the rules of fairness and, where they exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the rules of natural justice. [Emphasis added by Beaudry J.]
The Court interpreted Sopinka J.’s statement broadly to include conduct reviews as well as postponement applications. The Court stated that, “to limit the precedential value of
Prassad to such a specific point flies in the face of the broad judicial treatment that the case has been given since its release,”Footnote 6 and further stated that “[t]he jurisdictional context in which
Prassad was decided was simply one of the contexts contemplated by this general statement by Sopinka J.”Footnote 7
 The Court in Rezaei also observed that, “… denial of the jurisdiction of the IRB to ensure the integrity of its processes would be a disservice to its stakeholders. These stakeholders include not only the claimants who appear before the Board and its Divisions, but also the Canadian public at large, which is served by effective mechanisms for the application of immigration policy.”Footnote 8
2. The doctrine of
 The doctrine of
stare decisis generally requires the IRB to follow the legal findings of the Federal Court.Footnote 9 The
Rezaei decision has not been overruled. It has been followed in several IRB decisions as authority for the IRB’s jurisdiction to convene counsel conduct proceedings.Footnote 10
 While it appears that the Federal Court has not issued reasons regarding an analogous counsel conduct review, it has mentioned
Rezaei in three decisions. In
Yari v. CanadaFootnote 11 the Federal Court, in holding that the Immigration Appeal Division had the discretion to regulate its own procedure when its rules are silent, cited Beaudry J.’s statements in Rezaei that “It clearly makes intuitive sense that a tribunal such as the IRB or any of its constituent divisions ought to be able to regulate its own procedure. It ought also to regulate the privilege of appearing before the tribunal to represent a claimant.”Footnote 12 In
Goltsberg v. CanadaFootnote 13 the Federal Court cited
Rezaei for the proposition that “It is trite law that the RPD is a master of its own procedure”. In
Geza v. CanadaFootnote 14 the Federal Court referred to
Prassad in finding that the IRB has implicit jurisdiction over the process by which it discharges its statutory duties.
 Moreover, there is little to distinguish the facts in
Rezaei from those in this case: both involve immigration consultants facing allegations of poor conduct before the RPD, who were then subject to a proceeding presided over by Assistant Deputy Chairpersons of the Immigration Appeal Division who had delegated authority from the IRB Chairperson.
 In accordance with the doctrine of
stare decisis, I am bound to follow the Federal Court decision in Rezaei unless there is an applicable exception to that doctrine.
 The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that the doctrine of
stare decisis is fundamental to our legal system but is not a straight jacket. Settled rulings may be reconsidered where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate” or where a new legal issue is raised.Footnote 15 I have considered whether any of the jurisdictional arguments raised by Mr. Khan fall within these exceptions to the doctrine of
stare decisis, and have concluded that they do not.
(a) Has there been a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate
 Mr. Khan asserts that the
Rezaei decision has no application to this proceeding as it was decided under the former Immigration Act and provisions related to the rights of individuals to appear as counsel before the IRB differ from those under the IRPA.
 When the facts in
Rezaei arose, the Immigration Act was the applicable legislation. However, the IRPA came into force on June 28, 2002. Mr. Khan asserts that two of the provisions in the IRPA raise jurisdictional issues in this proceeding: section 91 of the IRPA which led to the creation of the ICCRC, and paragraph 161(1)(b) which provides that the IRB Chairperson may make rules respecting the conduct of persons in proceedings before the IRB, as well as the consequences of, and sanctions for, the breach of those rules. I have considered whether these legislative changes represent changes in the law, circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shift the debate and constitute an exception to the doctrine of stare decisis and have concluded that they do not.
(i) Do the legislative changes in section 91 of the IRPA and the creation of the ICCRC impact the IRB’s jurisdiction to convene a proceeding such as this one, since the ICCRC did not exist when
Rezaei was decided
 When the
Rezaei decision was issued in 2002, there was no regulatory body for immigration consultants. As a result of the designation of the ICCRC in June 2011 by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration under subsection 91(5) of the IRPA, members of the ICCRC who are in good standing may represent or advise paying clients concerning matters related to the IRPA. Mr. Khan asserts that the ICCRC has the exclusive power to regulate its members’ conduct. I do not agree with this assertion.
 A review of the jurisprudence strongly suggests that the existence of a regulatory body does not affect the ability of a tribunal to control who appears before it. The Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. CunninghamFootnote 16 disagreed that oversight of counsel withdrawal fell exclusively to law societies. Rothstein J. stated that, “[b]oth the courts and law societies play different, but important, roles in regulating withdrawal: the courts prevent harm to the administration of justice and the law societies discipline lawyers whose conduct falls below professional standards They are not mutually exclusive.”Footnote 17
 In the administrative context, in
Wilder v. Ontario Securities CommissionFootnote 18 the tribunal rejected the argument that it was unable to take action against a lawyer because only the Law Society of Upper Canada had jurisdiction to regulate the lawyer’s professional conduct was rejected. The tribunal held that it was not usurping the role of the Law Society because its objective was not to discipline the lawyer for professional misconduct but rather to remedy a breach of its statute which violated the public interest in fair and efficient capital markets and to control its own processes.Footnote 19
 Other tribunals also have acted to prevent abuse of process against counsel who are members of regulatory bodies; see, for example, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario in
A.M. v. Michener InstituteFootnote 20 and the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Board in
TEL-45395-14 (Re).Footnote 21
Domantay v.CanadaFootnote 22 the Federal Court recognized that the IRB has a duty to be proactive with respect to the status of counsel in order to protect the public, stating that:
. . .there is a duty incumbent upon the Board to verify that those individuals representing clients with whom it has dealings are authorized representatives pursuant to the Regulations, or that they are not receiving a fee for their services.
This duty envisions the protection of applicants and the preservation of the integrity of Canada’s immigration system”. [Emphasis added]
 This same duty to protect litigants, in this instance the refugee claimant Mr. Khan was representing in File No VB8-01910, as well as preservation of the integrity of Canada’s refugee and immigration systems, underpin this proceeding. The goal of the proceeding is not to punish Mr. Khan but rather to safeguard and protect the integrity and effectiveness of IRB proceedings. This preventive role of the IRB can coexist with any reactive role of the ICCRC.
 Mr. Khan further asserts that the right of ICCRC members to represent and advise under section 91 of the IRPA has created substantive rights for immigration consultants. I do not accept this assertion.
 The question of the substantive rights of the person seeking to serve as a representative was considered in
Rezaei. There the applicant sought a declaration that the IRB did not have the jurisdiction to suspend or deny a consultant the ability to practice before the IRB, arguing that a decision regarding who can appear before a board or tribunal was not a simple matter of procedure but rather a quasi-judicial decision which affected the substantive rights of the individual. In response, the Court said as follows:Footnote 23
. . .it cannot be said that the question of capacity to serve as a representative of a claimant is not procedural because it affects the substantive rights of the person who is seeking to act as counsel. During the course of a particular hearing, the only substantive rights with which the tribunal is concerned are those of the parties; that is, the claimant and the Minister.
To the extent that representation by counsel affects the procedure by which the substantive rights at the heart of the case are determined, that matter is procedural and is therefore within the competence of the IRB. [Emphasis added]
 In conclusion, I find that section 91 of the IRPA and the resultant creation of the ICCRC does not prevent the IRB from being able to continue to safeguard and protect the integrity and effectiveness of its proceedings. Nor do I find that it has created substantive rights for immigration consultants. Therefore, I find that section 91 of the IRPA has not fundamentally shifted the parameters of the debate to provide a basis to depart from the binding precedent of
(ii) Has paragraph 161(1)(b) of the IRPA fundamentally shifted the debate
 I have next considered the impact, if any, of paragraph 161(1)(b) of the IRPA and have concluded that it does not fundamentally shift the debate.
 Paragraph 161(1)(b) contemplates the issuance of rules relating to the conduct of persons appearing before the IRB. Mr. Khan asserts that Parliament’s intention in enacting paragraph 161(1)(b) of the IRPA was to remedy a lack of power on the part of the IRB to regulate the conduct of persons appearing in IRB proceedings. He argues that if the IRB already had such power, there would have been no need for paragraph 161(1)(b). He asserts that the inclusion of paragraph 161(1)(b) in the IRPA is consistent with his view that the IRB is an “inferior court” that lacks any of the inherent jurisdiction enjoyed by superior courts to regulate its proceedings. He further asserts that since the Chairperson has not yet made any rules pursuant to paragraph 161(1)(b) the IRB’s lack of power to regulate the conduct of persons appearing before it continues.
 Wilson v. Atomic EnergyFootnote 24 is cited in support of these arguments. However, I do not find that case to be analogous to this proceeding. There the provisions of the newly introduced statute contradicted what was formerly permissible under the common law. The common law had allowed the termination of employees without cause so long as minimum notice or compensation was given. However, sections of the
Canada Labour Code placed greater restrictions on employers including the requirement to provide reasons for dismissal and the possibility of orders for reinstatement. Abella J. stated that the new statutory provisions would be rendered meaningless if the employer could rely on the common law and dismiss the employee again by giving notice and severance pay.Footnote 25
 In contrast, in the matter before me, there is no contradiction between paragraph 161(1)(b) and the common law, namely
Rezaei. I find that paragraph 161(1)(b) merely codified what already existed at common law.
 I am aware of the decision in
Canada v. BrownFootnote 26 which might be considered to support Mr. Khan’s position. There the statute governing the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal also contemplated that the chairperson may make rules to allow for the addition of third parties to a proceeding. At the time the tribunal added a third parties, no rules had been made. After the first instance proceeding but before judicial review, new rules were added expressly providing a process to add parties. The Federal Court found that although the tribunal had since filled the gap in its rules, it had overstepped its jurisdiction earlier when it added a third party, for had Parliament intended the tribunal to have such a power, it “would not have circumscribed such authority with the discretionary precondition of the adoption of rules of procedure.”Footnote 27 In my view, Brown is distinguishable from this proceeding. There the tribunal had no common law authority to rely on when it added a third party; the Federal Court noted that the tribunal’s own jurisprudence set out two scenarios where third parties could be forcibly added, neither of which applied. In this proceeding, I have the
Rezaei decision to rely on.
 I note as well that there is jurisprudence suggesting that express legislative reference to a power does not take away prior common law power, such as:
 Further, the wording of paragraph 161(1)(b) is permissive: 161.(1) Rules – Subject to the approval of the Governor in Council, and in consultation with the Deputy Chairpersons, the Chairperson may make rules respecting
(b) the conduct of persons in proceedings before the Board, as well as the consequences of, and sanctions for, the breach of those rules; [. . .]
 Section 11 of the
Interpretation ActFootnote 29 provides that the expression “shall” is to be construed as imperative and the expression “may” as permissive. I am of the view that had Parliament intended that the Chairperson could only hold counsel conduct proceedings by enacting rules pursuant to paragraph 161(1)(b), imperative language would have been used.
 Such an interpretation is supported by jurisprudence. In
WattoFootnote 30 the statute governing the ICCRC provided that, “The articles or by-laws may provide that the directors, the members or any committee of directors or members or a corporation have power to discipline a member or to terminate their membership. If the articles or by-laws provide for such a power, they shall set out the circumstances and the manner in which that power may be exercised.”Footnote 31 The issue in
Watto was who could discipline a member. The Federal Court upheld the panel’s finding that the provision was not meant to be exhaustive and merely confirmed a power and set out what should happen if rules were made.
 I further note that all four divisions of the IRB have rules which grant discretion to a decision-maker to do whatever is necessary to deal with a matter in the absence of any other rules.Footnote 32 It is reasonable to infer that although paragraph 161(1)(b) now grants express legislative authority to make rules, if there are no rules, the IRB “may do whatever is necessary to deal with the matter”. Such an inference is supported by
Siloch v. CanadaFootnote 33 where Décary J.A. recalled the general rule that, “It is well settled that in the absence of specific rules laid down by statute or regulation, administrative tribunals control their own proceedings … subject to the proviso that they comply with the rules of fairness and, where they exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the rules of natural justice.”Footnote 34
 In conclusion, I find that paragraph 161(1)(b) of the IRPA was meant to codify the existing common law and that, in the absence of any rules, I may apply the procedures followed in
Rezaei. I find that paragraph 161(1)(b) has not fundamentally shifted the parameters of the debate to constitute an exception to the doctrine of
(b) Has a new legal issue been raised
 Mr. Khan asserts that the IRB is an “inferior court” that only has the power to cite for
in facie contempt. He further asserts that this proceeding deprives him of his rights under the
Bill of RightsFootnote 35 and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.Footnote 36 I do not find these arguments persuasive.
 As I understand his first argument, Mr. Khan asserts that because the IRB is not a superior court, it does not have inherent jurisdiction to maintain its authority to prevent its process being obstructed and abused. Rather, the IRB is a statutory tribunal and its powers are limited to those expressly granted it under the IRPA, and its ability to sanction misconduct is limited under common law to dealing with contempt in the face of the court. I disagree, for the reasons that follow.
 Whether or not administrative tribunals such as the IRB have inherent jurisdiction, the jurisprudence is clear that they have the authority to control their own procedure.Footnote 37
 There also is judicial authority that the power of an administrative tribunal to determine who can appear before it is a procedural matter.Footnote 38
 Moreover, in
ATCO the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the concept of powers broader than those expressly set out in a tribunal’s statute.Footnote 39 In determining the jurisdiction of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, Bastarache J. stated that, “… the powers conferred by an enabling statute are construed to include not only those expressly granted but also, by implication, all powers which are practically necessary for the accomplishment of the object intended to be secured by the statutory regime created by the legislature…”.Footnote 40 I note as well the conclusion of the Alberta Court of Appeal in
MakisFootnote 41 that the statement that tribunals are powerless to prevent abuses of their processes is of doubtful validity.
 In conclusion, I note that the objectives of the IRPA include the maintenance of the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system and the Canadian immigration system.Footnote 42 I am of the view that the powers practically necessary for the accomplishment of those objectives by the IRB include the power to determine who can appear before the IRB, to protect its processes from abuse.
 This conclusion effectively disposes of Mr. Khan’s assertions that the IRB only has the power to cite for
in facie contempt, that is contempt that occurs inside a courtroom. The judicial authorities Mr. Khan citesFootnote 43 on this point are unpersuasive, as they all turn on the narrow issue of whether a superior court can and should cite counsel for contempt, not over a tribunal’s jurisdiction over other remedies for poor counsel behaviour. Given that the jurisprudence supports the proposition that I have a wide discretion of remedies to prevent abuses and maintain the IRB’s integrity, including a conduct proceeding such as this one, I need not determine whether
ex facie or
in facie contempt applies.
 I turn next to the arguments made with respect to the
Bill of Rights and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I understand Mr. Khan to assert that he is entitled to an oral hearing. In that regard, on April 22, 2020 he was offered an oral hearing. On May 15, 2020 he was granted a one-month extension of time to consider whether to choose that option. The June 15, 2020 deadline passed without any communication from Mr. Khan. He neither asked for a further extension of time nor chose the option by that deadline. He provided no information as to what, if any, efforts he had made to retain counsel prior to the deadline or what circumstances had precluded him from retaining counsel prior to the deadline. In short, Mr. Khan simply let the deadline pass. In the result, he did not avail himself of the option to have an oral hearing.
 Mr. Khan also asserts a breach of section 15 of the
Charter on the basis that he is being discriminated against because he is an immigration consultant and not a lawyer. He has failed, however, to articulate even the bare requirements of a section 15
Charter breach, namely that this proceeding creates a distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds (race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability); and that it imposes burdens or denies a benefit in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage.Footnote 44
Delisle caseFootnote 45 cited by Mr. Khan is not applicable. In that case there was a legislative distinction in the treatment of two groups, and in any event L’Heureux-Dubé J. concurred with the majority that there was no section 15
 The proceedings contemplated by
Rezaei make no distinctions among whose conduct may be reviewed and how, be they an immigration consultant, a lawyer, a paralegal or an unauthorized representative.
 In conclusion, I find that the IRB has the power to control its own procedure, which includes the power to determine who can appear before it, and that the IRB is not powerless to prevent abuse of its processes. I further find that the lack of an oral hearing in this proceeding was the choice of Mr. Khan through his failure to respond to the deadline for choosing an oral hearing, and that there is no discrimination in this proceeding. In other words, I find that no new legal issue has been raised that would constitute an exception to the doctrine of
stare decisis and the application of
3. Can remedies be extended to more than one IRB Division
 I am led to the conclusion that
Rezaei remains good law and that none of the exceptions to the doctrine of
stare decisis apply. In
Rezaei, Beaudry J. stated that the IRB may impose a general ban prohibiting the applicant from appearing before the IRB, broader than on a case-by-case basis in order “to preserve the integrity of its process as a tribunal”.Footnote 46 This disposes of any question of whether any penalty imposed can be extended to more than one Division of the IRB.
Rezaei says that it can.
 Moreover, subsection 159(1) of the IRPA provides that the Chairperson is a member of each Division of the IRB. Pursuant to subsection 159(2), he has delegated his authority to me to “find facts” and “take any appropriate remedial action” that I may regard as necessary “to safeguard and protect the integrity and effectiveness of IRB proceedings, including prohibiting Mr. Khan from representing and appearing on behalf of any person before any of the Divisions of the IRB.”Footnote 47 The delegation of the Chairperson’s power to sanction the conduct of counsel is a delegation of the Chairperson’s general power to protect the integrity of proceedings at the IRB, not a delegation of a power in relation to any particular Division.
B. Bifurcation of the proceeding
 Mr. Khan seeks to separate the jurisdictional issues from the substantive issues that are the subject of this proceeding. He submits that this will avoid a potential waste of time and resources. He cites the Federal Court of Appeal in
Anti-dumping ActFootnote 48 that proceeding this way “may well result, in some cases, in expensive hearings being abortive”, adding that if this matter proceeds to an oral hearing on the merits, it would last at least one-half day. I do not find his arguments persuasive, for the reasons set out below.
 It is noteworthy that in the
Anti-dumping decision, the Court went on to say that a process of intermediate reviews would frustrate the work of the tribunal, and ruled that judicial review should best be left until the tribunal had reached a final decision.Footnote 49
 The decision of Stratas J.A. in
C.B. PowellFootnote 50 is instructive. Therein, he referred to the doctrine against fragmentation or bifurcation of administrative proceedings as one expression of the concept that “absent exceptional circumstances, parties cannot proceed to the court system until the administrative process has run its course.”Footnote 51 He stated that the “exceptional circumstances” exception is narrow and a jurisdictional issue, by itself, is not an exceptional circumstance.Footnote 52 Also instructive is the decision in
ShenFootnote 53 where the Federal Court affirmed that it should almost always refuse to rule on premature matters, noting the potential fragmentation of the process, the accompanying costs and delays, the possibility the tribunal may modify its ruling as the proceeding unfolds, or the issue may become moot if the applicant succeeds at the end of the administrative process.
 Mr. Khan also relies on the decision in
Watto.Footnote 54 There Norris J. applied the three-part test to grant an interlocutory injunction and found that the test was met such that it would fall within the exceptional circumstances exception to the doctrine against bifurcation. I find that case to be distinguishable from this proceeding. The issue of jurisdiction is much clearer in this proceeding than it was in
Watto given the prior common law authority on this specific issue in
Rezaei. There is no irreparable harm, as this proceeding is nearing its conclusion, which is more analogous to the facts in
Camp v. Canada.Footnote 55 And the balance of convenience does not favour bifurcation as it would result in the fragmentation of a proceeding that is nearly complete.
 I am mindful that in rejecting Mr. Khan’s request for bifurcation I am proceeding without his submissions on the merits of the allegations. However, he was given three extensions of time to provide submissions, most recently in my August 17, 2020 letter that expressly requested submissions speaking to the allegations that are the subject of the proceeding. No submissions were provided. That was his choice.
 In conclusion, I find that there are no exceptional circumstances that would warrant bifurcation of this proceeding.
 In the result, I do not grant Mr. Khan’s application.
C. Merits of the allegations
 As noted above, despite repeated requests made to Mr. Khan for submissions with respect to the allegations, none were provided. I am mindful of the requirements of fairness and natural justice, however, I consider that he was afforded ample opportunity to provide such submissions. It was his choice not to do, a choice made at his peril.
 Mr. Khan already provided an explanation of his conduct on the record; it is reflected in the redacted transcript of the hearing in IRB File No VB8-01910 on September 30, 2019 at pages 27-29. After the presiding RPD member announced he was suspending the hearing, Mr. Khan asked to “have a chat” with the member without the claimant and witness in the hearing room. The member agreed, making it clear that whatever Mr. Khan said would be on the record.
 Mr. Khan then stated that during the course of the last hour or so, he had texted some information to someone he thought was his staff but turned out to be a staff member of the IRB. He denied attempting to tamper with the witness and said that he was trying to clarify the information with respect to the date of death and the operational document brought by the witness. He said that he wanted to make sure that the information he had in his office file was correct for his submissions. He acknowledged that he should not have been texting but reiterated that he had been trying to contact one of his staff members.
 With respect, this explanation does not hold up when considering the content of the text messages in the context of what transpired during the hearing as set out in the transcript.
 For ease of reference the text messages are reproduced again below:
1:35 PM Her husband died in 2014
1:35 PM And you brought the affidavit
1:35 PM For the Lawyer
1:37 PM Make sure that you say you faxed me something from him
1:38 PM And it was wrong so you went to him again and brought it to me when you case six weeks ago
1:38 PM *six weeks ago
Response from the Registry:
1:40 PM Hello This is RPD scheduling, you are texting the wrong number
1:41 PM Fuck
1:41 PM Rrally
1:41 PM Sorry
 The hearing on September 30, 2019 began with the presiding member confirming that a witness was outside in the waiting room (at page 1, lines 17-20). The member then asked a few questions of the claimant to clarify the date of death of the claimant’s husband, as there had been some confusion as to whether the date was 2011 or 2014. The member stated that he had previously requested that the claimant bring additional documents to the hearing that would help establish when her husband died (at page 2, lines 7-14). The claimant responded that she had not done so, but that her counsel told her that the witness would be giving testimony (at page 2, lines 16-22). Mr. Khan confirmed that since the claimant’s testimony was over, he had faxed a will-say statement of a witness who may give evidence (page 2, lines 26-29). The transcript further indicates (at page 3, lines 10-15) that the date of death was clarified to the member’s satisfaction as 2014, and he moved on to another line of questions.
 Mr. Khan’s first text message states that “Her husband died in 2014”. It is difficult to understand why Mr. Khan would seek to text his office to clarify the date of death when it appears that the matter had been clarified during the hearing. I note also that the text is declaratory; it does not request information or convey instructions to do anything in connection with the date of death as would have been expected if Mr. Khan was trying to contact his staff. Moreover, it is clear from the transcript that the witness had been called, in part, to confirm the year of the claimant’s husband’s death, and indeed, this is one of the first questions the presiding member asked him (at page 19, line 19).
 Later in the hearing, the presiding member asked the claimant about a lawyer overseas who was working on her behalf and whether any documents had been received from this lawyer (at page 9, line 1 to page 13, line 31). The claimant testified that the witness was the connection between herself and the overseas lawyer (at page 9, lines 18-28). The presiding member had questions about a document that eventually was identified as an affidavit and marked as an exhibit. Mr. Khan informed the presiding member that the witness was the person who provided the affidavit to him (at page 10, lines 36-37) and that the witness had come to Canada approximately six to seven weeks ago (at page 13, line 33-36). Mr. Khan further informed the presiding member that the affidavit was sent back to the overseas lawyer to be “fixed” and that he hoped to elicit information about that from the witness (at page 14, lines 8-32). Shortly thereafter, the witness was called to testify (page 17, line 17 to page 18, line 3). The presiding member commenced the questioning, followed by Mr. Khan. Shortly thereafter, the hearing was suspended.
 Against this backdrop, it is evident to me that Mr. Khan’s text messages were intended for the witness, for the purpose of instructing him or influencing him as to what to say during his testimony. The text messages correspond to what Mr. Khan told the presiding member the witness would testify to. It was the witness who was going to “say” something as instructed in the text messages, not a staff member from his office. Mr. Khan had also advised the presiding member that the witness would be testifying to the details in the texts, namely that he had brought the affidavit from the overseas lawyer because it had needed to be fixed and that he had come to Canada some six or seven weeks earlier. To say that these text messages were for his office staff makes no sense.
 I note that the screen shots provided by the staff member of the RPD Registry depict the name “Mumtaz Khan” at the top, which correspond to Mr. Khan’s given and family names. In any event, Mr. Khan admitted to the presiding member that he had sent the texts in question, only disputing who they were intended for.
 When I consider the content of the texts, the transcript of the hearing which mirrors the directions given in the texts and what the witness was anticipated to testify to, as well as Mr. Khan’s texted expletive when advised he had texted the Registry and his weak explanation to the presiding member thereafter, I find on a balance of probabilities that these text messages were intended for the witness in an attempt to instruct or influence his testimony.
 In conclusion, I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the allegations against Mr. Khan have been established.
 I find that Mr. Khan attempted to tamper with the witness in IRB File No VB8-01910.
 In determining an appropriate remedy, I recall that its purpose is to safeguard and protect the integrity and effectiveness of IRB proceedings. I have considered the nature and seriousness of Mr. Khan’s conduct and the nature and gravity of the harm to the IRB. I am also mindful that Mr. Khan earns his livelihood as an immigration consultant.
 I have not found much authority to guide me in considering remedies. I have considered the remedial action imposed in
Rezai proceedings at the IRB, most notably in
Ehikwe,Footnote 56 but do not find those cases particularly helpful on the question of remedies in this case. I am aware of the
Stanton case but am mindful that it was a disciplinary matter before the Law Society of British Columbia.Footnote 57 It involved an attempt to tamper with a witness for which a three-month suspension was originally imposed.
 Mr. Khan’s conduct in IRB File No VB8-01910 was serious. An attempt to tamper with a witness in an IRB hearing is serious; it undermines the integrity of the IRB’s process. Such conduct also shows a lack of respect for the IRB. It also was potentially harmful to the person he represented. It is important for the IRB to act to protect its processes from such conduct. At the same time, unlike
Ehikwe, the conduct in this case consisted of one instance and remedial action could impact Mr. Khan’s ability to earn a livelihood.
 Having considered the matter, I determine an appropriate remedy to be a three-month prohibition from appearing as counsel before any Division of the IRB and representing, advising or consulting with any person regarding any proceeding concerning that person before the IRB, effective immediately. Further, prior to again appearing as counsel before any Division of the IRB and representing, advising or consulting with any person regarding any proceeding concerning that person before the IRB, Mr. Khan must provide proof to the IRB of successful completion of the half-day course on ethical practice offered by the ICCRC or an equivalent professional ethics course. This should benefit Mr. Khan and the IRB, as well as members of the public who would consider seeking Mr. Khan’s assistance in matters before the IRB.
 Upon issuance of this decision, I direct the Regional Registrars of the IRB to notify any persons who are represented by Mr. Khan in proceedings before the IRB that he is prohibited from appearing as counsel before any Division of the IRB and representing, advising or consulting with any person regarding any proceeding concerning that person before the IRB for a three-month period from the date of this decision. Further, I direct the Regional Registrars of the IRB to note that prior to representing anyone before the IRB in the future in any capacity, Mr. Khan must provide proof to the IRB of successful completion of the half-day course on ethical practice offered by the ICCRC or an equivalent professional ethics course.
Assistant Deputy Chairperson, Immigration Appeal Division
Dated: December 18, 2020