Chapter 4. Admissibility of evidence

​​Previous | Table of contents | Next

Table of contents

  1. 4.1. Overview
  2. 4.2. Evidence from person who is the subject of the appeal
    1. 4.2.1. Admissibility of new evidence under explicit criteria of subsection 110(4)
    2. 4.2.2. Admissibility of new evidence under the Singh factors
    3. 4.2.3. Submitting evidence with the record
    4. 4.2.4. Submitting evidence post-record
    5. 4.2.5. Evidence not admitted by Refugee Protection Division
  3. 4.3. Minister's evidence
    1. 4.3.1. Disclosure of Minister's evidence
    2. 4.3.2. Limitations on the admissibility of Minister's evidence
  4. 4.4. Evidence proved during an oral hearing before the Refugee Appeal Division
  5. Notes

4. Admissibility of e​vidence

4.1. Overview

RAD appeals are to proceed without a hearing and on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD.Note 1Subsection 110(3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal (person). However, the evidence that the RAD may accept from a person on appeal is limited to evidence that meets the criteria for proposed new evidence set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA.Note 2 The person may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection.

This limitation does not apply to the Minister and therefore the Minister’s evidence does not need to be new evidence that meets the criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA to be admissible on appeal.

In deciding whether it can accept a person’s proposed new evidence, the RAD must be satisfied that the evidence meets one of the three criteria under subsection 110(4) of the IRPANote 3 and all three of the factors set out in Singh.Note 4 If the evidence does not meet one of the three criteria under subsection 110(4) there is no need to proceed to an assessment of the three Singh factors.Note 5 Alternatively, if the proposed new evidence does not meet one of the three Singh factors, it is open to the RAD to reject the proposed new evidence, solely on the basis of that Singh factor and the RAD need not assess the criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA first.Note 6

If the person submits evidence in response to evidence submitted by the Minister, subsection 110(5) of the IRPA provides that subsection 110(4) of the IRPA does not apply to the person’s evidence.Note 7

If the person submits evidence in response to a request for submissions from the RAD, the evidence must still meet the statutory requirements and factors in Singh to be admissible.Note 8

Subsection 171(a.1) of the IRPA sets out that subject to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, if a hearing is held, the RAD must give the person and the Minister the opportunity to present evidence. Therefore, the criteria for the admissibility of new evidence apply to evidence presented by a person at a RAD oral hearing as well.

The onus is on the person to show how the evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the person.Note 9

RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) requires the person to provide this information in their memorandum (see section 4.2.3 of this Chapter).

The RAD must provide reasons as to why it is accepting the proposed new evidence.Note 10 The reasons must explain how the evidence meets one of the three criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and how it satisfies all three of the Singh factors: newness, relevance, and credibility. If the RAD rejects proposed new evidence the reasons must show that the RAD considered the explanations, submissions and supporting evidence when deciding the criteria for admissibility have not been met.Note 11

UNHCR Guidelines, case law and IRB decisions are considered doctrinal or legal support and therefore should not be treated as proposed new evidence which must meet subsection 110(4) and Singh requirements when submitted to the RAD.Note 12

4.2. Evidence from person who is the subject of the appeal

4.2.1. Admissibility of new evidence under explicit criteria of subsection 110(4)

There is no room for discretion in admitting proposed new evidence that does not meet one of the criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The RAD must be satisfied the proposed new evidence meets one of the explicit criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA.Note 13 The possibility that proposed new evidence may contradict a finding by the RPD is not sufficient to bring the evidence with the parameters of subsection 110(4).Note 14 Nor is it relevant to the analysis of the explicit criteria in subsection 110(4) that the probative value and credibility of proposed new evidence be assessed.Note 15

There is an expectation that a claimant will present to the RPD all the evidence that is available prior to the rejection of the claim. An appeal to the RAD is not an opportunity for the person to present additional evidence, previously available or reasonable to expect, to address deficiencies in their case that become clear when the claim is rejected by the RPD.Note 16 New evidence is “not intended to be a tune-up procedure for the RAD.”Note 17

The onus is on the person to provide full and detailed submissions regarding how any documentary evidence the person wishes to rely on not only meets the criteria requirements of subsection 110(4), but also how that evidence relates to the appellant.Note 18

Pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, the person may only present evidence which meets one of the following criteria.

4.2.1.1. The evidence arose after the rejection of the claim

The date of the document being submitted is not necessarily determinative of whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim; one also considers the date of the events referred to within the document.Note 19

4.2.1.2. The evidence was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection of the claim

The person must show that the evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been identified and disclosed prior to the rejection of the claim.Note 20 In deciding whether the evidence was or was not reasonably available, the RAD must look at other relevant evidence, such as any accompanying affidavit from the person, and not just the proposed new evidence itself, for the explanation proffered.Note 21 Absent an explanation for a delay in presenting evidence that otherwise could have been presented before the rejection, the RAD may find the evidence does not meet subsection 110(4).Note 22 The RAD may also assess the reasonableness of the explanation offered for the delay in presenting the evidence and take into account whether a request for an adjournment was made at the RPD in the appropriate circumstances.Note 23

4.2.1.3. The person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the time of the rejection of the claim

Evidence that is available earlier may not become relevant until later in the process in ways that the person may not initially expect.Note 24 However, the issue of IFA is one that claimants should always anticipate even if not identified before the RPD hearing.Note 25 Being surprised by the outcome of the RPD hearing does not necessarily entitle the person to submit new evidence.Note 26 The fact that the person was represented by counsel at the RPD can be a factor the RAD takes into account in assessing the person’s contention that he could not have been expected to present all pertinent evidence before the time of rejection.Note 27

4.2.2. Admissibility of new evidence under the Singh factors

In addition to meeting one of the three criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, the proposed new evidence must also meet all three of the factors affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Singh; newness, relevance and credibility.Note 28 If the evidence meets all of the Singh factors it is admissible. If it fails to meet one of them, it is inadmissible.Note 29 The onus is on the person to establish that these factors are met on a balance of probabilities.Note 30

The Federal Court of Appeal in Singh reviewed the implicit factors set out in the Raza decision for the admissibility of new evidence under subsection 113(a) of the IRPANote 31 and adapted them for the RAD’s application under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The Court affirmed that proposed new evidence must meet the newness, relevance, and credibility implicit factors for admissibility at RAD, but not the materiality factor, which is applicable only to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA.Note 32

4.2.2.1. Newness

This Raza factor, adopted in Singh, asks if the evidence is new in the sense that it is capable of:

  1. proving the current state of affairs in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the hearing in the RPD; or
  2. proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing; or
  3. ​contradicting a finding of fact made by the RPD (including a credibility finding)Note 33

As previously discussed in section 4.2.1.1 of this chapter, a document’s newness is not determined solely by the date on which that document was authored; what is important is the date of the event or circumstance that the document seeks to prove.Note 34 When the evidence within a document is mixed, in the sense that some is new and some is repetitive of that found on the Record, the document will meet the newness factor if the new portion, for example, proves a current state of affairs or contradicts a central finding of fact by the RPD.Note 35 It is worth noting that the newness component of Singh is somewhat redundant and does not really add to the explicit requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA.Note 36

4.2.2.2. Relevance

This Raza factor, adopted in Singh, asks if the evidence is relevant in the sense that it is capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection. In the context of a RAD appeal, it has been interpreted to mean whether the proposed new evidence is relevant to determinative issues in the appeal at the RAD.Note 37 The person should explain in the memorandum how the proposed new evidence is relevant to the appeal. RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) requires the person to explain how the evidence relates to them and a lack of explanation may lead to the evidence being dismissed as irrelevant.Note 38 However, where the proposed new evidence is clearly related to allegations that are central elements in the refugee claim, the RAD must address why the new evidence would be incapable of proving or disproving the allegation.Note 39 For example, where credibility was an issue at the RPD, a psychological report may not be relevant if it does not provide any specific information on how the person’s condition could have affected his testimony.Note 40

4.2.2.3. Credibility

This Raza factor, adopted in Singh, asks if the evidence is credible considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence. Credibility may be assessed by an examination of the form and content of the proposed new evidence, by comparing the content of the proposed new evidence to other evidence on the record, and by sufficient evidence to establish credibly how the evidence came into being.Note 41 The source of a document cannot be found not credible solely on the basis that the person who asked for the document was found to be generally not credible.Note 42 Suspicious or fortuitous timing with respect to the production of the proposed new evidence may, in limited circumstances, support a finding that it is not credible.Note 43

The RAD is not required to hold a hearing to assess the credibility of proposed new evidence. It is when otherwise credible admitted evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the general credibility of the person that a hearing may be held.Note 44 Similarly, the RAD is not necessarily required to give notice to the person that the credibility of proposed new evidence is at issue and to provide them with an opportunity to respond to the RAD’s concerns about the evidence.Note 45 A credibility finding on the admissibility of new evidence is not equivalent to a credibility assessment of the person.Note 46 The RAD may admit new evidence that meets the “source and circumstance” credibility threshold and still give it little or no weight when assessing its credibility and probative value within the context of all the evidence in deciding the appeal.Note 47

4.2.3. Submitting evidence with the record

Proposed new evidence must be submitted by the person with the appellant’s record or reply record (or in the case of a Minister’s appeal, with the respondent’s record). RAD Rule 3(3)(d)(i) sets out that the person must within the appellant’s record provide the RAD with a written statement indicating whether the appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) requires full and detailed submissions in the appellant’s memorandum indicating how the proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4). See Chapter 1: Introduction to the RAD for a detailed discussion of the rules on submitting new evidence in the respondent’s record or the reply record.

The full and detailed submissions required by RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) form the basis upon which the RAD decides if the criteria in subsection 110(4) are met.Note 48 In the absence of these submissions, it may be impossible for the RAD to determine whether the requirements of subsection 110(4) are met.Note 49 Where there is an explanation provided for the lateness of the proposed new evidence in an affidavit submitted with the proposed new evidence, the RAD may err if it rejects the proposed new evidence on the sole basis that the person failed to provide full and detailed submissions concerning subsection 110(4) in their memorandum.Note 50

The explanation given for the submission of proposed new evidence may be based on an allegation of counsel incompetence at the RPD hearing.Note 51 The RAD will have to consider, as part of its assessment of the admissibility of the evidence, the allegations made against counsel and consider both sides of the arguments if the allegations are contested.Note 52

4.2.4. Submitting evidence post-record

If the proposed new evidence was not submitted with the appellant’s record or reply record (or in the case of a Minister’s appeal, with the respondent’s record), the requirements of RAD Rule 29 must first be met before the evidence may be assessed for admissibility under subsection 110(4). RAD Rule 29 sets out the procedure to be followed. In order for the person to use the proposed new evidence RAD Rule 29 (2) requires that an application be made in accordance with RAD Rule 37.Note 53RAD Rule 29(3) requires the person to include in the application an explanation of how the documents meet the requirements of subsection 110(4). If the documents are being presented by the person in response to evidence presented by the Minister, the evidence does not have to meet the criteria in subsection 110(4).Note 54

Additionally, RAD Rule 29(4) sets out the factors which the RAD must consider in deciding whether to allow the application; the document’s relevance and probative value; any new evidence the document brings to the appeal; and whether the person, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document or written submissions with the relevant record. While the list of factors enumerated in RAD Rule 29(4) is not exhaustive, the use of the word “including” before the list of factors indicates the intent that each of the three factors must be considered by the RAD in deciding whether to allow the application.Note 55 The RAD must consider the relevance and probative value of a document even when it is not satisfied as to why the document was not submitted at the time of perfection.Note 56 A failure to do so will render the RAD’s decision unreasonable.Note 57 If the proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Rule 29, the RAD then proceeds to assess the admissibility of the evidence under subsection 110(4) and the Singh factors.

4.2.5. Evidence not admitted by Refugee Protection Division

Evidence submitted to the RPD during or after the hearing but which is not accepted by the RPD does not become part of the RPD Record.Note 58 If a person wishes to rely upon such evidence on appeal, the person must follow RAD Rule 3(3)(c), which allows an appellant to include in the appellant’s record any documents that the RPD refused to accept as evidence which the appellant now wishes to rely upon in the appeal. The RAD must consider the reasons the documents were rejected for admission by the RPD and decide if the RPD erred in refusing to admit the documents.Note 59 These documents are not proposed new evidence and do not have to meet the criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the Singh factors.Note 60

4.3. Minister's evidence

4.3.1. Disclosure of Minister's evidence

Pursuant to the RAD Rules, when the Minister intervenes in an appeal, they must show they have provided, first to the person and then to the RAD, a written notice of intervention together with any documentary evidence they wish to rely upon.Note 61 The notice of intervention must indicate the relevance of any documentary evidence provided under subsection 110(3) of the IRPA that the Minister wishes to rely upon (i.e. evidence that is not contained in the RPD record).Note 62

There are similar requirements pursuant to the RAD Rules when the Minister is the appellant. To perfect an appeal, the Minister must show they have provided, first to the person and then to the RAD, any supporting documents they wish to rely upon.Note 63 The appellant’s record must include a written statement indicating the relevance of any documentary evidence they have provided under subsection 110(3) of the IRPA.Note 64 It must also include any documents the RPD refused to accept as evidence, during or after the RPD hearing, if the Minister wants to rely on those documents in the appeal.Note 65

However, the above requirements do not preclude the Minister from submitting new evidence at a later stage in a proceeding. To the contrary, paragraph 171(a.5) of the IRPA provides that the Minister may submit further documentary evidence and written submissions at any time before the RAD makes a decision.Note 66 In all cases, the Minister must show they have provided any further documentary evidence or submissions first to the person and then to the RAD.Note 67 As the Minister can submit evidence at any time before the RAD makes a decision, the requirements of RAD Rules 29(1) through (4) do not apply.

4.3.2. Limitations on the admissibility of Minister's evidence

Further documentary evidence provided by the Minister under subsection 110(3) of the IRPA is not required to satisfy any of the admissibility criteria set out in subsection 110(4), as those criteria are expressly limited in application to the person.Note 68 However, as is the case with all evidence, the Minister’s new documentary evidence must be considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances in order for the RAD to receive and base a decision upon it.Note 69

Like the person, the Minister may submit further evidence in response to a request by the RAD (e.g., where the RAD wishes to raise a new issue and provides the parties with an opportunity to respond). Again, such evidence is not subject to the criteria for admissibility set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA or RAD Rules 29(1) through (4).

4.4. Evidence provided during an oral hearing before the Refugee Appeal Division

The RAD may convene an oral hearing in certain circumstances where it has admitted new documentary evidence that was provided by the person or the Minister.Note 70 As clarified by paragraph 171(a.1) of the IRPA, documentary evidence provided by the person during an oral hearing is still subject to the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA unless it was provided in response to evidence presented by the Minister.Note 71 Furthermore, a person seeking to present documentary evidence after an appeal is perfected will be required to bring an application under RAD Rule 29(2) of the RAD Rules. Note that, as discussed in section 4.3.2 above, documentary evidence provided by the Minister is not subject to the requirements of either subsection 110(4) of the IRPA or RAD Rules 29(1) through (4).

Notes

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(3): Subject to subsections (3.1), (4) and (6), the Refugee Appeal Division must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division, and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal and, in the case of a matter that is conducted before a panel of three members, written submissions from a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and any other person described in the rules of the Board.

Return to note 1 referrer

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(4).

Return to note 2 referrer

Olowolaiyemo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 895, paragraph 19 (CanLII) states that given the use of the word “or”, the factors set out in Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(4) are disjunctive.

Return to note 3 referrer

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraphs 34–35, 38–49, 64 (CanLII). In Singh, the Raza factors were modified for application at the RAD so that there are three factors to apply: newness, relevance, and credibility. All three factors must be met. See also Dugarte de Lopez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 707, paragraphs 18–19 (CanLII).

Return to note 4 referrer

Okunowo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 175, paragraph 41 (CanLII); Idumonza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 80, paragraph 19 (CanLII).

Return to note 5 referrer

Mavangou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 177, paragraph 33 (CanLII).

Return to note 6 referrer

Immigration Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(5): Subsection (4) does not apply in respect of evidence that is presented in response to evidence presented by the Minister.

Return to note 7 referrer

Karas v.Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1205, paragraph 46 (CanLII). Mohamed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 55 (CanLII). In Popoola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 6, paragraph 32 (CanLII) the court notes that an invitation by the RAD for further submission is not an undertaking that any evidence would be accepted regardless of whether it meets the statutory requirements.

Return to note 8 referrer

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 34–38 (CanLII). Iribhogbe v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 501, paragraphs 17,18, 25 (CanLII).

Return to note 9 referrer

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Davoodabadi, 2019 FC 350, paragraph 34 (CanLII).  

Return to note 10 referrer

In Salama v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1348 (CanLII), the RAD unreasonably refused to admit the appellant’s Twitter posts as new evidence due to credibility concerns about authorship. The RAD failed to address the appellant’s affidavit which affirmed that he was the author of the posts. In Ferko v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1357 (CanLII), the appellant submitted his own affidavit in which he disclosed for the first time that he was sexually assaulted as a teen. He also explained in the affidavit that he had never disclosed the assault because of shame and that his mother and sister were present at the RPD hearing and he was too ashamed to reveal the incident in their presence. The RAD did not admit the affidavit as new evidence because it found that no argument was made under Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) as to its admissibility. The Court found the RAD erred in rejecting the new evidence in the affidavit without considering the explanations that were also contained in the affidavit.  In Bahredar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1577, paragraph 22 (CanLII), the appellant tendered new evidence on state protection and alleged counsel incompetence for the failure to submit this evidence at the RPD. The RAD found no counsel incompetence and on that basis found the evidence did not meet the relevance test in Singh. The Court found the RAD erred when it isolated the new evidence to its consideration of counsel’s incompetence and did not consider the ultimate purpose that the documents were submitted for, namely, the inadequacy of state protection, despite the Applicant’s written arguments stating so.

Return to note 11 referrer

Osemwenkae v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 503, paragraph 7 (CanLII).

Return to note 12 referrer

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 35 (CanLII). In Denis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1182, paragraph 63 (CanLII) the Court noted that “It is true that the RAD cannot go beyond the three explicit conditions for admitting new evidence provided under subsection 110(4) of the Act. Singh clearly held that these three conditions are exhaustive. However, in reading the subsection itself, one cannot say that the RAD is entirely without discretion in assessing the admissibility of new evidence within the confines of those three conditions themselves, without importing additional considerations that parliament did not intend to grant the RAD jurisdiction to consider. Granted, the first two conditions, newness and reasonable availability, appear to be relatively objective and confer little if any discretion upon the RAD. However, the third condition, whether the applicant could have reasonably been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the time the RPD rejected the refugee claim, is clearly quite broad and entails a certain degree of inherent discretion in its application.”

Return to note 13 referrer

Arafa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 6, paragraph 43 (CanLII). See also Nteta-Tshamala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1191, paragraph 25 and 29 (CanLII), where the Court asked counsel for the applicant to send the original of the warrant (which had not been admitted as new evidence by the RAD) and the Court noted that even if it assumed the document is authentic, it was publicly accessible and could have been obtained prior to the rejection.

Return to note 14 referrer

Figueroa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 521, paragraph 45 (CanLII). In Ilias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 661, paragraph 33 (CanLII), the applicant’s submissions focussed on the importance of the proposed new evidence but did not explain how the proposed new evidence met the statutory test. Without information regarding dates on which the evidence became available or how it came to his attention it was impossible for the RAD to determine whether the requirements of Immigration Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(4) were met.

Return to note 15 referrer

Muwenda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 502, paragraph 14 (CanLII).

Return to note 16 referrer

Abdullahi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 260, paragraph 14 (CanLII).

Return to note 17 referrer

Tiodunmo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1489, paragraph 15 (CanLII).

Return to note 18 referrer

Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, paragraph 16 (CanLII); Galamb v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1230, paragraphs 15–21 (CanLII); Ilias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 661, paragraph 35 (CanLII); Mavangou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 177, paragraph 26 (CanLII); Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Davoodabadi, 2019 FC 350, paragraph 32, CanLII).

Return to note 19 referrer

Figueroa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 521, paragraph 23 (CanLII). In Paranych v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 891, paragraph 26 (CanLII) the Court upheld the RAD’s refusal to admit documents the appellant said he did not receive until after the hearing. The Court noted that the claim was rejected three months after the hearing and the person did not explain why the documents could not have been submitted prior to rejection. In Gabane v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 735, paragraphs 13-16 (CanLII), the RPD relied on specialized knowledge during the hearing and gave the applicant an opportunity to respond. The claim was rejected the next day.  The applicant argued the RAD should have allowed new evidence on this issue since he had little opportunity to respond. The Court noted that there was nothing preventing the applicant from requesting an opportunity to provide post-hearing submissions which he did not do and therefore found the RAD’s refusal to admit the new evidence reasonable.  

Return to note 20 referrer

Manan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 150, paragraph 31 (CanLII). In Ambrose–Esede v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1241, paragraphs 36–38 (CanLII), the Court found the RAD erred when it did not accept the affidavit of a friend and business partner of the agent of harm on the basis that it was reasonably available prior to the rejection. The affiant had explained that he did not provide the affidavit earlier because he did not want his friend and business associate to regard him as an enemy but when the claim was rejected, he realized the applicants’ lives were in danger and he changed his mind and came forward with the affidavit. In Fardusi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1568,​ paragraph 22 (CanLII), the Court found that it was unreasonable for the RAD to conclude the information in a Custody Application was reasonably available to the applicant at the time of rejection when she would have had to ask her husband, who was the agent of persecution, for that information. 

Return to note 21 referrer

Abdi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 54, paragraph 25 (CanLII), where the appellant’s submissions did not explain the reason for the delay in submitting evidence before the rejection of the claim, it was reasonable for the RAD to determine that the evidence did not fall within the parameters of Immigration Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(4). See also Ali v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1166, paragraph 30 (CanLII).

Return to note 22 referrer

In Nteta-Tshamala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1191, paragraphs 27–28 (CanLII), the applicant cited difficulties in communicating with an editor in a foreign country for the delay in her ability to obtain a wanted notice that appeared in a newspaper. However, she did not outline steps taken to obtain the notice and it was reasonable for the RAD to conclude she did not make sufficient efforts. In Mulugeta v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1436, paragraphs 15-20 (CanLII), the RAD did not admit a legal opinion from an Italian law firm on the basis that it was reasonably available prior to the rejection. The RAD did not find it credible that the appellant could not have communicated with the law firm by phone or other means during the COVID restrictions.  The Court found the RAD’s reasoning sound.  The Court also noted that “an applicant who is seeking evidence to support his claim before the RPD must show he did everything to obtain it prior to the RPD adjudication including a request for an adjournment where circumstances require a delay”.

Return to note 23 referrer

In Isugi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1421, paragraphs 37–38 (CanLII), the RAD erred by rejecting e-mails on the basis that counsel failed to provide detailed submissions as to why the applicants could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the time of the rejection of their claim. The emails provide a good and logical explanation as to why the applicants’ visa applications were completed at two different dates. The applicants could not reasonably have expected, when they filed their refugee claim, that their credibility would be impugned by the fact that their visa applications were filed at two different dates. In Arafa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 6, paragraph 40 (CanLII), the Court found the RAD erred in not accepting the applicants’ arguments of the mother’s difficulties in assembling the additional documents and forwarding them to the applicants in Canada. The mother may have assumed that the birth certificates were obvious and sufficient identity documents and she required further prompting and time to find and send the remainder of the identity documents. Muwenda v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC 502, paragraph 14 (CanLII) the Court found that the applicant could not reasonably have expected the RPD to reject a medical report on the basis of spelling errors. Therefore, the applicant could not reasonably have been expected to know he would need additional evidence to explain the spelling errors.

Return to note 24 referrer

In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Aregbesola, 2022 FC 820, paragraphs 9-14 (CanLII), the Court noted that the applicants could have anticipated the determinative issue of IFA and the RAD erred by admitting the evidence on the basis that they were not notified in advance of the hearing and the decision was rendered quickly. There was no obligation on the RPD to raise the IFA issue before the hearing.  See also Oyiborhoro v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 675, paragraph 19 (CanLII). In Olori v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1308, paragraphs 25–27 (CanLII), the Court rejected the argument that since IFA was only identified at the hearing, evidence related to the viability of an IFA could not have been reasonably expected until after the RPD decision.

Return to note 25 referrer

Adigun v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 649, paragraph 32 (CanLII).

Return to note 26 referrer

In Zerihaymanot v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 610, paragraphs 18-19 (CanLII), the applicant argued at the RAD that he could not have been expected to present additional identity documents at the RPD before his claim was refused. The RAD rejected the argument concluding that he should have known the need for documents given his legal representation, the BOC form, and the identification of the issue at the hearing.  The Court found this was reasonable and the applicant was not being put in a worse position because he was represented by counsel.

Return to note 27 referrer

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96 (CanLII); Mavangou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 177, paragraphs 22–25 (CanLII).

Return to note 28 referrer

Mavangou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 177, paragraph 33 (CanLII).

Return to note 29 referrer

Agazuma v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 696, paragraphs 26–27 (CanLII).

Return to note 30 referrer

Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, paragraph 13 (CanLII):

  1. Credibility: Is the evidence credible, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence? If not, the evidence need not be considered.
  2. Relevance: Is the evidence relevant to the PRRA application, in the sense that it is capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection? If not, the evidence need not be considered.
  3. Newness: Is the evidence new in the sense that it is capable of:
    1. proving the current state of affairs in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the hearing in the RPD; or
    2. proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing; or
    3. contradicting a finding of fact made by the RPD (including a credibility finding)?
    If not, the evidence need not be considered.
  4. Materiality: If the evidence is material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been made available to RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered.

Return to note 31 referrer

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraphs 47–49 (CanLII). Note that a number of post-Singh cases, in obiter, have continued to reference materiality Ifogah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1139, paragraph 43 (CanLII), Thorne v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 790, paragraph 8 (CanLII), Dugarte de Lopez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 707, paragraph 19 CanLII).

Return to note 32 referrer

Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, paragraph 13 (CanLII), as cited in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 38 (CanLII).

Return to note 33 referrer

Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, paragraph 16 (CanLII);Marku v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 991, paragraph 29 (CanLII); Idriss v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 540, paragraph 65 (CanLII).

Return to note 34 referrer

Gomez Guzman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 152, paragraphs 32–34 (CanLII).

Return to note 35 referrer

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 46 (CanLII); Dugarte de Lopez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 707, paragraph 19 (CanLII).

Return to note 36 referrer

Shodunke v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 261, paragraph 10 (CanLII); Ifogah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1139, paragraph 46 (CanLII); Benavides v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 43, paragraphs 51–52 (CanLII); Oyiborhoro v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 675, paragraph 37 (CanLII) .

Return to note 37 referrer

Lin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1175, paragraphs 15–16 (CanLII). In Lin, the applicant argued that the RAD erred in refusing to admit some of his proposed new evidence on the basis that it was irrelevant. The Court rejected the argument, noting that under RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii), the applicant had to explain how the new evidence related to him and that he had failed to do so in his submission to the RAD, which only said: “this new evidence and the evidence introduced above further corroborates the claim and adds credibility to the evidence that the Board member previously rejected”.

Return to note 38 referrer

Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 438, paragraph 34 (CanLII). In this case the documents related to central elements of the applicant’s claim but were rejected based on an absence of a link between the new evidence and the Taliban (agent of harm). The Court found the RAD erred by not explaining how the new evidence was incapable of proving Mr. Khan’s alleged fear of the Taliban. In Mupati v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1118, paragraph 12 (CanLII), the proposed new evidence addressed threats posed by the police and the agent of harm and the RAD’s reasons did not explain how the new evidence could be deemed irrelevant with respect to the applicant’s refugee claim. 

Return to note 39 referrer

Asim v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 517, paragraph 19 (CanLII). Also, in Oyiborhoro v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 675, paragraphs 33–37 (CanLII), the RAD identified credibility as the determinative issue on appeal and refused to admit new evidence on IFA which was the determinative issue at the RPD. The applicant did not elaborate on how the evidence was relevant to the credibility findings of the RAD. The Court held that the RAD did not err in refusing to admit materials that had no bearing on what it identified as the determinative issue on appeal.

Return to note 40 referrer

In Marquez Obando v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 441, paragraph 20 (CanLII), the applicant had argued the RAD erred by examining the documents for reasons that go far beyond an assessment of their source and the circumstances in which they came into existence. The Court stated that Raza and Singh do not limit the scope of the credibility analysis to source and circumstance and the RAD can consider other questions related to credibility.  In Okpugo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 772 (CanLII), a letter dated 2018 was rejected because the appellant had testified that she had no direct contact with the author, who was in hiding since 2017, and she provided no information as to how and when the letter was received. In Tan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1204 (CanLII), the RAD did not admit the proposed new evidence because it was vague, lacking in detail, and suspicious with respect to timing. In Tahir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1202 (CanLII) , the RAD refused to admit a warrant and summons as new evidence because of inconsistencies, and implausibility with other evidence. In Belek v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 196 (CanLII), the RAD did not admit a witness affidavit, a letter and hospitalization documents due to internal inconsistencies and irregularities and contradictions with parts of the applicant’s affidavit. In Wu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 779 (CanLII), the RAD did not admit a summons on the basis that it was implausible a non-coercive summons would be issued given the allegation that the authorities had arrested others and pursued the applicants. Similarly in Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 877 (CanLII), the RAD rejected a summons based on its implausibility as a non-coercive summons, its suspicious timing (issued 2 weeks after the rejection by the RPD) and that it was structurally inconsistent with the documentary evidence and fraudulent documents are widespread in that country. In Onyeawuna v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1214 (CanLII), the RAD rejected letters due to intrinsic credibility problems in the letters and the circumstances of their creation were implausible. In Paranych v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 891, paragraph 27 (CanLII), the RAD rejected the new evidence because the incidents mentioned therein were never mentioned in the applicant’s Basis of claim narrative or testimony at the RPD hearing. Similarly, in Atolagbe v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 868, paragraph 20 (CanLII), the RAD rejected the new evidence because it mentioned an agent of harm who was not mentioned at all by the applicants at the RPD hearing.

Return to note 41 referrer

Abdi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 906, paragraphs 16–17 (CanLII). Similarly, in Osman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1048 (CanLII), the Court held that the RAD cannot reject, as not credible, a witness affidavit supporting the person based on credibility concerns linked to a different witness. However, in Idugboe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 334, paragraphs 29–30 (CanLII), the Court found it was reasonable for the RAD to find an email submitted by the applicant’s brother to lack credibility as to its source because of credibility problems with that brother’s earlier affidavit. In Pilashvili v. Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 706, paragraphs 24, 27 (CanLII), the RAD erred when it relied on “circular reasoning” to find the content of the new evidence not credible based on its finding that the appellant’s allegations were not credible. The RAD did not engage in any analysis of the letters.

Return to note 42 referrer

In Siffort v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 351 (CanLII), the Court held that the suspicious timing upon which the RAD rejected the proposed new evidence was in fact based on misconstrued evidence and the RAD ought to have admitted the proposed new evidence and then assessed its credibility, convening an oral hearing if necessary. In Ambrose–Esede v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1241 (CanLII), the Court found that the RAD erred in rejecting an affidavit as too fortuitous on the basis of the affiant’s claim to have decided to help the applicant only after their claim was rejected. However, in Tuncdemir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 993, paragraph 37 (CanLII), the Court found that it was reasonable for the RAD to find it not credible that the applicant met the affiant at the exact time as their RPD claim had been rejected. Similarly, inIdugboe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 334, paragraphs 22 and 25 (CanLII), the RAD had found it “too fortuitous to be true” that within two weeks of receipt of the RPD’s decision a cluster of events happened. The Court found the RAD’s finding to be reasonable as it was based on the suspicious timing of a rash of threats allegedly arising immediately after the RPD had relied on the absence of threats from the family for a period of four years.

Return to note 43 referrer

A.B. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 61, paragraph 17 (CanLII). In Tan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1204, paragraphs 35–36 (CanLII), the RAD admitted the proposed new evidence as it was credible enough to meet the Singh requirement but gave it no weight. The Court agreed that here was no requirement to hold a hearing as the letter did not invoke further concerns about the applicant’s credibility.

Return to note 44 referrer

Rehman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 783, paragraphs 41, 48 (CanLII); Uddin v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 117, paragraph 14 (CanLII). See section 3.5.1 of Chapter 3: New Issues for a discussion of further cases in which the RAD was found not to have raised a new issue in assessing the admissibility of new evidence. But see section 3.5.2 of that chapter for a discussion of cases in which he RAD was found to have raised a new issue in assessing the admissibility of new evidence.

Return to note 45 referrer

A.B. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 61, paragraph 17 (CanLII).

Return to note 46 referrer

In Ajaguna v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 556 (CanLII), the RAD admitted evidence because it met the threshold of “source and circumstance” in Singh, but still gave it low weight in determining the merits of the appeal. At paragraph 6 the Court stated that, “there is nothing inherently illogical or inconsistent when a decision-maker admits new evidence because of its potential to affect the outcome of a case but ultimately finds it to be unreliable when examined closely against other received evidence.” Similarly in Tan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1204, paragraphs 35-36 (CanLII), the proposed new evidence was a letter from the applicant’s father which was vague and also suspicious as to its timing (in that the events referred to in the letter happened at the same time the applicant asked to submit additional evidence). The RAD found the evidence credible enough to meet the Singh requirement but gave it no weight. The Court stated at paragraph 36 that, “A document may be reliable and trustworthy to warrant admission, and yet incapable of proving the facts for which it is tendered due to a lack of probative value of its contents.” See also Tahir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1202 (CanLII), where the RAD refused to admit into evidence a warrant and summons because they did not meet the Singh credibility requirement. The Court stated that the RAD’s authenticity concerns about the warrant and the summons did not trigger a requirement to hold an oral hearing. However, in Gbemudu v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 451 (CanLII), the Court found the RAD erred when it did not admit the applicant’s brother’s affidavit on the basis of internal credibility problems and noted that some of the problems with the new evidence might have been resolved by giving the applicant an opportunity to address the credibility concerns.

Return to note 47 referrer

In Agazuma v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 696, paragraph 27 (CanLII), the Court notes that the applicants have the onus to establish the satisfaction of the subsection 110(4) criteria on a balance of probabilities. It was reasonable for the RAD to have found that the submissions were not full and detailed as the applicants did not specify the evidence to which their arguments pertained. See also Tiodunmo v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1489, paragraph 15 (CanLII), where the applicants failed to provide any substantive submissions on how the evidence meets subsection 110(4) or how it relates to the person. In Abdulrahman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 821, paragraphs 11–12 (CanLII), there was no information in the legal assistant’s affidavit explaining how or why the documents listed in the affidavit were submitted to the RAD as new evidence and there was also no affidavit from the applicant explaining why the documents were being submitted as new evidence. The Court notes it is incumbent on the applicant to comply with Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 3(3)(g)(iii) to make full and detailed submission regarding how proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how the evidence relates to the person.

Return to note 48 referrer

Ilias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 661, paragraph 33 (CanLII). In X (Re), 2017 CanLII 144899 (RAD), paragraphs 10–14 the RAD did not accept proposed new evidence on the basis of non-compliance with Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 3(3)(g)(iii).

Return to note 49 referrer

Isugi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1421, paragraphs 37–38 (CanLII), the RAD was wrong in rejecting e-mails on the sole basis that counsel failed to provide detailed submissions as to why the applicants could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented this evidence at the time of rejection as the e-mails provide a good and logical explanation.

Return to note 50 referrer

In Sayegh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 795, paragraphs 52–55 (CanLII), the applicants argued that they could not have reasonably adduced the proposed new evidence before the RPD because they were not properly advised by their then counsel as to the evidence that would be required to establish their claim. The RAD rejected the proposed new evidence on the basis that the applicants had deliberately not followed the Practice Notice: Allegations Against Former Counsel, August 27, 2018 which would give counsel the opportunity to respond to allegations. The Court held the RAD decision not to accept the new evidence was reasonable. In Ruiz–Lopez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 390, paragraphs 56–62 (CanLII), the RAD accepted as new evidence a bundle of three letters that the applicant said should have been provided to the RPD but, due to incompetent counsel, was not. The RAD also accepted as new evidence two affidavits that were sworn after the RPD hearing as they were probative to the allegations of counsel incompetence. See also Armando v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 94, paragraph 18 (CanLII). See section 8.4 of Chapter 8: Common Natural Justice Issues at the RAD for a further discussion of the case law on allegations of counsel incompetence.

Return to note 51 referrer

In Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1145, paragraphs 24 and 36 (CanLII) the applicant argued that the proposed new evidence was not reasonably available due to inadequate advice from his former counsel. The allegation of incompetence was disputed by former counsel. The Court found the RAD erred by not adequately addressing the evidence presented by each party with respect to the issue of representation.  

Return to note 52 referrer

See Chapter 1 Introduction to the RAD for procedures under Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 37.

Return to note 53 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR2012-257, rules 29(3) and (4):

  1. The person who is the subject of the appeal must include in an application to use a document that was not previously provided an explanation of how the document meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Act and how that evidence relates to the person, unless the document is being presented in response to evidence presented by the Minister.
  2. In deciding whether to allow an application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including
    1. the document’s relevance and probative value;
    2. any new evidence the document brings to the appeal; and
    3. whether the person who is the subject of the appeal, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document or written submissions with the appellant’s record, respondent’s record or reply record.

Return to note 54 referrer

Arisekola v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 275, paragraphs 11–12 (CanLII).

Return to note 55 referrer

In Semykina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 249, paragraphs 26–28 (CanLII), the Court found the RAD had erred by relying solely on the factor in Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 29(4)(c) and not assessing the other factors set out in Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 29(4). In Shroub v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 34, paragraphs 22–25 (CanLII), the Court set out that the RAD must consider the three factors set out in Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 29(4) and in this case the RAD failed to assess the probative value of the evidence.  

Return to note 56 referrer

Shroub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 34, paragraphs 23–24 and 26 (CanLII). Note that in Arisekola v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 275, paragraphs 11–14 (CanLII), the Court found that it was a breach of procedural fairness for the RAD to fail to consider the relevance and probative value of the documents.

Return to note 57 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 3(3)(c). Also see Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012/257, rule 21(3)(c).

Return to note 58 referrer

Tahir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1202, paragraphs 12, 18–19 (CanLII). See also Aytac v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 195, paragraphs 44–47 (CanLII), where the Court agreed that in assessing post-hearing documents that the RPD had rejected, the RAD correctly looked to the Rule 43 factors that the RPD considered in its decision not to admit the evidence. However, the RAD failed to properly consider the probative value of the rejected documents, in its review of the RPD’s decision to reject the documents, and so the RAD decision not to admit them was unreasonable.

Return to note 59 referrer

In X (Re), 2020 CanLII 116211 (RAD), paragraphs 6–7, the RAD found that the RPD had erred in not admitting cell phone records at the time of the RPD hearing and because the records fall under RAD Rule 3(3)(c) they are not new evidence under the meaning of subsection 110(4) and are not subject to further admissibility tests. See also X (Re), ​2019 CanLII 1323324 (RAD), paragraph 19. Tahir v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1201, paragraphs 12, 18–19 (CanLII).

Return to note 60 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rules 4(1) and 4(5). See section 1.4.2.2 of Chapter 1: Overview for a detailed discussion of the requirements applicable to a Minister’s intervention.

Return to note 61 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 4(2)(d).

Return to note 62 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rules 9(1) and 9(4). See section 1.4.3 of Chapter 1: Introduction to the RAD for a detailed discussion of the requirements applicable to appeals made by the Minister.

Return to note 63 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 9(2)(d)(i).

Return to note 64 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rule 9(2)(c).

Return to note 65 referrer

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(3) and Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 171(a.5).

Return to note 66 referrer

Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, rules 29(5) and 29(6).

Return to note 67 referrer

X (Re), 2015 CanLII 105867 (RAD), paragraph 10; X (Re), 2016 CanLII 105226 (RAD), paragraph 8; X (Re), 2016 CanLII 107906 (RAD), paragraph 7; X (Re)​, 2021 CanLII 23970 (RAD), paragraph 13.

Return to note 68 referrer

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, paragraph 171(a.3).

Return to note 69 referrer

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsections 110(3) and 110(6). See Chapter 6: Oral Hearings for further discussion of oral hearings and new evidence.

Return to note 70 referrer

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, chapter 27, subsection 110(5).

Return to note 71 referrer