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16 December 2019

BDI106384.FE

Burundi: The treatment of Tutsi, including women and youth, by the authorities and Imbonerakure members (2017-November 2019)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Treatment of Tutsi by the Authorities
1.1 Tutsi
1.1.1 Law Enforcement and Former Burundian Armed Forces (Ex-FAB)

Sources refer to a [International Crisis Group English version] “purg[e]” or “clean-up” of political opponents within the Burundian Armed Forces [Forces armées du Burundi, FAB] between 2015 and 2017 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 3, 9, 34; International Crisis Group 5 Apr. 2017, i). Some sources report that targets of this clean-up included Tutsi officers or soldiers (FIDH and Ligue Iteka June 2017, 11; International Crisis Group 5 Apr. 2017, i). According to sources, the “ex-FAB” [1], [referring to former members of the FAB, the majority of whom were Tutsis (UN 29 Sept. 2017, 61)], were specifically targeted (International Crisis Group 5 Apr. 2017, i, 3; FIDH and Ligue Iteka 9 Feb. 2017). The UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi explains that [translation] “[t]he Burundian army found itself deeply divided after the attempted coup in May 2015” [in which part of the army, opposed to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term, attempted to overthrow him (Freedom House 2019)] and that “this led to marginalization of the ex-FAB and their subjection to acts of violence and human rights violations” (UN 29 Sept. 2017, 61). The International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme, FIDH) and the Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka, or Ligue Iteka [2], report in a press release published in February 2017 that [translation] “since the beginning of the crisis in Burundi, several dozen ex-FAB have been arrested, detained and tortured, and some have disappeared or been executed” and that “the authorities target them because of their Tutsi ethnicity and the perception that they are opposed to Pierre Nkurunziza’s regime and his loyal forces” (FIDH and Ligue Iteka 9 Feb. 2017). The annual reports of the Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues, APRODH) [3] also refer to around 10 arrests and kidnappings of ex-FAB in 2017 and 2018, for which law enforcement is suspected of being responsible (APRODH Jan. 2019, 44, 47, 52; APRODH Jan. 2018, 22, 24, 31, 33). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

1.1.2 Speech and Remarks Made by the Authorities

Sources indicate that the Burundian government authorities use “ethnically divisive rhetoric” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 37) or [translation] “rhetoric ... aimed at manipulating the feeling of ethnic belonging” (UN 29 Sept. 2017, para. 700). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a risk and conflict analysis researcher from the French Institute of International Relations (Institut français des relations internationales, IFRI) [4] whose areas of interest include Burundi, speaking from his own perspective, noted that, during an election period, the regime wages [translation] “campaigns of intimidation” by describing political opponents, including the Tutsi, as “people to be eliminated” in order to “terrorize” and “silence” them (Researcher 25 Nov. 2019).

In addition, according to International Crisis Group, the Burundian government is engaging in

[International Crisis Group English version]

… “ethnicisation from above,” wherein the country’s troubles are laid at the door of individuals of Tutsi ethnicity (such as Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame or former president Pierre Buyoya) in association with others (the United Nations Commission of Enquiry, the European Union, the International Criminal Court and the AU [African Union]) who speak out against abuses. (International Crisis Group 21 May 2018)

Sources report that, in November 2018, international arrest warrants were issued against former President Pierre Buyoya and 16 other military and civilian officials [who were Tutsi (UN 12 Mar. 2019, para. 35)] in connection with the assassination of the president [who was Hutu (UN 12 Mar. 2019, para. 35)], Melchior Ndadaye, in 1993 (UN 12 Mar. 2019, para. 35; Jeune Afrique with AFP 2 Dec. 2018). At that time, Pierre Buyoya spoke out against a [UN English version] “political move” to divert attention from the existing political crisis (UN 12 Mar. 2019, para. 35; Jeune Afrique with AFP 2 Dec. 2018).

The Commission of Inquiry on Burundi also reports that insults and [translation] “hate speech” were used against the Tutsi by the authorities and members of the ruling party (UN 29 Sept. 2017, paras. 423, 488, 559, 692, 699). FIDH and the Ligue Iteka indicate that they have heard a recording of a speech in which the President of the Senate, on 7 April 2017, advocated violence against the Tutsi:

[FIDH and Ligue Iteka English version]

Notably, he called on the population to “silently pick up” ("kwegeranya mu Gbacerere", in Kirundi) the opponents. “Pick up” can be interpreted as “arrest” or “execute”. He is also said to have called to keep a close watch on people coming from the Mwaro di[st]rict (Gisozi and Rusaka), the Bururi district (Mugamba and Matana) and from the Bujumbura rural area (Mugongo, Manga [and] Mukike). These areas are seen as hostile because a majority of Tutsi live there. (FIDH and Ligue Iteka June 2017, 19, italics in original)

The Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, in a report published in September 2018, indicates that a man who had been [translation] “tortured” by police officers in July 2017 reported to the commission that the police officers had used “ethnically charged language” toward Tutsis as they beat him (UN 12 Sept. 2018, para. 347). In its September 2019 report, the same source again reports the use of ethnic slurs during acts of torture, including sexual torture, and provides examples directly pertaining to Tutsis (UN 13 Sept. 2019, para. 159, 196).

1.1.3 Ethnic Quotas

Sources report that the Arusha Agreement [which ended the civil war (International Crisis Group 20 June 2019, 2; Human Rights Watch 17 Jan. 2019)], required that quotas of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi be respected within the legislative (ISS 12 Mar. 2018; FIDH and Ligue Iteka May 2018, 8), executive and judiciary branches (FIDH and Ligue Iteka May 2018, 8). Sources also indicate that Hutus and Tutsis were to be equally represented in the army (FIDH and Ligue Iteka June 2017, 10; US 13 Mar. 2019, 10), the police and the National Intelligence Service (Service national de renseignement, SNR) (US 13 Mar. 2019, 10). The Commission of Inquiry on Burundi provides the following explanation:

[translation] For many years, the defence and security forces were dominated by the Tutsi minority, as was the political system. In response and to “achieve ethnic balance and to prevent acts of genocide and coups d’état,” the Arusha Agreement for peace and democracy in Burundi provided for ethnic parity in the Burundian national defence and police forces “[f]or a period to be determined by the Senate.” The Constitution promulgated in March 2005 approved this provision, extending the principle of parity to the ... SNR. (UN 12 Sept. 2018, para. 112)

The US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 also indicates that the purpose of these quotas was to prevent one of the two groups from having “disproportionate power that might be used against the other” (US 13 Mar. 2019, 10). According to International Crisis Group, these quotas [International Crisis Group English version] “were intended to protect the Tutsi minority” (International Crisis Group 20 June 2019, 2). The researcher stated that the government generally respects the quota system and [translation] “always appoints Tutsis to the administration” (Researcher 25 Nov. 2019). However, according to FIDH and the Ligue Iteka, [FIDH and Ligue Iteka English version] “executive, legislative and judicial powers are in large part controlled by the party in power” (FIDH and Ligue Iteka May 2018, 8). Other sources report that the ethnic balance is threatened within the security forces (International Crisis Group 5 Apr. 2017, 10; DW 4 Jan. 2017).

Sources report that a new constitution was approved by referendum in Burundi in May 2018 (Human Rights Watch 17 Jan. 2019; Freedom House 2019); it was promulgated in June 2018 (UN 12 Sept. 2018, para. 482). Sources indicate that, even if the ethnic quotas do not change with the new constitution, it opens the door for the Senate to review them (FIDH and Ligue Iteka May 2018, 8; US 13 Mar. 2019, 10). International Crisis Group stated in May 2018 that these quotas were to be reviewed over the following five years (International Crisis Group 21 May 2018).

1.1.4 Opposition to Government and Ethnicity

In its report published in 2017, the Burundian Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Coalition burundaise pour la Cour pénale internationale, CB-CPI) [5] states the following:

[translation] [The] targeted assassinations, forced disappearances, torture, extrajudicial executions, arrests, unlawful imprisonments and ... ethnic manipulation ... do not happen sporadically but rather as systematic attacks (abuses) devised as political strategies to destroy, terrorize and humiliate the opposition members, on one hand, and to wipe out the Tutsi community on the other. (CB-CPI Apr.-May 2017, 3)

The FIDH and the Ligue Iteka, the latter being one of the seven organizations that make up the CB-CPI, state in a report published in June 2017 that [FIDH and Ligue Iteka English version] “the Tutsi remain the primary targets of repression, especially in the FDNB [National Defence Force of Burundi (Forces de défense nationale du Burundi)]” and that “the repression and genocidal dynamics denounced by the FIDH and ITEKA League in November 2016 continue” (FIDH and Ligue Iteka June 2017, 9, 10).

However, the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi indicates, in its September 2017 report, that it [translation] “was … unable to establish that the Tutsi who have suffered human rights violations or abuses in Burundi since April 2015 experienced them chiefly as a result of their ethnicity,” but that these people “were primarily targeted because they were opponents of the government or perceived as such” (UN 29 Sept. 2017, para. 696). The same source indicates, however, that [translation] “[t]he presumed ethnicity [of a victim of arbitrary arrest or detention by the authorities] would have also sufficed, in some cases, to be considered armed opposition” (UN 29 Sept. 2017, para. 374). The source asserts that it [translation] “did not receive any credible testimony allowing the conclusion that, at the time of this report’s publication, an organization intended to destroy the Tutsis in Burundi is planned or in place” (UN 29 Sept. 2017, para. 694). In its September 2018 report, the Commission also states the following:

[translation] [A]s with last year, the Commission was unable to conclude that there were crimes of genocide. It remains convinced that the crisis that Burundi has been experiencing since April 2015 is, first and foremost, a political crisis. As in 2015 and 2016, some people of Tutsi descent were victims of violations but were so because of their opposition to the [g]overnment and/or the CNDD-FDD [National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie)] and not exclusively as a result of their ethnicity. Nonetheless, ethnic insults were sometimes used, compounding the victims’ suffering. (UN 12 Sept. 2018, para.723)

1.2 Tutsi Women

The CB-CPI reports in May 2017 that [translation] “any young woman or girl, Hutu or Tutsi, who is, or is perceived to be, opposed to the third term is a target ... for elements of the police, the army and the SNR” (CB-CPI Apr.-May 2017, 8). The same source states that raping Tutsi women is part of the [translation] “instrumentalization of ethnicity” process seeking to blame the Tutsi for political dissent and ignite ethnic sentiments in order to propel the Hutu to power (CB-CPI Apr.-May 2017, 9). The Commission of Inquiry on Burundi report, which covers the period from April 2015 to July 2017, refers to at least one rape of a Tutsi woman by police officers, during which ethnic slurs were uttered (UN 29 Sept. 2017, para. 483, 484). More recent information on the treatment of Tutsi women by the authorities could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

1.3 Tutsi Youth

The researcher stated that Tutsi youth are [translation] “suspected of being won over by the opposition” and, without going into further detail, that they are “therefore ill regarded by the regime” (Researcher 25 Nov. 2019). Further and corroborating information on the treatment of Tutsi youth by the authorities could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2. Treatment of Tutsi by the Imbonerakure

Sources note that the Imbonerakure are members of the youth league of the governing party (International Crisis Group 20 June 2019, 5; US 13 Mar. 2019, 22; Human Rights Watch 19 Jan. 2017). Some sources refer to them as a [translation] “militia” (UN 18 Apr. 2017; Africa Center for Strategic Studies 13 Mar. 2017). The Imbonerakure are presented by sources as being among the primary perpetrators of the violence (Human Rights Watch May 2018) and [UN English version] “serious violations” of human rights taking place in this country (UN 6 Aug. 2019, 1). For information about the Imbonerakure, their activities and their ties to the authorities, see Response to Information Request BDI106060 of February 2018.

According to Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018, which presents a country-by-country analysis of developments relating to political and economic trends, “[the Imbonerakure] are said to mainly attack Tutsi communities” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 2, 30). The same source, without providing further details, states that rural Tutsi are subjected to targeted killings and harassment at the hands of the Imbonerakure (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018, 41).

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies [6] reports in an article published in 2017 that ex-FAB “have complained about searches, abductions, arrests, and killings of their members by Imbonerakure elements” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 13 Mar. 2017, italics in original). The 2017 and 2018 APRODH reports also refer to arrests and beatings of ex-FAB by the Imbonerakure (APRODH Jan. 2019, 43, 73, 75; APRODH Jan. 2018, 6).

Without stating that this specifically concerns Tutsis, the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi indicates that, in May 2018, acts of sexual violence committed by the Imbonerakure were accompanied by threats and verbal abuse that were [UN English version] “sometimes of an ethnically charged nature” (UN 6 Aug. 2019, para. 40).

However, the researcher reported that, to his knowledge, [translation] “the Imbonerakure consider all opponents, including Tutsis, to be among the 'Ibipinga', which means ‘people to eliminate’ in local terminology” (Researcher 25 Nov. 2019). Human Rights Watch quotes five former Imbonerakure who described, in April 2018, their modus operandi:

[Human Rights Watch English version]

“First and foremost, the Imbonerakure target opponents or people we think are opposed to the CNDD-FDDD. But we also targeted Tutsis because most of the members of the opposition were Tutsi, and we were told that the Tutsi are supported by Rwanda and Rwanda was considered an enemy.” (Human Rights Watch May 2018)

2.1 Tutsi Women

The CB-CPI indicates in a report published in 2017 that [translation] “any young woman or girl, Hutu or Tutsi, who is, or is perceived to be, opposed to the third term is a target for the Imbonerakure rapist” (CB-CPI Apr.-May 2017, 8). The Commission of Inquiry on Burundi reports at least one case of sexual violence committed in 2015 by Imbonerakure, who attacked a woman living in a neighbourhood viewed as [translation] “dissenting,” after having specifically asked her what her ethnicity was (UN 29 Sept. 2017, para. 485).

Local observers reported to FIDH and the Ligue Iteka in March 2017 that, during an Imbonerakure gathering in the province of Muying that they had attended, the Imbonerakure called to [FIDH and Ligue Iteka English version] “'make more Tutsi girls and women pregnant so that they give birth to Imbonerakure'” (FIDH and Ligue Iteka June 2017, 19, italics in original). Further and corroborating information on the Imbonerakure’s treatment of Tutsi women could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.2 Tutsi Youth

Recent information about the Imbonerakure’s treatment of Tutsi youth was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this response.

Sources report that Imbonerakure students from the Mutanga campus of the Université du Burundi abused their classmates in 2017 (APRODH Jan. 2018, 6; Iwacu 23 Aug. 2017; RPA 17 Aug. 2017). The APRODH states that they attack their classmates who are not members of the CNDD-FDD and that [translation] “those of the Tutsi social component are targeted the most” (APRODH Jan. 2018, 6). Radio publique africaine (RPA) [7] reports in an article published in August 2017 that, while they attack [translation] “any passerby,” a student told them that “ethnic reasons were behind these acts” and that a Tutsi student had been beaten by the Imbonerakure (RPA 17 Aug. 2017).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Burundian Armed Forces (Forces armées burundaises, FAB) were replaced by the National Defence Force (Force de défense nationale, FDN) in 2004 (UN 12 Sept. 2018, para. 77). [International Crisis Group English version] “[T]he rebel groups and an army mainly composed of and led by Tutsis merged to form” the FDN (International Crisis Group 5 Apr. 2017, 1).

[2] The Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka, or Ligue Iteka, is [translation] “the first Burundian human rights organization to be legally recognized and to work openly in Burundi”; it “is ranked as one of the organizations with more field representation, notably through offices and human rights observers based in every province of the country and, in some locations, at the communal level” (Ligue Iteka n.d.).

[3] The Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues, APRODH) is a Burundian [translation] “non-political and non-profit association” for human rights (APRODH 25 Apr. 2013).

[4] The French Institute of International Relations (Institut français des relations internationales, IFRI) is a French think tank for [IFRI English version] “research and debate ... dedicated to the analysis of international issues” consisting of around 30 permanent professional researchers (IFRI n.d.). IFRI is mainly funded through private donations, particularly [translation] “corporate philanthropy” (IFRI 2019).

[5] The Burundian Coalition for the International Criminal Court (Coalition burundaise pour la Cour pénale internationale, CB-CPI) [translation] “is a non-profit association consisting of seven major Burundian civil society organizations”: Catholic Action Against Torture (Action catholique contre la torture, ACAT-Burundi), Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (APRODH), Ligue Iteka, Government Action Observatory (Observatoire de l’action gouvernementale, OAG), Burundian Forum for the Reinforcement of the Civil Society (Forum pour le renforcement de la société civile au Burundi, FORSC), Cadhro, and Association for the Defence of the Rights of Prisoners (Association burundaise pour la défense des droits des prisonniers, ABDP) (CB-CPI n.d.). Its objectives are to [translation] “conduct advocacy/lobbying with national authorities to have legislation implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court passed” and to provide “legal, judicial, psychological and social” assistance to victims of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes that are within the scope of the ICC (CB-CPI n.d.).

[6] The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, [Africa Center for Strategic Studies English version] “an academic institution within the U.S. Department of Defense established and funded by Congress” in 1999, serves as a forum for research, academic programs and the exchange of ideas; its objective is to advance security in Africa (Africa Center for Strategic Studies n.d.).

[7] Radio publique africaine (RPA) is a Burundian community radio station that practises [translation] “local journalism,” is committed to the defence of vulnerable groups such as “domestic servants, battered women, dispossessed farmers, bicycle taxis, orphans and prisoners” and has been involved in the peace process in Burundi by “promoting a dialogue approach” (RPA n.d.).

References

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 13 March 2017. “Dismantling the Arusha Accords as the Burundi Crisis Rages On.” [Accessed 26 Nov. 2019]

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. N.d. « Qui nous sommes ». [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (APRODH). January 2019. Rapport annuel de 2018. [Accessed 27 Nov. 2019]

Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (APRODH). January 2018. Rapport annuel de 2017. [Accessed 27 Nov. 2019]

Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues (APRODH). 25 April 2013. “À propos de nous.” [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. “Burundi Country Report.” Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

Coalition burundaise pour la Cour pénale internationale (CB-CPI). April-May 2017. Le viol comme outil de répression au Burundi. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

Coalition burundaise pour la Cour pénale internationale (CB-CPI). N.d. “Présentation générale : l’organisation.” [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Deutsche Welle (DW). 4 January 2017. Antéditeste Niragira. “Au Burundi, 300 militaires mis à la retraite.” [Accessed 13 Dec. 2019]

Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme (FIDH) and Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka (Ligue Iteka). May 2018. Référendum constitutionnel à marche forcée au Burundi. Le régime entend conserver et concentrer le pouvoir en perpétuant sa logique répressive. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme (FIDH) and Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka (Ligue Iteka). June 2017. Le Burundi au bord du gouffre : retour sur deux années de terreur. [Accessed 26 Nov. 2019]

Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme (FIDH) and Ligue burundaise des droits de l'homme Iteka (Ligue Iteka). 9 February 2017. “Intensification d'exécution, de tortures et de détentions de militaires tutsi.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

Freedom House. 2019. “Burundi.” Freedom in the World 2019. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

Human Rights Watch. 17 January 2019. “Burundi.” Rapport mondial 2019 : évènements de 2018. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

Human Rights Watch. May 2018. « On va te battre pour te corriger » : abus à l’approche du référendum constitutionnel au Burundi. [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

Human Rights Watch. 19 January 2017. « Burundi : des attaques perpétrées par des membres de la ligue des jeunes du parti au pouvoir ». [Accessed 19 Nov. 2019]

Institute for Security Studies (ISS). 12 March 2018. “The AU and the Constitutional Review Process in Burundi.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

Institut français de relations internationales (IFRI). 2019. “IFRI 1979-2019.” [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Institut français de relations internationales (IFRI). N.d. « Les missions de l'IFRI ». [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

International Crisis Group. 20 June 2019. Burundi : à court d'options. Rapport Afrique no 278. <>[Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

International Crisis Group. 21 May 2018. « L'UA doit plaider pour une approche inclusive au Burundi en vue de mettre fin à la violence ». [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

International Crisis Group. 5 April 2017. Burundi : l'armée dans la crise. Rapport Afrique no 247. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

Iwacu. 23 August 2017. Egide Nikiza. “Université du Burundi : polémique autour des rondes nocturnes.” [Accessed 28 Nov. 2019]

Jeune Afrique with Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2 December 2018. “Burundi : Visé par un mandat d'arrêt, l'ex-président Pierre Buyoya dénonce une ‘manipulation politique’.” [Accessed 25 Nov. 2019]

Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka (Ligue Iteka). N.d. “À propos.” [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Radio publique africaine (RPA). 17 August 2017. “Les Imbonerakure sèment la terreur à l’Université du Burundi.” [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Radio publique africaine (RPA). N.d. “Qui sommes-nous? [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

Researcher, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI). 25 November 2019. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

United Nations (UN). 13 September 2019. Human Rights Council. Rapport final détaillé de la Commission d’enquête sur le Burundi. (A/HRC/42/CRP.2) [Accessed 13 Dec. 2019]

United Nations (UN). 6 August 2019. Human Rights Council. Rapport de la Commission d'enquête sur le Burundi. (A/HRC/42/49) [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

United Nations (UN). 12 March 2019. Security Council. Mise en œuvre de l’Accord-cadre pour la paix, la sécurité et la coopération pour la République démocratique du Congo et la région. (S/2019/229) [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

United Nations (UN). 12 September 2018. Human Rights Council. Rapport final détaillé de la Commission d’enquête sur le Burundi. (A/HRC/39/CRP.1) [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

United Nations (UN). 29 September 2017. Human Rights Council. Rapport final détaillé de la Commission d'enquête sur le Burundi. (A/HRC/36/CRP.1/Rev.1) [Accessed 20 Nov. 2019]

United Nations (UN). 18 April 2017. “Burundi : L’ONU dénonce les chants appelant au viol des femmes de l’opposition.” [Accessed 29 Nov. 2019]

United States (US). 13 March 2019. Department of State. “Burundi.” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2019]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Assistant political science professor whose interests include political violence; associate anthropology professor at an American university focusing on genocide and mass violence; Association burundaise pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes détenues; Association pour la paix et les droits de l’homme; criminal law professor at a university in Burundi; doctor of political science who has studied ethnic violence in Burundi; Ligue burundaise des droits de l’homme Iteka; Ligue des droits de la personne dans la région des Grands Lacs; political analyst whose research includes security, peace and Burundi; professor of international criminal law and African international law who has taught in Burundi.

Internet sites, including: Aménagement linguistique dans le monde; Amnesty International; BBC; ecoi.net; Factiva; Minority Rights Group International; The New Humanitarian; and Political Handbook of the World 2018-2019; UN – Refworld.



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