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Responses to Information Requests (RIRs) cite publicly accessible information available at the time of publication and within time constraints. A list of references and additional sources consulted are included in each RIR. Sources cited are considered the most current information available as of the date of the RIR.            

RIRs are not, and do not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Rather, they are intended to support the refugee determination process. More information on the methodology used by the Research Directorate can be found here.          

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The information presented in RIRs solely reflects the views and perspectives of the sources cited and does not necessarily reflect the position of the IRB or the Government of Canada.          

7 November 2014

NGA104979.E

Nigeria: Complaints mechanisms available for cases of police misconduct, including effectiveness (2013-October 2014)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of the CLEEN Foundation, a Nigerian NGO with three regional offices that works to "promote public safety, security, and accessible justice" through its programs, empirical research, and legislative advocacy, in partnership with government and civil society (CLEEN Foundation 30 Apr. 2013, iii), indicated that, over the past decade, the quality, and professionalism of police has "increased" and police oversight has "improved significantly," since the country's return to civilian rule in 1999, noting that officers have been charged, prosecuted, and dismissed from the force (ibid. 21 Oct. 2014). In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of criminology at the University of Alberta, whose research is focused on resource conflicts, political kidnapping, and the use of force by police in Nigeria, the broader police system is still characterized by a "lack of accountability" (10 Oct. 2014).

Human Rights Watch's World Report 2014 for Nigeria reports that the Nigerian police are involved in "frequent" human rights violations, such as extra-judicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrest, and extortion (2014). The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 indicates that Nigeria's security services have "perpetrated extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, beatings, arbitrary detention, mistreatment of detainees, and destruction of property" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 1-2). Sources report that security forces commit abuses with "impunity" (ibid., 2) or "near impunity" (Freedom House 2014). Freedom House 2014 reports that corruption in the police force "pervades their ranks" (ibid.). According to Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer survey, 92 percent of Nigerians surveyed perceive the police to be "corrupt/extremely corrupt" (TI 2013). The same survey found that 66 percent of those polled believed the judiciary was "corrupt/extremely corrupt" (ibid.).

According to the Assistant Professor, corruption, low morale, and lack of capacity make oversight and accountability of police "extremely difficult" (10 Oct. 2014). Human Rights Watch reports that "most" complaint mechanisms against police lack resources needed to investigate complaints received (Aug. 2010, 87). Similarly, CLEEN Foundation reports that the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) "lacks an effective database on complaints and discipline management" and that the police complaint management system is "generally inaccessible, ineffective, and does not enjoy the confidence of members of the public" (CLEEN 30 Apr. 2013, 12-13).

2. NPF Internal Mechanisms for Receiving Complaints

Sources report that the NPF has a number of internal mechanisms for receiving and processing public complaints about police misconduct including:

  • Human Rights Desk police officers (Human Rights Watch Aug. 2010, 87; CLEEN Foundation 21 Oct. 2014) at the police station level (ibid.);
  • complaint boxes and hotlines at police stations (Human Rights Watch Aug. 2010, 87);
  • Police Complaint Bureaus in the Public Relations offices (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014; CLEEN Foundation 21 Oct. 2014), in each of the 36 state-level police commands (ibid.); and
  • a written complaint about police misconduct can also be lodged to senior police officers, the State Commissioner of police or to the head of the police force, the Inspector-General (IG) of Police (Open Society Foundations 25 Jan. 2013; NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014).

2.1 NPF Internal Investigation of Complaints Against Officers

The CLEEN Foundation's April 2013 conference proceedings on the topic "External Police Accountability and the Police Service Commission," note that the NPF has two types of internal police disciplinary mechanisms: "internal administrative review" for intake, investigation and review of complaints against police by members of the public, and "internal investigation mechanisms for external review and enforcement" (CLEEN 30 Apr. 2013, 8). According to the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), a network of 46 civil society organizations working to promote police accountability and human rights in Nigeria (NOPRIN n.d.), and the Open Society Justice Initiative [1] in their 2010 report, Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extra-Judicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force, the "ultimate internal control mechanism of the police is an Orderly Room trial, the police equivalent of a court martial" in which the public does not participate and no public reports are produced (2010, 95). According to Amnesty International (AI), this internal police review mechanism has a "mandate to recommend disciplinary action" (AI Sept. 2014, 45).

The Assistant Professor indicated that cases of police misconduct in Nigeria are often not reported (10 Oct. 2014). According to a 2010 report by Human Rights Watch titled Everyone's in on the Game: Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force, the public "seldom" uses police complaint mechanisms to report incidents such as extortion and abuse (Aug. 2010, 89). Information on the number of complaints of police misconduct registered and handled by the NPF could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the program coordinator for NOPRIN indicated that when police receive written complaints from complainants, their lawyers, or human rights organizations, the complaints are referred by senior officers to the "police investigating unit" (NOPRIN 22 Oct. 2014). The same source notes that "very few cases are conclusively investigated" (ibid.). Similarly, Human Rights Watch reports that complaints against police are "rarely investigated" (Aug. 2010, 89). According to AI, "in practice," existing mechanisms such as reporting allegations directly to senior police officers or to police Human Rights desks, are "ineffective" and "serious concerns exist about the independence of the investigations" (AI 18 Sept. 2014, 45). Country Reports 2013 indicates that "authorities did not investigate the majority of cases of police abuse or punish perpetrators" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 2). Two sources further report that the centralized nature of the police force structure causes complaints to be dealt with slowly (Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014; Nigeria 4 Nov. 2014).

3. External Complaint Mechanisms
3.1 Police Service Commission (PSC)

The PSC is the civilian oversight mechanism of the NPF, and has the power to recruit, promote, and discipline any Nigerian police officer, with the exception of the Inspector-General of the NPF (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014; Open Society Foundations 25 Jan. 2013). According to AI, the PSC has "the power to dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over almost all police officers" but "cannot refer cases to the courts for prosecution" (AI Sept 2014, 45). Instead, the PSC refers complaints against police officers "back to the police for further investigation" and that this "invariably results in no further action and consequently human rights groups have stopped forwarding complaints" to the PSC (AI Sept. 2014, 45). According to the NOPRIN program coordinator, the PSC is empowered to investigate and impose disciplinary sanctions on the police; "or if there is a need for criminal prosecution, it is expected to refer to the police for prosecution" (NOPRIN 22 Oct. 2014). The same source stated that "there is no record of the PSC referring any case for prosecution" (ibid. 22 Oct. 2014).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Head of the Public Relations unit of the Public Complaints Commission (PCC), Nigeria's Ombudsman office, stated that "in practice, the Police Service Commission has delegated the powers of discipline of the rank and file (Junior Officers below the rank of Inspector) to the Inspector General of Police" (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014). CLEEN Foundation explains that police officers are liable under civil and criminal proceedings for abuse of power; however, in the case of criminal liability, "either the Nigeria Police Force or the Attorney-General of the state or of the Federation will have to invoke the process. They will do this only in a case they consider serious and in which power exercised by an officer is considered unjustified" (30 Apr. 2013, 14).

According to the 2011 Annual Report of the PSC the PSC received 202 complaints from members of the public against the police on allegations ranging from: "illegal detention, extortion, rape, torture and murder to extra-judicial killing by members of the force" (Nigeria 2011, 32). Most public complaints were in the categories of "Abuse of Office" and "Threat to Life," followed by homicide, brutality, corruption, extortion, and harassment (ibid., 34). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of the CLEEN Foundation indicated that between July and September 2014, 79 new reports of police misconduct were received by the organization's website "Stop the Bribes" (Oct. 2014, 6) [2]. Further statistical information on the number of public complaints against police could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to a 2012 report by the Civil Society Panel on Police Reform (CSO Panel), a panel organized by NOPRIN and CLEEN Foundation, which included results of public hearings on police reform in Nigeria's 6 geopolitical zones, "many" public submissions made to the panel noted that the PSC was unable to "even acknowledge their petitions against police, let alone act on them" (CSO Panel Sept. 2012, para. 3.74). The Assistant Professor indicated that, in his view, the PSC is "not effective in disciplining members for misconduct" and there is "very little public trust in PSC's capacity to punish errant officers" (10 Oct. 2014).

In an article published by the Nigerian newspaper The Nation, the Chairman of the PSC stated at a public briefing that the PSC "'is grossly underfunded and this has affected its capacity to deliver on its mandate. Poor funding has also led to low morale amongst serving officers and a series of complaints by the general public on many cases of police misconduct'" (25 June 2014). According to NOPRIN, the PSC lacks office space, personnel, and facilities "for effective performance of its functions" (10 Oct. 2014). Similarly, the Chairman of the PSC stated at a public briefing that the PSC has inadequate office equipment, office space and residential accommodation for serving officers, making "'coordination and supervision difficult'" (The Nation 25 June 2014).

The chairman of the PSC is former Inspector-General of the NPF, Mike Okiro (NOPRIN May 2013, 7; Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014). Human Rights Watch reported that when Okiro was the IG of the police, 785 suspected armed robbers were killed by police between June and September 2007 (Human Rights Watch Sept. 2008, 4). NOPRIN reports that while the IG of the NPF, Okiro had been "serially implicated in the promotion of extra-judicial executions" (May 2013, 2).

3.1.1 Disciplinary Actions Taken by NPF and PSC

The NOPRIN program coordinator stated that "on rare occasions" the PSC will announce the demotion or dismissal of "a few anonymous police officers for misconduct" (NOPRIN 22 Oct. 2014). Without providing details in relation to addressing specific complaints, the PSC reported in its 2011 Annual Report, that 12 senior police officers (SPO) were "exonerated," 37 were reprimanded, 5 were reduced in rank, 4 were compulsorily retired, and 9 were dismissed (Nigeria 2011, 33). The 2011 Annual Report indicates that 428 "inspectors and rank and file" officers had "pending disciplinary matters" (ibid,, 35). According to the CLEEN Foundation, of the 79 complaints received by the "Stop the Bribes" website for police complaints, 3 officers were dismissed, 19 were "cautioned" by the police force, and in other cases, the police investigated and determined the officers were "innocent" or did not investigate due to "unsubstantiated" allegations (CLEEN Foundation 30 Oct. 2014). Further statistics on disciplinary actions taken by the PSC could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.2 National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

Country Reports 2013 indicates that the NHRC holds the mandate to "examine security force killings and refer alleged perpetrators for prosecution" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 2). The NHRC indicates that the decisions of the Commission are "registrable as decisions of the High Court" (Nigeria n.d.a ). The NHRC has offices located in the 6 geopolitical zones of Nigeria (ibid.; NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014). The NHRC website indicates that the Commission's services, including the NHRC complaints mechanism, can be accessed free of charge (ibid.).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the NHRC indicated that in 2012 it received 1,920 complaints of "degrading treatment by law enforcement agents," 3,462 complaints of unlawful arrest, and 310 complaints of torture (Nigeria 4 Nov. 2014). In 2013, the NHRC received 404 complaints of unlawful arrest and detention, 178 complaints of torture, and 297 complaints of extra-judicial killing (ibid.).

According to the representative, when the NHRC receives a complaint of police misconduct, the NHRC analyses the complaint, contacts the officer affected, carries out an investigation and forwards the NHRC findings and recommendations to the Inspector General of Police, the relevant Commissioner of Police, or the PSC, for implementation (ibid.). In the matter of a criminal case, the commission refers the case to the federal or state Attorney General for prosecution (ibid.).

Country Reports 2013 indicates that the NHRC did not refer alleged perpetrators of killings by security forces for prosecution during 2013 (US 27 Feb. 2014, 2). According to NOPRIN, there is only one case where the commission "made such a decision following its investigation of allegation[s] of extrajudicial killing by military officers in Abuja" (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014). Sources report that the NHRC indicted the military and security agencies over the 2013 killing of 8 youths whom the security force members had deemed to be members of Boko Haram (The Tribune 9 June 2014; AllAfrica 3 July 2014). The NHRC held that the killing was "not justified" and reportedly awarded 10 million Naira (about C$68,000) to the families of the deceased and 5 million Naira to those injured in the incident, to be paid by the government in compensation (ibid.). Sources report that the agencies involved have appealed the decision of the NHRC (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014; AllAfrica 3 July 2014), and the Federal High Court in Abuja stopped the execution of the NHRC's ruling (ibid.). NOPRIN reports that the case is pending before the court of appeal (22 Oct. 2014).

According to the Assistant Professor, the NHRC can receive complaints about police, but will "contact the entity concerned and serve as a peace broker" (10 Oct. 2014). According to NOPRIN, the NHRC "lacks political support to effectively discharge its functions" and is not adequately funded or provided with trained staff (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014). The Assistant Professor stated that the slow pace of the judicial system has caused NHRC cases to remain unresolved (10 Oct. 2014). According to the representative of the NHRC, feedback on the outcome of NHRC investigations, in terms of officers disciplined by the police, are usually not communicated back to the NHRC, which was identified as a "gap" that the police and NHRC are working to address (Nigeria 4 Nov. 2014). The NHRC indicated that the police is cooperative when working with the NHRC in "most cases" where they are confident they have acted within the law; however, in "most cases where there is no such confidence, their cooperation is low" (ibid.).

3.3 Public Complaints Commission (PCC) (Nigeria Ombudsman)

According to the Nigerian government, the PCC has "wide powers" to investigate complaints made by the public against "any administrative injustice in any Government establishment in the Federal, State and Local Government" (Nigeria n.d.b.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Head of Public Relations for the PCC stated that the PCC has the "widest spread" [of Nigeria's complaint agencies], having offices in all states, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and 5 area offices (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014). The PCC has a public sector unit, and desk officers responsible for investigating complaints against police (ibid.). According to the Nigeria newspaper Daily Trust, the PCC has received over 1,200 petitions since January 2014 (6 Aug. 2014). Information on the number of complaints against police handled by the PCC could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources report that the PCC refers complaints of police misconduct to the PSC (Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014; Human Rights Watch Aug. 2010, 88). The PCC Head of Public Relations explained that when the PCC "receives cases bordering on police misconduct, such cases are forwarded to the Police Service Commission who in turn investigate and take disciplinary action" (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014). According to the PCC website, while the Commission cannot "entertain" any pending or current case before the courts, it can investigate and make recommendations on any breaches of administrative procedures of the court in these cases (Nigeria n.d.b).

The Assistant Professor indicated that, in his view, the PCC does not have the capacity to deal with cases effectively, due to its "extremely broad mandate" (10 Oct. 2014). In an interview with the Daily Trust, the Commissioner of the FCT PCC indicated that finance, accommodation, and mobility were "major" challenges faced by the PCC (6 Aug. 2014).

According to the Assistant Professor, the PCC "could take the accused officer to court, or can help the person [complainant] to take them to court" however, he notes that this is "not effective in practice" and indicated that "there is little evidence to [his] knowledge suggesting that this is an effective mechanism" (10 Oct. 2014). Corroborating information could not be found among the source consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.4 Legal Aid Council

The government's Legal Aid Council provides free legal aid services to citizens in need (CLEEN Foundation 21 Oct. 2014; NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014). The Assistant Professor notes that legal aid is available; however, "their resources are overwhelmed" and the capacity to provide legal aid is low (10 Oct. 2014). Similarly, the program coordinator of NOPRIN stated that "the impact of the [Legal Aid] council is hardly felt due to poor funding and inadequate personnel" (10 Oct. 2014). Further information on cases of police misconduct brought by the Legal Aid Council could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Civil and Court Proceedings

CLEEN Foundation indicates that "the prospect of an aggrieved citizen taking recourse [through] civil action is limited because of grinding poverty among the majority of citizens" (30 Apr. 2013, 14). According to the Assistant Professor, in reference to the pursuit of private lawsuits against police for misconduct:

[p]rivate lawsuits against police can be brought, but generally only if someone has the time, resources, and financial ability to pursue the case in the court system. Someone who is from a rural area, poor, uneducated, will not be able to access this option. People do bring lawsuits against the police and have been able to occasionally get justice this way. This has occurred in high profile cases of police misconduct. (Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014)

Corroborating information on high profile cases of police misconduct could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The Legal Defence Assistance Project (LEDAP), a non-governmental organization of lawyers and law professionals that provides legal aid services to Nigerians in situations of police misconduct (LEDAP 22 Oct. 2014), usually handles approximately 5 to 10 reports of police misconduct per month at their Lagos location, mainly related to torture in detention (ibid.). In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a representative from the LEDAP Lagos office explained their role in bringing complaints to court:

[m]ost times, in dealing with complaints of police misconduct, LEDAP will write to the police asking them to investigate the case. If LEDAP is not satisfied with the results of the police's internal investigation, they will go straight to the high court, or federal high court in Lagos (depending on the nature of the case), and ask the court to take action to correct the behaviour of the police, and if the case is serious, to ask that the officer is disciplined or dismissed. (ibid.)

The Nigerian newspaper Leadership reports that in August 2014, in Osun state, fifteen people who were "allegedly harassed and humiliated" sued the Department of State Security (DSS), Nigerian Army and NPF over their "alleged complicity" in "illegal arrest and detention" of the complainants (Leadership 25 Aug. 2014). Further information on this case could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.1 Enforcing Judgements Against Police Officers

Country Reports 2013 states that the law provides for access to the courts, and "courts can award damages and issue injunctions to stop or prevent a human rights violation;" however, "the decisions of civil courts were difficult to enforce" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 15). AI reports that few compensation claims are filed in court and that "even in rare cases where victims have been awarded compensation by a court, the authorities have ignored it" (18 Sept. 2014, 47). The program coordinator of NOPRIN similarly indicated that there are "many" cases in which complainants carrying out civil suits have received a favourable court judgment awarding them compensation; however, "the police habitually disrespect court orders and judgments" (NOPRIN 22 Oct. 2014).

NOPRIN and Open Society Justice Initiative's 2010 report notes that the NPF transfers police officers involved in complaints, causing investigating agencies to give up on complaints due to the inability to locate officers (2010, 96). Similarly, the LEDAP representative stated that it can be difficult to enforce a judgement against a police officer because they could have been transferred or have moved to another location in the country (LEDAP 22 Oct. 2014). The LEDAP representative further explained that:

LEDAP tries to make the NPF a party to the legal suit, so that even if the officer is moved, the police are still obliged to obey the order. However, the court system is cumbersome, and this can take many years, and LEDAP can lose track of officers because cases drag on for many years. LEDAP also tries to make LEDAP itself a plaintiff to the case, along with the victims, so that they may follow up. Judgments on police misconduct calling for punishments of police officers are unlikely to be enforced and not very many officers are disciplined in practice. (ibid.)

Country Reports 2013 indicates that "[i]n some cases private citizens or the government brought charges against perpetrators of human rights abuses in these units [NPF, State Security Service (SSS), and the military], but most cases lingered in court or went unresolved after an initial investigation" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 10). According to AI, in cases where allegations of torture by police are made in Nigerian courts, "judges do not appear to take such complaints seriously" (18 Sept. 2014, 47). Similarly, NOPRIN and the Open Society Justice Initiative's 2010 report states that in cases where courts find the NPF liable for torture, "they failed to order the investigation and prosecution of officers involved" (2010, 92). The LEDAP representative stated that when a case is taken to court, "the outcome can vary depending on the judge in the case, and the case can many times last for years," noting that such a "lengthy process" causes people to withdraw from the case (LEDAP 22 Oct. 2014).

5. Informal Mechanisms to Deal with Police Misconduct

According to the Assistant Professor, there is a "widespread" practice of using informal mechanisms to deal with police misconduct, such as payment by errant police officers to the victims (Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014). People that are well-positioned socially can sometimes rely on personal networks to access high level officials to have a complaint of misconduct dealt with (ibid.). The NOPRIN program coordinator indicated that it petitioned police authorities on behalf of victims in two cases of extra-judicial killings and the police officers responsible approached the families of the victims to "settle," offering them payment (NOPRIN 22 Oct. 2014). In both cases, the families accepted payment and dropped the cases (ibid.).

6. State Efforts and Civil Society Initiatives

Country Reports 2013 indicates that roadblocks and checkpoints have often been used by police in order to "extort" money from travellers (US 27 Feb. 2014, 27). Sources report that in 2012 many police-manned roadblocks in Nigeria were dismantled (Human Rights Watch 2014; Freedom House 2014). According to Freedom House, the IG of the NPF stated that the removal of the roadblocks has led to an 80 per cent reduction in police corruption (ibid.). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

However, sources report that police roadblocks remained in place despite the order that they be removed (US 27 Feb. 2014, 27; The Guardian 3 Sept. 2014). The Nigerian newspaper The Guardian reported that in 2012, 38 policemen have faced "orderly room trial" for setting up road blocks to extort money from drivers (ibid.).

In January 2013, the NPF adopted a new code of conduct to guide police member conduct and behaviour (Open Society Foundations 25 Jan. 2013; Bloomberg 11 Jan. 2013). However, AI expressed concern that the code "'does not explicitly state that use of force must be lawful and proportionate as well as necessary'" (Bloomberg 11 Jan. 2013). Country Reports 2013 indicated that "the police did not report any enforcement actions related to the code of conduct" (US 27 Feb. 2014, 33).

The Executive Director of the CLEEN Foundation states that the PSC has taken "proactive measures" to ensure good police conduct during elections, such as developing a "Guideline for Police Officers on Election Duties" and has partnered with CLEEN Foundation and civil society on police training and elections security management (21 Oct. 2014, 4).

According to the PCC, the CLEEN foundation has created a mechanism for regular meetings with government agencies charged with police accountability, which has "provided a veritable platform for joint and concerted efforts in the resolution of complaints" (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014). CLEEN Foundation's website "Stop the Bribes" continues to operate (CLEEN Foundation 21 Oct. 2014).

7. Specific Obstacles Influencing Reporting of Complaints

According to the PCC, most agencies for police complaints are usually located in the FCT or state capitals (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014). Sources report that urban residents are more likely to be able to access and file complaints than rural citizens (CLEEN Foundation 21 Oct. 2014; Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014). Two sources report that the PSC is only located in the FCT (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014; Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014), which affects the accessibility for "rural dwellers" to approach the agency and lodge complaints (ibid.). According to the Assistant Professor, the social class or position of a complainant "greatly affects the response to a person's complaint," noting that average Nigerians and those who are "socially disadvantaged are less likely to have their complaints heard and responded to" (Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014). Sources report that there is a lack of public awareness about police complaint mechanisms (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014; NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014).

The NOPRIN program coordinator indicated that "[p]ublic confidence in the police and in police internal control systems is generally very low. There are several of these [complaint] mechanisms but they are not effective and their functions are not streamlined" (NOPRIN 10 Oct. 2014). Similarly, the Assistant Professor stated that average Nigerians perceive the process of lodging complaints against police as "a lengthy process and a tedious waste of time that rarely leads to having complaints addressed or officers disciplined" (Assistant Professor 10 Oct. 2014). The CLEEN Foundation notes that "citizens do not usually trust internal administrative review procedures maintained by police" due to perceptions that:

  1. police commandants do not diligently investigate complaints;
  2. solidarity between officers, and rank and file inhibits effective investigation;
  3. administrative review mechanisms within the police are opaque and lack transparency;
  4. the standard of proof used by the police authority is subjective and favours police officers accused of wrongdoing;
  5. complainants are intimidated by police officers, and
  6. complainants are not adequately informed about how their complaints are being processed, and of the final decisions. (CLEEN 30 Apr. 2013, 9)

Sources report that police complainants have been threatened to drop complaints (NOPRIN 22 Oct. 2014; Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014). According to NOPRIN, "fear of reprisals" by police and "a tendency to cover up [for] their own are some of the major barriers people experience when trying to make a complaint against police for misconduct" (10 Oct. 2014). Similarly, "most" cases of torture by police documented by AI, in a report of cases gathers over a 10 year period, found that victims of human rights violations by the police or military were "reluctant to report" due to fear of "reprisals" (AI 18 Sept. 2014, 46). The PCC Head of Public Relations indicated that there is "palpable fear" among citizens that officers could retaliate (Nigeria 21 Oct. 2014).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Open Society Justice Initiative is an Open Society Foundations (OSF) program that uses litigation, advocacy and research to help secure legal remedies for human rights abuses and promote effective enforcement of the rule of law around the world (Open Society Justice Initiative n.d.). The Open Society Justice Initiative focuses on national criminal justice reform and anticorruption, among other issues (ibid.).

[2] CLEEN Foundation launched a website called "Stop the Bribes" which can receive reports and complaints about police conduct from the public, and which has an "inter-agency coordinating team" that includes the PSC (CLEEN Foundation 21 Oct. 2014).

References

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Amnesty International (AI). 18 September 2014. 'Welcome to Hell Fire': Torture and Other Ill-treatment in Nigeria. [Accessed 10 Oct. 2014]

Assistant Professor, University of Alberta. 10 October 2014. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Bloomberg. 11 January 2013. Elisha Bala-Gbogbo. "Nigeria Police Adopt Code of Conduct to Tackle Abuses." [Accessed 19 Oct. 2014]

Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria (CSO Panel). September 2012. Final Report. [Accessed 10 Oct. 2014]

CLEEN Foundation. 30 October 2014. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

CLEEN Foundation. 21 October 2014. Correspondence from the Executive Director to the Research Directorate.

CLEEN Foundation. 30 April 2013. External Police Accountability and the Police Service Commission. Conference Proceedings. [Accessed 10 Oct. 2014]

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Nigeria. N.d.b. Public Complaints Commission (PCC). Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Office. "Our Mandate." [Accessed 23 Oct. 2014]

Nigerian Tribune. 9 June 2014. Sunday Ejike. "As Military, SSS Tackle NHRC Over Apo Killings." [Accessed 20 Oct. 2014]

Open Society Foundations. 25 January 2013. Stanley Ibe. "Why a New Code May Not Improve Police Conduct in Nigeria." [Accessed 19 Oct. 2014]

Open Society Justice Initiative. N.d. "Background." [Accessed 5 Nov. 2014]

Transparency International (TI). 2013. "Nigeria." Global Corruption Barometer 2013. [Accessed 14 Oct. 2014]

United States (US). 27 February 2014. "Nigeria." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. [Accessed 10 Oct. 2014]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Attempts to contact the following organizations were unsuccessful within the time constraints of this Response: Access to Justice Nigeria; Civil Liberties Organization; Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre; Justice for All Nigeria; Nigeria – High Commission in Ottawa, Legal Aid Council, Nigeria Police Force, Police Service Commission.

A Professor of Conflict Studies, University of Durham was unable to provide information within the time constraints of this Response.

Internet sites, including: Access to Justice Nigeria; BBC; Civil Liberties Organization; Civil Resource Development and Documentation Centre; Deutsche Welle; ecoi.net; Justice for All Nigeria; Lagos State; Legal Defence Assistance Project; New York Times; Nigeria – High Commission in Ottawa, Legal Aid Council, National Human Rights Commission, Nigeria Police Force, Police Service Commission, Public Complaints Commission; Nigeria Police Watch; Open Society Initiative for West Africa; Stop Impunity Nigeria; Taylor and Francis Online; United States Institute for Peace; Stopthebribes.net; UN – Integrated Regional Information Networks, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Refworld, ReliefWeb; Vanguard.

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